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Offering individuals financial incentives for changing their health-related behaviour is 
one possible strategy for improving health and reducing morbidity and premature 
mortality. However, several important aspects of the behavioural and cognitive 
consequences of this type of intervention remain unclear. First, there is uncertainty 
regarding the effectiveness of financial incentives in achieving sustained changes in 
repeated health behaviours, as well as of the factors that might modify any effects. 
Second, the variables that might confound the impact of incentives on health-related 
behaviours remain unexplored. Third, the speculated unintended consequences of 
financial incentives on cognitive processes, including information processing and 
decision-making, have yet to be examined systematically. This thesis addresses these 
uncertainties. 
Study 1 is a systematic review and meta-analysis aiming to estimate the effectiveness of 
financial incentives in achieving sustained change across repeated health-behaviours 
(smoking cessation, healthier eating, including reduced alcohol consumption and 
increased physical activity) and to examine the factors that modify any impacts. 
Findings indicate that although financial incentives changed repeated health-behaviours, 
their role in reducing non-communicable disease burden is potentially limited, given 
effects were not sustained beyond three months after incentive removal. Results also 
highlight the role of recipients’ deprivation level in modifying incentive impacts on 
behaviour overall, as well as that of incentive value in modifying impacts on smoking 
cessation.  
Study 2 is a qualitative study exploring the variables that might confound the impact of 
financial incentives on health-related behaviours. The study describes and compares the 
stop-smoking experiences of pregnant smokers’ who were incentivised for smoking 
cessation with those of women who were not. Results highlight the need to be cautious 
about attributing the effects of financial-incentive schemes to incentives per se. Given 
that incentive schemes are complex behavioural interventions, their impacts could 
derive from indirect influences, mediated by changes to some aspects of the process 
involved in their delivery, including the provision of increased support.  
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Study 3 is a randomised controlled trial aiming to estimate further the effectiveness of 
financial incentives in changing health-related behaviours, by assessing their impact on 
uptake of the HPV vaccinations. The study also aims to examine the modifying role of 
recipients’ deprivation level and to addresses the uncertainty regarding the speculated 
unintended consequences of incentives on decision-making processes. Results indicate 
that although incentives increased vaccination completion rates, impacts were not 
modified by recipients’ deprivation level and uptake remained lower than the national 
target, necessitating consideration of other ways of achieving it. The quality of 
decisions to get vaccinated was unaffected by the offer of incentives. Knowledge of the 
vaccination’s side-effects, however, was not assessed in this study. Findings therefore, 
are not conclusive about the impact of incentives on the processing of risk-relevant 
information. 
Study 4 is a web-based experiment addressing the uncertainty regarding the speculated 
unintended consequences of financial incentives on information processing. It aims to 
determine the impact of incentives on the processing of risk-relevant information 
associated with an incentivised behaviour with potential adverse effects, as assessed by 
participants’ perceived risk related to engaging in the behaviour and their knowledge of 
its side-effects. The findings provide no evidence for the unintended consequences of 
incentives on the processing of risk-information. 
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the main findings and related implications for 
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Rationale and uncertainties 
Considerable morbidity and premature mortality could be avoided if individuals 
changed their behaviour and in particular, to stop smoking, reduce consumption of 
alcohol and calories from food, increase their levels of physical activity and increase 
their uptake of recommended vaccinations. Modifying health-related behaviour, 
however, is challenging:  Although many people want to alter their behaviour to 
improve their health, they find it difficult to implement and maintain the necessary 
changes. One potential intervention that is being considered in the UK and elsewhere is 
to offer individuals financial incentives for changing their health-related behaviours. 
Several aspects of the evidence regarding the impact of these interventions remain 
unclear. First, there is uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of incentives in achieving 
sustained changes when used to promote repeated health behaviours, as well as of the 
factors that modify their effectiveness. Second, the variables that might confound the 
impact of incentives on health-related behaviours remain unexplored. Finally, their 
speculated unintended consequences on cognitive processes, including information 
processing and decision-making, have yet to be examined systematically. This thesis 
aims to reduce these uncertainties. 
 
Thesis aims 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the behavioural and cognitive consequences of using 
financial incentives to change health-related behaviours. In addressing this aim, the 
thesis has the following objectives: 
1) To estimate the effectiveness of financial incentives in changing health-related 
behaviours (Chapters 3,4, 6 &7) 
i) regardless of whether they are still offered  
ii) when they have been discontinued (sustained effectiveness) 
2) To examine the factors that modify the impact of financial incentives on health- 
related behaviours (Chapters 3,4, 6 &7) 
3) To explore the possible confounding variables that inadvertently might influence 




4) To assess the impact of financial incentives on the quality of people’s decisions 
to engage in incentivised behaviours (Chapters 6, 7 & 8) 
 
Background to the thesis 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the context in which this thesis is embedded. It is a 
narrative review of the literature on the determinants of health-related behaviours, the 
use of behaviour change techniques and the use of financial incentives for changing 
health-related behaviours. The rational for investigating the latter is presented against 
the need for continued work in identifying techniques that are effective in changing 
health-related behaviour. The evidence for the effectiveness of financial incentive 
schemes is reported alongside the uncertainties and concerns regarding their use. The 
chapter concludes with an outline of the ways in which this thesis aims to reduce these 
uncertainties.  
 
Reviewing the literature on the use of financial incentives for changing 
repeated health-related behaviours 
Chapters 3 and 4 present Study 1, a systematic review and meta-analysis of research 
assessing the use of financial incentives across repeated health-related behaviours: 
smoking cessation, healthier eating, including reduced alcohol consumption and 
increased physical activity. The review examines the extent to which incentives result in 
sustained health-behaviour change i.e. change that is evidenced after removal of the 
incentives. It further assesses the role of potential effect modifiers, including the target 
behaviour, the value and type of the incentive (i.e. whether incentive attainment is 
certain or uncertain) and recipients’ level of deprivation. Finally, it examines the role of 
some study characteristics in confounding the effectiveness of financial incentives. 






Exploring potential variables that confound the effectiveness of 
financial incentives for changing health-related behaviours  
Chapter 5 presents Study 2 which complements findings from Study 1, by exploring 
how the effectiveness of financial incentives for changing repeated health-related 
behaviours may be overestimated due to some trials failing to standardise study 
procedures between incentivised and control groups. The study is qualitative in method 
and explores the variables in study designs that could potentially confound the 
attribution of effectiveness to financial incentives. 
 
Assessing the impact of financial incentives on uptake of the HPV 
vaccination and the quality of decisions to engage in incentivised 
behaviours 
Chapters 6 and 7 present Study 3 which, based on the evidence that financial incentives 
are most effective in promoting simple, one-off behaviours, such as getting vaccinated, 
assesses for the first time the impact of financial incentives on uptake of the HPV 
vaccination. The study, which is a randomised controlled trial, further examines the 
modifying role of participants’ level of deprivation on uptake of the vaccination, as well 
as the impact of incentives on the quality of decisions to get vaccinated. Chapter 6 
presents the trial protocol and Chapter 7 presents the trial findings. 
 
Further exploration of the impact of financial incentives on the quality 
of decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours  
Chapter 8 presents Study 4 which builds on the findings from Study 3 showing that the 
quality of decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours is unaffected by the offer of 
incentives. This web-based experiment further assesses the effects of financial 
incentives on decision-making, by examining their impact on the processing of risk-
relevant information in the context of offering financial incentives for performing a 
behaviour with potential adverse side-effects. It also examines the extent to which any 




Conclusion and implications 
The thesis closes with Chapter 9, a discussion of the main findings and their related 















































This chapter aims to provide the context within which this thesis was developed, by 
presenting a narrative review of the relevant literature. It begins by outlining the link 
between behaviour and health and by highlighting the rationale underlying the need to 
develop interventions to change health-related behaviours. It continues with a 
consideration of the determinants of health behaviour and an examination of existing 
behaviour change techniques, emphasising the need for continued work in identifying 
techniques that are effective in changing health-related behaviour. Following from this 
conclusion, financial incentives are introduced as a potentially effective behaviour 
change technique and a detailed analysis is presented on their use in schemes aimed at 
changing health-related behaviours. The evidence for their effectiveness is reported 
alongside the related uncertainties and concerns regarding their potential unintended 
consequences on decision-making and information-processing. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the issues surrounding the use of financial incentives schemes that 
require elucidating and an outline of the ways in which this thesis addresses these.  
 
Behaviour and health 
Behaviour is an important determinant of health worldwide. For example, tobacco use, 
poor diet-related behaviours, including the harmful use of alcohol, and physical 
inactivity contribute to the development of the major non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs), comprising cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, cancer and chronic 
respiratory diseases (Andersen, Schnohr, Schroll et al., 2000; Batty, Kivimaki, Gray et 
al., 2008; Batty, Shipley, Marmot et al., 2001; Cox, Whichelow & Prevost, 2000; He, 
Nowson, Lucas et al., 2007; Heidemann, Schulze, Franco et al., 2008; Jeffery, 2012; 
Teo, Ounpuu, Hawken et al., 2006). Evidence from a longitudinal study (Khaw, 
Wareham, Bingham et al., 2008) suggests that individuals who engage in all the 
aforementioned unhealthy behaviours are four times more likely to die within just over 
a decade, compared to people who do not smoke, are physically active, consume alcohol 
in moderation and adhere to the daily recommendations for fruit and vegetable 
consumption. Indeed, the non-communicable diseases associated with these unhealthy 
behaviours account for more than 50% of premature preventable deaths worldwide 
(3four50.com; WHO, 2012). Eighty percent of these deaths occur in low and middle-
income countries (WHO, 2008a; WHO, 2011), illustrating the socially patterned 
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prevalence of non-communicable diseases and their contribution to health inequalities, 
both between and within countries (WHO, 2008b). The morbidity and mortality burden 
of these diseases affects people in all age groups, and imposes large, increasing and 
avoidable costs in human, social and economic terms (Beaglehole, Bonita, Alleyne et 
al., 2011; WHO, 2012). Furthermore, infectious diseases, such as viral hepatitis, 
influenza, and tuberculosis, remain among the leading causes of global illness and 
death. Their spread is in part attributable to insufficient vaccination uptake, which could 
prevent 2-3 million deaths worldwide (WHO, UNICEF & Bank., 2009).  
 
These findings suggest that considerable morbidity and premature mortality could be 
avoided if individuals changed their behaviour. Modifying health-related behaviour, 
however, is difficult: Although many people want to alter their behaviour to promote 
their health, they find it difficult to implement and maintain the necessary changes 
(Ogden, Karim, Choudry et al., 2007; Sutton, 1998). This has resulted in on-going 
interest in the development of interventions that are effective in changing individuals’ 
and populations’ health-related behaviours. 
 
Changing health-related behaviour 
Over the last few years, numerous attempts have been made to encourage people to 
adopt healthier behaviours. Changing health-related behaviours has become a high 
priority of governments around the world, including the UK, as advocated by the 
publication of many related reports, such as the National Institute of Health and Clinical 
Excellence’s (NICE) guidance on behaviour change (2007) and the House of Lords 
Science and Technology Committee’s (2011) inquiry into the use of behaviour change 
interventions for achieving government policy goals. As a result, a multitude of 
interventions have been designed to promote health. These have targeted individuals, 
communities and populations and have been effective to varying degrees.  
 
In recent years it has become accepted that effective health behaviour-change 
interventions are likely to be those which have been informed by empirical evidence 
and theories of health behaviour (Haefner & Kirscht, 1970; Michie & Abraham, 2004). 
The use of theory in designing interventions has been supported for three main reasons. 
First, theory provides a framework for identifying and understanding the determinants 
of behaviours and behaviour change and their potential influence. Therefore, 
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interventions that target such determinants are likely to be more effective. Second, 
evaluations of theory based-interventions allow for theory to be tested. Third, as theory-
based interventions improve our understanding of what is effective, they assist in the 
progress and development of theory across behaviours, populations and contexts 
(Michie, Johnston, Francis et al., 2008). The need to develop theory-based interventions 
resulted from the observation that many existing interventions were only minimally 
effective, with most not being theoretically driven (Abraham, Krahé, Dominic et al., 
2002; Fisher & Fisher, 1992; Oakley, Fullerton, Holland et al., 1995; Sherr, 1987), 
while those that were theoretically driven were more effective (e.g. Bryan, Aiken & 
West, 1996; Fisher, Fisher, Misovich et al., 1996; Kalichman, Carey & Johnson, 1996). 
  
This following section reviews some of the issues regarding the effectiveness of health-
related behaviour change interventions.  
 
Determinants of health behaviour 
Traditionally within health psychology and other disciplines such as economics, 
individuals’ actions have been viewed as reasoned, conscious and intentional. Various 
theories have therefore been developed (e.g. Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 
1983); Health-Belief Model (Janz & Becker, 1984); Transtheoretical Model of Change 
(Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcross, 1992)) which assume that health behaviour is the 
result of cognitive appraisal processes of the (a) expectancy and value of potential 
health threats and (b) possible coping responses (Hofmann, Friese & Wiers, 2008a). 
These theories identify the psychological constructs assumed to influence these 
processes, thus providing potential targets for behaviour-change interventions, as well 
as the frameworks for understanding intervention effects (Johnston, 1995; Sniehotta, 
2009b). 
 
Numerous health-behaviour theories exist, specifying a number of such constructs, 
description of which goes beyond the aim of the present review. It is worth noting, 
however, that in reviewing the theoretical cognitive constructs included in a number of 
social cognitive models and self-regulation theories, Abraham, Sheeran & Johnston 
(1998) highlighted the role of self-efficacy beliefs, intention formation, attitudes, 
normative beliefs and self-representations as having the potential to influence people’s 
motivation to engage in health behaviours, as well as their actual behaviours, thus 
providing a framework for intervention design.  
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On the whole, however, interventions designed to alter constructs influencing goal-
directed behaviour and reasoning, such as attitudes, beliefs and intentions, have had 
only small to medium effects on behaviour (Hardeman, Johnston, Johnston et al., 2002; 
Sheeran, Harris & Epton, in press; Sniehotta, 2009a; Webb & Sheeran, 2006; WHO, 
2008c). As Sheeran, Gollwitzer & Bargh (2012) have recently argued “changing 
conscious thought does not, it seems, guarantee health behaviour change”, especially of 
the magnitude needed to reduce the global burden of disease (Marteau, Hollands & 
Fletcher, 2012). 
 
More recently, the role of unconscious processes in determining health behaviours has 
become a focus of research. This is reflected in the development of dual-processing 
models, such as the Reflective-Impulsive Model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), which 
proposes that health behaviour is governed by two interacting information-processing 
systems: the reflective system that generates behavioural decisions based on knowledge 
about facts and values, and the impulsive system that elicits behaviour through 
associative links and motivational orientations that the person has acquired over many 
experiences. According to the model, both these systems activate behavioural schemata, 
which are sometimes incompatible (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). For example, a tempting 
dessert may generate antagonism between the impulse to eat it and the goal to lose 
weight, resulting in conflict. Selection of the schema which determines behaviour 
depends on the relative strength of activation for each, with certain situations and 
dispositional conditions shifting the potential for schemata activation in favour of one of 
the two systems (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). For example, being hungry and in the 
presence of people who are eating makes it more likely that the impulse to eat is acted 
on. 
The significance of unconscious processes is increasingly being supported by 
accumulating evidence illustrating that people’s cognitions, feelings, and behaviour are 
guided both by implicit and explicit processes (Sheeran et al., 2012). Acknowledgement 
of the former’s importance can help explain the lack of significant behavioural changes 
afforded by a focus on reflective processes (Marteau et al., 2012; Sheeran et al., 2012). 
Dual-processing models, such as the Reflective-Impulsive Model, allow for the 
adoption of a more holistic approach to the understanding of health behaviour and 
highlight the importance of constructs not specified by earlier theories, such as the role 
of people’s implicit attitudes (i.e. evaluation of an object or behaviour outside conscious 
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awareness) in influencing health-related choices (e.g. Hollands, Prestwich & Marteau, 
2011). Dual-processing models also emphasise the role of the environment in 
determining health behaviour by acknowledging that environmental stimuli can cue 
automatic responses and actions. By highlighting the involvement of these additional 
potential determinants of health behaviour, a focus on unconscious processes offers new 
possible targets for intervention, as well as the opportunity to use behaviour-change 
strategies, which may complement those targeting reflective processes and thus enhance 
the effectiveness of behaviour change efforts (Sheeran et al., 2012). 
 
Behaviour change techniques 
From the above it is evident that the factors influencing health behaviours are numerous 
and the mechanisms by which they do so are complex. For example, a person’s success, 
e.g. Mark’s, in trying to lose weight might depend on his ability to refrain from eating 
many sweets and desserts. This in turn might depend on factors influencing his 
reasoning, such as whether he knows that eating many sweets hinders weight-loss, how 
much he likes eating sweets, or whether he believes he can avoid eating many sweets 
and desserts. It might also depend on environmental factors influencing his impulsive 
system, such as whether sweets and desserts are sold in the workplace cafeteria, the 
availability of healthy alternatives from which he could choose to satisfy his sweet-
tooth, whether he’s exposed to advertisements that cue sweet consumption, whether he 
finds himself in situations he’s associated with sweet-eating, such as the cinema, or 
whether other people around him are eating sweets. How many sweets he eventually 
eats could also depend on the size of their packaging or the colour of the plate he uses to 
eat from, as well as on whether he’s distracted or preoccupied while eating. All of these 
factors have been shown to affect food consumption (Wansink, 2004). Therefore, it 
comes as no surprise that interventions to change health-related behaviours are usually 
complex, consisting of many components. These components, i.e. the behaviour-change 
techniques which comprise the intervention and the procedures involved in their 
delivery, are crucial to intervention effectiveness, with their identification being a 
requirement for understanding when and why an intervention works (Michie & 
Abraham, 2008; Michie, Abraham, Eccles et al., 2011a). Evaluation of behaviour-
change techniques alone and in combination, is important for identifying how change is 




Although health behaviour theories make assumptions about the determinants of 
behaviour, they often do not specify the techniques by which to change these 
(Hardeman et al., 2002; Sniehotta, 2009a). Consequently, numerous behaviour change 
strategies have been used within interventions. The effect size of many of these has 
been empirically estimated. For example, facilitating the transformation of intentions 
into behaviour through the use of implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999; 
Gollwitzer, 1993) has been successfully applied and evaluated (e.g. Orbeil, Hodgldns & 
Sheeran, 1997; Sheeran, 2002). Similarly, strategies to enhance self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1986), such as verbal persuasion, modelling, selective attention to past successes and 
sequential mastery experiences have also been widely applied and found to lead to 
behaviour change (Bandura, 1992; Bandura, 1997; Bandura, 1998).  
 
Interventions, however, have not always included empirically or theoretically supported 
change techniques (Dombrowski, Sniehotta, Avenell et al., 2007; Hardeman et al., 
2002). This, in combination with the problematic variability in the reporting of 
intervention content -attributed to the absence of standardised definitions of behaviour 
change techniques (Abraham & Michie, 2008) -- and the lack of sufficient details in 
technique description (Michie & Abraham, 2004) inhibits understanding of (a) what 
entails an effective intervention, as well as (b) the conditions that influence 
effectiveness. To help resolve this problem, Michie, Johnston, Francis and colleagues 
(2008) generated a list of behaviour-change techniques accompanied by related 
definitions and identified links between these techniques and theory-based determinants 
of behaviour. Furthermore, Abraham & Michie (2008) developed a taxonomy of 
twenty-six generally applicable behaviour change techniques which could be reliably 
identified across 195 published descriptions of interventions for increasing physical 
activity and healthier eating. This taxonomy was subsequently revised and expanded to 
forty techniques (Michie, Ashford, Sniehotta et al., 2011b) and was recently further 
expanded to ninety-three techniques (Michie, Richardson, Johnston et al., 2013). It has 
also been extended to other behaviours, such as smoking cessation (Michie, Hyder, 
Walia et al., 2011c). 
 
The information generated by using such standardised definitions is important as it 
enables i) identification of the techniques that contribute to intervention effectiveness; 
ii) accurate appraisal of the scientific evidence that is produced and ii) standardisation, 
which is necessary for linking behaviour change techniques to mechanisms of action 
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and therefore elucidating the mechanisms by which interventions work (Michie et al., 
2011b). Such information is fundamental for designing optimal interventions (Michie et 
al., 2011b), as well as theory development (Sniehotta, 2009b). Having these shared 
labels and definitions has given systematic reviewers the opportunity to synthesise 
different interventions and attempt to identify the behaviour-change techniques that are 
effective for changing different behaviours (e.g. Albarracín, Gillette, Earl et al., 2005; 
Dombrowski, Sniehotta, Avenell et al., 2012a; Michie et al., 2011b; Michie, Jochelson, 
Markham et al., 2009b). For example, out of ten distinct techniques identified in 
descriptions of interventions to promote condom use, provision of normative arguments 
appears to be the most effective (but only for those under the age of 21 years) 
(Albarracín et al., 2005). For increasing physical activity and healthier eating, Michie, 
Abraham, Whittington et al. (2009a) found that the technique ‘self-monitoring’ is 
important in increasing intervention effectiveness, while for reducing obesity in adults 
with obesity-related co-morbidities, successful interventions are potentially those which 
include ‘provision of instructions’, ‘self-monitoring’, ‘relapse prevention’ and 
‘prompting practice’ (Dombrowski et al., 2012a). Interestingly, findings also suggest 
that effective interventions may be those that incorporate fewer behaviour-change 
techniques (Michie et al., 2009b), with those including more not necessarily being 
associated with better outcomes (Dombrowski et al., 2012a). This taxonomy of 
behaviour change techniques has also been used to describe and design new behaviour 
change interventions (e.g. Araújo-Soares, McIntyre, MacLennan et al., 2009; 
Dombrowski, Sniehotta, Johnston et al., 2012b; Sniehotta, Dombrowski, Avenell et al., 
2011). 
 
Most of the behaviour-change techniques included in the original taxonomy by 
Abraham & Michie (2008) were identified from interventions targeting reflective 
processes. As mentioned previously, however, efforts to change health behaviours could 
be complemented by the use of behaviour-change techniques that target unconscious 
processes. A recent review of research on implicit processes and health has identified a 
number of such potentially effective techniques (Sheeran et al., 2012), such as 
evaluative conditioning (i.e. altering the valence of a stimulus by pairing it with positive 
or negative stimulus (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini et al., 2010)) which can change 
health-behaviour by altering related implicit attitudes (Hollands et al., 2011). 
Techniques that target automatic processes by modifying individuals’ environment also 
hold the potential of effectively changing health-related behaviours (Marteau et al., 
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2012). For example, increasing the availability of healthier options within an 
environment, such as the number of healthier snacks in a vending machine, can promote 
selection of healthier choices (French, Hannan, Harnack et al., 2010). Given that only a 
minority of those exhibiting unhealthy behaviours participate in health promotion 
programmes, one of the advantages of behaviour-change techniques that target 
unconscious processes compared to those that target reflective processes, is that the 
former do not require deliberate engagement on behalf of individuals or direct contact 
with them. As such, their delivery might be more efficient and cost-effective, thus 
holding the potential of being applied at a population level (Marteau et al., 2012). 
Furthermore because their use does not rely on individuals’ level of literacy, numeracy 
and cognitive control, which are often underdeveloped in the most socially deprived 
(Kutner, Greenberg, Jin et al., 2006; Spears, 2010; Williams, 2003), such techniques 
also hold the potential of reducing health inequalities (Marteau et al., 2012). 
 
The need for continued work in identifying effective behaviour change 
techniques 
Even though much research into designing effective ways for promoting health has been 
conducted and significant progress is being made towards identifying the strategies that 
generate health-behaviour changes, many people today continue to behave in unhealthy 
ways (Ogden, 2012). For example, although smoking rates in the UK have decreased 
significantly in the last 30 years (from 39% in 1980 to 21% in 2009) (The NHS 
Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2011b; Wald & Nicolaides-Bouman, 
1991), a substantial minority of the population continues to smoke, with the prevalence 
of smoking being twice as high amongst the most deprived populations compared to 
those least deprived (The NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2011b). 
Furthermore, rates of obesity in the UK are rising, with over a quarter of British adults 
classified as obese in 2010 (The NHS Information Centre Lifestyle Statistics, 2012). 
The biggest challenge in promoting healthy behaviours has been to identify the 
strategies that encourage people to both initiate the required changes and sustain them, 
as illustrated by the case of obesity and weight management. Over the past few decades 
much research has been devoted to designing interventions to reduce obesity and 
control weight, resulting in the development of many treatments. For obesity, the most 
effective treatment appears to be surgery (Maggard, Shugarman, Suttorp et al., 2005; 
Picot, Jones, Colquitt et al., 2009), which can result in sustained changes, but is invasive 
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and with potentially serious adverse side-effects (Picot et al., 2009). For weight-loss in 
the overweight, recent evidence suggests that commercial programmes, such as Weight 
Watchers can effectively reduce weight (Jebb, Ahern, Olson et al., 2011; Jolly, Lewis, 
Beach et al., 2011). Although these types of treatment could lead to sustained weight 
loss, with effects observed at least up to 12 months from the beginning of interventions 
(Jolly et al., 2011; Picot et al., 2009), in general most people who lose weight do not 
manage to maintain their weight-loss in the longer-term (Glenny, O'meara, Melville et 
al., 1997; Jeffery, Epstein, Wilson et al., 2000; Wing & Phelan, 2005).  
 
One of the problems with existing interventions aimed at changing health-related 
behaviours is that their development has not been informed by evidence (Dombrowski 
et al., 2007). There is a need to further our understanding of which strategies are most 
effective in achieving sustained behaviour changes and to systematically assess those 
which have the potential of promoting health, but have so far remained unevaluated.  
 
The role of financial incentives in changing behaviour 
Behaviour-change techniques involving identification of reinforcers and changing the 
consequences of a behaviour have been widely and successfully applied across 
behaviours (e.g. Sarafino, 2001; Walker, 1984). Indeed providing contingent rewards, 
the use of punishment and the use of negative reinforcement are all behaviour-change 
techniques that have been used in health-behaviour change interventions and are 
included in the existing taxonomy of behaviour-change techniques (Abraham & Michie, 
2008; Michie et al., 2008; Michie et al., 2013). One potentially effective strategy for 
changing the consequences of a behaviour and improving individuals’ health-related 
behaviours is to use financial incentives.  
 
Financial incentives can be defined as a) the offer of cash or cash-like rewards (such as 
vouchers that can be exchanged for goods or services) contingent on the performance or 
achievement of one or more pre-specified health-related behaviours or outcomes and/or 
b) the imposition of financially-related penalties contingent on the non-performance or 
non-achievement of one or more pre-specified health-related behaviours or outcomes 
(Adams, Giles, Robalino, McColl & Sniehotta 2012). Financial incentive schemes are 
increasingly being considered and applied in health policies around the world in an 
attempt to promote health-enhancing behaviours (Lagarde, Haines & Palmer, 2007; Le 
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Grand, 2008). They have been used most often in low and middle income countries as 
part of programmes which aim to reduce poverty and health inequalities. These 
programmes use ‘conditional cash transfers’ that are delivered to families, if certain 
health and educational criteria have been met (Lagarde et al., 2007). They have also 
been used in high-income countries to target some health behaviours, including tobacco 
use, unhealthy eating and lack of physical activity (e.g. APM Health Europe, 2007; 
North East Essex NHS Trust, 2009). Most financial incentive schemes involve the offer 
of a reward, such as a cash payment, a voucher or a prize, which is delivered if a pre-
specified behaviour or outcome has been achieved. Other schemes involve the use of a 
‘deposit-contract’ whereby individuals pledge their own money, which they lose if they 
fail to meet their goals. Uncertainty remains, however, with regards to whether and how 
financial incentives work in changing behaviour to promote health (Marteau, Ashcroft 
& Oliver, 2009). 
 
This thesis focuses on financial incentives provided in various forms, including cash 
payments, vouchers, chances to win lotteries, prizes, gifts or deposit contracts. It 
excludes the following: 
(a) incentives of little, no monetary or symbolic value (e.g. certificates, stickers, 
badges, key-rings, t-shirts, caps, hats or mugs), 
(b) incentives that are not contingent on individual performance of the target 
behaviour or achievement of the target outcome (e.g. consumer sales 
promotions, direct pricing, income transfer programs, tax credits),  
(c) incentives that are offered to health-care providers for improving health-service 
access and delivery. (p 26) 
 
Financial incentives and behaviour 
The importance of money in contemporary society is evident: people require money to 
satisfy their everyday needs and strive to obtain it. The valence of money, however, lies 
not only in its instrumentality, but also in the symbolic value it has acquired through its 
perceived association with prestige, status, and other factors (Furnham & Argyle, 1998; 
Zelizer, 1997). Given the power of money, it comes as no surprise that the past few 
decades have witnessed an increased interest in the potential impact of monetary 




In theory, financial incentives are likely to operate on behaviour both via the impulsive 
and reflective information processing systems. According to learning-theory, linking the 
target behaviour to a positively evaluated stimulus (e.g. a reward with monetary value), 
which is delivered close in time to the performance of the behaviour, strengthens the 
value associated with the behaviour (Marteau, 2010). From an economics perspective, 
this increases the utility gained from performing the target behaviour, thus providing an 
impetus for individuals to act (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Dawes, 1999; Hertwig & 
Ortmann, 2001; Lopes, 1994; Zwick, Erev & Budescu, 1999). At the same time, 
financial incentives might work according to the axioms of Social Cognitive Theory 
(Bandura, 1986; Bandura, 1997; Bandura & McClelland, 1977), by shifting people’s 
outcome expectations of the likely consequences of the target behaviour in a positive 
direction, or by removing perceived barriers, thus increasing their self–efficacy. In a 
similar manner, incentives might influence people’s perceived behavioural control and 
attitudes towards the target behaviour and in turn their intentions, as predicted by the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen, 1991). They might also operate by 
facilitating allocation of limited cognitive capacity, in such a way as to achieve the now 
more highly valued target behaviour (Marteau, 2010). These possibilities suggest that 
financial incentives may enable people to overcome the costs and barriers associated 
with initiating the target behaviour and/or shift their perception of the related cost-
benefit ratio, such that the benefits of performing the related behaviour outweigh the 
costs. Either way, financial incentives have the potential to move individuals past the 
‘threshold’ needed to act. Offering incentives for a sufficient number of occurrences -- 
with the exact number depending on a various factors, such as the target behaviour and 
the value of the incentive (See table 2.1 for a list of potential effect modifiers) -- thereby 
allowing individuals to experience the beneficial consequences of the target behaviour, 
could therefore promote the development of new habits (Charness & Gneezy, 2009). 
 
People, however, might not always respond to incentives as predicted. Indeed, findings 
indicate that monetary rewards have varying effects on behaviour (Bonner, Hastie, 
Sprinkle et al., 2000; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; Jenkins Jr, 
1986; Jenkins Jr, Mitra, Gupta et al., 1998; Kohn, 1993; Young & Lewis, 1995). For 
many tasks, such as memory or recall tasks, probability matching and multicue 
probability learning and clerical tasks, they seem to enhance performance (e.g. Camerer 
& Hogarth, 1999; Kahneman & Peavler, 1969; Libby & Lipe, 1992), while for others, 
such as those involving market trading, bargaining, and risky choices, they have no 
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effect (e.g. Camerer, 1990; Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin et al., 1994; Fouraker & Siegel, 
1960; Güth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982; Neelin, Sonnenschein & Spiegel, 1988). 
In certain situations they may even inhibit performance, such as when engaging in some 
judgment and decision-making tasks (e.g. Arkes, Dawes & Christensen, 1986; Ashton, 
1990; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Hogarth, Gibbs, McKenzie et al., 1991) or tasks 
considered by participants as interesting (Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999). Taken 
together, these findings imply that the impact of financial incentives on behaviour 
depends on many factors.  
 
Financial incentives and health-behaviour 
When applied to health contexts, financial incentive schemes hold the potential of 
evoking health-behaviour changes, thereby reducing the burden of non-communicable 
and infectious diseases. The impact of such schemes, however, does not seem equal 
across all types of health behaviours (Jochelson, 2007) and several aspects of their 
effectiveness remain unclear (Marteau et al., 2009).  
In some situations even small financial incentives can encourage healthy behaviours 
(Sutherland, Christianson & Leatherman, 2008). Incentives have been shown most 
effective in promoting simple, one-off behaviours, such as attending clinic 
appointments, undergoing vaccinations, attending mammography and tuberculosis 
screening, and adhering to healthcare treatments (Sutherland et al., 2008). When used to 
modify complex, repeated health-related behaviours that contribute to non-
communicable diseases, there is uncertainty regarding the conditions under which 
change is achieved and sustained after the intervention is discontinued (Hagger, 
Keatley, Chan et al., 2013; Jochelson, 2007; Marteau et al., 2009). Findings suggest that 
financial incentives are effective in achieving short-term changes (i.e. for the duration 
incentives are offered) to these behaviours (e.g. Jochelson, 2007; Sutherland et al., 
2008). The strongest related evidence derives from interventions involving the use of 
financial incentives in drug abstinence programmes (Lussier, Heil, Mongeon et al., 
2006; Prendergast, Podus, Finney et al., 2006), although their effectiveness in achieving 
sustained changes (i.e. after the incentive is discontinued) in this context has yet to be 
assessed (Marteau et al., 2009). It has, however, been examined in the context of other 
complex health-related behaviours, such as smoking and weight reduction, but findings 
have been inconclusive. For example, a Cochrane review of the effects of incentives on 
smoking cessation identified only one study (amongst 19 included) reporting evidence 
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of sustained cessation beyond discontinuation of the incentives (Cahill & Perera, 2011; 
Volpp, Troxel, Pauly et al., 2009). This study included a large sample size and used 
high-value incentives. This is in contrast to most of the trials included in the review, 
which were underpowered and offered only small incentives (Marteau et al., 2009; 
Troxel & Volpp, 2012). The negative findings of the review may therefore have resulted 
from the inclusion of studies with problematic trial designs and could thus be regarded 
as misleading (Troxel & Volpp, 2012). A similar pattern has also been observed in the 
context of financial incentives for weight-loss. A meta-analysis of relevant studies 
found no evidence of a sustained effect at 12 or 18 month follow-up (Paul-Ebhohimhen 
& Avenell, 2008). As with the smoking cessation review, included studies had very 
small sample sizes and were thus possibly underpowered to detect any potential effects 
of incentives. Furthermore, although results of the meta-analysis suggested that 
incentive effectiveness could depend on the amount offered, as revealed by a weak trend 
in favour of incentives comprising more than 1.2% of individuals’ incomes, 
approximately half of the included studies offered only small incentives (Paul-
Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008). Given all the above, it is apparent that there is a need to 
clarify the impact of financial incentives on complex health-related behaviours, and to 
elucidate the conditions under which they are most likely to result in sustained 
behaviour changes. 
 
The second uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of financial incentives for changing 
health-related behaviours concerns the factors that might modify their impact. Studies 
assessing the effects of financial incentives on health-behaviours have produced mixed 
results. This might be partly due to the use of incentives schemes whose design has not 
been informed by theory or pre-existing evidence and have thus failed to account for the 
possible variables that might influence behavioural responses to incentives (See Table 
2.1). For example, most of the studies included in the two aforementioned reviews of 
the impacts of financial incentives on smoking cessation and weight-loss did not justify 
the choice of the amount, frequency or method of delivery of the financial incentives 
used. (Cahill & Perera, 2011; Paul-Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008). Furthermore, most 
offered only small-value incentives. This is in contrast to the principles of learning 
theory, as well as those of economic theory and social cognitive theory, which specify 
that larger reinforcements lead to greater behaviour change. This could imply a lack of 
understanding of the mechanisms by which incentives lead to behaviour change. 
Understanding these mechanisms is critical for determining how to maximise the 
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effectiveness of monetary incentives (Bonner, 1999) and for designing optimal 
incentive schemes.  
As can be seen in Table 2.1, various factors might modify how incentives influence 
behaviour. These can be described in four categories i) incentive scheme characteristics; 
ii) recipients’ social and psychological characteristics; iii) the type of behaviour for 
which incentives are offered and iv) the context within which incentives are offered 
(Jochelson, 2007; Sutherland et al., 2008). Assumptions regarding the importance of 
some of these variables, such as incentive value (e.g. Jochelson, 2007; Sutherland et al., 
2008), incentive type (e.g. certain or uncertain (Leung, Ho, Chan et al., 2002)) and 
recipients’ deprivation level (e.g. Sutherland et al., 2008) have often been discussed in 
the literature. In reality little is known about the actual factors that modify behavioural 
responses to incentives (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). Research in the area of drug 
abstinence provides some evidence that more immediate incentive delivery and greater 
monetary value are associated with larger incentive effect sizes (Lussier et al., 2006). 
Research in the area of smoking cessation (Heil, Higgins, Bernstein et al., 2008; Heil, 
Tidey, Holmes et al., 2003; Higgins, Wong, Badger et al., 2000) has also shown that a 
high frequency reinforcement schedule that becomes gradually less frequent over time, 
escalates in value with successive confirmations of abstinence and includes a reset 
contingency (i.e. whereby failure resets the incentive value back to the initial level) 
could be effective in obtaining initial abstinence, which is associated with longer-term 
abstinence (Gourlay, Forbes, Marriner et al., 1994; Higgins et al., 2000; Kenford, Fiore, 
Jorenby et al., 1994; Yudkin, Jones, Lancaster et al., 1996). These latter findings, 
however, have mostly derived from laboratory-based studies conducted under highly 
controlled conditions (e.g. frequency of monitoring and provision of incentives as high 
as three times a day (Heil et al., 2003; Roll & Higgins, 2000)) and may therefore not be 
generalisable to smoking behaviour in the general population, nor transferable to other 
health-related behaviours. Indeed, the variables that influence the impact of incentives 
on one type of behaviour may not necessarily have an effect on another type of 
behaviour. Furthermore, variables might interact with each other to produce different 
effects under different circumstances. 
Clarification of the mechanisms by which financial incentives operate on behaviour, as 
well as of the nature and exact role of the potential modifiers displayed in Table 2.1, 
would enable a better understanding of the processes through which financial incentives 
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Positive (reward) vs. Negative (penalty)  
Exchangeable (e.g.  voucher)  vs. Non exchangeable (e.g. gift)   
Certain (e.g. voucher) vs. Uncertain (lottery ticket)                    
Related to target behaviour (e.g. voucher for healthy groceries)  vs. Not related to target behaviour 
Contingent on behaviour vs. Non-contingent 
High vs. Low 
Immediate vs. Delayed 
Intermittent vs. Continuous 
Fixed vs. Incremental 
Incremental w/ value reset (in case of non-adherence) vs. W/out value reset 
Behaviour achievement vs.  behaviour achievement and sustained change 
Change to target behaviour (e.g. healthier eating) vs. Change to index of target behaviour (e.g. weight-loss) vs. Change to indirect behaviour (e.g. purchasing healthy foods) 
Self vs. Family vs. Community (charity donation) 
Government vs. Employer vs. Health Insurance vs. Self 
 Recipients 
Social & material resources 
Population 
Psychological resources 
Educational  level, Income, Occupation  
 
General vs. Patients vs. Employees 
 





Unhealthy vs. healthy 
 
Control 
One-off (e.g. vaccination uptake) vs. Repeated (e.g. smoking cessation)  
 
Stopping (e.g. smoking) vs. starting (e.g. physical activity) 
 
Addictive (e.g. smoking)  vs. non-addictive (e.g. sedentary behaviour) 
High volitional control (e.g. smoking cessation) vs. low volitional control (e.g. vaccination uptake) 
Context 
Country wealth 
Health care system 
Support system 
Prevalence of behaviour  
Setting 
High vs. Middle vs. Low income 
Privatised vs. Socialised  
Incentive part of effective behavioural intervention vs. Not 
High vs. Low 




The unintended consequences of financial incentives on the quality of decisions to 
engage in incentivised behaviours 
Unlike most interventions designed to change behaviour, the use of financial incentives 
raises particular concerns regarding their potentially adverse effects on the quality of 
people’s decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours. This is particularly relevant to 
behaviours associated with possible adverse side-effects, such as taking certain 
medicines, receiving immunisation, and attending screening appointments.  
 
One way to judge the quality of a decision to engage in an incentivised behaviour is to 
assess whether it represents an informed choice. A decision is considered informed (and 
thus of high quality) when it is based on salient knowledge and acting on it is in line 
with the decision-maker’s attitudes (Marteau, Dormandy & Michie, 2001). Related to 
the former is the need to ensure that the risks associated with the incentivised behaviour 
have been fully processed. Marteau, Ashcroft & Oliver (2009) point out that the 
prospect of receiving a financial reward could result in the risks associated with a 
particular health behaviour being overlooked. There are two possible ways that this 
could occur: firstly, monetary incentives might lead people to ignore or not process risk 
information; secondly, people may process risk-related information but perceive the 
risks to themselves as low. 
 
Based on the above, being presented with financial incentives does not necessarily 
compromise the quality of people’s decisions to engage in an incentivised behaviour. 
Even if individuals choose to value the incentive more highly than they value any 
possible negative outcome or risk, the quality of their decision to engage in the 
behaviour would remain intact as long it were informed and the related risk- 
information were fully processed. 
 
To date, no know studies have attempted to assess the mechanisms by which financial 
incentives influence the decision-making processes involved in engaging in an 
incentivised health-behaviour. Discussions and research within two conceptually 
analogous domains could help elucidate the issue. The first involves the use of 
payments for live organ donations, which have been criticised for undermining donors’ 
ability to calculate the related risks (e.g. Becker & Elias, 2007; Olbrisch, Benedict, 
Haller et al., 2001). Partial support for this claim derives from studies investigating the 
economic and health consequences of selling kidneys in India (Goyal, Mehta, 
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Schneiderman et al., 2002) and Pakistan (Naqvi, Ali, Mazhar et al., 2007). Findings 
show that the majority of vendors were very poor and sold their organs to pay off debts, 
but would not recommend others to do the same. This could be interpreted as an 
indication that sellers were unaware of the negative consequences associated with organ 
donation. However, no conclusions can be drawn regarding whether they were 
inadequately informed of the likely outcomes or whether money led them to ignore the 
risks or perceive them as low. Recent research shows that as the risk of renal failure 
increases, individuals’ become less willing to donate kidneys, regardless of the level of 
payment offered, therefore suggesting that financial incentives do not blind people to 
the risks of living kidney donation (Halpern, Raz, Kohn et al., 2010). 
 
The second related research area involves the use of financial incentives for 
participation in research, including clinical trials. Payments increase individuals’ 
willingness to participate in research (Bentley & Thacker, 2004; Singer, Groves & 
Corning, 1999; Slomka, McCurdy, Ratliff et al., 2007). Their use has been criticised, 
however, for being undue inducements (Dickert & Grady, 1999) that alter decision-
making processes, such that the side-effects of participating are not fully considered 
(Dickert, Emanuel & Grady, 2002), or risks are overlooked (Grant & Sugarman, 2004; 
London, 2005). These concerns are largely hypothetical with the evidence about how 
participation payments influence perceived risk and decision-making processes being 
scare. The few studies that have been conducted in the area suggest that compensation 
does not lead people to neglect research risks (Bentley & Thacker, 2004; Dunn, Kim, 
Fellows et al., 2009; Halpern, Karlawish, Casarett et al., 2004; Singer & Couper, 2008). 
Specifically, it has been found that people make rational trade-offs between risk and 
benefit. Although they are willing to accept more risk in return for more money, this 
does not blind them to risk or distort their judgments (Bentley & Thacker, 2004; Dunn 
et al., 2009; Halpern et al., 2004; Halpern et al., 2010; Singer & Couper, 2008). On the 
contrary, participation payments could signal risk and increase vigilance and 
information seeking when the amount offered is high. (Cryder, John London, Volpp et 
al., 2010).  
 
Although the above findings highlight some of the potential effects of financial 
incentives on the processing of risk-related information, certain limitations associated 
with the design of the studies, including failure to incorporate conditions of no payment 
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and lack of measures assessing individuals’ knowledge of risks, do not allow firm 
conclusions to be drawn. 
 
The effectiveness of incentives and the possible confounding variables 
Financial incentive schemes are rarely comprised of only one behaviour change 
technique i.e. the use of rewards, but rather of a combination of techniques. For 
example, they usually involve agreeing on a contract, which specifies the conditions of 
exchange between behaviour and money encompassed in their use (Johnston & 
Sniehotta, 2010). Furthermore, the provision of incentives requires contact between 
health professionals, who measure achievement of the target behaviour, and patients 
(Johnston & Sniehotta, 2010). It also requires frequent monitoring of the behaviour, 
which is often accompanied by provision of related feedback. Although incentives 
schemes are hypothesised to work by linking the target behaviour to a positively 
evaluated stimulus, unless they are evaluated against control groups subjected to the 
exact same procedures as the intervention group, apart from the provision of incentives, 
it is not possible to infer whether their effectiveness can be attributed to the incentives 
per se or to indirect influences, mediated by changes to some aspects of the process 
involved in their delivery. In line with this, Hagger et al. (2013) have recently 
highlighted the possibility that the impact of incentives in one the few studies showing 
their effectiveness in achieving sustained behaviour change (Volpp et al., 2009) could 
be confounded by additional intervention components not included in the control group. 
Indeed the content of active control groups has been argued as being critical to assessing 
intervention effectiveness (Abraham, 2011; de Bruin, Viechtbauer, Schaalma et al., 
2010). 
  
For example, without appropriate control groups and given the procedures usually 
involved in delivery of incentives, it would not be possible to dismiss the possibility of 
incentives schemes operating by increasing health professionals’ engagement with 
patients or through the additional involvement required on behalf of the latter, such as 
attending clinics or undergoing particular tests, as part of assessing eligibility for a 
reward. Indeed the importance of frequent contact has been demonstrated by one review 
which found that interventions including more frequent contact with participants 
achieved higher levels of weight-loss. (Dombrowski et al., 2012a). Furthermore, given 
that behavioural contracts improve patients’ adherence to health care activities, even in 
the absence of the exchange of money (Bosch-Capblanch, Abba, Prictor et al., 2007), it 
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would not be possible to assess whether incentive scheme effectiveness should be 
attributed to the process of contract-agreement.  
 
Furthermore, to more precisely assess the effect of incentives, appropriate control 
groups should involve the provision of unconditional payments, delivered regardless of 
performance of the target behaviour. These would allow researchers to disentangle the 
impact of using payments from the conditionality component of incentives schemes and 
determine whether paying people is enough to produce desired effects or whether 
payments need to be contingent on performance of a specific behaviour (Baird, 
McIntosh & Özler, 2011; Baird, Garfein, McIntosh et al., 2012; Robertson, Mushati, 
Eaton et al., 2013). 
 
These issues highlight the need to be cautious when assessing the effectiveness of 
financial incentives schemes, given that such schemes are complex behavioural 
interventions that might operate through one or more of various pathways. 
 
Conclusion and next steps 
Although considerable progress has been made in designing effective interventions for 
changing health-related behaviours, many people continue to behave in unhealthy ways. 
Using financial incentives might be an effective strategy for changing health-related 
behaviours, thus holding the potential to reduce the morbidity and premature mortality, 
which is associated with many preventable illnesses. Although the use of financial 
incentives has been shown to effectively evoke behaviour-change in some situations, 
uncertainty remains about several aspects of the evidence regarding the impact of this 
intervention. First, there is a need to determine the conditions under which change is 
sustained after the intervention is discontinued. Second, the factors that might modify 
behavioural responses to incentives require clarification, including the exact role of 
incentive amount and type and recipients’ level of social and material deprivation. 
Third, given that financial incentives schemes are complex behavioural interventions 
consisting of many components, there is a need to explore the possible confounding 
variables that might influence the impact of incentives on health-related behaviours. 
Finally, there is a need to empirically assess the validity of existing concerns regarding 
the potentially adverse consequences of financial incentives for changing health related 
behaviours on the quality of people’s decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours and 
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their ability to processes risk-relevant information. The present thesis aims to address 
these issues through a series of four studies.  
 
Study 1 is a systematic review and meta-analysis of trials assessing the impact of 
financial incentives on smoking cessation, healthier eating, including reduced alcohol 
consumption and increased physical activity. By synthesising the evidence across 
various behaviours and including information about incentive value and type and 
recipients’ level of deprivation in the analyses, this study aims to assess the modifying 
role of these variables and thus determine the conditions under which financial 
incentives lead to sustained effectiveness. This study further aims to assess whether 
effectiveness is affected by the existence of possible confounding variables, by 
including information regarding trials’ level of standardisation of study procedures 
between incentivised and control groups in the analyses.  
 
Study 2 is a qualitative study describing and comparing the stop-smoking experiences of 
pregnant smokers’ who were incentivised for smoking cessation and of those who were 
not. Its aim is to further explore the possible confounding variables that might influence 
the impact of incentives schemes on health-related behaviours.  
 
Study 3 is a randomised controlled trial which assesses the effectiveness of financial 
incentives for increasing uptake of the HPV vaccinations. This study also examines the 
role of recipients’ level of social and material deprivation in modifying behavioural 
responses to incentives. Furthermore, it assesses the impact of financial incentives on 
the quality of people’s decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours  
 
Finally, Study 4 is web-based experiment examining the potentially adverse effects of 
incentives on the quality of people’s decision, by assessing their impact on the 
processing of risk-relevant information in the context of offering an incentive to engage 
in a behaviour with potential negative side-effects. 
 
The next chapter 
The following chapter presents the protocol for Study 1, the systematic review and 
meta-analysis assessing the impact of financial incentives across repeated health-related 








Personal financial incentives for 
changing repeated health-related 
behaviours: protocol for a systematic 














Background: Smoking, unhealthy eating, including the excessive consumption of 
alcohol and physical inactivity lead to chronic illnesses that account for over 50% of 
preventable deaths worldwide. Financial incentive schemes could be used to change 
these behaviours, but uncertainty remains regarding their potential to achieve sustained 
changes. 
Objectives: This review aims to estimate: i. the effectiveness of financial incentives in 
achieving sustained change for: smoking cessation, healthier eating, including reduced 
alcohol consumption and increased physical activity; ii. whether effectiveness is 
modified by (a) the target behaviour, (b) incentive value and type and (c) recipients’ 
deprivation level  
Data Sources: We will search multiple electronic databases, including MEDLINE, 
EMBASE, PsycINFO, CINAHL, SCOPUS, EconLit, CENTRAL, and the Cochrane 
Database of Systematic Reviews, references of relevant papers and the “grey” literature. 
Study Selection: We will include randomised controlled trials which allocate adults to 
the offer of financial incentives or a control group and include outcomes relating to the 
pre-specified behaviours assessed at a minimum of six months from intervention start. 
Data extraction and synthesis: To generate an overall estimate of behaviour-change, 
dichotomous data will be extracted. If unavailable, continuous data will extracted and 
dichotomised. Financial incentives will be classified according to their value (‘high’ vs. 
‘low’) and type (‘certain’ vs. ‘uncertain’) and participants according to their deprivation 
level (‘high’ vs. ‘other’). Analyses will include meta-analyses and meta-regressions 
grouped by timed endpoints. Pooled effect sizes will be calculated with 95% confidence 
intervals using random effects models.  
Conclusions: Results will inform discussions regarding the potential role of financial 
incentives in reducing the burden of non-communicable diseases and health inequalities. 
 
Eleni Mantzari, Florian Vogt, Ian Shemilt, Yinghui Wei, Julian Higgins, Theresa 
Marteau (2012). Personal financial incentives for changing habitual health-related 






Condition or domain being studied 
Poor repeated health-related behaviours, including tobacco smoking (Batty et al., 2008; 
Teo et al., 2006), poor diet-related behaviours (including the harmful use of alcohol) 
(Cox et al., 2000; He et al., 2007; Heidemann et al., 2008) and lack of physical activity 
(Andersen et al., 2000; Batty et al., 2001), contribute greatly to the development of 
major risk factors for non-communicable diseases (NCDs). These diseases, which 
include cardiovascular diseases, type 2 diabetes, certain types of cancers and chronic 
respiratory diseases, together account for more than 50% of preventable deaths 
worldwide (3four50.com; WHO, 2011). The morbidity and mortality burden of NCDs 
affects people in all age groups, imposing large, increasing and avoidable costs in 
human, social and economic terms (Beaglehole et al., 2011; WHO, 2011).  
 
The prevalence of NCD-related risk factors, such as obesity, hypertension, raised blood 
glucose and cholesterol, as well as the physiological or metabolic consequences of 
tobacco smoking, can be reduced by changing individuals' and populations’ health-
related habits, so as to promote certain healthy behaviours, including smoking cessation, 
physical activity and healthier eating (including the responsible consumption of 
alcohol). Achieving this could in turn reduce the prevalence and burden of NCDs (Katz, 
O'Connell, Yeh et al., 2005).  
 
Modifying repeated health-related behaviours, however, is difficult. Although many 
people report that they want to change their behaviour to improve their health, most find 
it difficult to implement and maintain the necessary changes (Ogden et al., 2007; Sutton, 
1998). One possible way to improve individuals’ health-related behaviours is through 
the use of personal financial incentives. Personal financial incentives are increasingly 
being considered and applied in health policies around the world in an attempt to 
promote health-enhancing behaviours (Lagarde et al., 2007; Le Grand, 2008). Several 
aspects of the effectiveness of personal financial incentives to promote health-related 
behaviours, however, remain unclear (Marteau et al., 2009). For example, although 
there is evidence that they can be effective in promoting one-off health-related 
behaviours, such as attendance at clinic appointments, uptake of immunisations, 
mammography screening and tuberculosis screening, and adherence to healthcare 
treatments (Sutherland et al., 2008), the currently limited evidence base indicates that 
the impact of such incentives on repeated health-related behaviours, such as smoking-, 
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diet- and physical activity-related behaviours, is less straightforward (Sutherland et al., 
2008). Furthermore, evidence for the sustained effectiveness of personal financial 
incentives beyond the period of intervention remains to be established (Marteau et al., 
2009).  
 
When using financial incentives to improve repeated health-related behaviours the 
concern has been not only that they may not lead to sustained changes (Jochelson, 2007; 
Kane, Johnson, Town et al., 2004; Sutherland et al., 2008) but also that they may 
undermine intrinsic motivation, making it less likely than before incentivisation that the 
target behaviour is performed after the incentives are discontinued (Deci et al., 1999). 
According to Cognitive Evaluation Theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985) this is likely to occur 
in situations where incentives are perceived as controlling behaviour. The theory further 
predicts that if incentives engender feelings of competence, and therefore confirm an 
individual’s autonomy, they might actually enhance intrinsic motivation. The extent to 
which these phenomena occur in the context of health-related behaviours has been 
questioned (Promberger & Marteau, 2013). Reviews focused on trials on smoking 
cessation (Cahill & Perera, 2011) and weight loss (Paul-Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008) 
have found no evidence to indicate that individuals who have been incentivised are less 
likely than non-incentivised individuals to engage in healthy behaviours after incentives 
cease. The results of such trials however, have not been systematically assembled, 
critically appraised or synthesised in such a way that would allow for more definitive 
conclusions to be drawn. 
 
Research is needed which will synthesise the available evidence across various repeated 
health-related behaviours, in order to establish the exact conditions under which 
incentives are effective in changing such behaviours, i.e. to determine which types of 
personal financial incentives, for which participants and which behaviours (or related 
outcomes) result in greatest changes. Furthermore there is a need to determine whether 
these behaviour changes are:  
 
(a) sustained after the incentive is discontinued;  
(b) maintained for the duration incentives are offered but undermine intrinsic 
motivation, making it less likely than before incentivisation that people engage in the 
healthy behaviour after the incentive is discontinued; or  
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(c) maintained only for the duration incentives are offered with the behaviour returning 
to baseline levels after they are discontinued.  
 
There is also a need to elucidate the circumstances under which each possibility might 
occur.  
 
This review will address these gaps in the literature by focusing on the use of incentives 
for changing poor repeated health-related behaviours, i.e. tobacco smoking, physical 
inactivity, and unhealthy eating, including the harmful drinking of alcohol, and for 
promoting healthier repeated behaviours, i.e. smoking cessation, increased physical 
activity, and healthier eating, including the responsible drinking of alcohol. In addition, 
it will consider the impact of personal financial incentives on the proximal indicators of 
eating behaviour and performance of physical activity (body weight, body mass, blood 
glucose, blood cholesterol, blood lipids) (i.e. major, modifiable physiological or 
metabolic risk factors for NCDs). It will also attempt to determine the variables that 
modify the effect of financial incentives on repeated health-related behaviours.  
 
Although various existing reviews have examined the use of incentives for changing 
health-related behaviour, no single review has focused explicitly on repeated health-
related behaviours and has asked the same questions as those proposed in this review. 
Although the proposed review has some overlap with existing reviews in terms of the 
included studies, it will differ through the inclusion of further trials and the analysis of 
variables which hitherto have remained unexamined. By building upon existing reviews 
it will endeavour to produce a more complete and comprehensive picture of the impact 
of personal financial incentives allowing generalisations across repeated health-
behaviours, both about the impact and the modifiers of such impact (See Appendix 3.2 
for a list of existing reviews assessing the impact of financial incentives on repeated 











The objectives of this review are:  
 
a) to assess the impact of personal financial incentives, six or more months after 
recruitment into an incentive scheme, on the performance of repeated health-related 
behaviours:  
1. regardless of whether the incentive is still being offered at that time-point,  
2. when the incentive has been discontinued for at least one month.  
 
b) to assess the extent to which the impacts reported in (a.1) and (a.2) are modified by:  
1. behaviour type (smoking related vs. eating-related vs. physical activity-
related),  
2. incentive scheme characteristics (value of the incentive and whether 
attainment is certain vs. uncertain) 
3. participant characteristics (level of social and material deprivation),  
4. study characteristics (level of risk of bias relating to the standardization of 
study procedures across groups and the reliability of the outcome measures). 
 
c) to assess the impact of personal financial incentives on motivation (intrinsic vs. 


















 Electronic searches  
We will conduct computerised searches of the following databases:  
• MEDLINE (Ovid SP) (1948 to present)  
• EMBASE (Ovid SP) (1974 to present)  
• PsycINFO (Ovid SP) (1806 to present)  
• CINAHL (EBSCO Host) (1981 to present)  
• Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (The Cochrane Library) (1991 to present)  
• Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), The Cochrane Library 
(1991 to present)  
• SCOPUS (Elsevier) (1996 to present)  
• Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (The Cochrane Library) (1994 to present)  
• Econlit (EBSCO) (1977 to present) 
 
We will limit searches to studies of adults (18+ years of age). We will not apply 
restrictions with regard to the language of publication.  
 
Searching other resources  
In order to identify relevant ongoing and unpublished studies (e.g. dissertations, 
conference proceedings, working papers etc.) we will search the following resources:  
• HMIC (Ovid) (1983-present)  
• Online clinical trials registers  
o www.controlled-trials.com/mrct/ for UK trials  
o clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/search for US trials  
• Google Scholar (using basic keywords such as “financial incentives” “smoking 
cessation”, “physical activity”, “weight-loss”; the first 1000 references will be 
scanned)  
• Websites of key organisations in the area of health and incentives for health promotion  
o Center for Health Incentives and Behavioral Economics (http://chibe.upenn.edu/)  
o Healthy Incentives (www.healthyincentives.org.uk/)  
o Weight Wins (www.weightwins.co.uk/)  
o Departments of Health for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland  
o Australian Federal and States Departments of Health  
o The World Health Organisation  
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o United States Department of Health  
 
In addition, we will search reference lists of eligible articles and contact key researchers 


































Types of study to be included 
We will include randomised controlled trials and cluster randomised controlled trials, 
which assess the impact of personal financial incentives on repeated health-related 
behaviours (smoking cessation, healthier eating, including reduced alcohol consumption 
and increased physical activity), and/or the proximal direct consequences of such 
behaviours. At least one comparison group in the trials must have been randomised to 
receive personal financial incentives and compared to either groups not receiving 
financial incentives and/or groups receiving financial incentives that differ in type 
and/or amount. Trials must have measured outcomes up to at least 6 months from the 
start of the intervention.  
 
We will exclude all studies other than randomised controlled trials to minimise the risk 
of bias. We will only include studies with a minimum follow-up of 6 months because 
we are interested in the sustainability of repeated health-behaviours. Performance of the 
target behaviour at six months from the beginning of the intervention is the gold 
standard for smoking cessation (Hughes, Keely, Niaura et al., 2003). We are applying 
this criterion to the other target behaviours and outcomes for reasons of standardisation 
and comparability. We will include studies with multiple comparison groups in which 
participants are offered personal financial incentives that differ in specific 
characteristics, such as type and/or monetary value. We will include studies of the 
effects of multi-component interventions if two or more comparison groups are exposed 
to interventions that differ only in the offer of personal financial incentives (or in the 
offer of personal financial incentives that differ in specific characteristics). However, 
we will exclude studies of the effects of multi-component interventions in which 
personal financial incentives feature as one component, but the study design precludes 
collection of data relating to the independent effect(s) of incentives.  
 
Participants/ population 
 Adults aged 18 years or over (no restrictions for socio-economic or clinical 
characteristics or prognostic factors).  
 
Given the prediction that the impact of personal financial incentives is moderated by 
recipients’ level of social and material deprivation, (e.g. Sutherland et al., 2008), we 
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will classify participants at the study level as either highly social and materially 
deprived (“High”) or not highly socially and materially deprived (“Other”). 
 
Intervention(s), exposure(s) 
 Interventions will consist of the offer of personal financial incentives, provided directly 
to patients or consumers (as opposed to health-care providers), contingent upon: 
smoking cessation; performance of a pre-specified level of physical or sedentary 
activity; achievement of a pre-specified target relating to the eating of healthier or less 
healthy foods and drinking of alcoholic beverages; achievement of a pre-specified 
calorific or nutritional target related to nutrient intake; achievement of a pre-specified 
level of energy expenditure; and/or achievement of a pre-specified level of weight loss.  
 
We will exclude incentives of little or no monetary value and those of symbolic value 
(e.g. certificates, stickers, badges, key-rings, t-shirts, caps, hats or mugs) and incentives 
that are not contingent on individual performance of the target behaviour(s) or 
achievement of the target outcome(s) (e.g. consumer sales promotions, direct pricing, 
income transfer programmes, tax credits).  
 
For the purposes of this review, we will classify personal financial incentives according 
to two dimensions, presented in order of expected importance:  
 
1. the monetary value of the financial incentive (whether high or low; see 'Data 
Extraction'). This variable has been frequently proposed as an important modifier of the 
effect of financial incentives on health-related behaviour (e.g. Lussier et al., 2006; Paul-
Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008; Sutherland et al., 2008) 
2. whether attainment of the financial incentive is certain (i.e. the possibility of 
obtaining the incentive depends only on performance of the pre-specified target 
behaviour or achievement of the pre-specified target outcome) vs. uncertain (i.e. the 
possibility of obtaining the incentive depends both on performance of the pre-specified 
target behaviour or achievement of the pre-specified outcome and chance. Performance 
of the pre-specified target behaviour or achievement of the pre-specified target outcome 
entitles participants’ to the possibility of winning the incentive by being entered into a 
draw/lottery/sweepstake/competition/contest. Actually attaining the incentive, however, 
depends on chance). Assessing this distinction is important, as research in related areas 
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suggests that participants might respond differentially to a certain vs. an uncertain 
incentive (e.g. Leung et al., 2002). 
 
Comparator(s)/ control 
 Eligible comparison groups will be those in which participants are exposed to:  
a) no treatment;  
b) the same treatment as the incentivised group(s), but without the offer of a personal 
financial incentive; or  
c) a personal financial incentive that differs from that offered to the treatment group in 
type (i.e. certain vs. uncertain), and/or monetary value.  
 
Context 
 There will be no restrictions relating to the geographical or organisational setting(s) or 
context(s) in which the intervention(s) are provided.  
 
Outcome(s) 
 Achievement of the desired repeated health-related behaviour or related outcome – i.e. 
performance of the target health behaviour or achievement of the target outcome, at 
least 6 months after recruitment into the personal financial incentives scheme and one 
month after the personal financial incentive has been discontinued, where the target 
behaviour or related outcome refers to that for which the incentive has been offered.  
 
For each of the repeated health-behaviours we are considering, we are interested in the 
following outcomes:  
 
Smoking cessation:  
cessation (dichotomous - measured by carbon monoxide reading or cotinine test of 
urine, saliva or blood).  
 
Physical activity:  
• achievement of target level or frequency of physical activity (dichotomous - measured 




Eating healthier foods:  
• achievement of target amount or frequency of specified healthier food(s)/drink(s) 
(including alcoholic beverages) consumed (dichotomous - measured objectively, e.g. by 
diet record or diary, food frequency questionnaire)  
 
Eating unhealthier foods:  
• achievement of target amount or frequency of specified unhealthier food(s)/dink(s) 
(including alcoholic beverages) consumed (dichotomous - measured objectively, e.g. by 
diet record or diary, food frequency questionnaire)  
 
Proximal direct consequences of eating behaviour and/or performance of physical or 
sedentary activity:  
• achievement of target calorific or nutritional profile of food(s)/drink(s) consumed 
(dichotomous - measured objectively, e.g. based on diet record or diary, food frequency 
questionnaire)  
• achievement of target level of energy expenditure (dichotomous - measured 
objectively, e.g. based on activity record, diary, questionnaire or scale)  
• achievement of target level of cardio-respiratory fitness (dichotomous - measured by 
maximal oxygen intake VO2 max)  
 
Risk factors for NCDs:  
• achievement of target body weight/body fat distribution/body mass/related proxies 
(e.g. leptin, adipocytokines and other obesity or inflammatory markers), given target 
weight loss/fat loss/body mass/related proxies if applicable (dichotomous - measured 
objectively)  
• achievement of target blood cholesterol level/blood lipid profile/blood glucose level 
(dichotomous - measured objectively)  
 
Motivation (intrinsic vs. extrinsic) to engage in target health-related behaviour 
(dichotomous- measured using self-report questionnaires)  
 
Where these outcomes are not available, we will record and dichotomise the following 




Physical activity:  
• amount of physical activity (continuous - measured objectively, e.g. number of 
minutes or steps performed)  
 
Eating healthier/unhealthier foods:  
• amount of healthy/unhealthy food(s)/drink(s) (including alcoholic beverages) 
consumed (continuous - measured objectively, e.g. by diet record or diary, food 
frequency questionnaire)  
 
Proximal direct consequences of eating behaviour and/or performance of physical or 
sedentary activity:  
• amount of calories from food(s)/drinks(s) consumed (continuous -measured 
objectively, e.g. based on diet records or diary, food frequency questionnaire)  
• level of energy expenditure (continuous - measured objectively, e.g. based on activity 
records, diary, questionnaire or scale)  
• level of cardio-respiratory fitness (continuous - measured by maximal oxygen intake 
VO2 max)  
 
Risk factors for NCDs:  
• level of weight loss/fat loss/body mass improvement (continuous - measured 
objectively)  
• level of blood cholesterol/blood glucose/blood lipid (continuous - measured 
objectively)  
 
Motivation (intrinsic vs. extrinsic) to engage in target health-related behaviour 
(continuous- measured using self-report questionnaires)  
 
We will extract only dichotomous outcome data and present it in tables describing and 
summarising the results of each study. Where dichotomous data are not available, we 
will extract continuous outcome data and dichotomise it, by converting SMDs directly 
to odds ratios.  
 
We will deal with varying time-points of assessment of the outcome by creating time-
assessment categories. These will begin at six months after recruitment into an incentive 
scheme and will consist of six month intervals (i.e. 6 months, 6-12 months, 12-18 
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months, 18-24 months etc. since recruitment). We will also create time-assessment 
categories for after removal of the incentive. These will consist of one month intervals 
between 1 and 3 months, a three month interval between 3 and 6 months and six month 
intervals thereafter (i.e. 1-2 months 2-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-12 months, 12-18 
months, etc. after discontinuation of incentives). We will calculate odds ratios for 
outcomes.  
 
The extraction and (where necessary and possible) conversion of outcome data into 
dichotomous measures is intended to allow an overall estimate of behaviour change 



























Data extraction, (selection and coding) 
 Two authors (EM and FV) will independently extract all data. If outcome data are 
unavailable or are not presented in the published full-text reports of individual studies in 
the forms pre-specified in ‘Outcome(s)' section (i.e. dichotomous data), or we cannot 
converted them to the necessary format, we will contact study authors with a request to 
provide these data. The first author (EM) will reconcile the two sets of independently 
completed data extraction forms. If there are inconsistencies between the two sets, we 
will re-check extracted data and verify them against the corresponding full-text study 
report. If uncertainly remains, the two data extractors will meet to discuss and reach a 
consensus. If consensus cannot be reached a final decision will be made following 
discussion with a third author (IS).  
 
To allow for assessment of the role of the pre-specified moderating variables (i.e. 
incentive scheme characteristics (incentive value and certainty) and participants’ level 
of social and material deprivation), during the data extraction process we will categorise 
incentives and their recipients at the study level. Specifically, we will classify incentives 
according to:  
 
 a) their value i.e. low (<$400) vs. high (≥ $400).  
 
We will make judgements of “High value” if the total value of incentives is larger than 
the minimum weekly income required to be earned per household for individuals to be 
above the USA poverty threshold. We have chosen to follow USA guidelines because 
currently the majority of research in this field has been conducted in this country. The 
average number of family members per household in the USA is three (rounded off to 
the nearest figure) (United States Census Bureau, 2011) with the equivalent poverty 
threshold set at approximately $18530 annually ($386 weekly) per household (US 
Department of Health & Human Services, 2011). Based on this, we will classify the 
value of incentives worth $400 (total value) and above as “high” and those worth $400 
(total value) and below as “low”. 
 
 b) their type, i.e. certain (all incentives, such as cash, deposits, gifts, vouchers etc., 




We will collect information on participants’ level of social and material deprivation and 
make judgements based on any relevant information that is available in the included 
studies (e.g. income, employment, education, ethnicity, SES scores). We will aggregate 
this information to allow studies to be categorised as either highly social and materially 
deprived (“High”) or not highly socially and materially deprived (“Other”). We have 
chosen this categorisation because our primary interest is to determine whether 
incentives are more effective for the most deprived, rather than to assess the level of 
effectiveness associated with each level of deprivation. We will make categorisations at 
the study level to allow between-studies comparisons. 
 
We will make judgements of “High deprivation” when any or all of the following 
conditions are met: 
1. Majority of study participants have not completed high school or the mean 
number of years in education is less than 12 years 
2. Majority of study participants earn less than $ 20,000/year ($1,666/month), or 
the mean reported income is less than $20,000/year or the majority of 
participants are allocated to the lowest income category 
3. Majority of study participants are unemployed or in unskilled, semi-skilled, 
skilled, or blue collar jobs 
4. Majority of participants have a low SES score or the mean SES score is low. 
Decisions about whether SES scores are indicative of high deprivation will be 
made by referring to the scoring of the scale used and any related instructions for 
interpreting these scores. 
5. Majority of study participants are non-White. This information will be used 
when income, education, occupation and SES have not been measured, or when 
the information provided by these variables does not allow for definite 
categorisations (e.g. income is low but education is borderline, such as just 
above 12 years). Judgments of high deprivation based on these variables will not 
be affected if the sample is predominantly white. 
6. Majority of study participants are underinsured or lacking insurance, receiving 
Medicaid, or attending public clinics or Women Infant and Children (WIC) 
programmes. 





If the information provided by two variables is contradictory, e.g. income is low but 
education is high, then we will take into account the information provided by a third 
variable, such as occupation or ethnicity, to make a judgment. If no relevant information 
is reported in the paper, then we will contact authors and enquire about the availability 
































Risk of bias (quality) assessment 
 We will assess risk of bias of included studies at the outcome level. For both 
randomised controlled trials and cluster randomised trials, we will assess risk of bias by 
applying of the Cochrane Collaboration risk of bias tool (Higgins, Altman, Gøtzsche et 
al., 2011). We will assess the risk of bias for the following domains  
 
Selection bias:  
1. Random sequence generation  
2. Allocation concealment  
 
Performance bias:  
1. Blinding of participants and personnel  
We do not expect knowledge of intervention allocation by participants to lead to 
performance bias. In fact, blinding of participants is usually not relevant in studies 
assessing the impact of financial incentives on health-related behaviours. For the 
intervention to work, participants need to be aware of their entitlement to incentives, so 
that they can perform the necessary behaviour/achieve the outcome necessary for their 
attainment. Consequently, we will not consider studies in which participants were not 
blinded to be at high risk of bias. We will make risk of bias judgements regarding 
blinding of personnel (and whether their knowledge of the intervention may have 
altered the way they interacted with participants, and has thus influenced outcomes)  
 
2. Standardization of study procedures  
A related potential source of performance bias specific to trials assessing the impact of 
financial incentives on health-enhancing behaviours that we will assess, is whether 
studies have controlled for the additional processes inherit in the delivery of the 
incentive, compared to regular treatment: Attainment of incentives often requires 
additional involvement, on behalf of both participants and personnel, in the form of 
frequent clinical appointment attendance, monitoring of the formers’ performance etc., 
which may confound the impact of financial incentives, leading to an overestimation of 
their effectiveness. We will make judgements of low risk of bias when study procedures 
have ensured that all processes are standardised between groups (i.e. all participants 
attend an equal number of clinical appointments and their performance is monitored a 
comparable number of times) apart from the provision of financial incentives contingent 
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on performance of a target behaviour/achievement of a target outcome. A lack of such 
standardisation will result in judgments of high risk of bias, whereas we will make a 
judgement of unclear risk of bias when there is insufficient information regarding the 
procedures relating to the non-intervention groups. We will incorporate this risk of 
performance bias assessments into the analysis to determine whether the impact of 
financial incentives co-varies with such between-study differences.  
 
Detection bias  
1. Blinding of outcome assessment  
In trials assessing the impact of financial incentives on health-related behaviours 
outcome assessors are often responsible for disseminating the incentives. We expect it 
to be often the case therefore that assessors are aware of which group a participant has 
been allocated to. Whether or not a lack of blinding of outcome assessment leads to bias 
will largely depend on the robustness/reliability of the outcome measure used in each 
study, and the extent to which it requires judgements on behalf of the outcome 
assessors.  
 
2. Reliability of outcome measure  
A related source of detection bias, the risk of which we will assess in studies included in 
this review, concerns the method of outcome assessment employed and the extent to 
which it is reliable or can be deceived. We expect easily falsifiable measurements to be 
deceived more by participants in conditions where delivery of the financial incentive is 
contingent on the outcome of the assessment, thus leading to bias. We will consider 
studies in which the outcome assessment relies purely on self-report measures at high 
risk of bias, compared to those which include an objective outcome measure, such as a 
biochemical indicator. For example, in the case of physical activity and healthier eating, 
we will consider studies at low risk of bias if they rely on biochemical indicators such as 
weight-loss, maximal oxygen intake, blood lipid/glucose profiles, as opposed to diaries 
or questionnaires. With regards to smoking cessation, we will consider studies at low 
risk if smoking status is measured using the Russell standard (West, Hajek, Stead et al., 
2005), as opposed to relying on self-report or monitoring of carbon monoxide level. We 
will incorporate these risk of detection bias assessments into the analysis to determine 
whether the impact of financial incentives co-varies with the type of method used to 




Attrition bias  
Incomplete outcome data  
We expect that in studies assessing the impact of financial incentives on health-related 
behaviour, greater levels of attrition will be observed in non-incentivised groups 
compared to the incentivised groups. We will analyse originally dichotomous and/or 
dichotomised outcome data missing due to participant drop-out via intention-to treat 
analysis, with a conservative assumption being made that participants dropping-out 
have not sustained (or achieved) the target behaviour or related outcome.  
 
Reporting bias  
1. Selective outcome reporting  
2. Other sources of potential bias  
 
For cluster randomised trials we will also consider the following:  
 
Recruitment bias  
For this domain, we will make high risk of bias judgements for studies where 
participants were recruited into clusters after randomisation was completed. We will 
make low risk of bias judgements for studies where recruitment was completed before 
randomisation. We will make unclear risk of bias judgments for studies where there is a 
lack of information regarding the order of recruitment and randomisation.  
 
Two authors will independently apply the risk of bias tool. Additionally, each author 
will collect and record the source of information for each risk of bias judgement (e.g. 
quotation or summary of information from trial report). Where judgements are based on 
assumptions made on the basis of information provided outside publicly available 
documents, this should be stated. Any inconsistencies between the two authors with 
respect to coding judgements or information in support of judgements will be resolved 
by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached a final decision will be made following 







Dealing with missing data 
 We will dichotomise outcome data not available in dichotomous format. We will 
analyse originally dichotomous and/or dichotomised outcome data missing due to 
participant drop-out via intention-to treat analysis, with a conservative assumption being 
made that participants dropping-out have not sustained (or achieved) the target 
behaviour or related outcome. We will deal with missing statistics either by imputation 
or by contacting authors. 
 
Assessment of heterogeneity 
 We will assess heterogeneity by visually examining the extent to which confidence 
intervals overlap through inspection of forest plots. Furthermore, we will calculate and 
report the I-squared statistic and its confidence limits and assess heterogeneity based on 
the recommendations by (Deeks, Higgins & Altman, 2011). We will employ random-
effects models to incorporate heterogeneity among studies in meta-analyses. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
 We will not conduct formal sensitivity analyses to compare the outcome between 
studies at high vs. low risk of bias across all bias domains. Instead, we will include the 
bias domains most pertinent to studies assessing the impact of financial incentives on 
health-related behaviours, i.e. the risks of bias arising from a lack of standardisation of 
study procedures and the use of unreliable outcome measures as co-variates in our main 
analysis, to determine how they affect the outcome. 
 
Strategy for data synthesis 
 If possible, we will combine data from cluster-randomised controlled trials and 
individually randomised controlled trials for the analysis. For cluster-randomised 
controlled trials that have not taken their design into account (i.e. have not performed 
statistical methods that allow analysis at the level of the individual while accounting for 
the clustering in the data) will perform corrected analyses where possible, if the 
following information can be extracted:  
• the number of clusters (or groups) randomised to each intervention group; or the 
average (mean) size of each cluster;  
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• the outcome data ignoring the cluster design for the total number of individuals (for 
example, number or proportion of individuals with events, or means and standard 
deviations); and  
• an estimate of the intracluster (or intraclass) correlation coefficient (ICC).  
 
We will deal with data from studies with multiple treatment arms (i.e. in which 
participants have been randomised to different types of incentives) by conducting 
multivariate analyses, whereby we will model direct comparisons between each 
treatment arm and the control. In cases of multiple control groups (i.e. groups not 
offered treatment and groups offered the same treatment as the incentivised groups but 
without the offer of financial incentives) we will exclude the groups that allow for the 
least accurate estimation of the independent effect of financial incentives (i.e. groups 
not offered treatment).  
 
We will conduct a narrative review, describing the interventions, review/study 
populations, review/study characteristics and the impact of financial incentives for 
changing the three repeated health-related behaviours of interest, namely smoking 
cessation, healthier eating, including reduced alcohol consumption and physical 
increased activity.  
 
Our statistical analysis will consist of a meta-regression, which will incorporate 
multivariate analyses for multiple treatment studies (in which participants are allocated 
to incentivised groups differing with respect to the type and/or size of the incentive 
offered), using metareg (Sterne, Harbord & White, 2010)).  
 
The analysis will involve the following stages:  
 
Stage 1: The effect of incentives (all combined vs. control) on health-related behaviour 
(all combined) will be estimated through a standard meta-analysis  
 
Stage 2: A meta-regression will be performed with behaviour type (i.e. smoking 
cessation, physical activity, healthier eating, weight-loss) as a covariate.  
 
Stage 3: A meta-regression will be performed with incentive-scheme characteristics as 
covariates (certain vs. uncertain and value of incentive). A multivariate framework will 
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be used for studies with multiple treatment arms in order for direct comparisons 
between each treatment arm and the control to be modelled (i.e. for studies with groups 
A’ vs. A” vs. C the multivariate framework will be used to estimate the effects of A’ vs. 
C and A” vs. C). Interaction terms will be included to investigate the joint effects of the 
incentive scheme characteristics (certain vs. uncertain and value of incentive).  
 
Stage 4: A meta-regression will be performed with participant characteristics (i.e. level 
of material deprivation) and risk of bias (i.e. risk of performance and detection bias) as 
covariates. Behaviour type and incentive scheme characteristics will be re-entered into 
the model if they are found to be important predictors at stages 2 and 3 respectively.  
 
We will calculate pooled effect sizes with 95% confidence intervals using random 
effects models. Given that we expect effect sizes to vary between studies according to 
the characteristics of the studied populations and target behaviours or related outcomes, 
random- as opposed to fixed-effect models are, ex ante, considered likely to be more 
appropriate for the purposes of this review.  
 
The next chapter 
This chapter presented the protocol for Study 1, the systematic review and meta-
analysis assessing the impact of financial incentives across repeated health-related 
behaviours and the role of potential effect modifiers. The following chapter presents the 
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 Background: Sustained changes in health-related behaviours would reduce the huge 
and growing global burden of non-communicable diseases. Uncertainty remains about 
whether financial-incentive schemes could achieve such changes.   
Objectives: This review aims to estimate: i. the effectiveness of financial incentives in 
achieving and sustaining behaviour change across: smoking cessation, healthier eating, 
including reduced alcohol consumption and physical activity; ii. whether effectiveness 
is modified by (a) the target behaviour, (b) incentive value and type and (c) recipients’ 
deprivation level.  
Data Sources: We searched multiple electronic databases, references of relevant papers 
and the “grey” literature from inception to July 2012. We screened 24265 unique 
articles and included 34 in the meta-analysis (0.14%), 20 assessing smoking, and three 
assessing physical activity. None assessed alcohol consumption or diet. Also, 11 
assessing indicators of healthier eating and/or physical activity (e.g. body weight) were 
included. 
Study Selection: We included randomised controlled trials offering adults financial 
incentives that assessed outcomes relating to pre-specified behaviours at a minimum of 
six months from intervention start. 
Data extraction and synthesis: To estimate overall behaviour-change, dichotomous 
data were extracted. If unavailable, continuous data were extracted and dichotomised. 
Financial incentives were classified according to their value (‘high’ vs. ‘low’) and type 
(‘certain’ vs. ‘uncertain’) and participants according to deprivation level (‘high’ vs. 
‘other’). Analyses included meta-analyses and meta-regressions grouped by timed 
endpoints (months from intervention start: ‘6’; ‘>6-12’; >12-18; >18; months from 
incentive removal: ‘>2-3’; >3-6; ‘>6’). Summary effect sizes were calculated using 
random effects meta-analyses. 
Results: Financial incentives increased behaviour-change, with effects lasting up to 18 
months from intervention start (OR 1.53, 95%CI 1.05-2.23) and three months after 
incentive removal (OR 2.11, 95%CI 1.21-3.6.7). The target behaviour, incentive value 
and incentive type did not independently modify effect sizes at any time-point. An 
interaction between target behaviour and incentive value modified effects at ‘6’ months 
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from intervention start: low-value incentives for smoking cessation decreased behaviour 
change (OR 1.49, 95%CI 1.12-1.98). Recipients’ deprivation level modified effects at 
‘>6-12’ months from intervention start, with higher deprivation levels increasing 
behaviour-change (high vs. other deprivation level: OR 2.17, 95%CI 1.22-3.85), but not 
at other assessed time-points. 
Conclusions: Financial incentives change repeated health-behaviours and may help 
reduce health inequalities. However, their role in reducing non-communicable disease 
burden is potentially limited based on current evidence that effects are not sustained 
beyond three months after incentive removal. 
Mantzari, E., Vogt, F., Shemilt, I., Wei
, 
Y., Higgins, J.P.T., Marteau T.M. (in 
submission). Personal financial incentives for changing habitual health-related 




















Smoking, poor diet-related behaviours, including excessive alcohol consumption, and 
physical inactivity contribute to the development of major non-communicable diseases, 
(i.e. cardiovascular diseases, type 2 diabetes, certain types of cancers and chronic 
respiratory diseases (Andersen et al., 2000; Batty et al., 2008; Batty et al., 2001; Cox et 
al., 2000; He et al., 2007; Heidemann et al., 2008; Teo et al., 2006)), which account for 
more than 50% of preventable premature deaths worldwide (3four50.com; WHO, 
2012). The World Health Assembly has recently pledged to reduce non-communicable 
diseases by 25% by 2015 (WHO, 2013). Offering individuals financial incentives for 
changing their health-related behaviour has the potential to contribute to this ambitious 
target, but uncertainty remains about the effectiveness of these schemes.   
 
Financial incentives have been most effective in changing one-off health-related 
behaviours, such as undergoing vaccinations, attending screening, and adhering to 
healthcare treatments (Jochelson, 2007; Kane et al., 2004; Sutherland et al., 2008). 
When used to change repeated health-related behaviours that contribute to non-
communicable diseases (smoking, diet, including excessive alcohol consumption and 
physical inactivity), uncertainty remains. Although there is some evidence that incentive 
schemes can modify such behaviours (e.g. Jochelson, 2007; Sutherland et al., 2008), the 
conditions under which change is achieved and sustained after the intervention is 
discontinued are unclear (Jochelson, 2007; Marteau et al., 2009). 
 
Most of the existing systematic reviews that have focused on the impact of financial 
incentives on repeated health-related behaviours (e.g. Cahill & Perera, 2011; Jochelson, 
2007; Kane et al., 2004; Paul-Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008; Sutherland et al., 2008; 
Wall, Mhurchu, Blakely et al., 2006) (See Appendix 3.2 for a more comprehensive list 
of such reviews and an explanation of how they differ from the current review) suggest 
that achieved changes are not sustained after financial incentives are discontinued. 
These, however, have assessed the impact of incentives over time from the beginning of 
interventions, without explicitly focusing on or systematically analysing effects after 
incentive removal. This distinction is important, as in some studies delivery of the final 
incentive has coincided with the final follow-up assessment (Donatelle, Prows, 
Champeau et al., 2000a; Donatelle, Prows, Champeau et al., 2000b; Gallagher, Penn, 
Schindler et al., 2007; Jeffery, Hellerstedt & Schmid, 1990; Klesges, Glasgow, Klesges 
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et al., 1987; Rand, Stitzer, Bigelow et al., 1989). Furthermore, apart from a few 
exceptions (e.g. Paul-Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008), most existing reviews have not 
systematically analysed the factors that modify behavioural responses to incentives. 
Such factors include the behaviour targeted (Jochelson, 2007; Sutherland et al., 2008), 
the value of the incentive (Lussier et al., 2006; Paul-Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008; 
Sutherland et al., 2008), whether incentive attainment is certain (e.g. voucher or cash 
payment) or uncertain (e.g. lottery ticket) (Leung et al., 2002) and recipients’ level of 
social and material deprivation (Sutherland et al., 2008). Some evidence suggests that 
under the right conditions financial incentives could lead to sustained changes (Cahill & 
Perera, 2011; Troxel & Volpp, 2012; Volpp et al., 2009). This highlights the need for 
research to move beyond the question of whether incentives work, to an elucidation of 
the circumstances under which they are most effective (Marteau et al., 2009). An 
improved understanding of the role of potential effect modifiers is needed to inform the 
design of optimal personal financial incentive schemes. 
 
The present review aims to produce a more comprehensive picture of the impact of 
personal financial incentives on repeated health-related behaviours by aiming to 
estimate: 
a. the effectiveness of financial incentive schemes in achieving change across 
repeated health-behaviours: smoking cessation, healthier eating, including 
reduced alcohol consumption, and physical activity 
i.  regardless of whether the incentive is still offered  
ii. when the incentive has been discontinued  
 
b. the extent to which the effectiveness of financial incentives schemes is 
modified by: 
i. the target behaviour (smoking-related vs. eating and alcohol 
consumption-related vs. physical activity-related) 
ii. the value and type (i.e. certain vs. uncertain) of the incentive  








Further information on the study methods are presented in the systematic review 
protocol, details of which were registered on PROSPERO 
www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/display_record.asp?ID=CRD42012002675.  
 
Study inclusion criteria 
We included randomised controlled trials (RCTs), including cluster randomised 
controlled trials (cluster-RCTs), assessing the impact of personal financial incentives on 
repeated health-related behaviours (smoking cessation, healthier eating, including 
reduced alcohol consumption and increased physical activity), and/or the proximal 
direct consequences of such behaviours, in adults aged 18 years and over. No other 
restrictions were applied with regards to the participants of included studies. At least 
one comparison group in included studies had to have been randomised to receive 
personal financial incentives and compared either to i) groups not receiving treatment; 
ii) groups receiving the same treatment as the incentivised groups, but without the offer 
of a financial incentive; and/or iii) groups receiving financial incentives that differed in 
type (certain vs. uncertain) and/or amount. Studies had to have measured outcomes 
relating to the pre-specified health-related behaviours at a minimum of 6 months from 
the start of interventions, to allow for assessment of the sustainability of behavioural 
changes. Studies of the effects of multi-component interventions were included if two or 
more comparison groups were exposed to interventions that differed only in the offer of 
personal financial incentives (or in the offer of incentives that differed in specific 
characteristics). However, studies of the effects of multi-component interventions in 
which personal financial incentives featured as one component, but the study design 
precluded assessment of the independent effects of incentives, were excluded. Studies 
offering incentives of little or no monetary value and those of symbolic value (e.g. 
certificates, stickers, badges, key-rings, t-shirts, caps, hats or mugs) and incentives that 
were not contingent on achievement of the target outcome (e.g. consumer sales 
promotions, direct pricing, income transfer programmes, tax credits) were excluded. No 
restrictions were imposed relating to the geographical or organisational settings or 







We used a detailed strategy (Appendix 4.1) to search the following databases for 
published articles from inception to July 2012: MEDLINE, EMBASE, PsycINFO, 
CINAHL, SCOPUS, EconLit, CENTRAL and the Cochrane Database of Systematic 
Reviews. Searches were limited to studies of adults (18+ years of age). No restrictions 
were applied with regards to the language or date of publication. We also searched the 
reference lists of existing relevant reviews and eligible articles, to identify further 
potentially eligible studies. To identify relevant ongoing and unpublished studies, we 
searched HMIC, online clinical trials registers, Google Scholar and websites of key 
organisations in the area of health and incentives for health promotion.  
 
Study selection and data extraction 
The titles and abstracts of all records of study reports were screened by one author 
(EM). The full-text reports of potentially eligible studies were obtained for further 
independent assessment by one author (EM) and one trained research assistant (JT). 
Disagreements were resolved by consensus.  
 
One author (EM) and one trained research assistant (LSR) independently extracted all 
data. The first author (EM) reconciled the two sets of completed data extraction forms. 
To allow for an overall estimate of behaviour change across the three sets of target 
behaviours, dichotomous data were extracted, as measures of effectiveness in terms of 
the attainment or non-attainment of a pre-specified target level of behaviour change. If 
outcome data were unavailable, or were not presented in dichotomous form, or could 
not be converted to the necessary format, study authors were contacted with a request to 
provide these data. Relevant existing systematic reviews (e.g. Cahill & Perera, 2011; 
Paul-Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008) were also checked for availability of such data. 
Where dichotomous data were not available, continuous outcome data were extracted 
and results later re-expressed as odds ratios (see Data analysis).  
 
To allow for assessment of the role of the pre-specified moderating variables (incentive 
value and certainty and participants’ level of social and material deprivation), during the 
data extraction process incentives were classified according to their value as either ‘low’ 
(<$400) or ‘high’ (≥ $400). Judgments regarding the classification of value in the only 
study included in the review, which was conducted in a low income country (Giné, 
Karlan & Zinman, 2010), were made based on information reported by the study 
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authors that incentives constituted approximately 20% of participants’ monthly income.   
Checks conducted using the http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ website confirmed 
that the classification of value of all studies included in the analyses remained the same 
when taking inflation into account. Incentives were also classified according to their 
type as either ‘certain’ (all incentives, such as cash, deposits, gifts, vouchers etc., 
excluding lotteries) or ‘uncertain’ (i.e. lotteries). Participants’ level of social and 
material deprivation was classified at the study level as either ‘high’ or ‘other’ based on 
any relevant information that was available in the included study reports (e.g. income, 
employment, education, ethnicity, SES scores). (For the specific criteria used to make 
these classifications refer to the review protocol in Chapter 3). If no relevant 
information was reported in the papers to allow these classifications to be made, study 
authors were contacted with a request to provide relevant data. 
 
Assessment of methodological quality of included studies 
One author (EM) and one trained research assistant (LSR) independently assessed the 
risk of bias of included RCTs and cluster-RCTs, by applying the Cochrane 
Collaboration risk of bias tool (Higgins et al., 2011). Judgements of low, high and 
unclear risk of bias were made for each domain, following the definitions and criteria 
provided in Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions (Higgins et al., 
2011). Inconsistencies with respect to coding judgements were resolved by consensus. 
When judging the risk of performance bias, in addition to the domain specified by the 
Cochrane tool, the level of standardisation of study procedures between groups (i.e. 
whether studies had controlled for the additional processes inherit in the delivery of the 
incentive, compared to regular treatment) was also assessed. When judging the risk of 
detection bias, the reliability of the outcome measures used in each study (i.e. whether 
outcome assessors could have be deceived by study participants) was also assessed. For 
cluster-randomised controlled trials, the potential risk of bias resulting from recruitment 
of participants after the randomisation of clusters was completed was considered. 
 
Data analysis 
Dichotomous outcome data were analysed by calculating an odds ratio (OR) for each 
study as effect size, along with a 95% confidence interval. When dichotomous data 
were not available, but continuous outcome data were, a standardized mean difference 
(SMD) was calculated and converted to an odds ratio on the basis of a logistic 
distributional assumption for the continuous outcome (Anzures‐Cabrera, Sarpatwari & 
69 
 
Higgins, 2011). Specifically, the approximate log (OR) was obtained asSMD 3 . 
Outcomes assessed at various time-points were analysed separately based on pre-
specified time-assessment intervals and the availability of data corresponding to each of 
these. The time-assessment categories used were: months from intervention start: 6, >6-
12, >12-18, >18; months from incentive removal: >2-3, >3-6, >6. Missing standard 
deviations of change in body weight were calculated using the formula proposed by 
Avenell, Broom, Brown et al. (2004) (SD of weight change = 5.915 + (0.283 x absolute 
value of mean change in weight)).  
 
Heterogeneity was assessed via examination of forest plots and calculation of the I-
squared statistic. Data were synthesized via meta-analyses grouped by timed endpoints. 
Univariable and multivariable meta-regressions were conducted to assess the effect of 
moderating variables on log (OR). These were implemented for outcomes relating to 6 
and >6-12 months from intervention start, and >2-3 and >6 months from incentive 
removal. They were not implemented for outcomes relating to other endpoints due to 
insufficient statistical power. Moderating variables investigated were behaviour type, 
incentive value, incentive attainment certainty, recipients’ level of deprivation, 
judgement of potential bias relating to standardisation of study procedures, and 
judgement of potential bias related to the reliability of outcome measurements. Two-
way interactions were examined between pairs of effect modifiers. All meta-regression 
analyses were conducted using xi:metareg in Stata (Harbord & Higgins, 2008). 
Summary effect sizes were calculated and their 95% confidence intervals were 













The flow of records and studies through the systematic review process is presented in 
Figure 4.1. Of the 38730 publications identified, 516 were retrieved for full-text 
assessment. Thirty-nine studies (n=39) reported in 53 articles met criteria for inclusion 
in the review (Appendix 4.2), 34 of which were used for the analyses (Figure 4.1). One 
study (Francisco, Paine, Fawcett et al., 1994) was excluded from the analyses because 
outcome dispersion was reported in the form of ranges, which are unstable for the 
estimation of standard errors needed for the analyses. Another (Jeffrey, 1983) was 
excluded because the two incentivised groups included in this study did not differ on 
any key variables (value and/or certainty of attainment) and there was no control group 
to which a possible combination of the two could be compared. Two more (Mahoney, 
1974; Norton & Powers, 1980) were excluded because data relating to assessments at a 
minimum of 6-months from intervention start were not reported. A final study (Wing, 
Epstein, Marcus et al., 1981) was not included in the analyses because a crossover 
method was employed in the delivery of incentives and there was no control group to 
which a possible combination of the two crossover treatment groups could be compared.  
 
Description of included studies 
The characteristics of studies included in the review are presented in Appendix 4.3. 
Seven studies (n=7) were cluster-randomised control trials (Galbo, 2011; Giné et al., 
2010; Glasgow, Hollis, Ary et al., 1993; Gomel, Oldenburg, Simpson et al., 1993; 
Hennrikus, Jeffery, Lando et al., 2002; Jason, Salina, McMahon et al., 1997; Klesges et 
al., 1987). The great majority (n=36) were conducted in the USA. One was conducted in 
the Philippines (Giné et al., 2010), one in Australia (Gomel et al., 1993) and one in 
Northern Ireland (Hunter, 2011). Twelve were carried out within workplaces (Bloch, 
Armstrong, Dettling et al., 2006; Francisco et al., 1994; Galbo, 2011; Glasgow et al., 
1993; Gomel et al., 1993; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Hunter, 2011; Jason et al., 1997; 
Klesges et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989; Volpp et al., 2009; Windsor, Lowe & Bartlett, 
1988), 15 within the community (Giné et al., 2010; Jeffery, Bjornson-Benson, 
Rosenthal et al., 1984; Jeffery et al., 1990; Jeffery, Wing, Thorson et al., 1998; Jeffery, 
Wing, Thorson et al., 1993; Jeffrey, 1983; John, Norton, Fassbender et al., 2011; Klem 
& Klesges, 1988; Kramer, Jeffery, Snell et al., 1986; Mahoney, 1974; Norton & 
Powers, 1980; Saccone & Israel, 1978; Volpp, John, Troxel et al., 2008a; Wing et al., 
1981; Wing, Jeffery, Pronk et al., 1996), 11 in medical/health settings (Crowley, 
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Macdonald & Walter, 1995; Donatelle & Hudson, 2002; Donatelle et al., 2000a; 
Donatelle et al., 2000b; Gallagher et al., 2007; Heil et al., 2008; Higgins, Heil, Solomon 
et al., 2004; Higgins, Washio, Heil et al., 2012; Long, Jahnle, Richardson et al., 2012; 
Shoptaw, Rotheram‐Fuller, Yang et al., 2002; Volpp, Levy, Asch et al., 2006) and one 
in an academic setting (Tevyaw, Colby, Tidey et al., 2009).  
 






























The majority of studies (n=19) focused on smoking cessation (Crowley et al., 1995; 
Donatelle & Hudson, 2002; Donatelle et al., 2000a; Donatelle et al., 2000b; Gallagher et 
al., 2007; Giné et al., 2010; Glasgow et al., 1993; Heil et al., 2008; Hennrikus et al., 
2002; Higgins et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2012; Jason et al., 1997; Klesges et al., 1987; 
Rand et al., 1989; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Tevyaw et al., 2009; Volpp et al., 2006; Volpp 
et al., 2009; Windsor et al., 1988), 15 on indicators of healthier eating and/or physical 
activity (body weight cholesterol levels, haemoglobin levels) (Bloch et al., 2006; 
Francisco et al., 1994; Galbo, 2011; Jeffery et al., 1984; Jeffery et al., 1993; Jeffrey, 
1983; John et al., 2011; Klem & Klesges, 1988; Kramer et al., 1986; Long et al., 2012; 
Mahoney, 1974; Norton & Powers, 1980; Saccone & Israel, 1978; Volpp et al., 2008a; 
Wing et al., 1981) and two on physical activity (Hunter, 2011; Wing et al., 1996). Three 
studies targeted more than one behaviour. Jeffery et al. (1990) targeted two different 
participant populations for weight-loss (indicator of healthier eating and/or physical 
activity) and smoking cessation respectively. Gomel et al. (1993) focused on smoking 
cessation, and changes to indicators of physical activity and/or healthier eating. Only 
data on smoking cessation were included in the analyses, as those relating to the other 
outcomes were not fully reported in the study report. Jeffery et al. (1998) reported 
outcomes relating both to physical activity and weight-loss (indicator of healthier eating 
and/or physical activity). No studies reporting outcomes relating to healthier eating or 
alcohol consumption were found eligible for inclusion in the review. None of the 
included studies reported outcomes relating to the impact of financial incentives on 
motivation to engage in the target behaviours. 
 
Target behaviours were assessed at various time-points ranging from six months (Bloch 
et al., 2006; Crowley et al., 1995; Donatelle & Hudson, 2002; Donatelle et al., 2000a; 
Donatelle et al., 2000b; Francisco et al., 1994; Giné et al., 2010; Gomel et al., 1993; 
Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2012; Hunter, 2011; Jason et al., 
1997; Jeffery et al., 1990; Jeffery et al., 1998; Jeffery et al., 1993; Klem & Klesges, 
1988; Klesges et al., 1987; Long et al., 2012; Rand et al., 1989; Shoptaw et al., 2002; 
Tevyaw et al., 2009; Volpp et al., 2006; Volpp et al., 2009; Windsor et al., 1988; Wing 
et al., 1996) to >18 months from intervention start (Glasgow et al., 1993; Hennrikus et 
al., 2002; Jason et al., 1997; Jeffery et al., 1993), with most studies reporting outcomes 
at more than one time-point. Twenty-six studies included assessments after 
discontinuation of the incentives (Crowley et al., 1995; Donatelle & Hudson, 2002; 
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Giné et al., 2010; Glasgow et al., 1993; Gomel et al., 1993; Heil et al., 2008; Hennrikus 
et al., 2002; Higgins et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2012; Hunter, 2011; Jason et al., 1997; 
Jeffery et al., 1984; Jeffery et al., 1993; Jeffrey, 1983; John et al., 2011; Klem & 
Klesges, 1988; Mahoney, 1974; Norton & Powers, 1980; Saccone & Israel, 1978; 
Shoptaw et al., 2002; Tevyaw et al., 2009; Volpp et al., 2008a; Volpp et al., 2006; 
Volpp et al., 2009; Windsor et al., 1988; Wing et al., 1996). In the remainder 13 the last 
assessment coincided with the delivery of the final incentive (Bloch et al., 2006; 
Donatelle et al., 2000a; Donatelle et al., 2000b; Francisco et al., 1994; Galbo, 2011; 
Gallagher et al., 2007; Jeffery et al., 1990; Jeffery et al., 1998; Klesges et al., 1987; 
Kramer et al., 1986; Long et al., 2012; Rand et al., 1989; Wing et al., 1996). 
 
Financial incentive schemes 
The duration of the financial incentive schemes varied between studies and ranged from 
three weeks (Tevyaw et al., 2009) to 18 months (Hennrikus et al., 2002; Jeffery et al., 
1998; Jeffery et al., 1993). In the majority of studies (n=31), financial incentives were 
offered in addition to other interventions for changing the target behaviours, such as 
counselling, advice, social support, self-help manuals, brochures, professional advice, 
nicotine replacement therapy. In eight studies financial incentives consisted of the only 
intervention (Francisco et al., 1994; Gallagher et al., 2007; Glasgow et al., 1993; Heil et 
al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2012; Hunter, 2011; Long et al., 2012). 
Studies differed in the types of incentives they used. Eight rewarded behaviour change 
with vouchers (Donatelle & Hudson, 2002; Donatelle et al., 2000a; Donatelle et al., 
2000b; Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2012; Hunter, 2011; 
Shoptaw et al., 2002), 11 with cash payments (Jason et al., 1997; Jeffery et al., 1998; 
Jeffery et al., 1993; Klem & Klesges, 1988; Klesges et al., 1987; Long et al., 2012; 
Rand et al., 1989; Tevyaw et al., 2009; Volpp et al., 2006; Volpp et al., 2009; Windsor 
et al., 1988) and two with cheque payments (Bloch et al., 2006; Wing et al., 1981). Four 
studies used lottery tickets as the incentive (Crowley et al., 1995; Francisco et al., 1994; 
Hennrikus et al., 2002; Wing et al., 1996) and eight used a system of deposits refunded 
for behaviour change (Giné et al., 2010; Jeffery et al., 1984; Jeffery et al., 1990; Jeffrey, 
1983; Kramer et al., 1986; Mahoney, 1974; Norton & Powers, 1980; Saccone & Israel, 
1978). Two studies combined cash payments or vouchers with lottery prizes (Glasgow 
et al., 1993; Gomel et al., 1993), two combined cash payments with a deposit system 
(Galbo, 2011; John et al., 2011) and one included two incentivised groups, one of which 
was offered cash payments combined with deposits and the other lottery tickets (Volpp 
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et al., 2008a). Information regarding incentive type was missing from one study 
(Gallagher et al., 2007). With regards to their certainty of attainment, the majority of 
incentive schemes were classified as ‘certain’ (n=32). Four were classified as 
‘uncertain’ (Crowley et al., 1995; Francisco et al., 1994; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Wing et 
al., 1996) and two as both ‘certain and uncertain’ (i.e. the same group of participants 
were offered cash payments or vouchers and chances to win lotteries) (Glasgow et al., 
1993; Gomel et al., 1993). One study (Volpp et al., 2008a) included two incentivised 
groups, one which was classified as ‘certain’ and the other as ‘uncertain’.  
 
The value of the incentives also differed between studies and ranged from $15 to $1950 
for ‘certain’ incentives and $11200 for ‘uncertain’ incentives. The value of the 
incentives used in 20 studies was classified as ‘low’ (Bloch et al., 2006; Donatelle et al., 
2000b; Francisco et al., 1994; Hunter, 2011; Jason et al., 1997; Jeffery et al., 1984; 
Jeffery et al., 1990; Jeffrey, 1983; Klem & Klesges, 1988; Klesges et al., 1987; Kramer 
et al., 1986; Long et al., 2012; Mahoney, 1974; Norton & Powers, 1980; Rand et al., 
1989; Saccone & Israel, 1978; Tevyaw et al., 2009; Volpp et al., 2006; Windsor et al., 
1988; Wing et al., 1981) and as ‘high’ in 18 studies (Crowley et al., 1995; Donatelle et 
al., 2000a; Galbo, 2011; Gallagher et al., 2007; Giné et al., 2010; Glasgow et al., 1993; 
Gomel et al., 1993; Heil et al., 2008; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Higgins et al., 2004; 
Higgins et al., 2012; Jeffery et al., 1998; Jeffery et al., 1993; John et al., 2011; Shoptaw 
et al., 2002; Volpp et al., 2008a; Volpp et al., 2009; Wing et al., 1996). One study 
(Donatelle & Hudson, 2002) included two incentivised groups differing in their 
classification of value (i.e. the value of the incentive offered to one group was classified 
as ‘low’ and to the other as ‘high’). 
 
Participants 
The studies included a total of 12842 adults, with a mean age ranging from 19.7 to 59.6 
years. The studies differed in terms of the types of populations they included. Twelve 
studies included employees (Bloch et al., 2006; Francisco et al., 1994; Galbo, 2011; 
Glasgow et al., 1993; Gomel et al., 1993; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Hunter, 2011; Jason et 
al., 1997; Klesges et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989; Volpp et al., 2009; Windsor et al., 
1988), 15 included members of the general public (Giné et al., 2010; Jeffery et al., 1984; 
Jeffery et al., 1990; Jeffery et al., 1998; Jeffery et al., 1993; Jeffrey, 1983; John et al., 
2011; Klem & Klesges, 1988; Kramer et al., 1986; Mahoney, 1974; Norton & Powers, 
1980; Saccone & Israel, 1978; Volpp et al., 2008a; Wing et al., 1981; Wing et al., 
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1996), six included pregnant women (Donatelle & Hudson, 2002; Donatelle et al., 
2000a; Donatelle et al., 2000b; Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 
2012) one patients with COPD (Crowley et al., 1995) one mental health patients 
(Gallagher et al., 2007) one drug addicts (Shoptaw et al., 2002), and one university 
students (Tevyaw et al., 2009). Most studies (n=32) included male and female 
participants. In addition, however, to the six studies conducted with pregnant women, 
one further study included only female participants (Wing et al., 1996) and another 
included only men (Jeffrey, 1983). Most studies (n=38) included participants from 
various ethnic backgrounds. One, however, focused only on African Americans (Long 
et al., 2012). Participants’ level of social and material deprivation was classified as 
‘high’ in 12 studies (Crowley et al., 1995; Donatelle & Hudson, 2002; Donatelle et al., 
2000a; Donatelle et al., 2000b; Gallagher et al., 2007; Giné et al., 2010; Heil et al., 
2008; Higgins et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2012; Rand et al., 1989; Shoptaw et al., 2002; 
Volpp et al., 2006). Five studies did not include any information to allow for a 
classification to be made (Klem & Klesges, 1988; Mahoney, 1974; Norton & Powers, 
1980; Wing et al., 1981; Wing et al., 1996). Participants’ deprivation level of the 
remaining 22 studies was classified as ‘other’.  
 
Quality of included studies (Figure 4.2) 
 
Selection bias 
As can be seen in Figure 4.2, only nine studies were considered to have conducted 
adequate randomisation procedures (Gallagher et al., 2007; Hunter, 2011; John et al., 
2011; Long et al., 2012; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp et al., 2008a; Volpp et al., 2006; 
Volpp et al., 2009; Windsor et al., 1988) with six of these considered to have also 
followed adequate procedures for allocation concealment (Hunter, 2011; Long et al., 
2012; Volpp et al., 2008a; Volpp et al., 2006; Volpp et al., 2009; Windsor et al., 1988). 
Most studies provided insufficient detail for the integrity of randomisation (n=26) and 
allocation concealment to be assessed (n=30). The remainder did not use adequate 
randomisation (Crowley et al., 1995; Giné et al., 2010; Higgins et al., 2004; Jeffery et 
al., 1990) or allocation concealment procedures (Crowley et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 







Because of the nature of financial incentive schemes, participants could not be blinded 
in any of the studies. Seven studies either reported attempts to blind personnel, or their 
lack of blinding was assessed to have minimal risk (i.e. the chances of personnel 
influencing outcomes (e.g. through encouragement) were considered to be low (Bloch et 
al., 2006; Donatelle & Hudson, 2002; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Hunter, 2011; Jeffery et 
al., 1990; Long et al., 2012; Volpp et al., 2006). Thirty studies provided insufficient 
detail to judge whether a lack of blinding increased the risk of bias, while in two studies 
the lack of blinding was considered to have potentially affected outcomes (Gallagher et 
al., 2007; Glasgow et al., 1993). 
 
The majority of studies (n=29) had sufficiently standardised study procedures between 
incentivised and control groups, therefore diminishing the possibility that obtained 
outcomes were the result of the additional processes inherit in the delivery of the 
incentive. Ten studies failed to standardise study procedure between incentivised and 
control groups (Donatelle et al., 2000a; Donatelle et al., 2000b; Galbo, 2011; Gallagher 
et al., 2007; Giné et al., 2010; Glasgow et al., 1993; John et al., 2011; Kramer et al., 
1986; Volpp et al., 2008a; Volpp et al., 2009). The impact of incentives in these studies 
may, therefore be confounded by other intervention components. 
 
Detection bias 
In all but one study, which was judged to be at high risk of bias (Jeffery et al., 1998; 
outcome relating to physical activity), outcome assessors were considered to have been 
adequately blinded or the risk resulting from a lack of blinding, was judged to be 
minimal (i.e. the method of outcome assessment did not require subjective interpretation 
on behalf of the assessors). Most studies (n=28) used reliable, objective measures when 
assessing outcomes. The measures used in seven studies were judged to have potentially 
resulted in detection bias (Hennrikus et al., 2002; Hunter, 2011; Jason et al., 1997; 
Jeffery et al., 1990; Jeffery et al., 1998; Klesges et al., 1987; Rand et al., 1989). 
 
Risk of bias in Cluster-RCTs 
Of the seven studies that were cluster randomised-controlled trials, one was judged at 
high risk of recruitment bias, due participants being recruited into clusters after 
randomisation was completed (Giné et al., 2010). The information provided in one 
further study was insufficient to judge its risk of recruitment bias (Gomel et al., 1993). 
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Figure 4.2. Risk of bias 
summary: review authors' 
judgements about each 
























Impact of financial incentives on repeated health-related behaviours  
Thirty-four independent studies including 10585 adults were included in the analysis 
(See Appendix 4.4 for study results). The total number of comparisons across time-
points and behaviours/outcomes was 112 (Table 4.1)1. The number of comparisons 
decreased over time, with only five relating to assessments beyond 18 months from 
intervention start (Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.1. Number of comparisons and participants included in the analyses for each 
behaviour/outcome  
Behaviour type/ Outcome*           # of comparisons # participants 
treatment /control 
Smoking cessation 70 4500/4263 
Indicators of healthier eating/physical activity  35 639/551 
Physical activity 7 293/306 
Total 112 5432/5120 
* The majority of comparisons relate to smoking cessation. Very few relate to physical activity. None reflect alcohol 
consumption and healthier eating 
 
Table 4.2 Number of comparisons at difference measurement times 
Measurement time Number of comparisons 
6 months from start 33 
>6-12 months from start 28 
>12-18 months from start 13 
>18 months from start 5 
>2-3 months from removal 11 
>3-6 months from removal 9 
>6 months from removal 13 
 
There were moderate levels of heterogeneity between studies at most time-points (6 
months: I²=39%, p=0.01; >6-12 months: I²=66%, p=0.00; >12-18 months: I²=54%, 
p=0.01; >2-3 months from incentive removal: I²=51%, p=0.02), apart from >18 months 
from intervention start (I²=0%, p=0.55) and >3-6 months (I²=46%, p=0.06) and >6 
months from incentive removal (I²=0%, p=0.59). These levels of heterogeneity derived 
from moderate to substantial inconsistencies observed at these time-points in relation to 
the results of studies assessing smoking cessation (6months: I²=52%, p=0.00; >6-12 
                                                             
1 Eight studies (Donatelle et al 2002; Jeffery et al 1990; Jeffery et al 1993; Jeffery et al 1998; Saccone 
&Israel 1978; Shoptaw et al 2002; Volpp et al 2008; Windsor et al., 1988) included more than one 
incentivised group and appropriate control and thus offered more than one comparison at assessed time-
points. These were included in the analysis as separate studies: Donatelle (A), (B); Jeffery 1990 (A), (B); 
Jeffery 1993 (A), (B); Jeffery 1998(A), (B); Saccone 1978(A), (B); Shoptaw 2002 (A), (B); Volpp 2008 
(A), (B); Windsor 1988 (A), (B). 
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months: I²= 79%, p=0.00; >12-18 months: I²=61%, p=0.02; >18 months: I²=0%, 
p=0.39; >2-3 months from incentive removal: I²=54%, p=0.04; >3-6 months: I²=46%, 
p=0.06; >6months: I²=15%, p=0.32). Inconsistencies observed in relation to the results 
of studies targeting other behaviours/outcomes were judged minor (indicators of 
healthier eating/physical activity: 6months: I²=0%, p=0.63; >6-12 months: I²= 0%, 
p=0.98; >12-18 months: I²=0%, p=0.75; >18 months: I²=0%, p=0.77; >2-3 months from 
incentive removal: I²=0%, p=0.60; >6 months from incentive removal: I²=0%, p=0.66; 
physical activity: 6months: I²=0%, p=0.88; >12-18 months: I²=0%, p=0.54) 
 
Financial incentives beneficially changed overall behaviours at 6 months (OR 1.80, CI 
95% 1.37-2.32), >6-12 months (OR 1.67, 95% CI 1.13-2.45) and >12-18 months from 
intervention start (OR 2.69, 95% CI 1.39-5.23), but not at >18 months (OR 1.04, 95% 
CI 0.88-1.21) (Table 4.2; Figure 4.3). When focusing only on studies including 
assessments of outcomes after removal of the incentives, it was found that financial 
incentives were effective in sustaining changes to overall behaviour for up to >2-3 
months from incentive removal (OR 2.11, 95% CI 1.21-3.6.7), but not thereafter (>3-6 
months: OR 1.31, 95% CI 0.90-1.90; >6 months: OR 1.10, 95% CI 0.95-1.27) (Table 
4.2; Figure 4.4). 
 
With regards to their impact on each of the included behaviours/outcomes, financial 
incentives significantly increased the odds of smoking cessation at all measurement 
times except at >18months from intervention start (6 months: OR 1.80, 95% CI 1.37-
2.37; >6-12 months: OR 1.67, 95% CI 1.13-2.45; >12-18months: OR 2.69, 95 CI 1.39-
5.23; >18months: OR 1.06, 95% CI 0.90-1.25). Improved cessation rates were sustained 
for up to >2-3 months after incentive removal (OR 2.57, 95% CI 1.20-5.54). Beyond 3 
months from removal these effects disappeared (>3-6 months: OR 1.31, 95% CI 0.90-
1.90; >6 months: OR 1.16, 95% CI 0.94-1.43). Financial incentives also beneficially 
changed indicators of healthier eating and/or physical activity at 6 months (OR 1.66, 
95% CI 1.28-2.15) and >6-12months (OR 1.39, 95% CI 1.03-1.88) from interventions 
start. Changes, however, were not sustained after incentive removal (>2-3 months: OR 
1.99, 95% CI 0.53-7.42; >6 months: OR 1.11, 95% CI 0.76-1.63). Physical activity was 
measured only at 6 months and >12-18 months from intervention start and >2-3 months 
after incentive removal: financial incentives did not to lead to any significant 
improvements at any of these time-points (6 months: OR 1.29, 95% CI 0.97-1.72; >12-
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18 months: OR 0.75, 95% CI 0.41-1.34; >2-3 months from incentive removal: OR 1.21, 
95% CI 0.85-1.71 (Table 4.2)). 
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Table 4.3. Overall behaviour change (summary odds ratios with 95% CIs) and change for targeted behaviours 
 Measurement time from intervention start 
 












































































































































The change of effects over time  
The effects of financial incentives on behaviour overall follow a monotonic trend, with 
effects weakening over time. A similar pattern is also observed with regards to effects 
on indicators of healthier eating and/or physical activity, with point estimates of 
summary odds ratios decreasing with measurement time. This trend, is less clear for 
smoking cessation, but becomes more apparent after exclusion of comparisons at >12–
18 months from intervention start, where the summary odds ratios are estimated less 
precisely, as suggested by the wider 95% confidence intervals (Figure 4.5).  
 
When focusing on effects after removal of the incentives, this monotonic trend is also 
observed, with effects on behaviour overall weakening over time. A similar pattern is 
also observed with regards to effects on smoking cessation and indicators of healthier 
eating and/or physical activity, with point estimates of summary odds ratios decreasing 
















































Time since offering financial incentives










Effect modifiers (Table 4.3) 
The effect of financial incentives was not modified by the target behaviour, the 
incentive value or the incentive type at any of the assessed time-points (Table 4.3). Both 
univariable and multivariable meta-regressions (latter are found in Appendix 4.5) 
produced similar results. Univariable analysis showed participants’ deprivation level to 
modify the effect size at >6-12 months from intervention start, but not at other time-
points (Table 4.3). Studies including highly deprived participants (n=10) generated an 
average effect approximately twice the size of studies including non-deprived 
participants (n=10) (OR 2.17, 95% CI 1.22-3.85) (Figure 4.7). Multivariable analysis 
did not reveal any statistically significant effect modifiers (Appendix 4.5) at >6-12 
months from intervention start. Meta-regression analyses were not performed for 
outcomes measured >12-18 and >18 months from intervention start or >3-6 months 
after incentive removal due to the small number of between-study comparisons at these 
time-points (n=13; n=5 and n=9 respectively). 
 
One interaction was found to be statistically significant at the 5% statistical significance 
level at 6 months from intervention start: low monetary value incentives were associated 
with a decrease in smoking cessation rates compared to higher monetary value 




























 m 6 m
Times since removal of incentives





cessation but not the direction of the effect. The summary odds ratio for smoking 
cessation from studies using financial incentives of low monetary value (n=10) vs. high 
monetary value (n=11) was 1.49 (CI 95% 1.12-1.98). We did not identify any 
statistically significant two-way interactions at the 5% statistical significance level at 
time-points other than 6 months from intervention start.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: The effect of financial incentives on health-behaviour according to recipients’ deprivation 





Table 4.4. Results from meta-regression analyses according to time-point 
                                        Univariable meta-regression 
 Measurement time from intervention start Measurement time after incentive removal 
  6months >6-12 months >2-3 months >6 months 
  
Behaviour Type 
Coefficient estimates  
(95% CI) 
P-values Coefficient estimates  
(95% CI) 
P-values Coefficient estimates 
 (95% CI) 




Smoking cessation             
vs.                                 
Healthier eating/physical activity indicators 
 
Smoking cessation          
 vs.                                    
Physical activity  
Attainment certainty 
Certain                      
    vs.                                  
 Uncertain 
 
Certain                     
 vs.                                        
Certain and uncertain 
Monetary value 
High                   
    vs.                                    
  Low  
Level of deprivation 
Other                      
    vs.                                      
   High  
Procedure standardisation bias 
Low                         
  vs.                                        
   High 
Outcome measure reliability bias 
Low                             
vs.                                      






0.73 (0.44 -1.23) 









(n=30 vs 2) 
 
 




















































































































































0.70 (0.09 -6.18) 






























































































































































Financial incentives changed repeated health-related behaviours with effects lasting up 
to 18 months from the beginning of intervention, but weakening over time. Changes 
were sustained up to three months after removal of the incentives but not thereafter. 
Neither target behaviour, incentive value nor incentive type independently modified 
effectiveness at any time-point. An interaction between the target behaviour and 
incentive value modified effects at six months from intervention start, with offers of 
lower monetary value decreasing the likelihood of smoking cessation. Recipients’ 
deprivation level modified effects between six and 12 months from intervention start, 
with higher deprivation levels increasing behaviour-change, but not at other time-points. 
 
Interpretation of findings 
This is the first review, of which we are aware, to provide an overall estimate of the 
impact of financial incentives across repeated health-related behaviours. Interpretation 
of the related findings, however, requires some caution for the following reasons. First, 
not all behaviours classified as repeated health-related were represented in this review. 
Searches did not yield any studies assessing eating-related behaviours or alcohol 
consumption that were eligible for inclusion. Second, although the overall impact of 
financial incentives on repeated health-related behaviours weakened over time, this 
coincided with a decrease in the number of comparisons assessing outcomes at each 
time-point, implying a lack of statistical power to detect longer-term effectiveness. For 
example, 33 comparisons were available at six months from intervention start, whereas 
only five included assessments beyond 18 months. Third, although the effectiveness of 
financial incentives was not modified by the target behaviour at any of the assessment 
time-points, inspection of their impact on individual behaviours suggests that summary 
effect sizes were driven by studies assessing smoking cessation. This was the only 
behaviour for which changes were maintained up to 18 months from intervention start 
and sustained after removal of the incentives. Finally, although physical activity was not 
affected by the offer financial incentives, the findings do not allow conclusions to be 
drawn due to lack of statistical power. Only three related studies met criteria for 
inclusion in this review (Hunter, 2011; Jeffery et al., 1998; Wing et al., 1996), with only 




Most of the studies included in this review targeted smoking cessation. This could 
partially explain why the use of financial incentives appears to be more promising for 
improving this behaviour compared with others. Contrary to the conclusions of previous 
reviews (Cahill & Perera, 2011; Jochelson, 2007; Kane et al., 2004), we found that 
changes to smoking cessation were sustained after incentive removal. This is perhaps 
due this review’s explicit focus on impacts after incentive removal, which hitherto had 
not been systematically assessed. Alternatively, it might be related to the inclusion of 
studies assessing the impact of financial incentives on smoking cessation during 
pregnancy (Donatelle & Hudson, 2002; Donatelle et al., 2000a; Donatelle et al., 2000b; 
Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2012), most of which included 
post-incentive follow-up assessments. Indeed, five out of seven comparisons assessing 
smoking cessation >2-3 months after incentive removal targeted pregnant smokers. 
Financial incentives are the single most effective intervention for smoking cessation in 
pregnancy (Bauld & Coleman, 2009; Lumley, Chamberlain, Dowswell et al., 2009), but 
the sustainability of their impact has remained unexplored. One of the characteristics of 
the studies demonstrating this effectiveness is the use of large rewards. Large rewards 
have been predicted to motivate greater behaviour-change (Jochelson, 2007; Lussier et 
al., 2006; Sigmon & Patrick, 2012; Sutherland et al., 2008). Incentive value in the 
present review was found to moderate the impact of financial incentives on smoking 
cessation at six months from intervention start, but not after incentive removal or at any 
other time-points. If the sustained effects of incentives on smoking cessation reported 
herein are related to the inclusion of studies incentivising pregnant smokers, then 
perhaps the key variable is not only incentive value, but also some of the other specific 
incentive scheme characteristics of these studies, the role of which was not assessed in 
this review. For example, apart from using large rewards, these studies also employed 
high frequency incremental reinforcement schedules that became gradually less frequent 
over time (Marteau, Thorne, Aveyard, et al, 2013). Alternatively, the classification of 
incentive value into ‘low’ and ‘high’ in this review was perhaps too crude to allow for 
effects to be detected at other time-periods, or there was insufficient statistical power to 
do so. At six months from intervention start, studies assessing smoking cessation were 
almost evenly split by value level, with a relatively large number of comparisons falling 
under each category (high value: 11 comparisons; low value: 10 comparisons). At other 
time points, however, this split was uneven (i.e. >6-12 months high: 13, low: 4; >2-3 
months from removal: high: 6, low: 1; >6 months from removal: high: 5; low: 2). 
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Although findings show that changes to smoking cessation can be sustained, there is no 
evidence to suggest that they do so beyond three months. Between three and six months 
from incentive removal only two studies significantly favoured the use of incentives 
(Giné et al., 2010; Volpp et al., 2009). The effectiveness of the latter has been attributed 
to its large sample size and use of large rewards (Cahill & Perera, 2011; Troxel & 
Volpp, 2012), characteristics shared by both these studies. There was insufficient power 
to conduct meta-regression analyses at this time point and determine, whether under 
some conditions, improvements could be sustained beyond three months. The lack of 
significant effects and effect modifiers six months from removal, however, suggest that 
ultimately changes disappear, regardless of the circumstances surrounding incentive 
delivery.  
 
In interpreting the impact of financial incentives on indicators of healthier eating and/or 
physical activity, it should be noted that outcomes assessed beyond six months from the 
beginning of interventions refer to weight-loss. Consistent with the findings from a 
previous meta-analysis (Paul-Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008) financial incentives did not 
improve weight-loss beyond 12 months from the beginning of intervention and changes 
were not sustained after incentive removal. The temporal pattern of weight-loss in all 
related studies included in this review was similar. Rate of weight-loss was faster at the 
beginning of treatments, slowed down gradually over time and was followed by slow 
regain. This pattern is seen with most weight-loss interventions (Jeffery, 2012). The 
reduced duration of incentive effects on weight-loss compared to smoking cessation 
might have several causes. First, change in body weight is the cumulative sequence of 
many different behaviours over time rather than the consequence of a single behaviour 
(Jeffery, 2012). Second, many of the included studies had small sample sizes. This, in 
combination with the reported weakening of incentives effects over time might have 
resulted in a lack of power to detect effects at later time-points. Furthermore, reported 
outcomes varied greatly between studies, from mean change in weight from baseline, to 
the proportion of individuals achieving minimum weight-loss equivalent to 5% of initial 
body weight, to the proportion of participants achieving pre-specified weight loss goals 
and the proportion maintaining post-treatment weight. Outcomes not relying on 
achievement of a pre-specified goal (e.g. mean weight-loss) are potentially more 
sensitive than others (e.g. the proportion of individuals achieving minimum weight-loss, 
equivalent to 5% of initial body weight) in revealing significant differences between 
groups. Consequently, the variability in reported outcomes might have affected the 
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potential to detect effects. Finally, whereas the majority of studies on smoking cessation 
used rewards, most studies on weight-loss used deposit contracts. Requiring individuals 
to pledge their own funds rather than directly reinforcing them might differentially 
affect outcomes. The moderating effect of this incentive characteristic was not assessed 
in the present review.  
 
Also in contrast to the findings relating to smoking cessation, the value of the incentive 
was not found to modify incentive impacts on indicators of healthier eating and/or 
physical activity, including weight-loss. This is at odds to the large body of research 
documenting a positive association between magnitude of reinforcement and behaviour 
change (e.g. Catania, 1963; Kane et al., 2004; Lussier et al., 2006). This null finding 
might be related to a lack of power. Although at certain time-points (i.e. >6-12 months 
and >6 months from removal) studies were evenly split by value category, the number 
of comparisons was perhaps too small to detect any effects.  
 
Financial incentives have been predicted to be more effective in motivating behaviour-
change in the most socially and materially deprived (Sutherland et al., 2008). Consistent 
with this prediction, between six and 12 months from the beginning of interventions, the 
effect of incentives across repeated health-related behaviours was greater for those 
classified as highly deprived. This is the first empirical evidence to date, we are aware 
of, demonstrating the role of recipients’ deprivation level in the moderation of the 
impact of financial incentives on health-related behaviour. It is an important finding as 
it suggests that the use of incentives schemes can help reduce health inequalities. 
Although the impact of incentives appeared greater for highly deprived individuals 
compared to those classified as non-deprived at all assessed time-points, differences 
were significant only between six and 12 months from intervention start. This is most 
likely related to a lack of statistical power to detect effects at other assessed time-points. 
The number of comparisons falling under each deprivation category at time-points after 
removal of the incentives was relatively small and unevenly split (>2-3 months after 
removal: high: 7, other:3; >6 months high:4; other: 9). Comparisons at six months from 
intervention start were similar in size and split to those at >6-12 months. Detection of 
effects at the latter time-point coincided with a greater proportion of studies including 
non-deprived participants having removed financial incentives compared to studies 
including deprived participants. This might have resulted in reduced effect sizes in the 
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former, thus creating a big enough difference with the latter to be statistically 
significant. 
 
The impact of financial incentives has also been suggested to differ according to 
whether the incentive attainment is certain (e.g. voucher or cash payment) or uncertain 
(e.g. a lottery ticket), with some studies demonstrating the superiority of cash payments 
over lotteries (Leung et al., 2002; Niza, Rudisill & Dolan, in submission). This review, 
did not find the certainty of incentive attainment to significantly affect outcomes, at any 
of the time-points. The most likely explanation for this null finding is that analyses were 
not powered to detect effects. Of the 34 studies included in the analyses, three were 
classified as ‘uncertain’ (Crowley et al., 1995; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Wing et al., 1996) 
two as both ‘certain and uncertain’ (Glasgow et al., 1993; Gomel et al., 1993), while one 
study (Volpp et al., 2008a) included two incentivised groups, one which was classified 
as ‘certain’ and the other as ‘uncertain’. Consequently, no conclusions can be drawn 
from this review regarding the moderating role of the certainty of incentive attainment.  
One of the issues in evaluating the use of financial incentives for changing health-
related behaviours is that without appropriate control groups their effectiveness could be 
confounded by the processes inherit in their delivery. For example, attainment of 
incentives often requires additional involvement on behalf of both participants and 
personnel, such as frequent clinical appointment attendance, monitoring of the formers’ 
performance etc., which could lead to an overestimation of the impact of financial 
incentives (Hagger et al., 2013; Johnston & Sniehotta, 2010). Similarly, outcome 
measures that could be achieved through deception could also result in the effectiveness 
of incentives being exaggerated (Lynagh, Sanson-Fisher & Bonevski, 2011). The 
present review attempted to assess the influence of potential confounders by including 
risk of bias judgements into the analyses relating to whether studies had standardised 
study procedures between incentivised and control groups and whether they had 
included reliable outcome measures. The findings provided some support in favour of 
the need to control these variables, especially when targeting smoking cessation. 
Between two and three months after incentive removal, significant positive effects were 
rendered non-significant when analyses included only studies that used standardised 
study procedures and reliable outcomes measures. After six months from incentive 
removal non-significant effects became significant when focusing only on studies that 
had standardised study procedures but included outcome measures of questionable 
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reliability. As findings are based on a small number of studies and are associated with a 
high probability of having resulted by chance (they were significant at the 10% 
statistical significance level) they should be interpreted with caution. 
One of the concerns regarding the use of incentives for changing repeated health-related 
behaviours is their potential to adversely affect motivation to engage in the incentivised 
behaviour, thus making it less likely than before incentivisation that the behaviour is 
performed once the incentive is stopped (e.g. Deci et al., 1999; Frey & Jegen, 2001; 
Jochelson, 2007; Kane et al., 2004). For this claim to be supported one would expect 
individuals in the non-incentivised arms of studies to be more likely than those 
incentivised to perform the target behaviours after removal of the incentives. Consistent 
with the conclusions from a recent narrative review (Promberger & Marteau, 2013), 
findings presented herein provide no empirical evidence to support this. On the 
contrary, those incentivised were significantly more likely to sustain improvements up 
to three months after removal of the incentives, with a similar non-significant trend 
observed at other time-points.  
 
Strengths 
The main strength of the present review lies in the novelty of its analyses. It is the first 
thus far to provide an overall estimate of the impact of financial incentives across a 
range of repeated health-related behaviours. It also the first review to focus explicitly on 
assessment of the sustained impact of financial incentives on repeated health-related 
behaviours i.e. after the removal of incentives. Furthermore, it is one of the few reviews 
to systematically assess the role of potential effect modifiers and study characteristics, 
thus attempting to answer not only the question of whether financial incentives are 
effective in changing repeated health-related behaviours, but under which circumstances 
they are most effective. In assessing the impact of potential effect modifiers, it is the 
first study we are aware of to empirically demonstrate the role of deprivation level in 
the moderation of the impact of financial incentives on health-related behaviours, thus 
highlighting the potential of incentives schemes to reduce health inequalities. 
 
Limitations 
The main limitation with this review is the small number of studies and associated lack 
of statistical power for certain comparisons, which restricts the conclusions that can be 
drawn with regards to: i. the sustained impact of financial incentives on overall 
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behaviour beyond 18 months from intervention start; ii. the impact of financial 
incentives on physical activity; and iii. the role of certain of the targeted effect 
modifiers, including that of deprivation level at all assessed time-points. Furthermore, 
although results revealed the modifying role of incentive value and recipients’ level of 
deprivation, the role of many other potentially important effect modifiers was not 
examined. A few of these include whether the incentive scheme involved the use of a 
deposit contract system, the duration of the incentive scheme, the immediacy of 
incentive delivery and the frequency of reinforcement. An improved understanding of 
the role of these potential effect modifiers is needed to inform the design of optimal 
personal financial incentive schemes. 
 
Implications 
Behaviour-change maintenance is critical for chronic disease prevention and should be 
the aim of every intervention aimed at changing repeated health-related behaviours. 
Although the use of financial incentives appears useful in initiating healthier 
behaviours, with changes sustained for some months after incentive removal, results 
from this review reveal that ultimately their effects disappear. This is a problem shared 
by most interventions targeting repeated behaviours at an individual level (Ogden, 
2012). This review compared the use of financial incentives to conditions where 
incentives were absent, but not to other interventions. It is therefore, not known whether 
incentives are better at producing short-term changes compared to other behaviour-
change strategies. If so, it might be worth complementing their use with behaviour-
maintenance and relapse prevention strategies, which could be delivered after incentive 
removal. The suggestion to combine the use financial incentives for changing repeated 
health behaviours with other supportive strategies has also been advocated by others 
(Hagger et al., 2013; Lynagh et al., 2011). If, however, incentives are no more effective 
than other related interventions, then one might question their cost-effectiveness. Even 
if cost-effective, their application depends on their acceptability to policy makers, health 
professionals and the public. The use of financial incentives for health promotion 
attracts negative views (Promberger, Brown, Ashcroft et al., 2011), although these can 
be attenuated by evidence of their effectiveness (Promberger, Dolan & Marteau, 2012). 
Consequently, what is found effective in research will not necessarily be considered 
acceptable in practice. For example, following completion of one the few studies 
included in this review which showed sustained smoking cessation beyond three months 
after incentive removal (Volpp et al., 2009), the company where the study was run 
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decided to implement an incentive scheme based on the study findings. However, 
feedback from non-smoking employees led to the replacement of the $750 reward, used 
in the trial, with a $625 penalty for smokers (Volpp, Asch, Galvin et al., 2011). Given 
the lack of sustainable effects, in addition to the potential cost-effectiveness and 
acceptability issues surrounding the use of financial incentives for changing health-
related behaviours, future research and policies should investigate and consider the 
application of financial mechanisms in environment policies that would alter the 
consequences of repeated health-related behaviours at a population level (e.g. through 
taxation or product pricing), rather than directly reward individuals.  
 
Conclusion 
Financial incentives change repeated health-behaviours and may help reduce health 
inequalities. However, their role in reducing the burden of non-communicable diseases 
is potentially limited, given the lack of evidence regarding the sustainability of effects 
beyond three months after incentive removal. 
 
The next chapter 
The findings presented in this chapter demonstrate that financial incentives can improve 
repeated health-related behaviours with effects sustaining up to three months from 
incentive removal. They also highlight the need to control for the variables and 
processes inherit in the delivery of financial incentives. The next chapter presents the 
findings from Study 2, a qualitative study complementing the findings from Study 1, by 
further exploring the variables that could potentially confound the impact of financial 
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Background: Financial incentives appear to be effective in promoting smoking 
cessation in pregnancy. The mechanisms by which they might operate, however, are 
poorly understood. The present study examines how financial incentives for smoking 
cessation during pregnancy may work, by exploring pregnant women’s experiences of 
trying to stop smoking, within and outside of a financial incentives scheme. 
 
Methods: Thirty-six (n=36) UK-based pregnant smokers (n=36), offered standard NHS 
Stop-Smoking Services, of whom twenty (n=20) were enrolled in a financial incentives 
scheme for smoking cessation (n=20) and sixteen (n=16) were not, were interviewed 
about (i) their motivation to stop smoking, and (ii) the factors they perceived as 
influencing their quitting efforts. Framework Analysis was used to analyse the data. 
 
Results: Women in the two groups reported similar reasons for wanting to stop 
smoking during pregnancy. However, they described dissimilar experiences of the Stop-
Smoking Services, which they perceived to have differentially influenced their quit 
attempts. Women who were incentivised reported using the services more than women 
who were not incentivised. In addition, they described the motivating experience of 
being monitored and receiving feedback on their progress. Non-incentivised women 
reported problems receiving the appropriate Nicotine Replacement Therapy, which they 
described as having a detrimental effect on their quitting efforts. 
 
Conclusion: Women participating in a financial incentives scheme to stop smoking 
reported greater engagement with the Stop-Smoking Services, from which they 
described receiving more help in quitting than women who were not part of the scheme. 
These results highlight the complexity of financial incentives schemes and the 
intricacies surrounding the ways in which they operate to affect smoking cessation. 
These might involve influencing individuals’ motivation and self-regulation, changing 
engagement with and provision of support services, or a combination of these. 
 
E Mantzari, E., F Vogt, F., Marteau, T.M. (2012). Financial incentives for smoking 
cessation during pregnancy: is it from being paid or from the extra aid? BMC Pregnancy 




Smoking during pregnancy is a major cause of infant morbidity and mortality (Floyd, 
Rimer, Giovino et al., 1993) and contributes greatly to health inequalities (Power & 
Matthews, 1997). It causes up to 4,000 deaths per year in the UK from miscarriages and 
stillbirths, and leads to increases in preterm births, low birth-weight babies (Charlton, 
1996; Royal College of Physicians, 1992), sudden infant death, asthma and attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (Batstra, Hadders-Algra & Neeleman, 2003; Charlton, 
1996). Despite these adverse consequences, many women fail to quit while pregnant, 
with at least 17% of mothers in the UK smoking throughout their pregnancies in 2005 
(The Information Centre, 2007). Reducing the incidence of smoking during pregnancy 
has therefore become an important focus of health policies in the UK and elsewhere. 
 
Existing interventions have been relatively successful in promoting smoking cessation 
during pregnancy (Dolan-Mullen, Ramirez & Groff, 1994; Lumley, Oliver & Waters, 
2004). A recently updated systematic review (Lumley et al., 2009) found the most 
effective of these to involve the use of financial incentives for stopping smoking 
(financial incentives vs. other interventions: OR 0.73, 95% CI 0.66 to 0.82). Findings 
were based on results from four trials conducted in the USA (Donatelle et al., 2000a; 
Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2004; Sexton & Hebel, 1984) and were confirmed by a 
further meta-analysis of three of these (Bauld & Coleman, 2009). The mechanisms by 
which financial incentives operate to influence behaviour, including smoking cessation 
during pregnancy, are, however, poorly understood. 
 
The effectiveness of financial incentives in achieving behaviour change, including 
smoking cessation during pregnancy, might result from direct influences to individuals’ 
motivation and self-regulation. These influences potentially enable people to overcome 
the costs and barriers associated with initiating the target behaviour and move them past 
the “threshold” needed to act. Specifically, incentives might operate according to 
learning theory principles, by linking the target behaviour, in this case smoking 
cessation, to a positively evaluated stimulus, such as money, thus strengthening the 
value associated with the target behaviour (Marteau, 2010). Additionally they might 
work by influencing individuals’ outcome expectations, i.e. their valuation of the likely 
consequences of a behaviour (Bandura, 1986), or by facilitating allocation of limited 
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cognitive capacity in such a way as to achieve the now more highly valued altered 
behaviour (Marteau, 2010). 
 
The effectiveness of financial incentive schemes in changing behaviour might also 
result from indirect influences, mediated by changes to some aspects of the process 
involved in their delivery. For example, the provision of incentives requires contact 
between health professionals, who measure achievement of the target behaviour, and 
patients (Johnston & Sniehotta, 2010). Incentives might therefore operate by increasing 
health professionals’ engagement with patients or through the additional involvement 
required on behalf of the latter, such as attending clinics or undergoing particular tests, 
as part of assessing eligibility for a reward. In addition, they might influence behaviour 
through the contract-agreement, which specifies the conditions of exchange between 
behaviour and money, encompassed in their use (Johnston & Sniehotta, 2010), given 
that behavioural contracts have been shown to improve patients’ adherence to health 
care activities, even in the absence of the exchange of money (Bosch-Capblanch et al., 
2007). It is also possible, however, that the effectiveness of financial incentives in 
achieving behaviour change might also result from an interaction between direct 
influences to individuals’ motivation and self-regulation and indirect influences 
mediated by changes so certain aspects involved in the process of incentive delivery. 
 
Understanding the mechanisms by which financial incentives influence behaviour is key 
to determining how to maximise their effectiveness (Bonner, 1999) and for designing 
optimal incentive schemes. Research is therefore needed to illuminate the processes 
involved in producing their beneficial effect for smoking cessation during pregnancy. 
Given the lack of knowledge regarding the factors that are operating when financial 
incentives schemes are used, qualitative research has an important contribution to make. 
The present qualitative study attempts to explore these factors by examining and 
comparing the stop-smoking experiences of pregnant women who were incentivised for 









This is a comparative qualitative study, based on semi-structured interviews aiming to 
identify differences between the experiences of pregnant smokers who were 
incentivised for cessation and of those who were not. 
 
Participants 
Participants were thirty-six (n=36) pregnant smokers, twenty (n=20) of whom were 
receiving financial incentives for smoking cessation (incentivised group). The 
remaining sixteen (n=16) were only offered NHS Stop-Smoking treatment2 (control 
group). Participants were recruited through an opportunistic sampling frame involving a 
population of 115 pregnant smokers living in the greater Birmingham area, who were 
referred by their midwives to the NHS Stop-Smoking Services during the period 
September 2009 to May 2010 and: 
 
 
i. were enrolled in a pilot scheme of incentivising smoking cessation run by the 
Birmingham East & North Primary Care Trust (BEN PCT), (in partnership with 
the Young Foundation as part of the Healthy Incentives (HI) Partnership 
(www.healthyincentives.org.uk)), or 
 
ii. were eligible to be part of a comparison cohort, because they lived in areas 
selected as “comparison” areas. 
 
Women enrolled in the financial incentives scheme were offered vouchers for quitting 
smoking. The offer of vouchers was dependent upon women’s area of residence, i.e. 
whether they lived within the two pilot areas or not. Pilot areas were selected from the 
districts of Birmingham with the highest prevalence of smoking during pregnancy. The 
pilot financial incentive scheme aimed to enrol 200 pregnant smokers by the end of 
                                                             
2The NHS Stop Smoking Services were set up in England in 1999 to provide assistance to smokers 
motivated to quit. Services are provided in group or individual sessions, depending on local 
circumstances and patient preferences. Services vary in the types of interventions they provide and in 
their approaches to delivery Guidelines, however, specify that Nicotine replacement therapy (NRT), 
Champix (varenicline) and Zyban (bupropion), in combination with intensive behavioural support should 
be offered to all smokers using the services (Department of Health, 2008). Other elements services should 
include are: monitoring of carbon monoxide (CO) levels and feedback of results (Chambers, 2009). The 
guidelines also specify that pregnant smokers should be offered the full range of services, including 




2010 and to compare their smoking cessation rates against those of a comparison cohort 
of 200 women, recruited for evaluation purposes from parts of the PCT where financial 
incentives were not offered. Comparison areas were chosen by matching the pilot areas 
with two geographically similar districts with equivalent rates of smoking during 
pregnancy and comparable socio-economic composition. At the time the current study 
was conducted, 91 women were enrolled in the pilot financial incentives scheme, of 
whom 81 consented to be contacted for an interview. We aimed to recruit 20 of these 
women for the interview and achieved this with telephone calls to the first 58. 
Furthermore, 24 pregnant smokers had been recruited into the comparison cohort, of 
whom 20 consented to be contacted for an interview. All these women were contacted 
and 16 agreed to be interviewed (Figure 5.1). 
 
Following the recommendations by Guest, Bunce & Johnson (2006) as well as those by 
Kuzel (1992) and Morse (1994), this sample size was considered sufficient for 
achieving data saturation. Indeed, saturation of data for the themes of interest was 
achieved in both groups by the 15
th
 interview, suggesting that the group sizes were 
sufficiently large to capture the range of women’s smoking cessation experiences.  
 
The mean age of participants in the incentivised group was 28 (range: 19–43). The 
mean age of participants in the control group was also 28 (range 17–39). The majority 
of participants were of White-British origin, with one woman in the control group being 
of Indian decent and another in the incentivised group originating from Hong-Kong. 
Although, minority ethnic groups constitute approximately one third of Birmingham 
city’s population (with the Pakistani being the largest minority group followed by the 
Indian (Birmingham City Council, 2009)), women from minority ethnic groups are less 
likely to smoke compared to the general population (National Statistics, 2006). 
Compared to white women, they are also less likely to smoke during pregnancy 
(Hawkins, Lamb, Cole et al., 2008) and are less likely to set quit dates with the stop 
smoking services (The NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2011a). 
The majority of women in both groups were of a lower socio-economic class, as 
indicated by their Index of Multiple Deprivation Scores (incentivised group: 42.35; 
control group: 42.51) which are above the average for Birmingham3. Most women in 
                                                             
3 According to the West Midland Regional Observatory the most deprived area within the West Midlands 
is Birmingham with 39.63% of its Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) ranking in the worst 10% 
in England and an average IMD score of 38.41. 
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both groups were unemployed. Of those who were employed, most held skilled non-
manual and semi-skilled manual jobs in fields such as social care, maintenance and 
cleaning, automobile mechanics and law enforcement. At the time of the interview, six 
(n=6) women in the incentivised group and five (n=5) in the control group had already 
delivered their babies. Furthermore, one individual in the incentivised group had 
miscarried. With regards to their smoking status, eight (n=8) women in the incentivised 
group and four (n=4) in the control group were smoke-free at the time of the interview. 
The remaining 24 individuals were still smoking. 
Pregnant smokers in 
Birmingham referred to NHS 
Stop Smoking Services by 
midwives 
Excluded 
Pregnant smokers not 
living in pilot or 
comparison areas 
Pregnant smokers enrolled in 
pilot financial incentives 
scheme at time of study 
(n=91/200) 
Pregnant smokers recruited 
to comparison cohort at time 
of study (n=24/200) 
Contacted to be 
interviewed (n=58) 
Contacted to be 
interviewed n=(20) 
Interviewed (n=20) Interviewed (n=16) 
Consented to be contacted 
about an interview (n=20) 
Consent to be contacted 
about an interview (n=81) 





Women in both groups were enrolled into the Stop-Smoking Services by the “Call to 
quit” call-centre (Birmingham’s telephone line for information on local smoking 
cessation services). Women taking part in the financial incentives scheme for smoking 
cessation were asked by the call-centre’s representative about their willingness to be 
contacted about the possibility of being interviewed about their experiences of quitting 
smoking. Women not taking part in the scheme were informed by a research midwife 
working for BEN PCT of the possibility of being interviewed. Women in both groups 
willing to be contacted about the study were approached by the interviewer (EM) via 
telephone. She informed them about the purpose of the research and enquired about 
their willingness to participate. At this point, all women were advised that they would 
receive £20 in cash to compensate for their time spent completing the study (See 
Appendix 5.2 for Participant Information Sheet). A time and place [for a face-to-face 
interview] was arranged with those agreeing to be interviewed. The majority of 
participants chose to be interviewed in their homes, with one woman from the control 
group opting to be interviewed at her place of work (See Appendix 5.3 for Consent 
form). Ethical Approval for this study was granted by the NHS Birmingham, East, 
North and Solihull Research Ethics Committee, ref no 09/H1206/105) 
 
Interviews 
Interviews were semi-structured and followed an interview schedule (See Appendix 5.4) 
to elicit information on women’s experiences of smoking cessation. The schedule was 
piloted with five pregnant smokers attending prenatal appointments at a London 
hospital. 
 
Interviews lasted an average of 23 minutes and were digitally recorded. Upon their 
completion, women were thanked and received £20 in cash to compensate for the time 
spent participating in the interview. 
 
Data analysis 
Anonymised interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using Framework 
Analysis (Ritchie & Spencer, 2002) with the purpose of identifying and comparing the 
themes emerging in the accounts given by the two groups of women, with regards to i) 
their motivation for wanting to quit smoking, and ii) the factors they perceived as 
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facilitating and inhibiting their quit attempts (See Appendix 5.5 for resulting 
Framework) 
 
Framework Analysis was chosen because it provides a method of addressing specific 
research questions rather than for purely exploratory purposes. It consists of a matrix-
based analytic method, which facilitates rigorous and transparent data management, 
such that all stages of analysis can be systematically conducted. 
 
The analysis was conducted separately for each group of women. The resulting themes 

























The themes emerging in the accounts given by the two groups of women, with regards 
to i) their motivation for wanting to quit smoking, and ii) the factors they perceived as 
facilitating and inhibiting their quit attempts, are presented below. 
 
Reasons for wanting to quit smoking during pregnancy 
Women who were incentivised for smoking cessation and those who were not reported 
similar reasons for wanting to stop smoking during pregnancy, which were grouped 
under five themes: (i) Concern for baby, (ii) Feeling pressured, (iii) Financial issues, 
(iv) Concern for self and (v) Concern for existing children (Table 5.1). 
 









Being pregnant and concerned about the possible 




Internal Pressure. Experiencing guilt for 
smoking while pregnant and feeling pressure from 
self not to do so 
  
External Pressure. Experiencing pressure from 




Expense of smoking. Not affording to smoke and 
wanting to save money 
  





Concern about the illnesses and physical damage 
(including damage to appearance) caused by 
smoking, about consequences on existing health 






Being concerned about the consequences of 
smoking on the health of existing children, 
wanting to reduce the possibility of them 
becoming smokers because of exposure to 
smoking, and wanting to avoid causing children 






The provision of Financial incentives emerged as a sub-theme of Financial issues in 
incentivised women’s accounts of their motives for trying to quit: 
 
“And then the vouchers give me incentive to, like, stop smoking” (Participant14, 
incentivised group) 
 
This, however, was not discussed as a primary reason and was often described as an 
“added bonus” for already wanting to quit: 
 
“…the vouchers and the incentives and I thought well, that's even better. That, to me, 
was an added bonus that wasn't a reason quit, that was just like a reward for actually 
going to them.” (Participant26, incentivised group) 
 
Factors perceived as influencing the quit attempt 
 
Perceived facilitators 
The factors that were perceived as facilitating cessation efforts by women in both 
groups were grouped under two themes: (i) Endogenous factors and (ii) Exogenous 
factors. Facilitators described as deriving from within the self were classified as 
Endogenous, while those described as deriving from the environment were classified as 
Exogenous. Similar Endogenous factors were described by women who had been 
incentivised for cessation and those who had not. These were grouped under three sub-
themes: (i) Awareness of the consequences of smoking and quitting; (ii) Dispositional 
factors (positive mood, motivational strength and personality characteristics); and (iii) 
Low addiction (Table 5.2). 
 
Women in both groups also described comparable Exogenous factors as facilitating 
their efforts, which were grouped under five sub-themes: (i) Availability of support; (ii) 
Lack of exposure to smoke; (ii) Lack of opportunity to smoke; (iv) Stop Smoking 
Services; and (v) Financial incentives (Table 5.2). Their accounts differed, however, 
with regards to the dimensions that emerged in relation to one of the Exogenous factors, 
namely the Stop-Smoking Services. Although participants in both groups described the 
perceived beneficial effects of Receiving support and advice from the services and of 
the Nicotine Replacement Therapy that was provided by the services, incentivised 
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women discussed the former more consistently and at a greater length than did non-
incentivised women.  
 
Table 5.2.Factors perceived to facilitate smoking cessation attempt 
Factor Description Incentivised  
Non-
Incentivised  
Endogenous     
Awareness of the 
consequences of 
smoking & quitting  
On the baby’s health. Having  knowledge or 
experience of  the consequences of smoking on 
the unborn baby and thinking of potential harms 
  
 On resources. Thinking that smoking leads to a 
waste of money and quitting efforts and 
experiencing the benefits of quitting on money 
and time 
  
 On personal health. Thinking of the 
consequences of smoking on health and 
experiencing the physical benefits of quitting 
  
Dispositional factors  Personality. Possessing traits associated with an 
increased ability to maintain focus and persist 
with efforts  
  
 Motivational strength. Wanting to quit and 
being focused on quitting 
  
 Mood. Being in a positive mood   
Low addiction Lack of Cravings. Not experiencing cravings for 
cigarettes and smoking 
  
Exogenous    
Availability of support i) Having friends, family and colleagues provide 
encouragement, praise, concurrent quitting, and 
prohibition of smoking or exposure to smoke 
  
Lack of exposure to 
smoke 
Lack of smoking in immediate environment and 
deliberately avoiding smoking situations 
  
Lack opportunity to 
smoke 
Decreased opportunities to smoke due to 
prohibition of smoking in certain places and 
around certain people, embarrassment of 
smoking in public, existence of health issues or 




Receiving support& advice. Being provided 
with support by speaking to smoking cessation 
counsellors and receiving information and advice 
  
 NRT. Receiving NRT   
 Receiving feedback. Getting feedback on 
progress either verbally from members of the 
services or by viewing improved CO levels 
  
 Being monitored. Having CO levels checked by 
the Stop-Smoking Services 
  





Incentivised women additionally described the motivating experience of Being 
monitored: 
 
“I think having that knowing that he was going to check what, what we were… the 
intake and stuff that was kind of the, the bit that was making me not want to smoke as 
well because it was like for the test…” (Participant02, incentivised group) 
 
Specifically, women in this group described how having their carbon monoxide levels 
checked made them not want to smoke, out of the need to prove their abstinence: 
 
“if I go to the chemist I have to prove to the pharmacist that I have cut down… it's a 
bigger goal” (Participant36, incentivised group) 
 
This need appeared related to their fear of being judged for smoking during pregnancy: 
 
“I knew that I'd got to go and check in, it's what, it's what that person would think of me 
I'm pregnant and I'm smoking and they'll going to know that I'm smoking. So it was that, 
having that support because I knew I'd have to face somebody. And I guess it was that 
being judged by…” (Participant26, incentivised group) 
 
It also appeared to have arisen from their fear of being told off for not trying to quit: 
 
“So I was constantly thinking about keeping my carbon monoxide levels down so I don't 
get into trouble… I thought it was like I keep smoking like my five/six a day then my 
carbon monoxide levels will either stay the same or go up a little bit. And it would be 
like, "You're not trying to quit why should I bother with you because you're not even 
participating". Do you know what I mean?” (Participant20, incentivised group) 
 
Furthermore, it appeared to be associated with women’s desire to avoid disappointing 
the smoking cessation counsellors: 
 
“…they was very good. And I think it was going to somewhere like that every week that 
you didn't want to go and say, "I smoked." ((laughs)) You know it helped you… You 




Being monitored was closely related to the sub-theme Receiving Feedback, which was 
also perceived by incentivised women as having a beneficial effect on their smoking 
cessation efforts: 
 
“For me to be tested and everything is good because and it kind of makes you feel good 
when it comes up like that and they're like "Oh well done."” (Participant30, 
incentivised group) 
 
In fact, Receiving Feedback was described as a consequence of Being Monitored: 
witnessing improved carbon monoxide levels and/or receiving related praise from the 
smoking cessation counsellors was perceived to increase confidence and was thus 
perceived as facilitating efforts: 
 
“It's just more of a moral support I think really and checking your carbon levels and 
once you realise you've done good, you know, it boosts your confidence to keep, keep 
not smoking, do you know what I mean?” (Participant32, incentivised group) 
 
These differences in experiences may be related to the observation that women in the 
control group were less engaged with the services, regardless of the fact that access was 
equal across the two groups: Whereas all women in the incentivised group had used the 
Stop-Smoking Services at least once, some individuals in the control group had failed to 
attend even their first appointments: 
 
“So have you used the services this time round?”(Interviewer) 
“Not as yet - no” (Participant21, control group). 
 
Had non-incentivised women used the services, their experiences might have been more 
similar to those of incentivised women, given that service delivery was meant to be 
identical across the two groups, with the exception of voucher provision. Indeed, when 
asked how being monitored each week would potentially influence her attempt to stop 
smoking, one woman in the control group who had not attended the services reported: 
 
“No I think that sounds good… Because it's, it's actually assessing you isn't it? You're 
not going to want to turn up there say you've not stopped smoking…. I think that would 
help me. …Because it's putting a little bit of pressure on me, it's pushing me a little bit… 
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Because you want to do it anyhow and I suppose like somebody watching you constantly 
that's what it's like isn't it? (Participant35, control group) 
 
This differential engagement with the services seems related to the offer of Financial 
Incentives which appears to have motivated incentivised women to attend the services: 
 
“I wouldn't have bothered going all the way to the doctors because at the beginning of 
your pregnancy and that you don't want to go out the house anyway because you're 
feeling sick and you're heavy and frumpy, and it just seems like a long way to go for 
nothing just to blow into a thing. With the vouchers it's like you're getting paid… 
rewarded to go there” (Participant14; incentivised group). 
 
Indeed, the Financial Incentives were perceived as facilitating cessation attempts: 
 
“the vouchers give me incentive to like stop smoking… So the vouchers have helped 
yeah because I'm thinking it's not that worth risking.” (Participant14, incentivised 
group) 
 
The vouchers appeared to have achieved this by providing a goal to work towards and a 
focus for resisting urges to smoke: 
 
“I feel like I need another one [cigarette] I sort of sit there and think to myself well if I 
have this one it's going to mess me up getting my vouchers for my kids….I won't 
because I'll just think well I've got the vouchers to look forward to” (Participant16, 
incentivised group) 
 
An alternative explanation for the absence of the aforementioned sub-themes from the 
accounts of non-incentivised women is that whereas monitoring in the incentivised 
group was conducted routinely due to attainment of the vouchers being contingent upon 
the results of such monitoring, monitoring in the control group was inconsistent. This 
accords with the accounts of two women in the control group, one of whom was not 
monitored and another who exceptionally, was: 
 
“They don't really monitor you… They only do it, they only did it the once” 
(Participant28, control group). 
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“I think that was the most useful thing and knowing that you were going back the 
following week and that it had to be good because there was a quantifiable way of 
seeing if you'd been sticking to the routine.” (Participant13, control group; 28:20–23). 
 
Perceived inhibitors 
Similarly to the perceived facilitators, the factors that were perceived to inhibit 
cessation efforts, both by women who were incentivised and those who were not, were 
grouped under two themes: (i) Endogenous and (ii) Exogenous factors. Obstacles 
described as deriving from within the self were classified as Endogenous, while those 
described as deriving from the environment were classified as Exogenous. Similar 
Endogenous obstacles were described by women who had been incentivised for 
cessation and those who had not. These were grouped under four sub-themes: (i) 
Disregarding the consequences of smoking and quitting; (ii) Dispositional factors, 
(negative mood, lack of motivation strength and personality characteristics); (iii) 
Perceived benefits of smoking; and (iv) Addiction (Table 5.3). 
 
Furthermore, women in both groups reported similar Exogenous factors as 
compromising their efforts, which were grouped under five sub-themes: (i) Lack of 
support; (ii) Exposure to smoke; (ii) Availability of cigarettes and opportunity to smoke; 
(iv) Stop Smoking Services; and (v) Financial incentives (Table 5.3). Their accounts, 
however, differed with regards to the sub-themes that emerged in relation to one of the 
















Table 5.3. Factors perceived to inhibit smoking cessation attempt 
Factor Description Incentivised  Non-
Incentivised 





On the baby’s health. Discounting the harm of 
smoking because of having experienced 
disconfirming situations. Also discounting harm 
because of reduced cigarette consumption or because 
of inability to visualise baby and disregarding the 
benefits of quitting at advanced pregnancy stage 
  
 On personal health. Blocking out personal health 
concerns and disregarding harms of smoking due to 
lack of relevant experience or by dissociating self 




Personality. Possessing traits associated with a 
decreased ability to maintain focus and an increased 
likelihood of giving in to temptations 
  
 Lack of motivation. Not really wanting to quit 
because of enjoying smoking or not considering 
quitting important 
  
 Mood. Being in a negative mood   
Perceived benefits 
of smoking  
To deal with stress. Thinking that smoking helps 
with stress and using it to calm nerves down 
 
  
 To deal with boredom. Smoking when bored   
 To control weight. Thinking that smoking helps 
control weight and that quitting would result in 
weight-gain 
  
 For social inclusion. Feeling left out when not 
smoking and using smoking for social inclusion 
  
Addiction  Habit & Associations. Associating smoking with 
certain times of the day and being used to smoking in 
certain contexts 
  
 Cravings. Experiencing cravings for cigarettes and 
smoking 
  
Exogenous     
Lack of social 
support 
Not receiving encouragement or praise, being told not 
to smoke and not having non-smoker peers to set 
example 
  







Smoking in situations that allow doing so, such in the 





Lack of Support& Advice. Being judged, not being 
listen to, not being given sufficient explanations and 
advise, not being followed-up and lacking attention 
and individualized support 
  
 NRT provision problems. Not receiving the 
appropriate NRT  
  
 Lack of expertise. Lack of experience regarding 




Accessibility issues. Service not being local, waiting 





Problems with getting the vouchers  Ν/Α 
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Specifically, although participants in both groups described the perceived detrimental 
effects of the Lack of Support and Advice from the services and of the Accessibility 
Issues, non-incentivised women described the adverse effects of not receiving the 
appropriate Nicotine Replacement Therapy (NRT). This was perceived by women in 
this group as differentially affecting their cessation efforts and was mentioned as 
resulting from a lack of information on behalf of the services regarding the treatments 
allowed during pregnancy: 
 
“…she gave me the patch where I wanted the highest patch that I could have because 
I've been smoking 20 24/7, they actually told me the most I could have was a 20mg 
patch, which now I've been told by the midwife that's not true….The patch didn't seem 
to be working. And then when I told my midwife it didn't work and she said it was, erm, 
that I could have more than a 20mg patch. Where I'd got told that was all I could 
have… I was pregnant I wasn't allowed the highest dose I could have was the 20mg 
patch… I wouldn’t be smoking now if the pharmacist had given me the right amount” 
(Participant09, control group) 
 
This NRT-provision problem was also discussed in relation to the services’ lack of 
suggestions regarding alternative aids for women who were experiencing side effects 
with their existing treatment: 
 
“....patches…because I've got eczema… … and they irritate my skin… No I went back, 
erm, and I tried the inhalers, but I didn't like them, they give me a sore throat and I 
didn't like when you suck on them you get a nasty taste in your mouth. .. And I have 
tried the gum but I don't like them they sort of burn your tongue and that… So I like, 
sort of run out of options. I didn't know what else I could try really…” (Participant07, 
control group; 8:16–24; 9:1–9) 
 
It also seems to have stemmed from the specific prescription protocols adopted by the 
services: 
 
I remember running out [of lozenge] not being able to get an appointment so… 
Basically my doctor…you'd phone at half eight in the morning it's engaged for ages. By 
the time you get through you can't get an appointment but now they've changed the 
rules. The doctor I went to see him last time I said, "Look please I can do it on… it's 
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going to take me a month to get an appointment with your smoking nurse here" and I 
said, "can't you just give me the prescription now while I'm waiting?" But he 
wouldn't.”(Participant34, control group; 18:1–18) 
 
Not receiving the appropriate NRT appears associated to smoking cessation counsellors’ 
lack of expertise, which was described as an additional factor inhibiting the efforts of 
non-incentivised women: 
 
“I said to her, erm, er, yeah about me being pregnant and still carrying the lozenges 
she's like "Yeah." I said I've got patches at home can I still use them, like can I start on 
them again rather than give me more, they're from last year they're still in date though? 
And she said, "I've never dealt with a pregnant woman before."” (Participant34, 
control group) 
 
This lack of expertise was perceived as generalised and not only in relation to smoking 
cessation during pregnancy: 
 
“Actually she was actually reading off the form, so it wasn't like she knew it, she was 
reading it from a book when I kept signing it saying… And she was reading from there 
about the cravings and how the patch works and if I need to go in and talk to them. She 
wasn't saying it off her head, she was reading it off a form …[]… I think that's… she 
didn't know but really that's wrong because they're a pharmacy. Because they're a Stop 
Smo--… how you can stop smoking they should have all the right information. So I think 
someone needs to go to them and see if they have got the right information.” 
(Participant09, control group) 
 
The above issues were only raised by women who were not participating in the 
incentive scheme for cessation. Given that access to NRT was meant to be identical 
across the two groups, this finding raises questions regarding whether it reflects 
differences in perception, or actual differences in service provision. These possibilities 
will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Incentivised women were unique in their descriptions of the inhibiting effects of 
encountering problems with obtaining the vouchers, which they perceived as having 
compromised their smoking cessation attempt: 
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 “Well it didn't work very well because the first week we went my voucher came, but it 
didn't come to my address it came to another address and they sent it on. And then the 
next time I went to the chemist for the next test I didn't tell him that he hasn't got my 






























Women in the two groups reported comparable reasons for wanting to stop smoking 
during pregnancy. While citing broadly similar factors as influencing their quit 
attempts, their accounts differed with regards to their experiences of the Stop-Smoking 
Services. Women who were incentivised described the motivating experience of being 
monitored and receiving feedback on their progress. Non-incentivised women reported 
problems receiving the appropriate Nicotine Replacement Therapy, which they 
described as having a detrimental effect on their cessation efforts. 
 
Reasons for wanting to stop smoking 
Although women in the two groups reported similar motivations for trying to stop 
smoking, the accounts of incentivised women differed with regards to the mention of 
financial incentives. Attainment of the incentives by those in the incentivised group, 
however, was not described as a primary reason for attempting to quit smoking, but was 
referred to as an “added bonus” for doing something they were already motivated to do. 
The incentives therefore were not described as having an influential role in women’s 
decisions to stop smoking. This is consistent with the findings of a recent investigation 
showing that the majority of quitters, among non-pregnant smokers, did not consider 
incentive-attainment as a main reason for quitting smoking (Kim, Kamyab, Zhu et al., 
2011). There are three possible explanations for this finding. 
 
Firstly, it may reflect an actual failure of incentives to influence women’s motivation to 
stop smoking. The value of incentives offered in the current scheme was considerably 
smaller (more than ten-fold less) than that offered in the trials from which there is 
evidence of effectiveness (Donatelle et al., 2000a; Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 
2004). They were also offered as fixed sums at fixed periods of time. Consequently, 
they may have been too small or offered in a way unlikely to influence motivation or 
shape new behaviours. Initial impressions of the scheme’s effectiveness, however, do 
not appear to support this explanation: a larger number of women from the incentivised 
group compared to the non-incentivised group were referred to the Stop-Smoking 
Services. Although this could in part be attributable to midwives’ differential 
engagement with women from each group, it may also reflect incentivised women’s 




A second possible explanation for the aforementioned finding is that women were not 
aware of the effect financial incentives had on their motivation to stop smoking. Indeed, 
people are often unaware of the processes underlying their thoughts and motivation for 
their behaviours (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, Lee-Chai, Barndollar et al., 2001; 
Moskowitz, Li & Kirk, 2004). It is therefore possible that financial incentives 
influenced women’s motivation outside their conscious awareness. The mechanisms by 
which this could occur are unclear. One hypothesis is that incentives work through 
increasing positive affect, which can be induced by the provision of money (Meloy, 
Russo & Miller, 2006) and is considered to have a fundamental role in non-conscious 
motivation (Aarts, 2007) . 
 
The third explanation for the aforementioned finding is that women were aware of the 
effect financial incentives had on their motivation to stop smoking but were unwilling to 
admit it. Smoking during pregnancy is surrounded by social stigma. The majority of 
people are critical of pregnant smokers and view smoking during pregnancy as an 
indication of women not taking the responsibilities of motherhood seriously (NHS 
Leicestershire and Rutland, 2009). As such, pregnant women often perceive pressure to 
stop smoking (Bondas & Eriksson, 2001), with people feeling that they should do so for 
medical and social reasons (Bull, Burke, Walsh et al., 2007). The use of financial 
incentives for health promotion is also surrounded by negative attitudes, with people 
often finding such interventions unacceptable (Promberger et al., 2011) and arguing that 
individuals should not be paid to do things they should do anyway (Long & Volpp, 
2008). Taken together these negative attitudes may have lead women in the present 
study to feel pressure to focus more on the health reasons for quitting smoking, such as 
for the health of their baby and underplay the influence of incentives. 
 
Factors influencing quit attempts 
While women in the two groups perceived broadly similar factors as having influenced 
their quitting efforts, their accounts differed with regards to their dissimilar experiences 
of the Stop Smoking Services. Incentivised women described the motivating experience 
of being monitored and receiving feedback on their progress. Non-incentivised women 
on the other hand described the detrimental effect of not receiving the appropriate 





Firstly, given that access to the services and their delivery was meant to be identical 
across groups, findings may represent a difference in perception that is not reflected in 
actual delivery of the services. Specifically, differences in women’s levels of 
engagement with the services may have influenced how they perceived them. Repeated 
exposure to novel stimuli increases liking (Zajonc, 1968). Accordingly, incentivised 
women’s greater use of the services, which appeared related to the provision of 
incentives, may have led them to focus more on the services’ positive aspects. Similarly, 
the lack of engagement by non-incentivised women may have led them to focus on the 
negative aspects. Exposure can also have positive effects on affect (Bornstein, 1989; 
Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992), which has been shown to influence thinking, and the 
evaluation of events (Isen, 1993; Isen, 1999; Weiss, Nicholas & Daus, 1999), as well as 
attitude formation (Kim, Lim & Bhargava, 1998). The provision of money has also been 
shown to induce positive affect (Meloy et al., 2006). Consequently, differences in 
perception might have resulted from differences in positive affect. Furthermore, given 
that affect generated by one stimulus can be transferred to another (Allen & Madden, 
1985; Shimp, 1991), the positive affect resulting from incentive-attainment may have 
generalised to the context in which this occurred, i.e. the Stop-Smoking Services, thus 
leading incentivised women to perceive the services more positively. If differences in 
support are perceived, rather than actual, and reflect a differential engagement with the 
services, then the use of incentives might be effective to the extent that they increase 
pregnant smokers’ involvement with the services. 
 
A second explanation for the aforementioned perceived differences is that they may 
reflect an actual difference in women’s experience of the services. This may have 
resulted from differential engagement with the services, related to the provision of 
incentives, as well as differential delivery of the services. The latter may have resulted 
regardless of the intention to keep the services identical across groups. The incentive 
scheme was not randomised across services, but rather was provided in different parts of 
a geographical area in England. It is therefore possible that service delivery differed in 
these areas. Indeed, it is accepted that Services vary in the types of interventions they 
choose to provide and their approaches to delivery depending on local circumstances 
and patients’ preferences (Chambers, 2009; Department of Health, 2008). Although 
guidelines exist with regards to the elements all interventions should include, such as 
CO monitoring and delivery of progress related feedback (Chambers, 2009), provision 
of these varies greatly within the NHS Stop Smoking Services (May & McEwen, 2008). 
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Differences may have also been related to the provision of financial incentives. 
Incentivised women appeared to be using the services more as a result of the incentives. 
This greater engagement may have given women in this group more of an opportunity 
to experience service-related support. Furthermore, because voucher delivery was 
contingent upon biochemically confirmed smoking cessation, monitoring of smoking 
behaviour and provision of related feedback from the services might have been more 
regular for incentivised women. This would explain the absence of these themes from 
the accounts of non-incentivised women. Moreover, being involved in a programme 
specifically aimed at pregnant smokers may have led smoking cessation counsellors 
included in the financial-incentives scheme to receive more education and training 
about the NRT aids allowed during pregnancy. Absence of such training, due to the lack 
of involvement with a scheme designed for pregnant smokers, could explain non-
incentivised women’s experiences of problems with NRT-provision. Indeed, women in 
this group discussed these problems, in relation to service providers’ inadequate 
knowledge and expertise. 
 
If differences in the delivery of the Stop Smoking Services are actual rather than 
perceived and if the incentive scheme is shown to be effective in promoting smoking 
cessation, then one possible explanation would be that its impact is due wholly or in part 
to increased levels of support from the services, provided in the form of monitoring, 
progress-related feedback and/or delivery of appropriate NRT. Given the exploratory 
nature of the current study, in addition to the lack of a formal evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the incentive scheme, this hypothesis has not yet been tested. Further 
research is necessary to establish whether the potential effectiveness of financial 
incentives is indeed mediated by increased levels of support from the services. If this is 
the case, it may be possible to improve smoking cessation rates by furthering service 
providers’ training and ensuring delivery of regular monitoring and progress-related 
feedback, rather than providing incentives. However, while there is some evidence to 
suggest the effectiveness of NRT in reducing smoking in pregnancy (Bauld & Coleman, 
2009), biochemical risk assessment, including CO measurement and feedback, does not 
appear to aid smoking cessation (Bize, Burnand, Mueller et al., 2009). This finding 
could be taken as an indication that incentivised women’s perceptions of the beneficial 
influence of monitoring and feedback provision, in reality, may not have necessarily 
affected their cessation success. Further research is necessary to elucidate the role of 
service-support in the effectiveness of financial incentives for smoking cessation during 
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pregnancy and to clarify the role of other potentially important variables in the 
mediation of the impact of financial incentives for smoking cessation during pregnancy. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
The present study has certain important strengths. First, it is the first investigation 
attempting to determine how financial incentive schemes for smoking cessation during 
pregnancy may have their effects. Consequently, it is the first to explore the experiences 
and perceptions of pregnant smokers who have been incentivised for cessation and 
compare them with those of pregnant smokers not receiving incentives. This 
comparative design allowed for identification and exploration of the factors that are 
potentially important for smoking cessation during pregnancy. Finally, the strength of 
this study also lays in the size of its sample: it is one of the largest interview-based 
studies of pregnant smokers, focusing on the accounts of thirty-six women. This is 
important as pregnant smokers are an extremely difficult group to recruit and study. 
 
The current study has certain limitations that restrict assessment of how such incentives 
may be having an effect. First, the qualitative, exploratory nature of the study does not 
allow for causal relationships to be established. Second, as mentioned previously, the 
incentives scheme is pending formal evaluation and its effectiveness has yet to be 
established. At the time the interviews were conducted few women in either group had 
stopped smoking, thereby precluding comparisons within and between groups between 
quitters and non-quitters. 
 
Conclusion 
Regardless of the above limitations, the findings presented here highlight certain 
important issues about incorporating financial incentives for smoking cessation during 
pregnancy into the NHS Stop-Smoking Services. These include the need to be cautious 
about attributing the effects of financial incentives schemes to incentives per se, given 
that such schemes are complex behavioural interventions that might operate through one 
or more of various pathways, including by increasing individuals’ motivation and self-
regulation, by changing their engagement with and provision of support services, or a 





The next chapter 
The next chapter presents the protocol for Study 3, a randomised controlled trial further 
examining the effectiveness of financial incentives in changing health-related 
behaviours by assessing their impact on uptake of the HPV vaccination. The study also 
examines the modifying role of recipients’ deprivation level and assesses the potentially 
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HPV vaccinations: protocol for a 



















 Background: HPV vaccination reduces the risk of cervical cancer. Uptake, however, of 
the ‘catch-up’ campaign in England for 17-18 year old girls is below the 80% NHS 
target. The aim of this randomised controlled trial is to assess the impact of financial 
incentives on (a) the uptake and completion of an HPV vaccination programme and (b) 
the quality of the decisions to undertake the vaccination. It also aims to assess whether 
any impact on uptake is moderated by participants’ deprivation level. 
Method/Design: One thousand (n=1000) 16-18 year-old girls will be invited to 
participate in an HPV vaccination programme: Five-hundred (n=500) will have received 
a previous invitation to get vaccinated but will have failed to do so (previous non-
attenders) and 500 will not have previously received an invitation (first-time invitees). 
Girls will be randomly selected from eligible participants who are registered with a GP 
in areas covered by the Birmingham East and North (BEN) and Heart of Birmingham 
Primary Care Trusts. The two samples of girls will be randomised to receive either a 
standard vaccination invitation letter or an invitation letter including the offer of 
vouchers worth £45 for receiving three vaccinations. Girls will also complete a 
questionnaire to assess the quality of their decisions to be vaccinated. The primary 
outcome will be uptake of the 1st and 3rd vaccinations. The secondary outcome will be 
the quality of the decisions to undertake the vaccination, measured by assessing 
attitudes towards and knowledge of the HPV vaccination. 
Discussion: The key results will be: a) the effectiveness of financial incentives in 
increasing uptake of the 1st and 3rd vaccinations; b) the role of participants’ socio-
economic status in the moderation of the impact of incentives on uptake; and c) the 
impact of incentives on the quality of decisions to undertake the HPV vaccinations. 
 
Mantzari, E., Vogt, F., & Marteau, T.M. (2012). Using financial incentives to increase 
initial uptake and completion of HPV vaccinations: protocol for a randomised 
controlled trial, BMC Health Services Research 2012, 12:301 doi:10.1186/1472-6963-










Human Papillomavirus (HPV) is an ubiquitous sexually transmitted virus that could 
lead to cervical cancer (Brabin, Fairbrother, Mandal et al., 2005; Moscicki, Shiboski, 
Broering et al., 1998). HPV vaccines help prevent infection by some of the most 
common forms of HPV that are associated with later development of cancer (Harper, 
Franco, Wheeler et al., 2004; Villa, Costa, Petta et al., 2005). The HPV immunisation 





vaccine two months later, and a 3
rd
 vaccine six months after the first vaccination. 
Completion of all three vaccinations is necessary to effectively reduce the risk of 
cervical cancer (Garland, Hernandez-Avila, Wheeler et al., 2007). The degree of 
protection afforded by incomplete immunisation is currently unknown (Widdice, 
Bernstein, Leonard et al., 2011). 
 
Since September 2008 a national programme has started in England and Wales aiming 
to vaccinate girls aged 12-13 against HPV. A two-year ‘catch-up’ campaign that offers 
the HPV vaccine to 17-18 year old girls has also been initiated. The objective of these 
HPV vaccination programmes is to provide three doses of the HPV vaccine to females 
before they become sexually active, when the risk of HPV infection and subsequent 
cervical cancer development increases. It is estimated that if this objective is met and 
vaccination coverage is sufficiently high (80% of the target population), up to 400 
deaths per year in England could be prevented (Sheridan, White, Barlow et al., 2010). 
Although the national programme in England aimed at 12-13 year-old girls has resulted 
in high uptake (88.1% uptake of the first vaccination and 80.1% of the third 
vaccination), the uptake rates for the “catch-up” campaign in England (targeting 17-18 
year olds) have been lower, with 62.2% of the target group receiving the first dose and 
31.8% the third (Sheridan et al., 2010). 
 
Offering girls financial incentives to undergo the HPV vaccination could increase these 
uptake rates. Incentive mechanisms are increasingly being considered and used in health 
care policy in the UK and elsewhere in an attempt to change health-related behaviour 
(Lagarde et al., 2007; Le Grand, 2008). They are most effective in changing ‘simple’, 
‘one-off behaviours’ such as getting vaccinated (Achat, Mcintyre & Burgess, 1999; 
Beith, Eichler & Weil, 2007). Their effectiveness, however, has been predicted to vary 
with recipients’ level of social deprivation. Specifically, it has been argued that financial 
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incentives should be more effective for the most socially deprived (Sutherland et al., 
2008). Most of the calls, to use incentives in HPV vaccination programmes in the UK 
have so far focused on incentivising those providing the vaccination (e.g. GPs) rather 
than vaccination recipients (Tanday, 2008). Their effectiveness therefore in this context 
is currently unknown. Furthermore, no studies have assessed the role of social 
deprivation in the moderation of their impact on vaccination uptake. 
 
Even if effective in improving uptake of the HPV national programme, the use of 
financial incentives raises concerns about the possible adverse effects they may have on 
the quality of people’s decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours. For example, it 
has been argued that the prospect of receiving a financial reward could result in the risks 
associated with a particular health behaviour being overlooked (Marteau et al., 2009). 
To date, however, no known studies have assessed the mechanisms by which financial 
incentives influence the decision-making processes involved in engaging in an 
incentivised health behaviour. 
 
In summary, further research is needed to determine the impact of financial incentives 
upon first, uptake of the HPV vaccination, and second, the quality of recipients’ 
decisions to get vaccinated. Furthermore, research is needed to determine the role of 
social deprivation in the moderation of the impact of financial incentives on uptake of 
vaccinations. 
 
Objectives and hypotheses 
The primary objectives of the present study are: 
 
a) To assess the impact of financial incentives on the initial uptake (uptake of the 
first vaccination) and completion rates (uptake of the third vaccination) of an HPV 
vaccination programme 
 
b) To assess the impact of financial incentives on the quality of the decision to be 
vaccinated, as measured by attitudes towards and knowledge of the vaccination. 
The secondary objective is: 
 
a) To assess whether the impact of financial incentives on the initial uptake and 
completion rates of an HPV vaccination programme is moderated by participants’ 





Those offered financial incentives to get vaccinated against HPV are more likely to 
receive the first and third HPV vaccinations. 
 
Hypothesis II 
The effect of incentives on uptake of the first and third vaccinations will be moderated 
by participants’ levels of social deprivation, with larger effects of the incentives being 
observed for the most socially deprived 
. 
Hypothesis III 

























This is a randomised controlled trial in which two independent samples of participants 
are separately randomised to the offer of financial incentives for getting vaccinated. 
 
Participants 
Participants will compromise of 16-18 year old girls, living in Birmingham. To be 
included in the trial, girls must fulfil the following inclusion criteria: 
 
 
a) Live in areas falling under the administration of the Birmingham East and North 
(BEN) and the Heart of Birmingham Primary Care Trusts 
 
b) Be registered with a GP within one of the two PCTs 
 
c) Be eligible to be vaccinated through the clinics (Sutton Cottage, Partners in 
Health and Dove Medical Centre) 
 
d) Not have been vaccinated against HPV before. 
 
Half of the sample will consist of girls who have previously received an invitation to get 
vaccinated, but have failed to attend the first appointment (previous non-attenders). The 
remaining half will consist of girls who have not yet received an invitation to attend the 
vaccination programme (first-time invitees). 
 
Intervention 




All participants will receive letters inviting them to attend their first HPV vaccination 
session. These will be sent, on behalf of the Birmingham East and North and Heart of 
Birmingham Primary Care Trusts, and will include the date, time and location of the 






Reminder text messages 
Participants attending their first vaccination appointment will be asked to inform the 
researchers of their mobile phone numbers. These will be used to send text messages 
reminding them of their subsequent vaccination appointments. These will be sent during 
the intervals between the first and second vaccinations and the second and third 
vaccinations and two days prior to the next session. An example of the wording of these 
messages is: “(Name), don’t forget your HPV jab at (date and time) at the (venue). 
Thank you”. 
 
Offer of financial incentives 
Participants from the two samples (i.e. previous-non-attenders and first-time invitees) 
allocated to the incentivised groups will receive a modified version of the standard 
vaccination invitation letter, described above, which will include the offer of vouchers 
worth £45 for receiving the three vaccinations. Specifically, participants will be 
informed that they will receive: 
  £20 for the first vaccination 
  £5 for the second vaccination 
  
£20 for the third vaccination 
 
Procedure 
The trial will be run by the Birmingham East and North Primary Care Trust in 
collaboration with Healthy Incentives (www.healthyincentives.org.uk/, a social 
enterprise arising as a result of a partnership between the Young Foundation and the 
Birmingham East and North Primary Care Trust). The Birmingham East and North PCT 
has employed the Birmingham Primary Care Shared Services Agency (BPCSSA) to do 
the following: select participants to be included in the trial; randomise them to each 
group and post the invitation letters. Once the letters have been sent, the BPCSSA will 
provide the Healthy Incentives team with the details of all the participants who have 
been invited, including their names, addresses, scheduled vaccination dates, the 
participant group (previous non-attender or previously not invited) and randomisation 
group (incentive or not). The vaccinations for all individuals will take place at three 
community clinics (Appendix 6.3). The BPCSSA will schedule a number of 
‘incentivised only’ sessions at these clinics to avoid any tensions caused by not 
incentivising all groups. Vaccinations will be carried out by nurses working with Heart 
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of Birmingham (HOB). When attending their first vaccination session and while waiting 
to get vaccinated, participants will be asked to sign a consent form and complete a 
measure assessing the quality of their decision to get vaccinated (Appendix 6.4). They 
will also be requested to select a date for their next vaccination. Receipt of each 
vaccination will be contingent on completion of all the previous doses (i.e. in order to 
receive the 3rd vaccination participants will need to have first completed the 1st and 2nd 
vaccinations), with no skipping of doses being allowed. After receiving their 
vaccinations, participants in the incentivised groups will be provided with the 




 vaccination sessions, 
the Healthy Incentives team will send participants text messages reminding them of 
their appointments. 
 
Participant recruitment and randomisation  
To be included in the study, participants will be selected randomly from a list of names 
of all girls aged 16-18 years, meeting the above inclusion criteria (See Figure 6.1). This 
list will be compiled by the Birmingham Primary Care Shared Services Agency 
(BPCSSA), which holds and controls all Birmingham patient data, from the names of all 
16-18 year old girls eligible to be vaccinated against HPV. The list will be sorted 
according to whether girls have received a previous invitation to get vaccinated but have 
failed to attend their first session or have not previously received an invitation. 
BPCSSA will randomly select 500 participants to be included in the trial from each of 
these two sub-lists using the RAND() function in Excel. Selected individuals from both 
the samples will subsequently be separately randomised, via the aforementioned 
technique, to receive one of two invitations letters (Appendix 6.2): 
a) A standard letter inviting them to attend their first vaccination session, or  
b) A modified invitation letter, which will include the offer of vouchers worth £45 for 
receiving the three vaccinations  
 
This will result in the groups presented in Table 6.1 
 
Table 6.1 Incentivised and control groups 
 Receiving invitation for 1
st
 time Having received an invitation 
previously 
Control Group 250 (receiving standard invitation 
letters; no incentives) 
250 (receiving standard invitation 
letters; no incentives) 
Intervention 
Group 
250 (receiving modified invitation 
letters; incentives) 










Uptake of each vaccination by participants will be recorded at the community clinics 
where vaccinations will take place. 
 
Social deprivation 
Levels of social deprivation will be measured by using participants’ postcodes to 
calculate Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) scores. This is a measure of multiple 
deprivation measured at the small area level, i.e. the Lower Layer Super Output Area 
(LSOA). It is made up of seven LSOA level domain indices, which relate to income 
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deprivation, employment deprivation, health deprivation and disability, education skills 
and training deprivation, barriers to housing and services, living environment 
deprivation, and crime. IMD scores range from 0.37 (least deprived) to 85.46 (most 
deprived) (Community and Neighborhoods, 2007). 
 
Informed choice 
In order to assess whether the offer of financial incentives undermines the quality of 
decisions to undertake the HPV vaccinations, a short modified version of a validated 
measure of informed choice will be used (Marteau et al., 2001). This will consist of: 
 
 
1. two items rated on a seven point scale, assessing attitudes towards the HPV 
vaccination: “For me, having the HPV vaccination is (a) 1: not at all good −7: 
extremely good and (b) 1: not at all harmful-7: extremely harmful.” 
 
2. three items assessing knowledge of the HPV vaccination by requesting 
participants to determine the validity (whether true or false) of three statements 
relating to the vaccination: “If I have the HPV vaccination: I am less likely to get 
cervical cancer; I am less likely to get other sexually transmitted diseases; I am 
less likely to get pregnant” 
 
Sample size determination 
According to the latest report from the Department of Health on coverage of the HPV 
vaccinations (Sheridan et al., 2010) the average completion rate for the “catch-up” 
campaign targeting females aged 17-18 years in the Birmingham East & North Primary 
Care Trust is 32.4%. Previous studies investigating the impact of financial incentives on 
uptake of vaccinations have reported an average between-group difference of 
approximately 8.5%: Specifically, Moran, Nelson, Wofford et al. (1996) reported an 
effect size of 8.5% for uptake of the influenza vaccination with incentives (20.3% 
(control group) vs. 28.8% (incentivised group)) and Yokley & Glenwick (1984) 
reported an average increase of 8.4% in childhood immunisation across three time 
points with the addition of incentives (at two weeks: 10.1% (control group) vs. 22.5% 
(incentivised group); at 2 months: 22.7% (control group) vs. 30.8% (incentivised 
group); at three months: 26% (control group) vs. 30.8% (incentivised group)). Based on 
these figures, we expect financial incentives in this study to increase completion (i.e. 
uptake of the 3
rd
 vaccination) of the HPV vaccination programme by 8.5%, resulting in 
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a completion rate of 40.9% by incentivised groups. To detect this difference between 
arms using a two-tailed χ2 test at the 5% significance level with 80% power, a sample of 
1008 participants is required (calculations performed in GPower 3.0). This figure has 
been rounded off to the nearest whole number, resulting in a required sample of 1000 
participants (half of whom consist of previous-non-attenders and half of whom, first-
time invitees), giving 500 in each intervention arm (See Table 6.1) 
 
Evaluation 
The evaluation of the financial incentive scheme will be conducted by researchers at 
King’s College London, Centre for the Study of Incentives in Health (CSI Health, 
www.kcl.ac.uk/csihealth). Data relating to participants’ uptake of each of the three HPV 
vaccinations, along with their postcodes, age and answers to the measure of informed 
choice will be transferred by the Healthy Incentives team to CSI Health researchers. All 
information will be anonymised and kept securely. Data will be transferred via email in 
password protected files. CSI Health researchers will analyse the data with the aim of: i) 
determining the impact of financial incentives on uptake of the HPV vaccination and on 




To assess the impact of the intervention on initial uptake (i.e. the 1st vaccination) and 
completion of the HPV vaccination programme (i.e. the 3rd vaccination) logistic 
regressions will be performed separately for each of the two samples, i.e. for girls who 
have not received an invitation to get vaccinated before and those who have received a 
previous invitation but have failed to attend. To test the moderating effect of social 
deprivation on the impact of the intervention, the interaction between IMD scores and 
intervention will be added to the logistic regression models. To test whether there is a 
difference in the size of effect of the intervention in the two samples, datasets will be 
combined and another logistic regression conducted, in which whether participants have 
received an invitation to get vaccinated before or not will be added as a predictor to the 





 vaccinations between the intervention and control groups, the χ2 test will 
be used. Finally, differences in knowledge of the HPV vaccination between intervention 
and control groups will be tested using the χ2 test, while differences in attitudes towards 
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the HPV vaccination will be examined via a one-way analysis of variance. All tests will 





































The results of the study will produce valuable information regarding the potential 
effectiveness of financial incentives in increasing uptake and completion of the HPV 
vaccinations by teenage girls. The results will also provide valuable information 
regarding the validity of concerns about the potentially adverse effects of financial 
incentives on the quality of people’s decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours. If 
evidence from this trial supports such concerns, further research will be needed to assess 
how incentives might undermine informed choice, e.g. whether they alter who attends 
or whether they alter the attitudes towards and/or knowledge of the target behaviour in 
all who are offered incentives and therefore in those who attend. The design of the 
present trial does not allow for such assessments to be made. 
 
Knowledge regarding the impact of financial incentives both on uptake of the HPV 
vaccination and on the quality of decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours is 
lacking in the literature. Findings therefore, are expected to clarify these issues and have 
the potential to inform discussions concerning the increasing use of financial incentives 
for health promotion 
 
The next chapter 
This chapter presented the protocol for Study 3, the randomised controlled trial 
assessing the impact of financial incentives on uptake of the HPV vaccination and the 
quality of decisions to get vaccinated. The following chapter presents the findings for 




















Financial incentives for increasing 
uptake of HPV vaccinations: a 

















Objective: Uptake of the HPV vaccinations by 17-18 year-old girls in England is below 
(<35%) target (80%). This trial assesses (a) the impact of financial incentives on uptake 
and completion of an HPV-vaccination programme and (b) whether any impact is 
moderated by participants’ deprivation level. The trial also assesses the impact of 
financial incentives on the quality of decisions to get vaccinated. 
Methods: One-thousand 16-18 year-old girls were invited to participate in an HPV-
vaccination programme, of whom 500 had not been invited before, and 500 were 
unresponsive to previous invitations. Girls in both groups were randomised to receive 
either a standard invitation letter or a letter including the offer of vouchers worth £45 
(€56; $73) for undergoing three vaccinations. Girls attending their 1
st
 vaccination 
appointment completed a questionnaire assessing the quality of their decisions to be 




 vaccinations and decision 
quality. 
Results: The intervention increased uptake of the 1
st
 vaccination (first-time invitees: 
28.4% vs. 19.6%; OR 1.63, CI 95% 1.08-2.47; previous non-attenders: 23.6% vs. 
10.4%; OR 2.65, CI 95% 1.61-4.38), and 3rd vaccination (first-time invitees: 22.4 % vs. 
12%; OR 2.15, CI 95% 1.32-3.50; previous non-attenders: 12.4% vs. 3%; OR 4.28, CI 
95% 1.92-9.55). ). Impacts were not moderated by participants’ deprivation level. The 
quality of decisions to get vaccinated was unaffected by the intervention. 
Conclusions: Although the intervention increased completion of the HPV vaccinations, 
uptake remained lower than the national target which, in addition to cost-effectiveness 
and acceptability issues, necessitates consideration of other ways of achieving it. 
Trial registration: Current Controlled Trials ISRCTN 52339409 
 
Mantzari, E., Vogt, F., & Marteau, T.M. (in press). Financial incentives for increasing 







Human Papillomavirus (HPV) is an ubiquitous sexually transmitted virus that could 
lead to cervical cancer (Brabin et al., 2005; Moscicki et al., 1998), the second most 
common cancer in women worldwide (Ferlay, Shin, Bray et al., 2010). HPV vaccines 
help prevent infection with `high-risk’ strands of HPV that are associated with later 
cancer development (Ault, 2007; Franco & Harper, 2005). Immunisation against HPV 
requires completion of three vaccinations to effectively reduce the risk of cervical 
cancer (Ault, 2007; Joura, Leodolter, Hernandez-Avila et al., 2007). The degree of 
protection afforded by incomplete immunisation is currently unknown (Widdice et al., 
2011).  
 
Since September 2008, a national programme has been implemented in England and 
Wales, UK, aiming to vaccinate girls aged 12-13 years against HPV. A two-year ‘catch-
up’ campaign targeting 17-18 year-old girls has also been initiated. The objective of 
these vaccination programmes is to provide three doses of the HPV vaccine to females 
before they become sexually active, when the risk of HPV infection and subsequent 
cervical cancer development increases. It is estimated that if this objective is met and 
vaccination coverage is sufficiently high (80% of the target population), up to 400 
deaths per year in England could be prevented (Sheridan et al., 2010). Although the 
national programme targeting 12-13 year-olds has met the 80% uptake target set by the 
National Health Service (NHS), with 88.1% of girls receiving the 1st vaccination and 
80.1% the 3rd, the ‘catch-up’ campaign targeting 17-18 year-olds has resulted in below-
target uptake, with 62.2% of girls receiving the 1st vaccination and only 31.8% the 3rd 
(Sheridan et al., 2010). Apart from these cohort differences, uptake of the HPV vaccine 
in England is also marked by social inequalities, with girls living in deprived areas and 
from ethnic minority backgrounds being less likely to get vaccinated (Roberts, Brabin, 
Stretch et al., 2011). Women from these populations are also more likely to develop 
cervical cancer (Shack, Jordan, Thomson et al., 2008). 
 
Offering girls financial incentives to undergo the HPV vaccination could increase 
uptake rates. Financial incentives are increasingly being considered and used in health 
care policies in the UK and elsewhere, in an attempt to improve health (Lagarde et al., 
2007; Le Grand, 2008). They are most effective in promoting ‘one-off’ behaviours, such 
as getting vaccinated (Achat et al., 1999; Seal, Kral, Lorvick et al., 2003; Sutherland et 
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al., 2008). Indeed, findings from systematic reviews suggest that financial incentives 
can increase uptake of recommended vaccinations by both adults and children (Briss, 
Rodewald, Hinman et al., 2000; Giuffrida & Torgerson, 1997; Kane et al., 2004; 
Ndiaye, Hopkins, Shefer et al., 2005; Stone, Morton, Hulscher et al., 2002; Sutherland 
et al., 2008). Their effectiveness is predicted to depend on recipients’ level of social and 
material deprivation. Consequently, one potential advantage of using financial 
incentives to promote health is that they may be more effective in motivating behaviour 
change in the most socially deprived (Sutherland et al., 2008). When applied to HPV-
vaccination programmes, incentives therefore, have the potential not only to improve 
the below-target uptake rates, but also to reduce health inequalities. Most of the calls to 
use incentives in HPV-vaccination programmes in the UK, however, have focused on 
incentivising vaccination providers (e.g. General Practitioners) rather than vaccination 
recipients (Tanday, 2008). The effectiveness of financial incentives in this latter context 
therefore, is currently unknown. Furthermore, no studies have assessed the role of social 
deprivation in the moderation of the impact of financial incentives on vaccination 
uptake.  
 
Even if effective in increasing uptake of HPV vaccinations, the use of financial 
incentives in HPV-vaccination programmes will need to be considered in the context of 
their possible negative consequences. Unlike most interventions designed to change 
behaviour, the use of financial incentives raises particular concerns regarding their 
potentially adverse effects on the quality of people’s decisions to engage in incentivised 
behaviours. For example, it has been argued that the prospect of receiving a financial 
reward could result in the risks associated with the incentivised behaviour being 
overlooked (Marteau et al., 2009). This is particularly relevant to behaviours associated 
with physical and/or psychological side-effects, such as getting vaccinated. To date, no 
known studies have assessed the impact of financial incentives on the quality of 
decisions to engage in incentivised behaviors. 
 
One way to judge the quality of a decision to engage in a behaviour is to assess whether 
it represents an informed choice. An informed choice has been operationally defined as 
one which is based on knowledge of the relevant information, is consistent with the 
decision-maker’s values and is behaviourally implemented (Marteau et al., 2001). These 
three dimensions of informed choice are also echoed in definitions of informed 
decision-making (Bekker, Hewison & Thornton, 2004; Dowie, 2002; Irwig, McCaffery, 
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Salkeld et al., 2006; Jepson, Hewison, Thompson et al., 2005; Rimer, Briss, Zeller et al., 
2004) and clinical decision quality (Sepucha, Fowler & Mulley, 2004). Using this 
operationalisation a multi-dimensional measure of informed choice has been developed 
(Marteau et al., 2001), validated (Michie, Dormandy & Marteau, 2002) and used to 
assess the quality of decisions in the context of screening (e.g. Dormandy, Michie, 
Hooper et al., 2006; Dormandy, Tsui & Marteau, 2007; Jaques, Sheffield & Halliday, 
2005; Kellar, Sutton, Griffin et al., 2008; Mathieu, Barratt, Davey et al., 2007; Michie, 
Dormandy & Marteau, 2003; Smith, Trevena, Simpson et al., 2010). Given that both 
screening and vaccination uptake involve preventative behaviours with potential side-
effects, this measure can readily be used to assess decision quality in the context of 
HPV vaccination uptake. 
 
The present study is the first worldwide trial which addresses the aforementioned 
uncertainties with regards to the use of financial incentives in HPV vaccination 
programmes. The specific aims of this trial are: (a) to assess the impact of financial 
incentives on initial uptake and completion of an HPV-vaccination programme and (b) 
to examine whether the impact of financial incentives on uptake and completion of an 
HPV-vaccination programme is moderated by recipients’ level of social deprivation. 
The trial further aims to assess the impact of financial incentives on the quality of 
decisions to be vaccinated. 
 
It was hypothesised that girls who were offered financial incentives to get vaccinated 
against HPV would be more likely to receive the first and third HPV vaccinations. 
Participants’ level of social deprivation was hypothesised to moderate the effects of 
financial incentives on uptake of the first and third HPV vaccinations, with larger 
effects of the incentives being predicted for the most socially deprived. In line with 
existing concerns, it was further hypothesised that the offer of financial incentives 














Between 2008/09 the uptake rates in England for the “catch-up” HPV-vaccination 
campaign targeting females aged 17-18 years was 62.2% for the 1st vaccination, 54.2% 
for the 2nd vaccination and 31.8% for the 3rd vaccination (Sheridan, et al, 2010). The 
equivalent figures for the Birmingham East and North (BEN) Primary Care Trust, 
where this trial was conducted, were 72.2%, 64.6% and 34.2% (Sheridan et al., 2010). 
 
Trial Design  
This is a parallel-group randomised controlled trial. 
 
Participants 
Participants were one thousand (n=1000) 16 – 18 year-old girls: five-hundred (n= 500) 
had not yet received an invitation to attend the vaccination programme (first-time 
invitees) and five-hundred (n= 500) had previously received an invitation to get 
vaccinated, but had failed to attend the first vaccination appointment (previous non-
attenders). All girls lived in Birmingham, UK and were: 
 
1. registered with General Practitioners within the Birmingham East and North and 
Heart of Birmingham Primary Care Trusts  
2. eligible to be vaccinated through the participating community clinics (Sutton 
Cottage, Partners in Health and Dove Medical Centre)  
3.  had not been vaccinated against HPV before.  
 
Recruitment and Randomisation  
Participants were selected randomly from a list of names of all girls aged 16-18 years 
registered with participating General Practitioners (Figure 7.1). After excluding girls not 
meeting the inclusion criteria, the list was sorted according to whether girls were first-
time invitees or previous non-attenders. Five-hundred girls were randomly selected 
from each of these two sub-lists for inclusion in the trial, using the RAND () function in 
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Excel and were then randomised via the same technique to control vs. intervention 
conditions (Table 7.1). 
 




Table 7.1.Description of trial groups 
 First-time invitees Previous non-attenders 
Control Group 250 (sent standard invitation 
letters; no incentives)  
250 (sent standard invitation 
letters; no incentives) 
Intervention Group 250 (sent modified invitation 
letters; incentives) 
250 (sent modified invitation 




Invitation letters. All participants received letters, addressed to them, inviting them to 
attend their 1
st
 HPV vaccination session. The letters included the date, time and venue 
of their allocated vaccination appointment. Participants were given the option to 
reschedule their appointment or attend a different immunisation clinic by contacting the 
immunisation team on a designated telephone number, included in the letter (Appendix 
6.2) 
Information leaflet. Along with the invitation letters, all participants were sent a leaflet 
containing information about HPV and the HPV vaccine. This was the standard leaflet 
used and distributed by the NHS. It included information on the prevalence of HPV (i.e. 
that it is common, with most people getting infected at some point in their life), on how 
it spreads (i.e. through sexual activity with somebody who has the virus), on the 
different types of HPV that exist and their relationship to cervical cancer (i.e. that more 
than 100 types of HPV exists but only 13 are known to cause cancer, with others being 
harmless or causing conditions such as genital warts), on the benefit of the HPV vaccine 
(i.e. that it reduces the risk of getting cervical cancer by 70%), on the limited protection 
afforded by it (i.e. that it protects against only the two types of the virus most often 
linked to cancer, but not against others or other sexually transmitted diseases and does 
not prevent pregnancy), as well as on the consequences of getting vaccinated (i.e. the 
vaccine’s side-effects – described as few and mild—and the continued need to undergo 
cervical cancer screening in the future). Participants wishing to obtain further 
information were directed to the relevant NHS website 
(www.immunusation.nhs.uk/hpv). 
 
Offer of financial incentives. Participants in the intervention groups received an 
invitation letter, which included the offer of Love2Shop vouchers worth £45 (€52; $65) 
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for receiving the three vaccinations (Appendix 6.2). The vouchers could be exchanged at 
numerous stores in the UK, including general merchandise and department stores, 
fashion and footwear retailers, specialist retailers (e.g. bookstores), jewelry shops, 
sports, outdoor and motoring stores, home improvement and soft furnishing stores, 
restaurants and leisure facilities (e.g. cinemas). The total amount was based on the only 
existing study of which we are aware, which assessed the impact of incentives on 
uptake of a vaccination requiring completion of three doses (Seal et al., 2003). In this 
study participants were offered $60 (£40) for receiving three doses of the Hepatitis B 
vaccine ($20 for each dose). Unlike this study however, which offered fixed-value 
rewards for each vaccination, participants in the present study were offered larger 




 vaccination in an attempt to motivate initiation and 
completion of the vaccination programme. Specifically, they were offered £20 (€23; 
$29) for receiving the 1
st
 vaccination; £5 (€6; $7) for the 2nd vaccination; and £20 (€23; 
$29) for the 3
rd
 vaccination. The exact amounts offered for each vaccination were 
chosen through discussion with experts. 
 
Reminder text messages. Participants in the intervention groups received text 




 vaccination sessions. These were sent 









and two days prior to the next session. An example of the wording of these messages 
was: “(Name), don’t forget your HPV jab on (day) at (time) at the (venue). Thank you”. 
Participants were not able to reply to these messages. Due an error made by the 
administration team running the incentive scheme, participants in the control groups did 




Uptake of each vaccination was recorded at the community clinics where vaccinations 




Area level social deprivation was measured using participants’ postcodes to calculate 
English 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) scores, which range from 0.37 (least 
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deprived) to 85.46 (most deprived) (Community and Neighborhoods, 2007). The Index 
of Multiple Deprivation is a measure of deprivation in England based on area of 
residence. It measures deprivation at the small area level, i.e. the Lower Layer Super 
Output Area (LSOA). It is derived from seven indices of deprivation, including income, 
employment, health deprivation and disability, education skills and training, barriers to 
housing and services and crime. These are combined into a single deprivation score for 
each small area in England. 
Quality of decisions to undergo vaccinations 
To assess the impact of financial incentives on the quality of decisions to undertake the 
HPV vaccinations, a short modified version of a validated measure of informed choice 
was used (Marteau, et al, 2001), consisting of:  
1. two items rated on a seven point scale, assessing attitudes towards the 
HPV vaccination: “For me, having the HPV vaccination is (a) 1: not at all good –7: 
extremely good and (b) 1: not at all harmful-7: extremely harmful”. 
2. three items assessing knowledge of the HPV vaccination. These 
requested participants to determine the validity (whether true or false) of three 
statements relating to the vaccination: “If I have the HPV vaccination: I am less likely 
to get cervical cancer; I am less likely to get other sexually transmitted diseases; I am 
less likely to get pregnant”. 
 
Girls were also requested to state their main reason for getting vaccinated. 
 
The original measure of informed choice was developed for use in the context of 
prenatal screening and consists of eight items assessing knowledge and four items 
assessing attitudes (Marteau et al., 2001). The component scales have been shown to 
have good internal consistency, predictive validity and discriminant validity (Michie et 
al., 2002). For the purposes of the present study, the knowledge items were adapted to 
assess awareness of the most important issues regarding uptake of the HPV vaccination, 
including the vaccine’s benefits and limited protection, which were highlighted in the 
information leaflet participants received. Their importance in comparison to the other 
information presented in the leaflet was judged and determined by a panel of experts. In 
order to reduce response burden, only three knowledge items were included 
(Cronbach’s alpha= 0.64). Similarly, only two out of the four original attitude items 
were chosen for inclusion, one assessing affective attitudes (“For me, having the HPV 
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vaccination is 1: not at all good –7: extremely good) and one assessing instrumental 
attitudes (For me, having the HPV vaccination is 1: not at all harmful-7: extremely 
harmful”). These were adapted from the original scale through rephrasing (Cronbach’s 
alpha= 0.63).  
 
Procedure 
The financial incentive scheme was run by the Birmingham East and North Primary 
Care Trust (in partnership with the Young Foundation). Participants were selected and 
recruited into the scheme by the Birmingham Primary Care Shared Services Agency, 
who holds and controls all patient data in Birmingham, UK. Recruitment took place 
between February and March 2010.  
 
The vaccination sessions were conducted at three community clinics (Sutton Cottage, 
Partners in Health and Dove Medical Centre) between March and September 2010, by 
nurses working with Heart of Birmingham Primary Care Trust. When attending their 1
st
 
session, participants signed a consent form, completed the measure of informed choice 
(Appendix 6.4) and selected a date for their next vaccination. Delivery of each 
vaccination was contingent on completion of all previous doses. After getting 
vaccinated, participants in the intervention groups were handed the appropriate 
vouchers.  
 
This study was approved by the Birmingham East and North Research Ethics 
Committee (reference 11/WM/0073)  
 
Statistical Analysis  
To assess the impact of the intervention on initial uptake (i.e. uptake of the 1st 
vaccination) and completion of the HPV-vaccination programme (i.e. uptake of the 3rd 
vaccination) logistic regressions were performed seperately for first-time invitees and 
previous non-attenders. To test the moderating effect of social deprivation on the impact 
of the intervention, the interaction between IMD scores and intervention was added to 
the logistic regression models. To test whether there was a difference in the effect size 
of the intervention in the two samples, datasets were combined and another logistic 
regression was conducted, in which sample (i.e. first-time invitees vs previous non-
attenders) was added as a predictor to the model, along with the intervention. The χ2 test 
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was used to test for differences in attrition rates from the 1
st
 to the 3
rd
 vaccination 
between the invervention and control groups. Differences in knowledge of the HPV 
vaccination between intervention and control groups were tested using the χ2 test, and 
differences in attitudes towards the HPV vaccination were examined using one-way 
































All groups were comparable in age and social deprivation (Table 7.2). Data met the 
linearity of the logit and multicollinnearity assumptions required for the logistic 
regression analyses. 
 
Table 7.2. Demongraphic characeristics of study participants (mean [sd]) 
 First-time invitees Previous non-attenders 
Characteristic Intervention Control Intervention Control 
Age  17·9 (0·76) 18·0 (0·69) 17·8 (0·81) 18·0 (0·74) 
Social deprivation 
(IMD)  
 46·3 (13·12) 45·3 (13·0) 35·3(21·9) 36·2 (22·2) 
 
Uptake of the 1st HPV Vaccination 
 
Table 7.3. Proportion (% [n]) of individuals in each sample and within each group receiving the 
vaccinations 









1st Vac 28.4 (n=71) 19.6 (n=49) 23.6 (n=59) 10.4 (n=26) 
2nd Vac 24.4 (n=61) 16.0 (n=40) 19.6 (n=49)  6.4 (n=16) 
3rd Vac 22.4 (n=56) 12.0(n=30) 12.4 (n=31) 3.0 (n=8) 
 
Financial incentives significantly increased initial uptake of the HPV-vaccination 
programme by approximately 10% (Table 7.3) in both first-time invitees, OR 1.63, CI 
95% 1.075-2.472 (Table 7.4) and previous non-attenders, OR 1.63, CI 95% 1.075-2.472 
(Table 7.4). The effect size did not vary between the two samples (non-significant 
interaction between Group [Intervention vs. Control] and Previous invitation), OR 




Table 7.4. OR and CIs of Group and IMD for First-time invitees and Previous non-attenders for the 1st and 3rd vaccinations 
  First-time invitees Previous non-attenders 
   95% CI for OR   95% CI for OR 







1.630* 1.075 2.472 0.976 
(0.255) 





0.983 1.014 -0.004 
(0.006) 







2.152* 1.324 3.496 1.455 
(0.409) 
4.283* 1.920 9.551 
IMD -0.013 
(0.014) 
0.987 0.970 1.004 -0.020 
(0.008) 







Uptake of the 3rd HPV Vaccination 
The combination of financial incentives and text messages significantly increased 
completion of the HPV-vaccination programme by about 10% (Table 7.3) in both first-
time invitees, OR 2.152, CI 95% 1.324-3.496 (Table 7.4) and previous non-attenders, 
OR 4.283, CI 95% 1.920-9.551 (Table 7.4). The size of effect was similar in the two 
samples (non-significant interaction between Group and Previous invitation), OR 0.494, 
CI 95% 0.194-1.257, p > 0.05. 
 
Reduction in Uptake from 1st to 3rd Vaccination  
Attrition between trial arms was similar: first-time invitees: intervention group = 6% vs. 
control group = 7.6%, χ2 (1, n = 500) = 0.50, p > 0.05; previous non-attenders: 
intervention group = 11.2% vs. control group = 7.4%, χ2(1, n = 500) = 2.39, p > 0.05. 
 
Social Deprivation 
The effect of the intervention on uptake of the 1st and 3rd vaccinations was not 
modified by social deprivation in either of the two samples (1st vaccination: first-time 
invitees: OR 0.985, CI 95% 0.954-1.017; previous non-attenders: OR 0.998, CI 95% 
0.76-1.021; 3rd vaccination: first-time invitees: OR 1.002, CI 95% 0.967-1.038; 
previous non-attenders: OR 1.007, CI 95% 0.966-1.049). 
 
Social deprivation was unrelated to uptake of the 1st and 3rd HPV vaccinations
 
amongst 
first-time invitees. For previous non-attenders, higher levels of social deprivation were 
associated with a reduced chance of uptake for the 3rd vaccination, OR 0.980, CI 95% 
0.964-0.996, but not the 1st vaccination (Table 7.4). 
 
Quality of Decisions 
The quality of decisions to undergo the HPV vaccination was similar in the two trial 
arms: attitudes were similarly positive (first-time invitees: intervention group: 5.8 
[sd=1.1], control group: 5.5 [sd=1.2]; previous non-attenders: intervention group: 5.7 
[sd=1.2], control group 6.1 [sd=0.7], F(3, 188) = 1.203, p > 0.05.) and knowledge 
similarly high (first-time invitees: intervention group: 81.5% correct answers, control 
group: 84.5% correct answers; previous non-attenders: intervention group: 88.2% 





Responses to a question about possible reasons for getting vaccinated also revealed no 














Consistent with the hypotheses, the offer of financial incentives increased the proportion 
of girls undergoing an initial HPV vaccination, while the combination of financial 
incentives and reminder text messages increased the proportion of girls completing the 
course of three HPV vaccinations. Contrary to predictions, these effects did not vary 
with level of social deprivation. Also contrary to predictions, the quality of girls’ 
decisions to undergo the vaccinations was unaffected by the offer of financial 
incentives. 
 
Meaning of the Results 
Findings from the current study are consistent with previous research demonstrating the 
effectiveness of financial incentives in promoting immunisations (Achat et al., 1999; 
Briss et al., 2000; Seal et al., 2003). Incentives may have operated by increasing the 
anticipated benefits of attending vaccination appointments sufficiently to overcome any 
perceived barriers. One of the barriers most strongly predicting uptake of the HPV 
vaccination is cost (Conroy, Rosenthal, Zimet et al., 2009). Although in the UK the 
HPV vaccinations are free as part of normal care, getting vaccinated entails expenses, 
such as transport costs for attending clinics. Incentives may have operated by removing 
such financial barriers. Indeed, it has been shown that patients often use their rewards to 
cover expenses related to engaging in the target health behaviour (Post, Cruz & 
Harman, 2006). Although girls in the current study could not use their incentives to 
directly pay for their transportation costs, as these were offered in the form of vouchers, 
anecdotal evidence from a similar incentive scheme run in the same area as the present 
one, in which pregnant smokers were offered vouchers for quitting smoking (Mantzari, 
Vogt & Marteau, 2012a), suggests that participants often engage in mental accounting, 
according to which transportation costs are deducted from the value of the vouchers in 
order to determine net gains.  
 
The incentives increased uptake of the vaccination by 10%, a surplus which the 
intervention maintained throughout completion of the programme, without reducing 
attrition between the 1st and 3rd vaccination. This finding could be taken as an 
indication of the superior effectiveness of the initial incentive, which may have been 
sufficient in maintaining the higher uptake rates without the subsequent incentives. It is 
not possible, however, to infer exactly how removal of the additional incentives would 
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have affected the results. The relative effectiveness of the incentives for each HPV 
vaccination should be examined in future research. 
 
One potential advantage of financial incentives is that they may be more effective in 
motivating behaviour change in the most socially deprived (Sutherland et al., 2008). 
Contrary to such predictions, however, social deprivation did not modify the effect of 
incentives in the present study. Perhaps the role of social deprivation depends on the 
type of behaviour being targeted, and might therefore be limited in modifying the 
impact of incentives on uptake of the HPV vaccinations. It is also possible however, that 
this finding is related to the measure of social deprivation used in this study. Although 
IMD scores have been previously used to assess participants’ level of deprivation 
(Marteau, Mann, Prevost et al., 2010), current findings may have resulted from the use 
of a proxy rather than a direct measure of social deprivation. Alternatively, it is possible 
that the range of social deprivation in the current study was too limited to allow for an 
effect to be detected. Future studies should aim to include participants to reflect a wider 
range of socioeconomic statuses.  
 
Although the intervention in the present study was effective in promoting the HPV 
vaccination, the highest uptake rates observed were 28.4% for the 1
st
 vaccination and 
22.4% for the 3rd (by first-time invitees in the intervention group). These figures are 
well below the 80% uptake target set by the NHS. They are also considerably lower 
than the attendance rates for the catch-up programme in the Birmingham East & North 
(BEN) Primary Care Trust, where this trial was run (72.2% for the 1st vaccination; and 
34·2% for the 3
rd
) as reported by the UK Department of Health (DH) (Sheridan et al., 
2010). The reasons underlying these differences in rates of uptake are unknown. A 
number of explanations are possible: First, they may reflect cohort differences. For 
example, the DH report refers to the attendance rates of 17-18 year-olds, while 
participants in the present study were aged 16-18 years (additional analyses revealed no 
effect of age on uptake). Second, they may reflect differences in the methods of patient 
recruitment and delivery of the HPV-vaccination programmes. For example, delivery of 
HPV vaccinations through General Practitioners is less effective compared to delivery 
through schools (Sheridan et al., 2010). Third, they may reflect issues with the 
reliability of the data reported in the DH report or the Primary Care Trust’s records. 
Anecdotal reports suggest that latter’s records were not up to date, with girls who had 
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already received the HPV vaccination through schools being invited for the present 
scheme; similar errors might have occurred when feeding figures into the DH report.  
 
Strengths 
The main strength of this study is its novelty. It is the first study to assess the 
effectiveness of financial incentives for increasing uptake of the HPV vaccinations. It is 
also the first study to our knowledge that assessed deprivation-level as a moderator of a 
financial incentive scheme. The incentive scheme used was designed to maximise 
retention: unlike other studies that have offered fixed-value rewards for each 
vaccination (Seal et al., 2003), larger incentives (£20) were offered at the beginning and 
end of the programme, to motivate participants to initiate and complete the vaccinations. 
 
Limitations 
Results from this study do not allow inferences to be made regarding the effectiveness 
of financial incentives alone for completing the programme. Girls in the intervention 
groups received reminder text-messages prior to their 2nd and 3rd vaccination 
appointments. Due to an error made by the administration team, these reminder 
messages were not delivered to girls in the control groups. Vaccine recall and reminder 
systems are known to increase vaccination rates (Jacobson Vann & Szilagyi, 2009). It is 
possible therefore, that the higher uptake rates of the 3rd vaccination by the intervention 
groups is attributable to the reminder text-messages, with incentives having no 
additional effect. This seems unlikely given that incentives work best in combination 
with reminder systems and standing orders (Sutherland et al., 2008). Future research 
should examine the contribution of these interventions separately.  
 
Furthermore, although findings appear to indicate that financial incentives do not 
compromise the quality of decisions to engage in an incentivised behaviour, with 
incentivised and non-incentivised girls’ attitudes towards the vaccination being 
similarly positive and their knowledge of its consequences similarly high, some 
limitations associated with the measurement of informed choice in this study reduce the 
certainty of the conclusions that can be drawn. First, as mentioned previously, we used a 
simplified version of a measure of informed choice, originally developed and validated 
for use in the context of screening. The resulting measure may not have been sensitive 
enough to adequately assess informed choice in relation to HPV vaccination uptake. 
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Further research is needed to validate the measure for use in this specific context. 
Second, the measure relied on assessment of attitudes as a proxy of values, which 
according to the operational definition of informed choice need to be congruent with 
choices (Marteau et al., 2001). Although attitudes have been argued to reflect values 
(Marteau et al., 2001; Rokeach, 1968), the extent to which their measurement captures 
core values as traditionally conceptualised and measured (e.g. Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz, 1992) is unknown (Marteau, 2009). Furthermore, the measurement of 
attitudes alone provides little understanding of the potentially conflicting values 
individuals may hold when considering health-related decisions and how these affect 
their ability to make informed choices (Marteau, 2009). Further research is needed that 
will lead to the development of measures that better capture the values that underlie 
human health-related decisions (Marteau, 2009), which will in turn lead to more valid 
assessments of decision quality. Third, girls’ knowledge of the vaccination’s side-
effects was not assessed in this study. Consequently, no inferences can be made about 
whether the offer of a financial reward results in the risks associated with the 
incentivised behaviour being overlooked (Marteau et al., 2009). Future research should 
assess the impact of incentives on the processing of risk -information associated with an 
incentivised health-behaviour. Another limitation is related to the timing of assessment. 
Girls were requested to complete the measure of informed choice once they had decided 
to get vaccinated. It is therefore possible that their attitudes towards the vaccination 
might have been influenced by their decision to receive it, rather than being a predictor 
of that decision. Furthermore, assessing decision quality after the offer of financial 
incentives does not allow inferences to be made regarding the mechanisms by which 
incentives might have influenced the decision-making process. For example, it remains 
uncertain whether incentives facilitated girls with positive attitudes towards the 
vaccination to act in line with their values or whether the incentives changed the girls’ 
attitudes to make them more positive. Furthermore, by not having measures of attitudes 
of non-attenders the insights afforded by such a comparison with attenders were not 
possible. Future research should aim to assess individuals’ knowledge and values 
related to an incentivised behaviour before incentives are offered. Including subsequent 
behaviour into the assessment, as proposed by Marteau et al (2001), will allow for a 
more valid assessment of informed choice and will help elucidate the mechanisms by 
which incentives influence health-related decisions. Finally, our findings do not allow 
firm conclusions to be drawn regarding the possibility of incentives to negatively 
influence autonomy and people’s ability to voluntarily make decisions, and thus coerce 
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them, as the measure of informed choice did not directly tap into these concepts. Further 
research should aim to complement the assessment of informed choice with measures 
that allow for a more direct and precise assessment of whether incentives are coercive 




While the incentive scheme increased uptake of HPV vaccinations, it is unknown 
whether such effects can be achieved in more cost-effective and acceptable ways. Other 
HPV-vaccination programmes, such as those rolled out in schools (Sheridan et al., 
2010), have achieved higher uptake rates than those achieved in this trial, without the 
expense of vouchers. Before the use of incentives is considered for wider 
implementation, research is needed to determine the optimal incentive value and 
delivery schedule for achieving maximum vaccination rates, supplemented with a 
formal cost-effectiveness analysis. Such cost-effectiveness analyses will need to take 
into account the extent to which the use of incentives might result in unintended 
consequences. These include the potentially adverse effect of incentives on intrinsic 
motivation (Deci et al., 1999), which might reduce the likelihood of individuals 
engaging in future health-related behaviours without the offer of rewards and the 
possibility for the offer of incentives to result in people refusing to adopt the 
incentivised behaviour due to arousal of suspicion (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Frey & 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). 
 
Even if cost-effective, the use of incentives for increasing HPV vaccinations will 
depend on their acceptability to policy makers, health professionals and the public. The 
use of financial incentives for health promotion attracts negative views (Promberger et 
al., 2011) which, coupled with the controversy surrounding the HPV vaccine for 
condoning early sexual activity (Waller, Marlow & Wardle, 2006) may render the use 
of financial incentives for increasing HPV vaccinations unacceptable, as evidenced 
from the media coverage of the present scheme. For example, The Daily Mail online 
wrote: “HMV voucher bribe for teenage girls to have cervical jabs: Fury at ‘promiscuity 
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scheme’ as NHS faces cuts” (Martin, 2010), while wideshut.co.uk reported: “Girls 
Bribed To Take Dangerous and Pointless HPV Vaccine” (Balderson, 2010)4. 
 
Conclusion 
The combination of financial incentives and reminder text messages increased uptake 
and completion of the HPV vaccinations. Even with this intervention, however, the 
vaccination rates were considerably lower than the national target of 80%. This finding, 
in addition to the cost-effectiveness and acceptability issues surrounding the use of 
financial incentives in increasing uptake of HPV vaccinations, necessitate consideration 
of other ways of achieving effective vaccination coverage targets.  
 
The next chapter 
The findings presented in this chapter do not support the concerns regarding the 
potentially adverse impact of financial incentives on the quality of decisions to engage 
in incentivised behaviours. Conclusions, however, were based on assessment of 
participants’ ability to make informed choices, which did not include knowledge of the 
adverse side-effects associated with the incentivised behaviour. The next chapter 
presents the findings from Study 5, a web-based experiment investigating the impact of 
financial incentives on the processing of risk-relevant information in the context of 










                                                             
4 These media reports were published in November 2010, after completion of the programme, which 
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 Background: The use of financial incentives for changing health-related behaviours 
raises concerns regarding their potential to undermine the processing of risks associated 
with incentivised behaviours, thus adversely affecting the quality of people’s decisions 
to engage in them. Uncertainty remains about the validity of such concerns. This web-
based experiment assesses the impact of financial incentives on i) willingness to take a 
pill with side-effects; ii) the time spent viewing risk-information and iii) risk-
information processing, as assessed by perceived-risk of taking the pill and knowledge 
of its side-effects. It further assesses whether any effects are moderated by cognitive-
load. 
Method: Two-hundred and seventy-five (n=275) university staff and students were 
recruited online under the pretext of being screened for a fictitious drug-trial. 
Participants were randomised to the offer of different compensation levels (no incentive, 
£25 or £1000) for taking a fictitious pill and the presence or absence of a cognitive-load 
task.   
Results: Willingness to take the pill increased with the offer of £1000 (84% vs. 67%; 
OR 3.66, CI 95% 1.27-10.6), but not with the offer of £25 (79% vs. 67%; OR 1.68, CI 
95% 0.71-4.01). Risk-information processing was unaffected by the offer of incentives. 
The time spent viewing the risk-information was affected by the offer of incentives, an 
effect moderated by cognitive-load: Without load, time increased with the value of 
incentives (£1000: M=304.4sec vs. £0: M=37.8sec, p<0.01; £25: M=66.6sec vs. £0: 
M=37.8sec, p=.00). Under load, time decreased with the offer of incentives (£1000: 
M=48.9sec vs. £0: M=132.7sec, p<0.01; £25: M=60.9sec vs. £0: M=132.7sec, p<0.01), 
but did not differ between the two incentivised groups (p>0.05). 
Conclusion: This study, which empirically tested the adverse effects of financial 
incentives on risk-information processing, finds no evidence to suggest that incentives 
undermine risk-information processing. On the contrary, findings indicate that 
incentives signal risk, an effect, however, which disappears under cognitive-load, 
highlighting the need to maximise cognitive capacity when presenting information 
about an incentivised health-related behaviour. 
Mantzari, E., Vogt, F., & Marteau, T.M. (under review). Does incentivising pill-taking 
‘crowd-out’ risk-information processing? Evidence from a web-based experiment. 




Financial incentives are increasingly being considered and used in health care policies 
in the UK and elsewhere, in an attempt to improve health-related behaviours (Le Grand, 
2008; Marteau et al., 2009), but unlike most interventions designed to change health 
behaviours, their use raises particular concerns regarding their potentially adverse 
effects on the quality of people’s decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours. This is 
particularly relevant to behaviours associated with adverse side-effects, such as taking 
certain medicines, receiving immunisation, and attending screening appointments. The 
specific concern is that the prospect of receiving a financial reward could result in the 
risks associated with an incentivised health behaviour being overlooked (Marteau et al., 
2009). There are two possible ways this could occur: first, financial incentives might 
lead people to ignore or not process risk-information; second, people might process 
risk- information but perceive the risks to themselves as low. 
 
Results from a recent randomised controlled trial did not find the offer of financial 
incentives to undermine the quality of people’s decisions to engage in an incentivised 
health-related behaviour (Mantzari, Vogt & Marteau, in press). These conclusions were 
based on an assessment of people’s ability to make informed choices, as measured by 
their attitudes towards the target behaviour and their knowledge of its health 
consequences. Knowledge of the related adverse side-effects was not assessed in this 
study. Consequently, findings do not allow inferences to be made about whether or not 
the offer of a financial reward results in the risks associated with the incentivised 
behaviour being overlooked (Marteau et al., 2009). We are unaware of any studies that 
have assessed the impact of financial incentives on the processing of risk-information 
associated with an incentivised health-related behaviour. Research within two 
conceptually analogous domains could help elucidate the uncertainty. The first involves 
the use of payments for live organ donations, which have been criticised for 
undermining donors’ ability to calculate the related risks (e.g. Becker & Elias, 2007; 
Olbrisch et al., 2001). Partial support for this claim derives from studies investigating 
the economic and health consequences of selling kidneys in India (Goyal et al., 2002) 
and Pakistan (Naqvi et al., 2007). Findings show that the majority of vendors were very 
poor and sold their organs to pay off debts, but would not recommend others to do the 
same. This could be interpreted as an indication that sellers were unaware of the 
negative consequences associated with organ donation. However, no conclusions can be 
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drawn regarding whether they were inadequately informed of the likely outcomes or 
whether the prospect of money led them to ignore the risks or perceive them as low. 
Recent research shows that as the risk of renal failure increases, individuals’ become 
less willing to donate kidneys, regardless of the level of payment offered, therefore 
suggesting that financial incentives do not blind people to the risks of living kidney 
donation (Halpern et al., 2010).  
 
The second related research area involves the use of financial incentives for 
participation in research, including clinical trials. Payments increase individuals’ 
willingness to participate in research (Bentley & Thacker, 2004; Singer et al., 1999; 
Slomka et al., 2007). They have, however, been criticised for being undue inducements 
(Dickert & Grady, 1999) that alter decision-making processes, such that the side-effects 
of participating are not fully considered (Dickert et al., 2002) and risks are overlooked 
(Grant & Sugarman, 2004; London, 2005), thus leading individuals to expose 
themselves unwittingly to the possibility of harm (McNeill, 1997). These concerns are 
largely theoretical with the evidence about how participation payments influence 
perceived risk and decision-making processes being scare. The few studies that have 
been conducted in the area suggest that compensation does not lead people to neglect 
research risks (Bentley & Thacker, 2004; Dunn et al., 2009; Halpern et al., 2004; Singer 
& Couper, 2008). Specifically, it has been found that people make rational trade-offs 
between risk and benefit. Although they are willing to accept more risk in return for 
more money, this does not blind them to risk or distort their judgments (Bentley & 
Thacker, 2004; Dunn et al., 2009; Halpern et al., 2004; Singer & Couper, 2008). On the 
contrary, participation payments could signal risk and increase vigilance and 
information seeking when the amount offered is high. In one study, participants were 
allocated to view information regarding either a trial that involved drawing blood or a 
trial that involved Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and were offered either 
$25, $100 or $1000 for participation. Findings showed that compared to the low-
payment scenarios, the offer of a high payment (i.e. $1000) increased participants’ 
willingness to participate, but also increased perceived risk and the time they spent 
viewing the risk- information (Cryder et al., 2010). 
 
Although the above findings highlight some of the potential effects of financial 
incentives on the processing of risk-information, certain limitations associated with the 
design of the studies do not allow firm conclusions to be drawn. These include first, a 
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failure to incorporate conditions of no payment, which prevents an assessment of the 
absolute effect of financial incentives on risk-information processing; second a lack of 
measures of individuals’ knowledge of risks. It has been suggested that when motivated 
by cash payments, individuals may have less interest in assessing or comprehending 
study details, reading consent forms or attempting to understand the research aims and 
related risks (Grady, 2005). Accordingly, an assessment of the impact of financial 
incentives on individuals’ knowledge of risks is essential. A third limitation of existing 
studies stems from the reliance on hypothetical scenarios, of which participants were 
aware. Only one study (Cryder et al., 2010) led individuals to believe that they were 
responding to information of an actual trial, in which they could participate.  
 
In addition to the above, no studies have assessed the moderating role of cognitive-load 
on the impact of financial incentives on risk-information processing. In real-life 
situations, the cognitive resources of some people invited to decide about engaging in 
incentivised behaviours are often overloaded with matters of daily living. Consistent 
with the assumptions of “dual-processing” models of decision-making (e.g. Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004), findings demonstrate that cognitive-load inhibits activation of the 
reflective system that generates behavioural decisions based on reasoning, judgment and 
knowledge about facts and values and increases activation of the impulsive system that 
elicits behaviour through associative links (Hinson, Jameson & Whitney, 2002; Shiv & 
Fedorikhin, 1999). Consequently, under cognitive-load people have less ability to 
process risks and rely on heuristics to make satisfactory decisions with minimal effort 
(Friese, Hofmann & Wänke, 2009; Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese et al., 2008b; 
Whitney, Rinehart & Hinson, 2008).  
 
In sum, given the scarcity of empirical studies in the area, in addition to the above 
shortcomings, further research is needed, particularly experiments, to illuminate the 
mechanisms by which financial incentives influence people’s decision-making 
mechanisms, including the processing of risk-information.  
 
The present study 
The aim of this study is to assess the impact of financial incentives on the quality of 
decisions to consume medicine with potential side-effects. This specific context was 
chosen because financial incentives have been used to improve medication compliance 
(e.g. DeFulio, Everly, Leoutsakos et al., 2012; Hill & Ramachandran, 1992; Morisky, 
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Malotte, Ebin et al., 2001; Pilote, Tulsky, Zolopa et al., 1996; Sorensen, Haug, Delucchi 
et al., 2007; Volpp, Loewenstein, Troxel et al., 2008b), yet their impact on the 
processing of side effects associated with most medicines has thus far remained 
unstudied.  
 
The study specifically evaluates the impact of low-value and high-value financial 
incentives on i) willingness to consume a pill with side-effects, ii) the time spent 
viewing the pill-related information, and iii) risk-information processing, as assessed by 
a) the level of perceived risk associated with consuming the pill and b) knowledge of its 




1) The offer of financial incentives increases the proportion of individuals who are 
willing to take the pill. 
2) The offer of a low-value financial incentive does not increase the time spent viewing 
the pill-related information. 
3) The offer of a high-value financial incentive increases the time spent viewing the pill-
related information. 
4) The offer of a low-value incentive does not affect risk-information processing. 
5) The offer of a high-value incentive affects risk-information processing. 













Design and overview 
The present study is a web-based experiment. Participants were recruited online under 
the pretext of being screened for a fictitious trial examining the impact of a new 
cognitive-enhancing pill on memory. Using a 3x2 factorial design, participants were 
randomised to view webpages including the offer of different levels of financial 
incentives for taking the fictitious pill (no incentive; £25; £1000) and the presence or 
absence of a task intended to induce cognitive load.  
 
Participants 
To be included in the study participants had to a) have registered their interest in 
research participation with the Behavioural Research Lab at the London School of 
Economics, or be members of staff or the student body of two schools (School of Law 
and School of Arts and Humanities) of King’s College London ,and b) have clicked on 
the study link sent to them via circular email (details under Recruitment and 
Randomisation). No exclusion criteria were imposed. The final sample comprised two-
hundred and seventy-five (n=275) staff, students and alumni of universities based in 
London, UK. Figure 8.1. illustrates the flow of participants through the study and Table 
8.1 presents participants’ demographic characteristics. Their mean age was 25.3 years, 
ranging from 18 to 56 years and 52% were female. The majority was White (59%), with 
29% classified as Asian and 5% as Black. Most participants were students (75%), 
working towards a first or second degree, 17.5% were in full-time or part-time 


































Table 8. 1. Demongraphic characteristics of study participants  
 No incentives 
(n=86) 
































Male 44% 49% 41% 44% 51% 55% 48% 
Female 56% 51% 59% 55% 49% 45% 52% 
Ethnicity 
White 49% 63% 58% 52% 67% 66% 59% 
Mixed 9% 2% 5% 7% 0% 4% 5% 
Asian 37% 28% 27% 36% 21% 23% 29% 
Black 2% 5% 10% 2% 5% 6% 5% 
Occupation 
Student 74% 74% 68% 79% 79% 74% 75% 
Employed full-time 14% 16% 19% 7% 16% 15% 15% 
Employed part-time 0% 5% 2% 5% 2% 4% 3% 
Unemployed 7% 2% 5% 3% 0% 0% 6% 
Education 
A-levels 14% 12% 15% 19% 14% 17% 15% 
Working towards degree 30% 28% 24% 28% 32% 21% 27% 
Completed degree 21% 12% 17% 14% 9% 13% 14% 
Working towards postgrad 21% 32% 24% 24% 20% 30% 25% 
Completed postgrad 14% 14% 17% 12% 23% 17% 16% 
Relationship 
Single 37% 60% 49% 64% 44% 59% 52% 
In relationship 37% 26% 32% 21% 32% 28% 29% 
Married 16% 2% 12% 7% 14% 9% 10% 
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Recruitment and Randomisation 
Participants were recruited online through circular emails sent (Appendix 8.1) to the 
contacts of a large participant database held by the Behavioural Research Lab at the 
London School of Economics, and to the staff and students of two schools (School of 
Law and School of Arts and Humanities) of King’s College London, UK. The emails 
informed participants of the existence of a fictitious trial assessing the impact of a new 
cognitive-enhancing pill on memory. Interested individuals were invited to complete the 
fictitious trial’s eligibility screening process, by clicking on a link contained within the 
email, which led to the study website (Appendix 8.2). They were informed that they 
would receive a shopping voucher worth £10 for completing the screening process. 
Upon clicking the link, participants were randomised to view one of six webpages, 
differing in the level of incentives offered for consuming the fictitious pill 
(reimbursement of travel expenses; reimbursement of travel expenses plus £25; or 
reimbursement of travel expenses plus £1000) and the inclusion or exclusion of a task 
intended to induce cognitive load. This consisted of the presentation of a five-digit 
number, which participants had to remember and recall at a later stage during the study. 
The randomisation resulted in six study groups (Table 8.2) and was achieved by 
programming the webserver through JavaScript to generate a random number between 0 
and 5. Each number had been pre-specified to correspond to one of the six groups. After 
generating the random number, the webserver automatically redirected the participant to 
the corresponding subpage. This procedure occurred within milliseconds and was not 
noticeable to participants. 
 
 Table 8.2.Study groups 
 Absence of 
financial 
incentive 
Offer of £25 
(low-value 
incentive) 





N=43 N=41 N=43 
Presence of 
cognitive load 








Willingness to take the pill 
Willingness to take the fictitious pill was assessed by requesting participants to specify 
whether they wished to participate in the fictitious trial. They chose one of four 
available options: a) yes definitely; b) yes, probably, but I would like to discuss further 
with a member of the research team; c) no, probably not, but I would like to discuss 
further with a member of the research team; d) no, definitely not. Because consumption 
of the pill was described as the central component of the fictitious trial, willingness to 
participate was considered equivalent to an affirmative disposition to taking the pill. 
 
Time spent viewing risk-information 
The time participants remained on the webpage presenting the pill-related information 




Perceived risk associated with taking the fictitious pill was measured using a 
questionnaire consisting of: 
 
i) two items assessing the perceived likelihood of experiencing any or all of the 
pill’s side-effects, rated on a five-point scale ranging from 1: very unlikely to 5: 
very likely  
 
ii) two items assessing the perceived severity of experiencing any or all of the 
pill’s side-effects, rated on a five-point scale ranging from 1: very good to 5: 
very bad. 
 
Average perceived likelihood and perceived severity scores were multiplied to obtain 
perceived risk scores.  
 
Knowledge of side-effects 




i) participants were requested to freely recall as many of the pill’s side effects as 
they could and to indicate wherever possible, whether these were described in 
the pill-related information as “very common”, “common” or “uncommon”. One 
point was scored for every correctly listed side-effect. Another point was given 
if the side-effect was accompanied by a correct description of its frequency. 
Scores ranged from 0 to 24. 
ii) participants were requested to choose from a list of possible side-effects the ones 
that were described in the related information as requiring medical attention. The 
possible options were: a) skin rash; b) fast heartbeat; c) speech problems; d) 
psychiatric reactions; and e) memory loss. The correct answers were (a) and (d) 
and participants were scored one point for correctly choosing each. Selection of 
all options was taken as an indication of participants’ guessing and resulted in 
one point being deducted. Scores ranged from 0 to 2. 
iii) participants were presented with six situations for which they were required to 
specify whether the pill should be taken with caution or should not be taken at 
all. The situations were: a) pregnant and/or breastfeeding women (should not be 
taken); b) people with high blood pressure (should not be taken); c) people with 
liver problems (should be taken with caution); d) people with irregular 
heartbeats (arrhythmias) (should not be taken); e) people with a history of 
mental health problems (should be taken with caution); f) people with a history 
of substance abuse (should be taken with caution); Participants were scored one 
point for each correct specification. Scores ranged from 0 to 6. 
 
To obtain an aggregated measure of knowledge, scores from the three measures were 
added together. Aggregated scores ranged from 0 to 32. (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.44) 
 
Procedure 
Upon entering the study website (Appendix 8.2), all individuals were presented with 
information about the fictitious trial, including its aim, which they were told was to 
assess the immediate impact of a new analeptic drug called Modagil, on non-sleep 
deprived individuals’ performance on memory-related tasks. Participants were informed 
that the fictitious screening process would involve completion of a series of 
questionnaires and would result in receipt of a £10 Amazon voucher. They were further 
informed that completion of the trial would involve visiting a lab, taking a single dose 
(one pill) of the drug and completing a number of simple memory-related tasks. 
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Participants also read information regarding their compensation for taking part in the 
trial, which differed according to the group to which they had been allocated (travel 
expenses; travel expenses and £25; travel expenses and £1000). The subsequent 
webpage presented participants with information about the fictitious drug Modagil, 
including its approved and off-label uses, its side-effects, including information about 
those which require medical attention, and its counter-indications. Although Modagil is 
not a real drug, most of the information used in the study was modeled on the actual 
drug Modafinil. A fictitious name was chosen to prevent participants who could not 
recall the pill’s side-effects from finding relevant information on the internet, in order to 
complete the measures of knowledge. It was confirmed that searching the internet for 
the term “Modagil” would only yield information regarding the trademarking 
registration for this brand by a pharmaceutical company. This was considered 
appropriate, as it would potentially reinforce participants’ belief in the credibility of the 
fictitious drug. Informed consent was provided by all participants via the next webpage. 
Participants allocated to the groups exposed to the cognitive-load task subsequently 
viewed a webpage presenting them with five randomly selected digits, which they were 
instructed to memorise for later recollection. This “cognitive-load” manipulation has 
been used previously (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney, 
2003; Whitney et al 2008). In the next webpage participants were requested to complete 
a questionnaire assessing demographic variables such as age, gender, level of education 
and occupation. Subsequently they were required to complete the measures of perceived 
risk and knowledge of the pill’s side effects and were asked to specify their willingness 
to take part in the fictitious trial. To prevent participants from re-visiting the pill-related 
information in order to complete the measures of knowledge, the ‘back’ function of the 
website was disabled. Upon completion of all the measures, participants were debriefed 
and informed of the true aims of the study. The study was approved by the London 
School of Economics Research Ethics Committee, Reference Number 203/26.06.2012.  
 
Statistical analysis 
To increase power, responses regarding participants’ willingness to take the pill were 
collapsed to create two outcomes: ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. Time and knowledge scores were 
log-transformed to correct for their non-normal distribution. To assess the effects of 
financial incentives and cognitive-load on willingness to take the pill, logistic regression 
analysis was conducted. To assess the effects of financial incentives and the moderating 
role of cognitive-load on perceived risk and knowledge of the pill’s side-effects, 
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univariate analyses of variance were conducted for each outcome variable separately. 
Due to the low Cronbach’s alpha between items assessing knowledge, the effects of the 
independent variables on each component of the knowledge scale was also assessed. 
Where analyses revealed significant interactions between the two independent variables, 
these were explored using simple main effects analyses and pairwise comparisons using 
the Bonferroni correction. All tests were assessed at the 5% level of significance. 
 
Power calculations 
Given the £10 expense associated with each participant, the total sample size of 275 
individuals was determined by the availability of resources. Post hoc analyses using 
GPower 3.1 revealed that the study had 80% power to detect a small effect (d=0.18) at 
the 5% significance level between groups on outcomes subjected to univariate analysis 
of variance, i.e. those relating to the time-spent viewing risk-related information, 
perceived risk, and knowledge. Based on the findings of Cryder et al. 
 (2010) relating to an average proportion of 17% of participants offered £25 being 
willing to participate in the trial (the study did not include a ‘no incentive’ control 
group), the present study also had 80% power to detect a minimum difference in 
willingness to take the pill of 18% between groups at the 5% statistical significance 



























All groups were comparable in demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, 
occupation, ethnicity) (Table 8.1) 
 
Willingness to take the pill 
The offer of £1000 increased the proportion of participants’ who were willing to take 
the pill (84% vs. 67% (Table 8.3); OR 3.66, CI 95% 1.27-10.6, p< 0.05). The offer of 
£25 did not significantly increase the proportion of individuals who were willing to take 
the pill (OR 1.68, CI 95% 0.71-4.01, p> 0.05) (Figure 8.1). Cognitive-load did not 
affect participants’ willingness to take the pill (OR 1.24, CI 95% 0.50-3.05, p> 0.05) 
nor did it moderate the impact of financial incentives on willingness to take the pill 
(Interaction between offer of £1000 and cognitive-load: OR 0.46, CI 95% 0.11-1.95, p> 
0.05; Interaction between offer of £25 and cognitive-load: OR 1.25, CI 95% 0.32-4.85, 
p> 0.05). 
 





Table 8.3. Values of outcome variables for each group 







































































































Time spent viewing risk-information 
The offer of financial incentives had a significant impact on the time spent viewing risk-
information (F (2, 270) = 7.14, p<0.01) This effect was moderated by cognitive-load 
(F(2, 270)=35.4, p<0.01) (See Figure 8.2). The effect of incentive level was significant 
both in the absence of cognitive load (F (2, 270)= 33.1, p<0.01) and in its presence (F 
(2,270)=9.18, p<0.01). Under no load, participants offered £1000 for taking the pill 
spent longer time viewing the pill information (M=304.4 sec) compared both to those 
not offered incentives (M=37.8sec), p<0.01, and those offered £25 (M=66.6sec), 
p<0.01. Those offered £25 also spent more time viewing the information compared to 
those not offered incentives, p<0.01. Under load, those offered both £1000 (M=48.9sec) 
and £25 (M=60.9sec) spent less time viewing the information compared to those not 
offered incentives (M=132.7sec), p<0.01 (for both comparisons). There was no 
significant difference between the two incentivised groups, p>0.05. Among those not 
offered incentives, time increased in the presence of load (M=132.7sec) compared to its 
absence (M=37.5sec), p<0.01. The opposite pattern was observed for those offered 
£1000 (no load: M=304.4sec; load: 48.9) p<0.01. For those offered £25, there was no 
difference in time in the absence (M=66.6sec) and presence of cognitive-load (load: 
M=60.9sec) p>0.05. 
 




Because the distribution of scores reflecting the time spent viewing the pill-related 
information was very positively skewed and leptokurtic, while casewise diagnostics 
identified four extreme outliers, additional analyses were conducted to assess the 
robustness of the aforementioned findings. Both median regression and robust 
regression revealed a similar pattern of results, confirming the significant impact of an 
interaction between the offer of incentives and cognitive load on the time spent viewing 
the pill-related information (Appendix 8.3). 
Risk information processing 
 Perceived risk 
The perceived risk associated with taking the pill was unaffected by the offer of 
financial incentives (F (2, 275) = 2.61, p>0.05). It was also unaffected by cognitive-load 
(F (1, 275) = 1.71, p>0.05). Cognitive-load did not moderate the impact of financial 
incentives on perceived risk (F (2, 275) =.2.08, p>0.05). 
 
Knowledge of the side-effects 
Knowledge of the pill’s side-effects was unaffected by the offer of financial incentives. 
(F (2, 259) = .15, p>0.05). It was also unaffected by cognitive-load (F (1, 259) = .02, 
p>0.05). Cognitive-load did not moderate time impact of financial incentives on 
knowledge of the pill’s side-effects (F (2,259) =.12, p>0.05). Each component of 
knowledge was also unaffected by the offer of financial incentives (Free recall: F (2, 
252) = 1.36, p>0.05; Knowledge of side-effects requiring medical attention: F (2, 250) = 
1.96, p>0.05; Knowledge of counterindications: F (2, 265) = 1.65, p>0.05) and 
cognitive load (Free recall: F (1, 252) = 1.59, p>0.05; Knowledge of side-effects 
requiring medical attention: (F (2, 250) = 0.77, p>0.05; Knowledge of 
counterindications: (F (2, 265) = 0.15, p>0.05), as well as the interaction between 
financial incentives and cognitive load (Free recall: F (2, 252) = 2.15, p>0.05; 
Knowledge of side-effects requiring medical attention: (F (2, 250) = 1.04, p>0.05; 









The offer of £1000 increased the proportion of participants’ who were willing to take a 
pill, but the offer of £25 did not. The offer of an incentive did not undermine the 
processing of risk-information: levels of perceived risk associated with taking the pill 
and knowledge of its side-effects did not differ between groups. Cognitive-load did not 
moderate the impact of financial incentives on willingness to take the pill or risk-
information processing. The time spent-viewing the pill-related information was 
affected by the offer of financial incentives, an effect moderated by cognitive load: In 
the absence of load, time increased with the value of incentives, with those offered 
£1000 spending the longest viewing the information. Under load, the offer of financial 
incentives reduced viewing time, with both those offered £25 and £1000 spending less 
time viewing the information compared to those not offered incentives.  
 
Interpretation  
The offer of £1000 increased the proportion of participants who were willing to take the 
pill, both compared to the absence of incentives and the offer of £25. This is consistent 
with predictions and previous research showing that higher payments increase 
willingness to participate in clinical trials more compared to lower payments (Bentley & 
Thacker, 2004; Cryder et al., 2010; Halpern et al., 2004). Although the offer of £25 
increased the proportion of individuals willing to take the pill by 12% (from -2% to 
25%) compared to those not offered incentives, this difference was not found to be 
significant. This finding is contrary to predictions, as well as research showing that 
incentives as low as £3 ($5) can increase medication compliance (e.g. Bock, Sales, 
Rogers et al., 2001; Chernew, Shah, Wegh et al., 2008; Volpp et al., 2008b). One 
possible explanation for this result is that it is due to a lack of statistical power to detect 
such an effect. Indeed, post-hoc analyses revealed that the study was insufficiently 
powered to detect significant differences in willingness to take the pill between those 
offered £25 and those not offered incentives. An alternative explanation for the 
conflicting findings between the present and previous research is that they reflect cohort 
differences. The present study relied on healthy volunteers who would not have had 
direct health-benefits from taking the pill. Their willingness to do so therefore, is 
assumed to have been driven mostly by financial reasons. This is consistent with 
research showing that financial incentives are important motivators among healthy 
volunteers in their decision to participate in clinical trials (Tishler & Bartholomae, 
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2002). Outcomes regarding the impact of small-value incentives on medication 
compliance, however, are based on patient populations, who are motivated by health-
benefits, as well as financial ones, for engaging in the incentivised behaviour. Patients’ 
perceptions of potential health-benefits can alter the effects of monetary payments on 
decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours in ways that are different to healthy 
volunteers (Dickert & Grady, 1999; Dunn et al., 2009). Consequently, patients might 
require smaller incentives, compared to healthy individuals, to move them past the 
benefit-threshold needed for them to act. Another explanation for the conflicting 
findings is that they are the result of the use of different study procedures. In the present 
investigation participants were clearly informed about the possible side-effects of 
consuming the fictitious pill. It is unknown, however, whether studies assessing the 
impact of financial incentives on medication compliance have highlighted the related 
risks to the same degree. If not, differences in willingness to engage in the behaviours 
might have resulted from between-study differences in the salience of risks. A final 
explanation for the lack of effect in the present study is that perhaps it was driven by 
individuals’ expectations of a larger offer of money. Consumption of the pill was 
presented in the context of a fictitious drug-trial. In the UK many trials pay between 
£1000-£2000 for participation (Jones, 2011). Possessing such knowledge might have 
led some of those offered £25 to decline participation.  
 
Although the offer of £1000 increased participants’ willingness to take the pill, it did 
not do so by leading them to overlook the related risks. Contrary to existing concerns 
(Dickert et al., 2002; Dickert & Grady, 1999; Grady, 2005; Grant & Sugarman, 2004; 
London, 2005; Marteau et al., 2009) financial incentives in this study did not undermine 
risk-information processing: levels of perceived risk associated with taking the pill and 
knowledge of its side-effects were similar between groups. This is consistent with 
previous research showing that in hypothetical situations, although people are willing to 
accept more risk in return for more money, this does not blind them to risk or distort 
their judgments (Bentley & Thacker, 2004; Dunn et al., 2009; Halpern et al., 2004; 
Halpern et al., 2010; Singer & Couper, 2008). On the contrary, large offers of 
compensation have been suggested to signal risk (Cryder et al., 2010; Frey & 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Consistent with this assumption, a study by Cryder et al., 
(2010) showed that high payments for trial participation increased information-seeking, 
as well as perceived risk. Similarly, those offered large incentives in the present study 
spent the longest time viewing the risk-information. Most importantly, however, results 
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from the current study also show that even small incentives can signal risk, as indicated 
by an increase in the time spent viewing risk-information by those offered £25 
compared to those not offered incentives. Contrary to the findings of Cryder et al., 
(2010), however, no effect was observed on perceived risk in the current study. There 
are two possible explanations for this conflicting result. First, it might reflect the use of 
different measures of perceived risk. In Cryder et al., (2010) participants made 
judgements about a medical procedure’s riskiness in comparison to other risky 
activities. In the present study, however, individuals assessed their level of personal 
perceived risk associated with consuming the pill. Evidence suggests that although 
people may judge an activity as risky, they do not always feel that the risk applies to 
them personally (e.g. Lichtenstein, 1978). This suggests that the apparently conflicting 
result between the current study and Cryder et al., (2010) could reflect the measurement 
of different aspects of perceived risk. Second, differences in findings between the two 
studies might represent different levels of riskiness associated with the procedures in 
which participants were requested to engage. Cryder et al., (2010) requested individuals 
to evaluate a study involving Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS),  an intrusive 
procedure with uncertain, possibly serious risks (e.g. seizures). In the present study, the 
possible side-effects associated with the fictitious pill were arguably less severe (e.g. 
headache, dizziness, weakness, nosebleeds, speech problems, memory loss, skin 
reactions). If different results are associated with the different levels of riskiness of 
procedures involved in each study, this would imply that individuals do not simply 
equate large incentives with riskiness in an automatic way, but perceive them as an 
indication of the need to pay more attention to risk-information and search for potential 
risks. Whether or not this increased vigilance leads to increased levels of perceived risk 
may depend on the actual riskiness of the related procedures. This is partially supported 
by the fact that in the present study, the level of perceived risk of those offered £1000 
decreased as their knowledge of the side-effects increased (r (84) =-0.22, p<0.05). 
Future research should assess how the impact of large incentives on levels of perceived 
risk is moderated by the riskiness of the incentivised behaviour or procedure. 
 
The offer of large incentives resulted in the greatest increase in the time spent viewing 
the risk-information, but contrary to predictions, this was not accompanied by an 
increase in knowledge of the pill’s side effects. This raises the question of what people 
were doing during the additional time they viewed the pill-information. There are two 
possible answers. First, based on the assumption that large payments signal more risk, it 
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is possible that those in the high-incentive group used the additional time to examine the 
information more carefully for anything that could be alarming, but did not pay 
additional attention to information they did not perceive as risky. According to this 
possibility, large incentives would increase knowledge of severe side-effects, rather than 
of all side-effects in general. As the variation of side-effect severity in the present study 
was not particularly wide, this assumption cannot be tested. Future research should 
assess the moderating role of side-effect severity on the impact of financial incentives 
on related knowledge. Alternatively, it is possible that the lack of differences in 
knowledge was the result of a ceiling effect. Perhaps the chosen side-effects were 
particularly easy to remember. Indeed some, such as headache and dizziness, are 
commonly associated with many medications. Consistent with this assumption, 
knowledge levels in this study were fairly high in all groups, regardless of the difficulty 
of the free-recall measure used. Consequently, perhaps the additional time participants 
spent on the pill-information failed to increase knowledge because they had reached the 
limits of their working memory capacity.  
 
Consistent with the aforementioned notion that incentives are not equated with risk in 
an automatic way is the finding that under cognitive-load the signalling effect of 
incentives –implied by increased time spent viewing risk-information– disappeared. In 
fact, in the presence of cognitive-load, those offered £1000 spent the least amount of 
time viewing the pill-related information. It appears that the offer of incentives, 
especially large ones, under conditions of load can undermine risk-information seeking, 
perhaps due to the activation of more automatic processes. Cognitive load inhibits 
activation of the reflective system –which generates behavioural decisions based 
reasoning, judgment and knowledge about facts and values– and increases activation of 
the impulsive system –which elicits behaviour through associative links that the person 
has acquired over many experiences– (Hinson et al., 2002; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). 
Consequently, it has been argued that under cognitive load people have less ability to 
process risks and rely on heuristics to make satisfactory decisions with minimal effort 
(Friese et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2008b; Whitney et al., 2008). In the present study, 
however, the decreased time spent viewing risk-information under conditions of 
cognitive load by those offered incentives did not undermine risk-information 
processing. Furthermore, cognitive load alone was not sufficient to achieve a shift 
towards activation of the impulsive system, thus highlighting the crucial role of the 
combination of load and information regarding the offer of incentives. The presence of 
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load increased the time spent viewing risk-information by those not offered financial 
incentives. As information seeking could be considered a deliberative process, this 
finding could be taken as an indication of the increased activation of the reflective 
system. Because of the extra burden on their working memory, it appears that 
individuals in this group needed longer time to process the risk-related information. 
This is consistent with findings showing that individuals with less working memory 
capacity require longer time for syntactic processing, which is involved in reading. (Just 
& Carpenter, 1992; King & Just, 1991).  
 
Strengths 
The main strength of this research is its novelty. It is the first study to assess the impact 
of financial incentives on knowledge of an incentivised behaviour’s side-effects. It is 
also the first study to assess the moderating role of cognitive load on the impact of 
financial incentives on risk-information processing. Furthermore, it the first study to 
incorporate conditions of no payment, thus allowing for an assessment of the absolute 
effect of financial incentives on risk-information processing. Finally, the study 
overcame the compromised generalisabilty of previous research findings, which resulted 
from a reliance on hypothetical scenarios which participants were aware of. Although 
participants in the current research were presented with information about a fictitious 
trial, measures were taken to establish its credibility, thus maximising the chance that 




There are some limitations associated with the present study. The first relates to the 
possible discrepancy between willingness to take the pill and actual behaviour. 
Although the majority of participants were willing to take the pill, it is not known how 
many would actually do so if requested. Future research should assess the impact of 
financial incentives on information processing and its relationship to actual rather than 
intended behaviour. Second, although measures were taken to ensure that the trial 
appeared credible, it is possible that some participants may have realised its fictitious 
nature, which could have influenced their responses. As perceived credibility of the trial 
was not measured, the extent to which this occurred cannot be assessed. The third 
limitation relates to the generalisabilty of the results. We do not know if similar findings 
will be obtained with a patient population offered payments to take a medicine. Future 
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research should replicate this study with patient populations. The moderating role of 
cognitive load on the time spent viewing the risk-related information also requires 
replication under real-life conditions. Finally, although findings allow for inferences to 
be made regarding the impact of financial incentives on risk-information processing, no 
conclusions can be made regarding whether decisions to take the pill were fully 
informed. According to the operational definition by Marteau et al., (2001) an informed 
choice is one that is based on knowledge of the salient information and is in line with 
the decision-maker’s attitudes. Attitudes towards the fictitious pill, however, were not 
assessed in the present study, which would have provided a more complete picture of 




The findings from the present study add to the evidence which challenges existing 
concerns regarding the adverse impact of financial incentives on the processing of risk-
information associated with incentivised behaviours. In fact, results suggest that 
incentives, especially large ones, signal the need for increased attention towards risk-
information. Results further suggest that under conditions of cognitive-load this 
signalling effect disappears. As cognitive-load is affected by the design and format of 
information and instructions (Chandler & Sweller, 1991; Sweller, 1994; Sweller, Van 
Merrienboer & Paas, 1998), the findings highlight the importance of presenting 
information about incentivised health-related behaviours and their consequences in a 
way that maximises cognitive capacity, in order to preserve the signalling effect of 
incentives and encourage focused attention. 
 
Conclusion 
The findings from the present study challenge concerns regarding the adverse effects of 
financial incentives on risk-information processing and the quality of decisions to 
engage in incentivised behaviours. Low value incentives do not undermine risk-
information processing or affect willingness to perform incentivised behaviours. 
Although large-value incentives increase willingness to engage in incentivised 
behaviours, their offer signals more risk. Offered when the cognitive capacity to process 
information is reduced, this signalling effect disappears, highlighting the need to 




The next chapter 
The following chapter presents a discussion of the main findings of the studies included 








































The aim of the research presented in this thesis was to assess the behavioural and 
cognitive consequences of using financial incentives to change health-related 
behaviours. In addressing this aim, the thesis had the following objectives: 
1. To estimate the effectiveness of financial incentives in changing health-related 
behaviours  
i. regardless of whether they are still offered  
ii. when they have been discontinued (sustained effectiveness) 
2. To examine the factors that modify the impact of financial incentives on health- 
related behaviours  
3. To explore the possible confounding variables that might inadvertently influence 
the impact of financial incentives on health-related behaviours  
4. To assess the impact of financial incentives on the quality of people’s decisions to 
engage in incentivised behaviours  
This final chapter is divided into two parts. The first part presents a summary of the 
studies incorporated in the thesis, including their findings, strengths, limitations and 
implications. The second part is organised around the four research objectives and 
presents conclusions regarding the evidence in relation to each, which is discussed in 
the context of the related implications for future research, practice and policy. The 
chapter ends with a consideration of the questions that still need to be answered and of 













Summary of studies 
Study 1: Personal financial incentives for changing repeated health-related 
behaviours: a systematic review and meta-analysis 
 
Main findings 
 Financial incentives changed repeated health-related behaviours with effects lasting 
up to 18 months from intervention start but weakening over time. 
 Changes were sustained for up to three months after removal of the incentives. 
 The impact of financial incentives on repeated health-behaviour appeared driven by 
studies assessing smoking cessation. 
 Improvements to smoking cessation through the use of financial incentives lasted 
up to 18 months from intervention start and three months post-incentive removal. 
 Improvements to indicators of healthier eating and/or physical activity (body 
weight, cholesterol levels and haemoglobin levels) lasted for up to 12 months from 
intervention start but disappeared after the removal of incentives. 
 Financial incentives did not significantly improve physical activity-related 
behaviours but null findings may be due to a lack of statistical power.  
 The target behaviour, incentive value and incentive type did not independently 
modify incentive effectiveness at any of the assessed time-points. 
 An interaction between the target behaviour and incentive value modified 
effectiveness at six months from intervention start: lower value incentives for 
smoking cessation reduced attainment of the target behaviour. 
 Recipients’ deprivation level modified incentive impacts between six and 12 
months from intervention start, with higher deprivation levels increasing attainment 
of the behaviour, but not at other assessed time-points. 
 The findings provided some support in favour of incentive effects being 
overestimated by a lack of standardisation of study procedures between 
incentivised and control groups and the use of unreliable outcome measures.  
 
Strengths 
 This is the first review of which we are aware to provide an overall estimate of the 
impact of financial incentives across a range of repeated health-related behaviours.  
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 It the first review to focus explicitly on assessment of the sustained impact of 
financial incentives on repeated health-related behaviours, i.e. after removal of the 
incentives.  
 It is one of the few reviews to systematically assess the role of potential effect 
modifiers, including the target behaviour, incentive value and type, and recipients’ 
deprivation level. 
 The review empirically demonstrated for the first time the role of recipients’ 
deprivation level in the moderation of the impact of financial incentives on health-
related behaviours, thus highlighting the potential of incentive schemes to reduce 
health inequalities. 
 It is the first review of which we are aware to include an assessment of whether the 
effectiveness of financial incentives can be confounded by a lack of standardisation 
of study procedures and the use of unreliable measures.  
 
Limitations 
 Interpretations require caution as the review lacked statistical power with regards to 
certain assessments, including: i. the sustained impact of financial incentives on 
overall behaviour beyond 18 months from intervention start; ii. the impact of 
financial incentives on physical activity; and iii. the role of certain of the targeted 
effect modifiers. 
 The role of many potentially important effect modifiers was not examined, such as 
whether the incentive scheme involved use of a deposit contract system, the 
duration of the incentive scheme, the immediacy of incentive delivery and the 
frequency of reinforcement.  
 
Implications  
 Financial incentives change repeated health-behaviours and may help reduce health 
inequalities. However, their role in reducing the burden of non-communicable 
diseases is potentially limited given the lack of evidence regarding the 
sustainability of effects beyond three months after incentive removal. 
 Incentivises could be used to initiate behaviour change with their use 
complemented by behaviour maintenance and relapse prevention techniques which 
could be delivered after their removal. Effects may also be larger if incentives are 
delivered in context of environments that support healthier behaviour as the default. 
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Future research, however, should first establish the cost-effectiveness of financial 
incentives schemes aimed at changing repeated health-behaviours. 
 Given the lack of sustainable effects, in addition to the potential cost-effectiveness 
and acceptability issues surrounding the use of financial incentives for changing 
health-related behaviours, future research and policies should perhaps investigate 
and consider the application of population level interventions to change 
environments, including the use of economic mechanisms, such as taxation or 
product pricing. 
 
Study 2: Financial incentives for smoking cessation during pregnancy: is it from 
being paid or the extra aid? 
 
Main findings 
 Pregnant smokers who were incentivised for smoking cessation and those not 
receiving incentives reported similar reasons for wanting to stop smoking during 
pregnancy. 
 Incentivised and non-incentivised women described dissimilar experiences of the 
NHS Stop-Smoking Services, which they perceived to have differentially 
influenced their quit attempts.  
 Women who were incentivised reported using the services more than women who 
were not incentivised and described the motivating experience of being monitored 
and receiving feedback on their progress.  
 Non-incentivised women reported problems receiving the appropriate Nicotine 




 This is the first investigation attempting to determine how financial incentive 
schemes for smoking cessation during pregnancy may have their effects. 
 It is the first study to explore the experiences and perceptions of pregnant smokers 
who were incentivised for cessation and compare them with those of pregnant 
smokers not receiving incentives. 
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 The comparative design used in this study allowed for identification and 
exploration of the factors that could potentially confound the impact of financial 
incentives on smoking cessation during pregnancy. 
 The study is one of the largest interview-based studies of pregnant smokers 
(focusing on the accounts of thirty-six women), who are an extremely difficult 
group to recruit and study. 
 
Limitations 
 The qualitative, exploratory nature of the study does not allow for causal 
relationships to be established between the variables identified as being important 
and smoking cessation. 
 The financial incentive scheme described in the study was pending formal 
evaluation at the time this research was conducted, thus precluding conclusions 
regarding whether reported between-group differences were related to differential 
effectiveness.  
 At the time the interviews were conducted few women in either group had stopped 
smoking, thereby precluding comparisons within and between groups between 
quitters and non-quitters. 
 
Implications 
 Findings from this study highlight the need to be cautious about attributing the 
effects of financial incentives schemes to incentives per se, given that such schemes 
are complex behavioural interventions that might operate through one or more of 
various pathways.  
 Future studies evaluating the impact of financial incentives on health-related 
behaviours should attempt to eliminate the influence of potential confounding 










Study 3: Financial incentives for increasing uptake of HPV vaccinations: a 
randomised controlled trial. 
 
Main findings 
 The offer of financial incentives increased initial uptake of an HPV vaccination 
programme. 
 The combination of financial incentives and reminder text messages increased 
completion of an HPV vaccinations programme.  
 The effects of financial incentives on uptake and completion of the HPV 
vaccination programme were not modified by recipients’ level of deprivation.  
 The quality of girls’ decisions to undergo the vaccinations was unaffected by the 
offer of financial incentives: attitudes towards the vaccination were similarly 
positive and knowledge of its health consequences similarly high for incentivised 
and non-incentivised participants. 
 
Strengths 
 This is the first study to assess the effectiveness of financial incentives for 
increasing uptake of the HPV vaccination.  
 It is the first trial of which we are aware that assessed the role of deprivation level 
in the potential moderation of the impact of financial incentives on health-related 
behaviours. 
 The incentive scheme used was designed to maximise retention: unlike other 
studies that have offered fixed-value rewards for each vaccination, larger incentives 
(£20) were offered at the beginning and end of the programme, to motivate 
participants to initiate and complete the vaccinations. 
 
Limitations 
 Results from this study do not allow inferences to be made regarding the 
effectiveness of financial incentives alone for completing the programme. An error 
made by those administrating the scheme resulted in girls in the intervention groups 
receiving reminder text-messages prior to their 2nd and 3rd vaccination 
appointments, but not girls in the control groups. 
  Conclusions regarding the impact of financial incentives on the quality of 
decisions are limited due to certain methodological shortcomings. First, the 
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measure of informed choice used in the study, which was developed for use in the 
context of screening, might not have been sensitive enough to assess decision 
quality in the context of HPV vaccination uptake. Second, girls’ knowledge of the 
vaccination’s side-effects was not assessed in this study. Consequently, no 
inferences can be made about whether the offer of a financial reward undermines 
risk-information processing. Third, assessing informed choice after girls had 
decided to get vaccinated raises the possibility that attitudes towards the 
vaccination were influenced by their decision to receive it. Finally, assessment of 
decision quality after the offer of financial incentives and only in those deciding to 
get vaccinated does not allow inferences to be made regarding the mechanisms by 
which incentives might influence decision-making processes. 
 
Implications 
 Although the intervention was effective in increasing completion of the HPV 
vaccination, uptake was well below the 80% uptake target set by the NHS, 
compromising the applicability of this intervention in this context. 
 It is unknown whether the use of financial incentives for uptake of the HPV 
vaccination is cost-effective. Future research in this context should be 
supplemented by a formal cost-effectiveness analysis.  
 The use of financial incentives for health promotion attracts negative views, as does 
the HPV vaccine, which is perceived as condoning early sexual activity. The use of 
financial incentives for increasing HPV vaccinations may therefore be too 
unacceptable. 
 Low uptake rates coupled by cost-effectiveness and acceptability issues necessitate 
consideration of alternative ways of achieving the vaccination coverage target set 
by the NHS. 
 
Study 4: Does incentivising pill-taking undermine risk-information processing? 
Evidence from a web-based experiment 
 
Main findings 
 Willingness to take a fictitious pill increased with the offer of £1000, but not with 
the offer of £25. 
 Risk-information processing was unaffected by the offer of incentives: levels of  
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perceived risk associated with taking the pill and knowledge of its side-effects were 
similar between groups. 
 The time spent viewing the risk-information was affected by the offer of incentives, 
an effect moderated by cognitive-load: Without load, time increased with the value 
of incentives. Under load, time decreased with the offer of incentives but did not 
differ between the two incentivised groups.  
 
Strengths 
 This is the first study to assess the impact of financial incentives on knowledge of 
an incentivised behaviour’s side-effects.  
 It is the first study to assess the moderating role of cognitive load on the impact of 
financial incentives on the processing of risk-information.  
 It is the first study to incorporate conditions of no payment when assessing the 
impact of financial incentives on risk-information processing, thus allowing for an 
assessment of the absolute effect of financial incentives.  
 Measures were taken to establish the fictitious trial’s credibility and to maximise 
the chances that responses reflected judgements that would have been made if 
financial incentives were actually offered, thus overcoming the compromised 
generalisabilty of previous research findings, which resulted from a reliance on 
hypothetical scenarios of which participants were aware.  
 
Limitations 
 The study used a proxy measure of behaviour rather than actual behaviour when 
assessing willingness to take the pill. Future research should assess the impact of 
financial incentives on information processing and its relationship to actual rather 
than intended behaviour. 
 Although measures were taken to ensure that the trial appeared credible, it is 
possible that some participants realised its fictitious nature, which could have 
influenced their responses.  
 The generalisability of the findings might be compromised due to the use of an 
analogue design. The moderating role of cognitive load on the time spent viewing 
the risk-related information requires replication under real-life conditions. 
 Attitudes – an essential component of the concept of informed choice (Marteau et 
al., 2001)-- towards the fictitious pill were not assessed in the study. Inclusion of 
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such an assessment would have allowed for a more complete picture of the impact 
of financial incentives on the quality of decisions to engage in incentivised 
behaviours to be drawn.  
 
Implications 
 The findings challenge concerns regarding the adverse effects of financial incentives 
on risk-information processing. On the contrary, they indicate that incentives signal 
risk, suggesting a cautionary impact. 
 Given the signalling effect of incentives can disappear under cognitive load, the 
findings highlight the need to optimise cognitive capacity when presenting 
information about incentivised health-behaviours. 
 Future research should attempt to replicate the findings from the present study with 
patient populations offered financial incentives for taking a medicine.  
 
Addressing the research objectives 
 The effectiveness of financial incentives in changing health-related behaviours  
The thesis focused on two different types of health-related behaviours: simple, one-off 
behaviours and complex, repeated behaviours. Within the literature, discussions 
regarding the effectiveness of incentives have distinguished between these two different 
behaviour types. Financial incentives have been found most effective in promoting 
simple, one-off health-related behaviours (Jochelson, 2007; Kane et al., 2004; 
Sutherland et al., 2008). Consistent with these findings, the research in Chapters 6 and 7 
demonstrated that financial incentives can increase uptake of an HPV vaccination 
programme. Although the effectiveness of incentives in increasing uptake of 
recommended vaccinations has been previously shown (Achat, McIntyre& Burgess, 
1999; Briss, et al, 2000; Seal, et al, 2003), their use in promoting the HPV vaccinations 
had hitherto remained unexamined. In order to accurately address the question of 
incentive effectiveness, however, we need to consider it in relation to the outcomes of 
interest, which are arguably different for different types of behaviours. When targeting 
simple, one-off behaviours, such as vaccination uptake, the goal is to achieve a 
behaviour for a limited number of occasions on which the intervention is offered. 
Consequently, the issue of sustainability of changes does not apply to these behaviours. 
The issue of transferability and whether, for example, the impact of incentivising uptake 
of one vaccination can affect uptake of other recommended vaccinations in the future 
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could be considered a form of change sustainability. Consideration of this, however, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Based on the aforementioned goal, the findings from 
Chapters 6 and 7 would support the conclusion that financial incentives are effective in 
changing health-related behaviours. However, assessment of the effectiveness of an 
intervention, such as the use of incentive schemes, should also include a consideration 
of its effect size and clinical significance in relation to the targets that have been set for 
specific health behaviours. With regards to uptake of the HPV vaccination, the NHS has 
set a vaccination coverage target of 80% of the target population (i.e. girls aged 12-18 
years). Even with the intervention, uptake rates reported in Chapter 7 were much lower 
than this target, a finding which questions the use of incentives in this context. 
 
When targeting complex, repeated health-related behaviours, the goal is two-fold: to 
initiate changes and sustain these after discontinuation of the intervention. Previous 
research suggests than incentives are effective in initiating changes to repeated health-
related behaviours, but fail to lead to sustained changes (Jochelson, 2007; Kane et al., 
2004). Consistent with this conclusion, Chapter 4 demonstrated that financial incentives 
can change complex, repeated health-related behaviours, but their effects are not 
sustained. Rather, they disappear a few months after incentive removal. Lack of 
sustained change is a problem shared by most interventions aimed at changing repeated 
health-behaviours (Ogden 2012). Although we cannot assess whether incentives are 
more or less effective than other interventions in this respect, findings suggest that if 
permanent change is the goal, incentives can’t help attain it, demonstrating their limited 
role in reducing the global burden of non-communicable diseases.  
 
In sum, financial incentives are effective in changing health-related behaviours. Such 
change, however, is not necessarily sufficient when assessing the use of such schemes, 
as effect sizes might not have clinical significance and changes are not sustained long 
after removal of the incentives.  
 
Factors that modify the impact of financial incentives on health-related behaviours  
The research in this thesis assessed the role of the following potential modifiers of the 
effects of financial incentives on health-related behaviours: the target behaviour, 
incentive value, incentive type (whether its attainment is certain or uncertain) and 
recipients’ level of deprivation. Although the impact of some of these variables is 
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demonstrated in the thesis, findings do not allow for firm conclusions to be drawn 
regarding their exact effects. 
The systematic review presented in Chapters 3 and 4 did not find responses to 
incentives to be modified by the target behaviour. Findings, however, suggested that the 
use of incentives might be more promising for smoking cessation, compared with other 
repeated health-behaviours assessed in the thesis. This could be the result of the 
increased research attention incentives for smoking cessation have received. As 
mentioned previously, the goal for interventions targeting these behaviours is to produce 
sustained behaviour change. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, incentive effects did not last 
more than three months beyond incentive removal for any of the targeted behaviours. 
Consequently, one could argue that incentives are equally effective (or equally 
ineffective) across repeated health-related behaviours in producing the desired goal.   
One of the variables often discussed as influencing behavioural responses to incentives 
is incentive value (Catania, 1963; Jochelson, 2007; Kane et al., 2004; Lussier et al., 
2006; Sutherland et al., 2008). Findings from Chapter 4 suggest a role of incentive 
value, but only in modifying the impact of financial incentives on smoking cessation. 
Given the methodological shortcomings associated with this research, to conclude that 
incentive value is not important for changing other health-behaviours would be 
premature. Further research should not only attempt to further assess the role of 
incentive value in modifying responses to incentives, but ideally to determine the 
optimal value that needs to be offered in order to effectively change different 
behaviours. Similarly, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the modifying role of the 
certainty of incentive attainment.  
The role of recipients’ deprivation level is varied within this thesis. The systematic 
review in Chapter 4 found effect sizes were greater for those classified as highly 
deprived, for one of the assessed timed-endpoints, thus highlighting the potential of 
incentive schemes in helping reduce health inequalities. The trial in Chapter 7, however, 
did not find deprivation level to be a significant effect modifier. There are two possible 
explanations for these different findings. First, the role of deprivation might depend on 
the type of behaviour being targeted. Although it might be significant in changing 
repeated health-related behaviours, it might not be important when targeting non- 
repeated health-behaviours, such as vaccination uptake. The modifying role of 
deprivation level on the impact of incentives on one-off behaviours should be 
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investigated in the context of evidence synthesis, in a similar manner to how it was 
assessed for repeated health-related behaviours in the systematic review presented in 
this thesis. Second, deprivation level might be important when targeting one-off 
behaviours but its effects could not be detected due to methodological shortcomings 
associated with the trial presented in Chapters 6 and 7. In any case, further research is 
clearly warranted to allow more definite conclusions to be drawn. 
Although the findings presented in this thesis are not conclusive, they demonstrate that, 
as hypothesised, incentive effects do depend on certain factors. As illustrated in Table 
2.1 of Chapter 2 (page 31), there are numerous variables that might influence 
behavioural responses to incentives. This thesis never aimed to examine the role of all 
of these, but chose to focus on those frequently discussed in the literature as being 
influential (Jochelson, 2007; Kane et al., 2004; Leung et al., 2002; Sutherland et al., 
2008). Future research should attempt to examine the role of additional potential effect 
modifiers. 
 
Confounding variables that influence the impact of incentives on health-related 
behaviours 
As financial incentive schemes are rarely comprised of only one behaviour change 
technique (i.e. the use of rewards) without the use of appropriate control groups it is not 
possible to infer whether their effectiveness can be attributed to the incentives per se or 
to indirect influences, mediated by changes to some aspects of the processes involved in 
their delivery. Consequently, failure to standardise procedures between incentivised and 
control groups could lead to the effectiveness of offering rewards being exaggerated. 
Similarly, as it is assumed that attempts to falsify outcomes are more likely amongst 
incentivised individuals than non-incentivised individuals, in order to attain the rewards, 
the use of falsifiable outcome measures might also result in an overestimation of 
incentive effectiveness. Findings from the research presented in this thesis provide some 
support for the occurrence of these phenomena. Chapter 4 presented some evidence of 
significant positive incentive effects being rendered non-significant when focusing only 
on trials that had standardised study procedures between groups and used reliable 
outcomes measures. Chapter 5 provides an illustration of how a lack of standardisation 
between groups could affect outcomes, by exploring and identifying some of the 
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variables that could confound incentive effectiveness. These include differential 
engagement with, and provision of support services. 
 
Although no firm conclusions can be drawn from the findings presented in this thesis 
with regards to the exact variables that might confound the impact of financial 
incentives on health-related behaviours, or the size of their effects, the evidence is 
arguably sufficient to highlight the need for future research to use appropriate control 
groups when evaluating incentive schemes. It also highlights the need for policy makers 
to base their decisions regarding the applicability of such schemes on evidence 
generated through well designed trials.  
 
One potentially important aspect of incentives schemes, the effect of which this thesis 
did not address, is conditionality. To more precisely assess the effect of incentives, 
appropriate control groups should involve the provision of unconditional payments, so 
that both groups receive incentives but for only one these are contingent on behaviour 
change. This would allow researchers to disentangle the impact of offering rewards 
from the conditionality component of incentive schemes and determine whether paying 
people regardless of outcome is enough to produce desired effects. A few studies in the 
field of smoking cessation and drug abstinence have compared conditional and 
unconditional incentives but results have been inconclusive. Some findings suggest that 
conditional payments are needed to produce changes (e.g. Dunn, Sigmon, Thomas et al., 
2008; Epstein, Hawkins, Covi et al., 2003; Heil et al., 2008; Higgins et al., 2004). 
Others, however, have found no differences between the two types of incentives (e.g. 
Lussier et al., 2006). Determining the exact components of incentive schemes that drive 
effectiveness is essential in designing optimal interventions. Future research should aim 
to clarify the potential differential effects of conditional and unconditional incentives.  
 
The impact of financial incentives on the quality of people’s decisions to engage in 
incentivised behaviours. 
Findings from the research presented in this thesis provide no evidence to support 
concerns regarding the potential adverse consequences of financial incentives on the 
quality of people’s decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours. Chapter 7 
demonstrated that incentives do not undermine individuals’ ability to make informed 
choices, as measured by their attitudes towards the incentivised behaviour and their 
knowledge of its health consequences. Chapter 8 showed that incentives also do not 
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undermine risk-information processing in the context of offering incentives to engage in 
a behaviour with potential adverse side-effects. On the contrary, incentives can signal 
risk to individuals. Before these findings are used as a basis to judge the applicability of 
financial incentive schemes for changing health-related behaviour, they require 
replication that will take into consideration the methodological limitations associated 
with the studies presented in Chapters 7 and 8.  
 
Depending on one’s ethical stance it is possible to argue that the evidence presented in 
Chapter 7 is not sufficient to conclude that incentives do not undermine the quality of 
decision-making processes. The specific argument would be that individuals 
participating in the trial may have had to overcome their negative attitudes in relation to 
the incentivised behaviour in order to attend their vaccination appointment. In other 
words, those who believed that the vaccination was harmful or bad might have changed 
their mind before arriving at the immunisation clinic, as a consequence of being offered 
incentives. The design of Study 4 could not allow for such an effect to be detected. 
Some may argue that this would constitute undue influence, which is the converse of 
informed consent or voluntary choice (Grady, 2005). As the trial did not assess 
informed choice prior to the offer of incentives, no relevant conclusions can be drawn. 
Future research should attempt to elucidate whether incentives alter who decides to 
engage in the behaviour or whether they alter the attitudes towards and/or knowledge of 
the target behaviour in all who are offered incentives, or a mixture of the two. The 
question, however, of whether or not changing someone’s attitudes constitutes undue 
influence is an ethical one and beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that the influential role of attitudes on actual behaviour has been included in 
several psychological theories, including those focusing on health behaviours. For 
example, the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) hypothesises that behavioural 
attitudes, along with other constructs, mediate the relationship between intention and 
behaviour. According to this, in order to change behaviour one must first change related 
attitudes. Consequently, many behaviour change techniques are designed to change 
attitudes, both explicit, such as persuasive communication (e.g. Fisher et al., 1996) and 
implicit, such as evaluative conditioning (e.g. Hollands et al., 2011). If getting someone 
to change his/her attitudes is undue influence, then all such techniques should be 
considered as having the potential to undermine the quality of decision-making 
processes, not just the use of incentives. Informed choice has been empirically 
operationalised as a choice that is in line with the decision-maker’s attitudes and is 
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based on salient knowledge (Marteau, et al., 2001). Based on this definition, the 
findings presented in Chapter 7 showed that incentives did not undermine the quality of 
decisions as measured by informed choice. Had participants decided to get vaccinated 




Although the research presented in this thesis has contributed towards addressing some 
of the uncertainties in relation to the use of incentives for changing health-related 
behaviours, there are still some questions that remain unanswered. Addressing these 
questions is essential before the use of financial incentives schemes is considered for 
application in health policies.   
 
Some of the uncertainties are related to the aspects this thesis focused on (and can thus 
be considered drawbacks of the presented research, although the thesis limitations are 
elaborated on in the next section). These involve i) the role of potential effect modifiers 
not assessed by the research presented in this thesis, as well as the need to further 
elucidate those assessed herein and ii) the need for further examination of the variables 
that could confound the impact of financial incentives on health-related behaviours, 
including the need to clarify the potential differential impacts of conditional and 
unconditional incentives.  
 
There is also uncertainty regarding whether financial incentives schemes can be 
delivered in ways that are cost-effective and acceptable. Apart from a few rare 
exceptions (e.g. Lahiri & Faghri, 2012), formal cost-effectiveness analyses of financial 
incentive schemes have not been conducted. The use of incentives also attracts criticism 
and raises moral concerns, for being potentially coercive, involving bribery and 
undermining autonomy (Ashcroft, 2011). Based on an ethical analysis of these concerns 
it has been argued that there is no good reason to assume that incentives constitute the 
above (Ashcroft, 2011). Nonetheless, evidence suggests that the public finds their use 
for health promotion less acceptable than other means (Parke, Ashcroft, Brown et al., 
2011; Promberger et al., 2011), although these negative views are attenuated by 
evidence of effectiveness (Promberger et al., 2012). As there is limited evidence of 
effectiveness for the use of incentives for changing some health-related behaviours, we 
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can assume that at least in some contexts, the use of incentives might remain 
unacceptable. Consequently, what is found to be effective in studies will not necessarily 
be considered acceptable in practice. This is reflected in non-smokers rejecting an 
effective programme for smokers employed in the same organization (Volpp et al., 
2011). 
 
Consideration of the use of financial incentives should be informed by these issues and 
uncertainties. 
 
Thesis strengths and limitations  
Apart from the strengths discussed in relation to each of the studies in the respective 
chapters and summarised at the beginning of this chapter, the thesis has the advantage 
of having relied on a variety of methods to capture many aspects of the behavioural and 
cognitive consequences of using financial incentives to change health-related 
behaviours. This has enabled the thesis to clarify some of the uncertainties surrounding 
the use of incentives in health-related contexts. This in turn has arguably allowed for a 
more holistic approach to the evaluation of their use for changing health-related 
behaviour. Consequently, the findings have the potential to directly inform discussions 
regarding the application of incentives in health policies.  
 
The primary limitation of the thesis, apart for those discussed in the preceding section 
and in relation to each individual study, is the lack of an in-depth assessment of the 
research objectives. Although choosing to address the various uncertainties surrounding 
the behavioural and cognitive consequences of financial incentive schemes has 
potentially resulted in a more holistic understanding of their use, at the same time it has 
precluded in-depth examination of any one of the research objectives. Furthermore, as 
the focus of the research in this thesis was to evaluate incentive effectiveness, the 
mechanisms by which incentives influence behaviour, were not assessed. Determining 
how incentives produce their effects is essential for designing optimal financial 
incentives schemes. It would also allow for an evaluation of existing theories of health 
behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a growing interest in the role of 
unconscious processes and impulses in determining health behaviours. This is reflected 
in the development of dual-processing models, such as the Reflective-Impulsive Model 
(Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In theory, financial incentives are likely to operate on 
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behaviour both via the impulsive and reflective information processing systems. For 
example they might work by linking the target behaviour to a positively evaluated 
stimulus, thus strengthening the value associated with the behaviour, by shifting 
people’s outcome expectations of the likely consequences of the target behaviour in a 
positive direction, by removing perceived barriers thus enhancing self-efficacy and 
perceived behavioural control, by rendering attitudes towards the target behaviour more 
positive or by facilitating allocation of limited cognitive capacity, in such a way as to 
achieve the now more highly valued target behaviour. The research presented in this 
thesis did not consider such mechanisms, so cannot be used to determine how these sets 
of influences may explain behaviour change in financial incentive schemes. This should 
be a focus of future research.  
 
Concluding statement 
The findings from the research presented in this thesis suggested that financial 
incentives are effective in changing health-related behaviours, but their effects do not 
always have clinical significance and are not sustained for more than a few months after 
incentive removal. The evidence demonstrated the role of recipients’ level of 
deprivation in modifying the impact of financial incentives on repeated health-related 
behaviours, but not on one-off  health-related behaviours, thus highlighting the potential 
of incentive schemes to help reduce health inequalities reflected in the socially patterned 
prevalence of non-communicable diseases. The findings also support the important role 
of incentive value in schemes targeting smoking cessation. Further research is necessary 
to further elucidate the role of other effect modifiers. The results provide some supports 
for the need to be cautious about attributing the impact of financial incentive schemes to 
incentives per se, as failure to control the variables and processes inherit in incentive 
delivery can confound incentive effectiveness. Possible confounding variables include 
differential engagement with, and provision of, support services. Finally, the results 
provide no evidence to suggest that financial incentives undermine the quality of 
people’s decisions to engage in incentivised behaviours. The research in this thesis has 
reduced some of the uncertainties surrounding the behavioural and cognitive 
consequences of financial incentive schemes for changing health-related behaviour. It 
remains unclear whether incentive schemes can be delivered in ways that are cost-
effective and acceptable and hence whether they can contribute to efforts to reduce the 
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0*   -     -    - - -    -    
1   - - - - - -    -  - -   -  - - 
2 - - - - - -     -   -  -  - - - - 
3 - -  - - - - - ? ? ? -  - ? ?  - ? ? ? 
4 - - -  - - - -  -    - -   - - - - 
5 -  - - - - - - - -  -  -  -  -   - 
6 - - - -   - -  - -   - -   - - - - 





 CCT - - -  -  -  - - - - 
8  - - - - - - -      -  -  - - - - 
9 -    - - - -  -  - -   -  -  - - 
10 - - - - -  - -  -   -   -  - - - - 
11     - - - -    - -   -  -  - - 
12  - - - - - - -  -   -   -  - - - - 
13  - - -   -   - -  -   - -  - - - 
14 - - - -  - - - N/A N/A N/A  -   - -  - - - 
15 - - - -  D - - -     -   -  - - - - 
16  - - - - - - -  -   -   - -  - - - 
17 - - - -   - -     -   -  - - - - 
18 -    - -    -  - -   - -  - - - 
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19 -    - -    -   -   - -  - - - 
20 - - - -  - - - N/A N/A N/A  -   -  - - - - 
21 - - - - - - -     - -   -  - M M M 
22 - - - - - - -     - -   -  -  -  S vs C 
23 - - - -  - - - N/A N/A N/A  -   - -  - - - 
24 -  -  - - - - N/A N/A N/A  -   -  - - - - 
25 -    - - - -   - - -   - -   M - - 
26 - - - -   - -     -   - -  - - - 
27 - - - - - -  
 
(A & other 
substance 
use) 
 - - - -  -   -  -  
28  - - - - - - -  -  - -   -  -  M - - 
29 - - - - D  - -  -   -   -  - - - - 
30 - - - -  - - - N/A  -  -   -  - - - - 
31 - - -  - - - -  - -  -   -  - - - - 
32  -   - - - -     -   - -  - - - 
33 - - - -  - - -   - - -  -   -  - - 
34 - - - -  - - -   -  -  -   - - - - 





 - - - -  -   -  -  
36  - - - - - - - N/A N/A N/A  -  -   - - - - 













38 - - - -  - - -    - -   -  - -! -! - 





IC= Incentive Characteristics 
ID= Individual Differences 
BT= Behaviour Type 
M=mentioned (not analysed) 
S=simple behaviour; C= complex behaviour 
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Analysis of overlap of current review with existing reviews 
We identified 38 reviews (of which eight are Cochrane reviews, including one protocol) 
that are relevant to the proposed review. Twenty-eight of the 38 reported a systematic 
search strategy. Eight reviews (three Cochrane and five non-Cochrane) performed meta-
analyses, upon which conclusions were drawn, with the remaining 30 relying on 
narrative analyses.  
All of these reviews evaluate, to varying degrees, the impact of financial incentives on 
one or repeated health-related behaviours. Sixteen out of 38 focused on the impact of 
financial incentives on health related behaviours. The remaining 22 focused on a range 
of interventions, of which financial incentives featured as just one. However, all 
existing reviews differ from the current review in various ways. 
Of the sixteen reviews that explicitly evaluated the impact of financial incentives, nine 
[three Cochrane (1, 3 and 5) and six non-Cochrane (9, 11, 25, 28, 32 and 38)], focused 
on a single repeated health-related behaviour, including smoking (Review 1, 3, 5, 9, 25, 
28) and dietary preferences (Reviews 33, 38). Consequently these reviews are not 
informative about the modifying role of behaviour type. Furthermore, only five of these 
reviews attempted to analyse how the impact of financial incentives on health-related 
behaviour is modified by incentive scheme characteristics (Reviews 1, 9, 11, 25, 33), 
and only one described certain individual differences that were characteristic of 
participants achieving the pre-specified behaviour (Review 5). 
Seven reviews, one Cochrane (7) and six non-Cochrane (18, 21, 22, 27, 35 and 37) 
focused explicitly on the impact of financial incentives on multiple health-related 
behaviours (as opposed to just one), including smoking, dietary preferences, alcohol 
consumption and physical activity. However, only two (27, 35) systematically analysed 
the role of certain (but not all) potential modifiers, i.e. incentives scheme characteristics, 
and behaviour type. 
Of the 22 reviews that did not focus exclusively on financial incentives, four were 
Cochrane (2, 4, 6, and 8) and eighteen non-Cochrane (10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 
23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36) reviews. In these reviews, financial incentive schemes 
featured as just one of several interventions targeting one, or more (as in the case of 
reviews 2, 13 and 19) specific health problems, such as obesity (Review 6, 14, 15, 17, 
20, 23, 26, 29, 30, 34), smoking (Review 4, 8, 12, 13, 16, 24, 31, 32, 36), alcohol 
(Reviews 2, 19) and physical inactivity (Reviews 10 and 29). The aim of these reviews 
was to evaluate the general effectiveness of various interventions, without necessarily 
reporting on the independent effect of financial incentives. Furthermore, these reviews 
did not include any analyses on the potential modifying role of incentive scheme 
characteristics or participants’ individual differences. Moreover, because they focused 
on a single health-related behaviour, they are not informative about the modifying role 
of behaviour type. 
In summary no single existing review has asked the same questions as the current 
review. Although the current review has some overlap with existing reviews in terms of 
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the included studies, it differs through the inclusion of further trials and the analysis of 
variables which hitherto had remained unexamined. By building upon existing reviews 
it produces a more complete and comprehensive picture of the impact of personal 
financial incentives allowing generalizations across behaviours both about the impact 























Appendix for Chapter 4 
 
 
Appendix 4.1: Search Strategy 
 
MEDLINE (Ovip SP) Search strategy  
1. exp Smoking OR Smoking.mp  
2.  exp Smoking Cessation OR smoking cessation.mp  
3. exp Tobacco Use Cessation  
4. (quit* adj3 smok*).mp  
5. (smok* adj3 abstinen*).mp  
6. (cut* down adj3 cigarette*).mp  
7. (smok* adj3 reduc*).mp  
8. (cigarette* adj3 reduc*)  
9. (CO adj3 reading*).mp  
10. (CO adj3 level*).mp  
11. (carbon monoxide adj3 reading*)  
12.  (carbon monoxide adj3 level*) OR cotinine adj3 level*.mp OR nicotine adj3 
addict*   
13. tobacco.mp OR exp Tobacco)  
14. 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4 OR 5 OR 6 OR 5 OR 8 OR 9 OR 10 OR 11 OR 12 OR 13 
15. exp Exercise OR exercise.mp  
16. (physical adj3 exercis*).mp  
17. (physical adj3 train*).mp  
18. (physical adj3 activ*).mp  
19. (physical adj3 inactiv*).mp  
20. (sedentary adj3 behavio?r*).mp OR (sedentary adj3 lifestyle*).mp  
21. (sedentary adj3 life-style*). 
22. (sedentary behavio?r* adj3 modif*).mp  
23. (sedentary lifestyle* adj3 modif*).mp  
24. (sedentary life-style* adj3 modif*). 
25. exp Physical Education and Training  
26. gym*.mp  
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27. exp Sports  
28. (gym* adj3 attend*).mp  
29. exp Walking  
30. exp Running  
31. exp Jogging  
32. fitness.mp  
33. exp Physical Fitness  
34. walk*  
35. run*  
36. jog*  
37. (aerobic* adj3 exercis*)  
38. (aerobic* adj3 activit*)  
39. (aerobic* adj3 train*)  
40. cardiorespiratory adj1 fitness.mp   
41. exp Swimming  
42. swim*.mp 
43. 15 OR 16 OR 17 OR 18 OR 19 OR 20 OR 21 OR 22 OR 23 OR 24 OR 25 OR 26 
OR 27 OR 28 OR 29 OR 30 OR 31 OR 32 OR 33 OR 34 OR 35 OR 36 OR 37 OR 38 
OR 39 OR 40 OR 41 OR 42 
44. exp Diet OR diet*  
45. Diet therapy  
46. exp Food  
47. exp Beverages 
48. nutrition.mp  
49. exp Nutrition assessment  
50. (nutrition* adj3 choice*).mp  
51. (nutrition* adj3 preference*).mp  
52. (healthy adj3 eating).mp  
53. (healthy adj3 diet).mp  
54. (diet* adj3 preference*).mp  
55. (diet* adj3 behavio?r*).mp  
56. (food* adj3 preference*).mp  
57. (food* adj3 choice*).mp  
58. (diet* adj3 choice*).mp  
59. (nutrition* adj3 habit*).mp  
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60. (diet* adj3 habit*).mp  
61. (diet* adj3 modif*).mp  
61. (food* adj3 habit*)  
62. (eat* adj3 habit*).mp  
63. (food* adj3 consum*).mp  
64. (vegetable* adj3 consum*).mp  
65. (vegetable* adj3 intake*).mp  
66. (fruit* adj3 consum*).mp  
67. (fruit* adj3 intake*).mp  
68. (beverage* adj3 consum*)  
69. (fat* adj3 consum*).mp  
70. (fat* adj3 intake*)  
71. weight-loss.mp  
72. weight loss mp.  
73. exp Weight Loss  
74. (weight adj3 decrease*).mp  
75. (weight adj3  reduc*).mp  
76. (calorie* adj3 intake*).mp  
77. (calorie* adj3 consum*).mp  
78. (calorie* adj3 decrease).mp  
79. (calorie* adj3 reduc*).mp  
80. (calorie* adj3 cut*down).mp  
81. (calorie* adj3 control*).mp  
82.  (fat* adj3 reduc*).mp  
83. (fat* adj3 decrease*).mp  
84. (fat* adj3 loss*).mp  
85. exp Obesity  
86. exp Body Mass Index  
87. exp Body Weight  
88. body weight.mp  
89. BMI.mp  
90. exp Overweight  
91. exp Obesity, Morbid 
92. obes*.mp  
93. exp Feeding Behavior  
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94. overweight.mp  
95. (weight adj3 control*).mp  
96. (waist-hip adj1 ratio).mp  
97. (skinfold adj1 thickness).mp  
98. (obesity adj3 prevent*).mp  
99. exp Eating  
100. exp Hypherphagia OR hyperphagia.mp 
101.overeat*.mp  
102. exp Energy Intake  
103. energy intake.mp  
104. (over eat*).mp  
105. overfeed*.mp  
106. (over feed*).mp  
107. exp Overnutrition OR overnutruition.mp  
108. adipose.mp  
109. exp Adipose Tissue  
110. (fat * adj3 content).mp  
111. (fat * adj3 distribut*).mp  
112. cholesterol adj3 blood  
113. glucose adj3 blood 
114. 44 OR 45 OR 46 OR 47 OR 48 OR 49 OR 50 OR 51 OR 52 OR 53 OR 54 OR 55 
OR 56 OR 57 OR 58 OR 59 OR 60 OR 61 OR 62 OR 63 OR 64 OR 65 OR 66 OR 67 
OR 68 OR 69 OR 70 OR 71 OR 72 OR 73 OR 74 OR 75 OR 76 OR 77 OR 78 OR 79 
OR 80 OR 81 OR 82 OR 83 OR 84 OR 85 OR 86 OR 87 OR 88 OR 89 OR 90 OR 91 
OR 92 OR 93 OR 94 OR 95 OR 96 OR 97 OR 98 OR 99 OR 100 OR 101 OR 102 OR 
103 OR 104 OR 105 OR 106 OR 107 OR 108 OR 109 OR 110 OR 111 OR 112 OR 113 
115. exp Alcohol Drinking/  
116. alcohol*.mp.  
117. alcohol reduction.mp.  
118. alcohol therapy.mp.  
119. Alcohol intervention*.mp.  
120. (alcohol* adj1 use*).mp.  
121. (alcohol* adj1 abuse*).mp.  
122. (alcohol* ad1 misuse*).mp.  
123. (binge* adj1 drink*).mp.  
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124. (alcohol* adj1 problems*).mp.  
125. binge drink*.mp.  
126. alcohol use*.mp. 
127. alcohol abuse*.mp. 
128. alcohol misuse*.mp. 
129. 115 OR 116 OR 117 OR 118 OR 119 OR 120 OR 121 OR 122 OR 123 OR 124 
OR 125 OR 126 OR 127 OR 128 
130. 14 OR 43 OR 114 OR 129 
131.Incentive*.mp  
132. exp Motivation  
133. exp Reimbursement, Incentive  
134. (financial adj3 incentive*).mp  
135. (pay* adj3 incentive*).mp  
136. (cash adj3 incentive*).mp  
137. (money adj3 incentive*).mp    
138. (monetary adj3 incentive*).mp  
139. (economic adj3 incentive*).mp  
140. exp Reward OR reward*  
141. pay*  
142. prize*.mp  
143. award*.mp  
144. cash.mp  
145. money.mp  
146. monetary.mp  
147. (cash adj3 pay*).mp  
148. (cash adj3 transfer*).mp  
149. (contingen* adj3 contract*.mp)  
150. exp Token Economy  
151. token*.mp  
152. (token adj1  economy).mp  
153. raffle*.mp  
154. (contingen* adj3 manag*).mp  
155. (contingent* adj3 contract*)  
156. lotter*.mp  
157. coupon*.mp  
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158. voucher*.mp  
159. gift*.mp  
160. motivat*.mp  
161. reinforce*.mp  
162. punish*.mp  
163. exp Punishment  
164. penalt*  
165. competition*.mp  
166. contest*.mp  
167.bonus*  
168. (contingen* adj3 pay*).mp  
169. deposit*  
170. (deposit* adj3 contract*).mp  
171. disincentive*.mp  
172. endowment*.mp  
173. (cash adj3 contingen*).mp  
174. (pay* adj3 contingen*)  
175. 131 OR 132 OE 133 OE 134 OR 135 OR 136 OR 137 OR 138 OR 139 OR 140 
OR 141 OR 142 OR 143 OR 144 OR 145 OR 146 OR 147 OR 148 OR 149 OR 150 OR 
151 OR 152 OR 153 OR 154 OR 155 OR 156 OR 157 OR 158 OR 159 OR 160 OR 161 
OR 162 OR 163 OR 164 OR 165 OR 166 OR 167 OR 168 OR 169 OR 170 OR 172 OR 
173 OR 174 
176. randomi?ed controlled trial.pt  
177. controlled clinical trial.pt.  
178. randomi?ed.ab.  
179. placebo.ab.  
180. drug therapy.fs. 
181. randomly.ab.  
182. trial.ab.  
183.groups.ab 
184. 176 OR 177 OR 178 OR 179 OR 180 OR 181 OR 182 OR 183 
185. 130 AND 175 AND 184 
 
Results limited to Humans and All Adults (19+) 
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49 smokers with 
diagnosis of 
COPD 
High All participants received a brochure + 
nicotine gum + CO monitoring over 86 
days. They were encouraged to throw 
cigarettes down toilet. All were given 1 
lottery ticket/ day for ’time and effort’. 
 
3 groups: 
1.Exp Group: Rewarded with lottery 
tickets for every CO test < 10 ppm. 
2. CSR Group: rewarded with lottery 
tickets for each self-report of abstinence 
since last visit. 
3 Control Group: each control was 
paired with an exp participant and 




Mean CO levels and 
cigarettes smoked 
per day at 6 months 
 
Validation: expired 
CO (cut off 10ppm), 
urinary cotinine, 
finger pulse 






was 65 days and 
the final 
assessment was 





impact of a 
variable not 













High 2 groups: 
1. Best Practice As  
 (ask, advice, assess, assist, arrange) 
which included information on the 
importance of quitting smoking during 
pregnancy and tailored smoking 
cessation kit. 
2. Best Practice As+ $50/month 
voucher + opportunity to choose 





at 8 months 























High 3 groups: 
1. Best Practice As (ask, advice, 








removed at final 












information on importance of quitting 
smoking during pregnancy and tailored 
smoking cessation kit. 
2. Best Practice 5 A’s + $25/month 
voucher for biochemically confirmed 
cessation +opportunity to select a 
partner to support them (supporter did 
not receive incentives).   
3. Best Practice 5 A’s plus $25/month 
voucher for biochemically confirmed 
cessation + biochemical feedback of 
potential harm to baby + select a 

































High 3 groups: 
1. Best Practice As  
support (ask, advice, assess, assist, 
arrange)which included information on 
importance of quitting smoking during 
pregnancy and tailored smoking 
cessation kit. 
2.Best Practice 5 A’s plus $25/month 
voucher for biochemically confirmed 
cessation 
3. Best Practice 5 A’s plus $75/month 










at 8 months 
gestation, 2 months 






/<100mg/ml at  
Assessed. 
Incentives 







was at 6-months 
post-partum 
Data provided 










in the control 
group were 
divided by 2 to 
derive to 2 
comparisons, 
each added to 
















1. CR: Weekly visits on wks (1-4 Phase 
I), fortnightly on wks 6-12 (Phase II) 
monthly on wks 16-24 (Phase III).  
Payments of $20 per abstinent visit in 








by expired CO < 
Not assessed. 
Incentives 
removed at final 
assessment (9 
months) 








III, and $80 if abstinent at 36wk follow 
up. 
 2.CR+NRT: As CR Group, + 16-wk 
course of 21mg NRTpatches, + 
supporting instructions. 
3. Control: Visits at baseline and wks 
20 and 36, +encouraged use of 
community smoker helpline and self-
help information. 






















was at the area 
level  
High All participants received an information 
pamphlet on the dangers of smoking 
and a tip sheet on how to quit.  
 
4.groups: 
1. CARESw/ deposit: financial 
commitment in form of savings 
balances and a non-financial 
commitment to be visited by a deposit 
collector (social pressure).Smokers 
encouraged to deposit their cigarette 
money every wk for 6 months, which 
was forfeited if failed smoking test. 
Participants received 30 pesos for 
taking 12 month test 
2. CARES w/out deposit : As above 
but without the deposit element (group 
dropped) 
3. Cue cards 
4. Control: Participants offered 30 
pesos for taking 6 month test + 30 for 














was 6 months 
and final 
assessment was 





due to low 
uptake and the 



















Other 2 groups: 
1. Incentive: Participants were eligible 
to receive monthly incentives ($120) 
for a year and if abstinent entered into 
monthly worksite lottery and annual 
sweepstake. Personnel offered support 
and encouragement but no quitting 
advice and support. 
















was 1 year and 
last assessment 




completed baseline and follow up 











Other 4 groups: 
1. HRA: risk factor profile feedback 
2. RFE: as above +advice, brochure, 
videos 
3. BC: as group 2 +individual 
counselling+ life-style change manual 
4. BCI: as group 3 +incentives, i.e. 2 
lottery draws for A$40 over 10wk 
period, + 5 draw tickets for 1wk 
cessation; At 3m A$40 voucher for 
achieved targets. Station achieving 
highest % of participants meeting 6m 







Change in BMI; 
Change in % of bay 
fat; Mean 
cholesterol changes; 
Change in aerobic 
capacity at 6 month 
and 12 months.  
 
Validation with 
blood tests (for 
smoking cessation 
blood cotinine was 
calculated with cut 











was 6 months 
and last 
assessment was 
































High All participants chose quit date, and 
reported daily to clinic for CO 
monitoring for 5 days, then urine 
cotinine monitoring twice wkly for 7 
wks, wkly for 4 wks, and then every 2 
weeks for remainder of pregnancy. 
Post-partum monitoring increased to 
once/wk for initial 4 wks, and then 
biwkly for next 8 wks, with abstinence 
monitoring ending at end of wk 
12.Vouchers escalating in value given 
for smoking cessation. Non-cessation 
reset vouchers back the original value 
but 2 consecutive negative tests 




at end of pregnancy, 
12 weeks post-
partum and 24 




abstinence was with 
CO /< 6ppm for the 
first 5 days and then 
with  urine-cotinine 








months) and last 
assessment was 





Participants also received routine 
advice from clinic. 
 2 groups: 
1.Contingent voucher group: 
participants received vouchers for 
cessation beginning at US$6.25 and 
escalated by US$1.25 to a max of 
US$45.00. +ve test results reset 
voucher back to original value 
2. Non-contingent voucher group: 
Participants received voucher 
independent of smoking status. 
US$15.00 per antenatal visit and 








24 worksites.  
 
Other 3 groups: 
1. Group: 13 group sessions over 
2months 
 2. Phone: sent printed materials+ 3-6 
telephone counselling sessions 
3. Choice: free choice between group 
or phone program. 
 
Half sites in each intervention were 
offered direct incentives for 
participation and quitting: Quitters at 
1month won $20 and entered lottery for 









friend or family 
member for 
monthly abstinence. 
Grand draw prize 
winners + 24 month 
random sample of 





was 18 months 
and last 
assessment was 
at 24 months 
Two levels of 
incentives were 





sessions or a 
choice, leading 
to 6 possible 





assess the effect 











one of three 
large group 
local obstetric 
practices or one 





at 36 weeks 
gestation, 12 weeks 



















abstinence was with 
CO /< 6ppm for the 
first 5 days and then 
with  urine-cotinine 
levels /<80 ng/ml 
 
assessment was 






















at 36 weeks 
gestation, 12 weeks 





abstinence was with 
CO /< 6ppm for the 
first 5 days and then 
with  urine-cotinine 
levels /<80 ng/ml 
Assessed, 
Incentives were 




months) and last 
assessment was 













Other 3 groups: 
1. Self-help group: 5-day cessation TV 
program ’Smoke-free in the 90s’+ 8-
page newspaper supplement, self-help  
2. Incentives group: as group 1+ 
$1/day for each day abstinent up to 
6months (maximum $175) 
3. Support group: as group 2 +group 
meetings twice/week for first 3wks, +14 
’booster’ meetings over 6months; 
program included ‘buddy’ system, and 
tips in booster sessions on living with a 





at 6 months, 12 
months, 18 months 




abstinence was with 
CO < 9ppm and for 
the 6 month 
assessment saliva 
cotinine (cut of 
point not 






was 6 months 
and last 
assessment was 
at 2 years. 
The Support 
group assessed 
the effect of 
group support 
and cognitive 
coping skills on 
smoking 













Other 2 groups: 
1. Newsletter: Participants were posted 
self-help manuals for smoking cessation 

















providing advice on behaviour change 
strategies. They were also requested to 
pay $5 registration fee 
2. Newsletter and incentive: As above 
but participants did not pay registration 
fee but were requested to deposit $60, 
1/6 of which would be refunded each 
month they were abstinent. Full refunds 
given to those achieving at least 4 
month cumulative abstinence or 
abstinence in last month of program. 
reporting being 
abstinent at the end 
of the study were 
required to come in 
for validation with 
salivary cotinine 

















program at their 
worksite; 
 
Other 3 groups: 
1. Basic Program 6 wkly CBT group 
sessions, aimed at brand-
switching+reduction, aiming for final 
quitting or reduced % of each cig 
smoked. Also info on maintenance and 
relapse prevention 
2. Competition: As 1, + within-site 
team competitions. Wkly feedback on 
team performance, smoking 
’barometer’, prizes for completing 
treatment (~ $5 per team member), for 
team with highest number of quitters at 
end (~ $10 per member), and for 
highest abstinence at 6m follow up (~ 
$15 per member). 
3. Relapse prevention: After 6 wks 
intervention worksites were randomized 
to relapse prevention or no relapse 
prevention resulting in 4 groups to be 
assessed at the 6 month follow-up 
As 1, +/- Comp, +/- 1- or 2-monthly 
meetings to discuss, role-play, quit 





at 6 months;  
 
Validation: CO < 10 
ppm and SCN at 
baseline. CO 
preferred to SCN at 












collapsed for the 
analyses to 
assess the effect 
of incentive vs. 









employed at a 
medical centre 
recruited with 
High 3 groups: 
1. Contingent payment/frequent 
monitoring: Participants attended 














group was the 
262 
 
poster adds and 
word of mouth  
 
smoking cessation+were given a 
booklet. Were told to stop smoking the 
following Sunday in preparation for 
Monday morning start of monitored 
abstinence period (5 days) when 
participants were visited at worksites 
for collection of breath samples. Were 
also required to visit study site to give 
afternoon sample+were visited at home 
for collection of evening samples. They 
received $25 for completion of this 
phase. Successful abstainers were 
visited at worksites twice/for breath 
samples+were paid $4 for each CO 
value less than 11ppm.  
2. Non-contingent payment/frequent 
monitoring: As above but participants 
paid $4 regardless of CO values 
3. Non/contingent payment 
infrequent monitoring: As above but 
participants were monitored only at 6 
months 






























High 4 groups: 
1. Patch: For duration of the 12 weeks 
prog participants received two or three 
nicotine patches with max of 84 
patches. Participants provided breath 
+urine samples 3 times/wk 
2. Patch & CM: As above+participants 
were offered vouchers for smoking 
cessation, escalating in value with 
consecutive abstinent CO samples and 
reset in case of failure. 
3. Patch & RP:As 1+ participants 
received relapse prevention 
counselling: psycoeducational 
techniques to enhance coping with 
smoking cessation +behavioural skills 









report, CO level at 
or below 8ppm and 






was 12 weeks 
and final 
assessment was 
at 12 months 
Comparisons of 
interest: i) Patch 
vs. Cm ii) Patch 
& RP vs. Parch 
& RP & CM. 
Each entered 









4. Patch& CM &RP: Participants 
received patch+ offered vouchers+ 














Other Four groups: 
1.MET + CM: Participants underwent 
motivational therapy+had 2 daily CO 
breath samples collected+received $5 
for samples regardless of smoking 
status . During wk 1 they earned $1 for 
CO reduction 25%-49%; $2 for 
reduction 50%-74% and $3 for 75% 
reduction or greater. During wk 2 
reinforcement given for abstinence in 
an escalating schedule beginning at $3 
and increasing by $0.5 for each 
consecutive non-smoking sample+ 
received bonus of $1 for 2 consecutive 
non abstinent samples. Failure reset 
value to $3 which returned to original 
value after 4 consecutive abstinent 
samples. 
2. MET + NR(no reinforcement): 
Participants received motivational 
enhancement+had 2 daily CO breath 
samples collected+received $5 for 
samples regardless of smoking+bonus 
of $10 for attending at least 80% of the 
CO readiness for each wee. Total of 
$240 could be earned. 
3. REL (muscle relaxation) +CM: As 
MET & CM but instead of motivation 
therapy participants received muscle 
relaxation therapy 
4. REL + NR: Participants received 
muscle relaxation+gave 2 daily CO 
breath samples+received $5 for samples 
regardless of status+bonus of $10 for 
attending at least 80% of the CO 
readiness for each wee. Total of $240 




at 6 months;  
 
Validation: CO 







was 3 weeks 
and final 
assessment was 
at 3 months 
The 2 MET 
groups and the 2 
REL were 
collapsed for the 
analysis to focus 
on CM vs. NR 
in line with the 
review by Cahill 

















High 2 groups: 
1. Incentives: Participants received 
invitation to enrol in smoking cessation 
prog+offered $20 to attend each of 5 
sessions (total of $100) + $100 for self-
reported quitting at 30 days+nicotine 
patches+$20 for adhering to validation 
procedures 
2. No incentives: Participants received 
invitation to enrol to smoking cessation 
prog. All enrolled received free nicotine 























was 30 days and 
last assessment 














Other All participants received $20/ telephone 
interview at baseline and at 3months 




1. Incentive: Participants received 
$100 for completion of smoking-
cessation prog; $250 for smoking 
cessation confirmed with cotinine test 
within 6 months after study enrolment; 
$400 for continued abstinence 6 months 
after initial cessation (9 or 12 months 
after enrolment) 
2. Control: Participants in this group 
received information about smoking 
cessation programs without being 




abstinence at 9 or 
12m. Those not 
abstinent at 3m 
were retested at 6m, 
and followed from 
then if abstinent. All 
abstinent at both 
follow ups were 
assessed again 6m 




by saliva 15 ng per 
ml or urine cotinine 





was 9 or 12 
months and last 
assessment was 
at 15 or 18 
months 
9-12m endpoint 
used in 6m 
time-point, and 
15-18m 
endpoint in 12m 
time-point, in 






















Other 4 groups: 
1.Control/self-help manual only: 
Participants received self-help manual 
2. Self-help manual &social 
support/skills training: As 1+ received 
cessation skills training (diary, deep 
breathing), contract to quit+quit 
smoking ’buddy’ (with buddy 
education). 
3.Self- help manual& incentives: As 
1+ received an incentive 6 wks 
following cessation and another at end 
of 6 month cessation (total $50) 
4.Self- help manual, social 
support/skills training&incentives: 















was 6 months 
and last 
assessment was 
at 1 year 
Comparisons of 
interest are 
i)Group 1 vs 3 






















to have high 
cholesterol.   
Other All participants received on-line 
educational materials 
3groups: 
Group 1 received $100 for reduction of  
LDL-C by 15% within 6 months 
Group 2 received multi-disciplinary 
educational program (series of live 
classes and phone support delivered by 
a nurse educator) 




Mean % change in 
LDL-C at 6 months 
compared to 
baseline; number of 
individuals in each 
group reaching 
target reduction of 
























recruited from a 
health fair. 
 
Other All participants received health-related 
information at health fair 
 
2 groups: 
1.Experimental group: offered $100 
to reduce serum cholesterol by 20% or 
Low value; 
uncertain 
Mean change in 
serum cholesterol 













reported in the 
form of ranges, 
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below 5.17mmoI.L (200mg/dL) 
2. Control group: not offered incentive 
to reduce serum cholesterol 
fasting blood test 
 
which are 
unstable for the 
estimation of 
standard errors 










working at 4 
nursing homes 
Other 2 groups: 
2.Control: Participants received 
booklet and had 1hr consultation with 
dietician and/or Health Educator-set 
weight loss goals (16lb or 24lb in 16 
weeks depending on initial BMI). They 
were weighted at 16 weeks and 28 
weeks. 
2. Incentivized group: Participants 
received above care + incentives for 
losing 11-14lb + could deposit money 
which could be earned back and 
matched if goals were met.  
High value; 
certain 




At 28 weeks: Mean 


























sample of men 
surveyed but 
found ineligible 
for a different 
trial 
 
Other All participants participated in 16 wk 
behavioural weight-reduction/education 
program. Weight loss goals were 30lb. 
Participants weighed wkly.  
 
6 groups: 
1.Group_$30: Participants deposited 
$30 and were reimbursed based on 
average weight-loss of their groups 
2.Group_$150: As group 1 but 
participants deposited $150 
3.Group_$300:As groups 1&2 but 
participants deposited $300 
4.Individual_$30: As group1 but 
participants reimbursed based on own 
weight-loss at rate of $1/lb up to a max 
weight loss of 2lb/wk  
5.Individual_$150: As group 2 but 
Low value; 
certain 
Weight change at 6, 




was 16 weeks 
and last 
assessment was 





groups did not 
differ on any 
key variables 
(classification 
of value and/or 
certainty of 
attainment) and 
there was no 
control group to 
which a possible 
combination of 




participants were reimbursed based on 
own weight-loss at a rate of $5/lb up to 
a max weight loss of 2lb/ week. 
6.Individual_$300: As group 3 but 
participants reimbursed based on own 
weight-loss at a rate of $10/lb up to a 






115 adults half 
of which were 
recruited from a 
population 
sample of a 
previous study 
by Jeffery et al 






Other All participants took part in 16 wkly 
group meeting covering nutritional, 
exercise and behavioural principles. A 
$150 deposit was used to construct 
weight loss contracts. 
 
3 groups: 
1. Control: deposit was refunded at 
first session 
2. Contracts w/ constant refunds: 
Participants either received $30 for 
each 5lb increment of average group 
weight loss (weight loss goal was 20l 
for women and 30lb for men) 
3. Contract with increasing refunds: 
participants received funds for 
successive 5lb increments of $5, £10, 
$20, $40 and $75. Individuals weight 
loss goals were 20lb for women and 




Mean change in 






was 16 weeks 
and last 
assessment was 




differed in a 
variable not 
assessed by the 
review and 
groups were  
collapsed for the 
analyses 
 












Other 2 groups: 
1. Newsletter: Participants were posted 
self-help manuals for weight-loss and 6 
newsletters (one a month) providing 
advice on behaviour change strategies. 
They were also requested to pay $5 
registration fee and set a weight-loss 
goal of max 4lb/month (24lb in 6 
months). 
2. Newsletter and incentive: As above 
but no registration fee requested. But 
participants deposited $60 to be 
Low value; 
certain 
Mean weight loss at 




loss was confirmed 
via self-report and a 









Jeffery 1990 (A) 
and (B) are part 
of one study 









refunded proportionate to their weight 
loss 

















Other five groups: 
1.Control: no intervention 
2.SBT: Participants provided with a 
standard behavioural treatment: 
counselling in groups meeting wkly for 
first 20 wks and once a month 
thereafter including wkly weigh-ins and  
individualised caloric daily goals and 
set weight loss goals (14 18 or 23 kg). 
Participants asked to record caloric 
intake in daily food record for first 20 
wks and for 1 week each month 
thereafter. Exercise program also 
prescribed   
3.SBT + food provision: Same SBT 
but participants also received packaged 
meals for 5 breakfasts and five dinners 
each wk and meal plan  
4.SBT + incentives: As SBT but 
participants also received cash payment 
each wk based on weight loss. Max 
payment $25/wk ;min payment $2.5 if 
weight maintained. Weight-losses of 
50% of goal paid with $12.50/wk 
5. SBT+ food provision+incentives: 
As SBT group, as well as packaged 
meals and incentives 
High value; 
certain 
Change in BMI; 
Change in weight; 
Changes in total 
calories consumed 
per day;% of 
calories from fat at 
6 months; 12 
months, 18 months 
and 30 months; 
Estimated energy 
expenditure from 
exercise, last week 





was 18 months 
and last 
assessment was 
at 30 months 
Control group is 
excluded from 
analysis because 








between: i) SBT 
























from 2 urban 
communities 
Other five groups: 
1.SB: Participants received behavioural 
intervention program for 18 months 
(group counselling, met wkly for 24 
weeks and monthly thereafter). 
Sessions included weigh-ins and 
participants were given caloric goals 
and menus. They were asked to record 
their daily caloric and fat intake and 
instructed to exercise and were taught 
High value; 
certain 
Mean change in 
body weight and 
exercise behaviour 









removed at final 
assessment (18 
months) 
The SB group is 
excluded from 
analyses 




interest: i) SBT 
plus supervised 




 2. SBT+ supervised walks: As SB but 
participants also had 3 supervised 
walks/wk.  
3. SBT+ supervised walks+ 
incentives: As group 1 and 2 but 
participants received financial 
incentives based on number of sessions 
walked at end of each month, 
increasing in value with cumulative 
attendance. 
4.SBT+ supervised walls w/ personal 
trainers: As group 2 but personal 
trainer assigned to work with 3-4 
participants,  
5. SBT+SW+PT+I: Received the 



































patient database  
Other 3 groups: 
1. Control: Participants underwent a 
1hr consultation with dietician at 
enrolment, in which strategies for 
weight loss were discussed, goal-setting 
and monthly weigh-ins. They were 
given weight loss target of 24lb for first 
24 wks and could then chose goal for 
wks 24-32. Also given a scale to 
monitor weight at home and received 
$20 for returning to clinic to be 
weighed 
2. Deposit contract- maintenance: At 
the beginning of the program 
participants had a 1h consultation with 
dietician. Weight loss goal set at 24lb in 
24 wks. At beginning of each month 
they deposited $0-$3/day of their funds. 
During the month they could 
accumulate rewards if each day they 
reported a weight at or below target 
weight-loss (their own deposit plus a 
1:1 match) which they would receive if 
High value; 
certain 




weight loss at 32 
weeks from start of 
program and 36 




loss equivalent to 
5% of initial body 
weight (latter data 
included in 
analysis and given 









was 32 weeks 
and final 
assessment was 
at 17 months 













they weighed at or below target weight 
loss at the end of month (4 pounds). 
After 24 wks they received incentives 
for maintaining weight loss. 
Participants also encouraged to have 
daily weigh-ins and received daily text 
msgs with feedback on progress and 
earnings. 
3. Deposit contract – opportunity for 
continued weight-loss: As above but 
after 24 weeks people told that during 
the next phase they had opportunity to 
continue losing weight and earning 













1. Bibliography: Participants given a 
self-help weight loss manual. Each wk 
for 12 wks they were weighed. 
2. Competition: Participants were 
assigned to two teams with cash prizes 
awarded to the team a) with highest 
participant rates ($5 per member) b) the 
highest % weight loss at 12 wks ($10 
per member) and c) the best 
maintenance of weight loss at the 3 
month follow-up ($20 per member) 
3. Bibliography + competition: As 
group 1 and 2 
Low value; 
certain 
Weight loss at 6 
months and 9 








was 6 months 
and last 
assessment was 
at 9 months  
With 
Bibliography as 
the control the 
Bibliography+C
ompetition 








group was  
excluded from 















Other All participants deposited $120  
3 groups: 
1. Incentives for weight maintenance: 
Participants took part in program with 
non-specific format. Monthly sessions 
consisted of discussions about weight 
maintenance and related problems. 
Deposit was lost for each session not 
Low value; 
certain 
Change in weight; 
% of individuals 
maintaining lost 







removed at final 
assessment (12 
months) 
 The skills 
training group is 
excluded from 
analyses 
because it is 
least 






attended + withheld (but returned in the 
end) if they weighed more than 
previous sessions 
2. Incentives for participation in 
skills training: Participants received 
parts of deposit for attending monthly 
group meetings which provided diet 
and physical activity information and 
skills training for maintaining weight 
loss 
3. No treatment: No intervention. $100 
from deposit refunded immediately. 
Participants sent reminder letter at 6 
months and followed at  1 year when 





















Other All patients were called the day after 
enrolment and notified of their starting 
HbA1c level as well as the American 
Diabetes Association 
and VA recommendations about HbA1c 
target levels. They were paid $25 for 
returning 6 months later for the follow-
up.  
3 groups: 
1.  Usual care: received no further 
intervention 
Peer mentoring: Patients matched to a 
peer mentor (African American patients 
whose glucose control had previously 
been poor but was currently good) 
within 1 to 3 wks.  
3. Financial incentives: participants 
offered $100 at 6 months for 1% 




Change in HbA1c 































1.Self-reward for weight loss: 
Participants deposited $35 and were 
fined $5 for missing group meetings. 




(Number of pounds 
lost divided by 
number of pounds 















stimulus control strategies for alteration 
of eating habits+weight charts & eating 
habits booklets for daily self-
monitoring. During first 2 wks they 
recorded  daily weight and eating habits 
+attended weight ins.  During next 6 
wks they received weight loss & habit 
improvement goals + were instructed to 
award themselves portions of their 
deposit for attainment of wkly goals   
2.Self-reward for habit improvement: 
As group 1 but participants were 
instructed to award themselves portions 
of their deposit for attainment of their 
weekly habit improvement goal 
3. Self-monitoring: As group 1 but  
during the subsequent 6 wks 
participants continued to monitor 
themselves and received weight loss 
and habit improvement goals after each 
weigh in. 
6. Delayed control 
1 
 






















1.Commitment for study completion 
and behaviour change: Participants 
took part in a 10 wk prog. 2 first wks 
were for self-monitoring and next  8 
were for weight loss. Were weighed 
twice/ week +attended wkly group 
meeting where they received social 
reinforcement and education in stimulus 
control of eating behaviour. Treatment 
included self-monitoring of eating and 
exercise and related goal setting.   
Participants also made a $15 deposit 
returned for completing study & 
meeting goals. 
2.Commitment for study completion: 
As group 1 but participants deposited 




in terms of eating 
and exercising; 






report; weight loss 













data relating to 




not reported.  
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3. No commitment 










Other All participants except for those in the 
No treatment group received the basic 
stimulus control package  
7 groups: 
1.No treatment 
2.Program only – monitoring weight: 
Participants told to monitor their weight 
daily 
3.Program only – monitoring eating: 
Participants told to monitor their eating 
behaviour daily 
4.Program w/ reinforcement by 
therapist for weight loss: participants  
told to monitor weight daily+ were 
weighed by therapist wkl.+deposited 
$30+received $1.50/lb lost up to $5 for 
last 6 wks  
4.Program w/ reinforcement by 
therapist for eating behaviour 
change: participants told to monitor 
eating behaviour daily at dinner meal 
with 9-point check-list+deposited $30+ 
received money for appropriate 
behaviour: 0-23 points no 
reinforcement; 24-33 point $1.75; 34-
43 points $3.50, 44-53 points $4.50 & 
54-63 point $5 
5.Program w/ reinforcement by sig 
other  for weight loss: As 4 but a 
significant other provided 
reinforcement 
6. Program w/ reinforcement by sig 
other for eating behaviour change: 




Change in weight at 








was 9 weeks 
and final 
assessment was 
at 1 year. 
Groups 4 and 6 
were combined 
for the analyses 
and compared to 
2 
  
Groups 5 and 7 
are combined 
for the analyses 








assess the effect 
of incentives 





















Other All participants received 1h 
consultation with dietician+were 
encouraged to have daily weigh-





















feedback on progress and earnings.  All 
participants received $20 for attending 
weigh-ins.  
3 groups: 
1. Deposit contract: At beginning of 
each month participants contributed $0-
$3/day of their funds to a deposit 
contract. During the month they could 
accumulate rewards if each day they 
reported a weight at or below their 
target weight-loss (their own deposit 
plus a 1:1 match+a $3 fixed payment) 
which they received  if they weighed at 
or below their target weight loss at the 
end of month (4 pounds). Weight loss 
goal was 16 pounds in 16 wks. 
 2. Lottery: Participants were eligible 
for daily lottery with expected value of 
$3/day if they reported a weight at or 
below their weight loss goal. Goal was 
16 pounds in 16 weeks 
3. Control: Participants participated in 




















Figures in the 
control group 
were divided by 
2 to derive to  2 
comparisons, 
which were 
added to the 



















Participants participated in 9 wkly +7 
monthly meetings where they were 
weighed+participated in lecture-
discussion of behavioural strategies for 
weight control+ were given daily 
caloric goal to produce 2lb/week 
weight- loss. Charts of eating&exercise 
were collected from participants wkly.  
2 groups: 
1. Payments for weight loss: 
Participants brought 15 cheques for $15 
to first meeting. One cheque was either 
returned or forfeited at each meeting. 
Cheques were returned at wkly 
intervals on an overall rate of weight 
loss of  2lb/wk. If cheques were 
Low value; 
certain 






was 9 weeks 
and last 
assessment was 
at 13 months 
Study excluded 
from analyses: a 
crossover 
method was 
employed in the 
delivery of 
incentives and 
there was no 
control group to 









forfeited 2 consecutive wks goals were 
adjusted.  During maintenance phase 
(after first 8 weeks) cheques were 
returned for attendance. 
2. Payments for attendance: 
Participants brought 15 cheques for $15 
to the first meeting. One cheque was 
either returned or forfeited at each 
meeting. The first 8 cheques were 
returned at wkly intervals for 


















Other 2 groups: 
1. Financial incentive: Participants 
used Physical Activity Loyalty card to 
self-monitor physical activity levels. 
Mins of physical activity were 
converted to points, redeemed for 
rewards at week 6 and week 12.  
Participants received feedback via the 
PAL scheme website on mins of 
physical activity calories burned and 
distance covered. 
2. No financial incentive: as above but 









at 6 months.  
 
Validation: minutes 









was 12 weeks 
and last 
assessment was 
at 6 months 
Data provided 
by author 















1. Control: Participants attended a 
standard behavioural weigh loss prog: 
meetings over 24 wks w/ weigh-ins+ 
educational lectures+supervised walk 
sessions  
 2. Monetary incentive: As above but 
also participants earned prizes for 
exercise attendance ($50 gift certificate 
High value; 
uncertain 
Difference in % of 
exercise sessions 
attended by 
incentive vs. control 
groups; Proportion 




















drawing after attending each walk and 
$2000 travel certificate drawing after 
last session). +participated in wkly 
group meetings for 24 wks w/ weigh-
ins +educational lectures. 
 






























Timing of last 
assessment 
Outcome Results Statistical 
significance 






6 months from 
intervention start 






NS Quite rate: n=5/36 CSR group (n=16) 
excluded from 
analyses with mean 
CCO 23.9 (+ 3.0), 
Groups collapsed at 
follow-up when 





>6-12 months from 
intervention start 
Quit rate I=21.4% 
C=5.9% 





6 months from 
intervention start 
Quit rate I=19.4% 
C=11.7% 
Not reported  Unpublished study. 
Author contacted for 
data. Best Practice 5 
A’s plus $25/month 
voucher plus 
biochemical feedback 
of potential harm to 
baby (n=59) group 
excluded from 
analyses with 











(>6 months after 
incentive removal) 
Quit rate I(A)=5% 
I(B)= 7% 
C=3% 
Not reported  Unpublished study. 






>6-12 months from 
intervention start 
Quit rate I=7% 
C=5% 
NS  CR+NRT (n=60) 
group not included in 




Gine, 2010 I=781 
C=616 
>6-12 months from 
intervention start 
(>3-6 months after 
incentive removal) 
Quit rate I=11% 
C=7% 
S  Cue cards group 
(n=603) excluded 
from analyses with 





>18 months from 
intervention start 
(>6 months after 
incentive removal) 
Quit rate I=10% 
C=8% 
NS Incentives had a sig. 
effect on less educated 
participants (18.6% vs. 
8.8%) 
 
Gomel 1993 I=30 
C=30 
>6-12 months from 
intervention start  
(>3-6 months after 
incentive removal) 
Quit rate I=3% 
C=10% 
NS Other outcomes: mean 
BMI change (sig. 
greater in HRA and 
RFE groups than for 
BC and BCI groups) 
mean change in % 
body fat (ns 
differences); mean 
change in aerobic 
capacity (ns 
differences); mean 
change in cholesterol 
(ns differences) 
 
The health risk 
assessment (n=40) 
and risk factor 
education (n=28) 
groups were 
excluded. Quite rates 
were 5% and 6% 
respectively. 





 (>2-3 months after 
incentive removal) 
Quit rate I=8% 
C=3% 





>18 months from 
intervention start 
(>6 months after 
incentive removal) 
Quit rate I=19.5% 
C= 19.7% 
Not reported  Groups with different 
mode of delivery  
(telephone vs. group 
session) were 
combined for the 
analyses 




Quit rate I=27% 
C=0% 
















(>2-3 months after 
incentive removal) 
Quit rate I=5% 
C=0% 
NS   
Jason 1997 I=281 
C=280 
>18 months from 
intervention start  
(>6 months after 
incentive removal) 
Quit rate I=13.2% 
C=10.3 
NS  GIM group (n=283) 








6 months from 
intervention start 
Quit rate I=22% 
C=6% 
Not reported   
Klesges 1987 I=66 
C=61 
6 months from 
intervention start 
Quit rate I=12% 
C=11.4% 
Not reported  Relapse prevention vs 
no relapse prevention 
groups were  
collapsed for the 
analyses 
Rand 1989 I=16 
C=16 
6 months from 
intervention start 
Quit rate I=6% 
C=6% 
NS  Control group (n=14) 









>6-12 months from 
intervention start 
(>6 months after 
incentive removal) 










6 months from 
intervention start 
(>3-6 months after 
incentive removal) 
Quit rate I=2% 
C=5.5% 
NS  Data extracted from 
Cahill & Perera 2011. 
Two CM groups and 
to NR groups 





6 months from 
intervention start 
 (>3-6 months after 
Quit rate I=6.5% 
C=4.6% 








>6-12 months from 
intervention start 
(>3-6 months after 
incentive removal) 
Quit rate I=9.4% 
C=3.6% 
S Incentivised 
participants had sig. 
higher rates of 
enrolment in smoking 
cessation course as 









>6-12 months from 
intervention start  
(>3-6 months after 
incentive removal) 




Not reported   
Indicators of healthier eating and/physical activity 
Bloch 2006 I=56 
C=55 
6 months from 
intervention start 
Achieveme






Not reported LDL-C was reduced 
17.9mg/dl (11%) in 
incentivised group and 
5.5mg/dL (4) in control 
and this difference was 
significant 
Dichotomous data 
extracted only and 




which achieved a 
reduction of 
17.9mg/dl (11%). 21 
participants reached 
to goal of reducing 













I=0.83mg/dL (1.21-21 mg/dL) 
C=0.68mg/dL (0.26-10 
mg/dL) 
S The incentivised group 
showed 13.2% 
reduction in serum 
cholesterol levels; the 
control exhibited 
11.3% reduction. 






Galbo 2011 I=51 
C=48 








Not reported Mean weight loss: I=-




extracted only and 
used in analyses. 
Jeffery 1983 I(a)=16 
I(b)=15 
I(c )=14 
>18 months from 
intervention start 







NS Group conditions also 
included (n=17; n=14; 
n=13;) with mean 
weight changes -13.6; -
15.8; -14.2 respectively 
Data not included in 
analyses 
Jeffery 1984 I=73 
C=40 
>6-12 months from 
intervention start 






Not reported  The two financial 
incentive groups 
(fixed amount vs 
increments) were 













Not reported   






>18 months from 
intervention start 





C(A)= -3.2 (sd=6.82) 
I(B)= -1.75(sd=6.41) 
C(B)=-2.5 (sd=6.82) 
NS   















S   














Not reported Mean weight loss; NS Two incentive groups 
collapsed for 
analyses. Data 
provided by author 
Klem 1988 I=19 
C=19 
>6-12 months from 
intervention start  










incentive removal) weight loss for group: 
-0.12, sd = 5.17 
Kramer 1986 I=28 
C=28 










NS Mean weight change:  
I= -17.7 (sd=18.0)  
C=- 18.8 (sd=15.5) 
The skills training 
group (n=29) was 
excluded from 




Long 2012 I=40 
C=39 






I=-0.46 (CI95% -1.02-0.10) 
C= -0.01 (CI 95% -0.52-0.51) 
NS  Peer mentor group 
(n=39) excluded from 
analyses.  Mean 








>6-12 months from 
intervention start 






Not reported NS  Data not included in 
analyses 
 
Norton 1980 I=13 
C=8 
>6-12 months from 
intervention start 








Not reported NS  Data not included in 
analyses 
 






>6-12 months from 
intervention start 








Not reported  The no treatment 
control group was 
excluded from the 
analyses. Mean 
weight loss :+4 
(sd=6.5).Reinforceme
nts by therapist and 
reinforcement by sig. 
other groups were 




control groups were 
also collapsed. 
Volpp 2008  I(A)= 19 
I(B)=19 
C=19 
>6-12 months from 
intervention start 










Not reported Mean weight loss; 
 I(A)= -6.2 (CI95% 
−11.67- 
−0.81) 





 Differences NS 
Data provided by 
author 
Wing 1981 I(A)=18 
I(B)=20 
>6-12 months from 
intervention start 






NS  Data not included in 
analyses 
Physical activity 
Hunter 2011 I=199 
C=207 
6 months from 
intervention start 











NS  Data provided by 
author 














































NS Attendance to exercise 
sessions. I=60.7% of 
sessions 





Appendix 4.5: Multivariable analyses 
 
 
6 months from start >6-12 months from start >2-3 months from removal >6 months from removal 
 
 
OR (95% CI) P-values OR (95% CI) P-values OR (95% CI) P-values OR (95% CI) P-values 
Constant 1.73(0.88-3.40) 0.07 1.26(0.40-4.01)  - - 0.86(0.29-2.55) 0.36 
Behaviour Type         
Smoking cessation  
vs. 
Indicators healthier eating/PA  
Smoking cessation  
vs. 














































































































































































































































































































Note: n denotes number of comparisons. Data relating to >2-3 months after incentive removal were subjected only to univariable meta-regression due to the small the number of comparisons
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Appendix 5.2: Participant information sheet 
  
Institute of    5th Floor Bermondsey Wing 
Psychiatry                  Guy’s Campus 
Department of                  London 
Psychology (at Guy’s)                  SE1 9RT 
Health Psychology Section          Tel + 44 (0)20 7188 0192 
                  Fax + 44 (0)20 7188 0195 
 
Would you like to earn £20 while taking about your experiences of trying to quit 
smoking during pregnancy? 
You are being invited to take part in a study, organised by researchers at King’s 
College London, who are working closely with Birmingham East and North Primary 
Care Trust. Before you decide whether to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to 
read the following information carefully and discuss it with friends, relatives or your GP 
if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Many pregnant women try to quit smoking each year, many using the help of NHS Stop 
Smoking Services.  
While many are helped, not everyone manages to quit. 
We would like to invite you to take part in a study to learn about women’s experiences 
of trying to stop smoking, their reasons for wanting to quit and their attitudes towards 
smoking when pregnant. We hope these experiences and attitudes will help us to 
develop services to make them even more effective. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You are being invited to take part because you have been identified as a pregnant 
woman who registered with the stop smoking services in Birmingham in the past 6 
months. You may recall that you agreed to be contacted by the research team when 
you talked to the “Call to Quit” service earlier in your pregnancy. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, taking part is voluntary.  It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you 
do decide to take part we will ask you to sign a consent form and give you a copy of 
this information sheet and the consent form to keep.  If you decide to take part you are 
still free to withdraw at any time.  If you decide not to take part you do not have to give 
a reason, nobody will be upset and the standard of care you receive will not be 
affected. 
 
What will I be asked to do if I take part? 
You will be interviewed by a researcher who will ask you about your experiences of 
trying to stop smoking. The interview will take between 30 minutes and one hour. You 
can choose whether you would like to be interviewed at home or in a local community 
centre. If you choose to be interviewed in a local community centre, you will be 
reimbursed for all travel expenses. You will also receive £20 to compensate for the 
time you spent participating in the interview. The interview will be tape-recorded. Also, 
after being interviewed you will be asked to complete a computerised task, which will 
take approximately 15 minutes and two short questionnaires. The purpose of these is 
to assess your attitudes towards smoking and your reasons for wanting to quit. Please 
300 
 




What are the possible downsides of taking part? 
We do not expect any downsides of taking part. In addition your normal care by your 
midwife will not be affected. 
 
What are the possible benefits in taking part? 
Taking part in the study will help us develop the stop smoking service for pregnant 
women. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All the information we collect from you will be treated in confidence. The Interview will 
be transcribed and identified by a code, not your name. All information will be used for 
research purposes only. It will not be possible to identify you from any report about this 
study.   
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of this study may be reported in professional publications or meetings but 
you will not be identified by name.  Should you wish to receive a copy of the results 




Is there an independent contact point where I can seek general advice about 
taking part in research? 
If you would like any independent advice about participating in research you can visit 
Consumers for Ethics in Research (CERES), an organization that offers information 
and advice on research in the NHS. 
Postal address: CERES PO Box 1365 London N16 0BW 
Email: info@ceres.org.uk 
Web address: http://www.ceres.org.uk/about.htm 
 
What if I have any concerns? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the 
lead researcher on the contact details at this end of this sheet who will do her best to 
answer your questions.   
 
Alternatively you could contact the Patient Advise and Liaison Service of the 
Birmingham East and North Primary Care Trust. The service is free and confidential 
and can be contacted between 9.00am to 4.00pm Monday to Friday. A message taking 
service is available outside these hours or when the line is busy.  
 Tel: 0800 328 3205  
 Text: 07974 729 108  
 Fax: 0121 333 5382  
 Email: palsbenpct@nhs.net  
 
 
In the unlikely event that you should have any grounds to complain regarding your 
treatment during this research and you believe your complaints have not been 
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adequately dealt with, you will also have the right to take legal action for compensation 
through King’s College London’s ‘No Fault Compensation Scheme’. 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research.  
 
 
Professor Theresa Marteau 
Lead Researcher 
 
Psychology Department (at Guy's), Health Psychology Section, King’s College London, 
5th Floor Bermondsey Wing, Guy's Campus, London Bridge, SE1 9RT 
 












































To take part in the study 
If you would like to take part in the study, please complete the slip below and return it as soon 
as possible. A stamped addressed envelope is included in this pack. Alternatively call Eleni on 
0777 8149 432 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Stop smoking services for pregnant women 
 
I have read the participant information sheet and am interested in taking part in the study. Please 
contact me to discuss further and to arrange a time and place to meet: 
 
Name:   ____________________________________ 
 
Address:  ____________________________________ 
    
   ____________________________________ 
 
   ____________________________________ 
 
   ____________________________________ 
 
Telephone number: ____________________________________ 
 
Preferred time  
to contact me:  ___________________________________ 
 
Please return to:  Eleni Mantzari 
CSI Health 
Health Psychology Section 
Department of Psychology (at Guy's) 
King's College London 


























Appendix 5.3: Consent Form 
 
      
Consent form, Final Version 1, Dated: 08/09/2009 




There are three copies of this form: one for you to keep, one for the study records and 
one for your patient records 
 
 
Title of Study Stop Smoking Services for Pregnant Women: A qualitative study 
Name of Lead 
Researcher 
Professor Theresa Marteau 
 Please 
tick box 
 Yes No 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for this study 
(Final Version 4) and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
  
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal 




I understand that identifiable personal information, such as my name and 
telephone number, will be collected by the research team at King’s College 
London as part of the research and that they may need to contact me directly 
during the study. I understand they will keep this confidential within the 
research team. 
  
4 I confirm that I received £20 to compensate for the time spent participating in 
the interview 
  





________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Name of Patient 
 
Date Signature 
________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Name of Person taking consent (if 
different to researcher) 
 
Date Signature 
________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Researcher Date Signature 
 
 








Appendix 5.4: Interview Topic Guide 
 
1. Background Information 
• Age 
• Occupation 
• Daily activities 
• Interests 
• Number of household member 
 
2. Smoking History 
• Number of years smoked 
• How smoking behaviour started 
• Number of previous quit attempts (before pregnancy) 
• Duration of previous quit attempts 
 
3. Previous quit attempts (before pregnancy) 
• Reasons for previous quit attempts (before pregnancy) 
• Facilitators 
• Difficulties/Obstacles 
• Implemented strategies 
• Easiness of remaining smoke free 
• Reasons for not quitting 
 
4. Current quit attempt  
• Reasons for current quit attempt 
• Have reasons changed during pregnancy? 
• Facilitators 
• Difficulties/Obstacles 
• Implemented strategies 
• Easiness of remaining smoke free 
• Reasons for not quitting 
• Factors that would encourage another quit attempt 
• Importance of not smoking 
• Reasons for importance 
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• Confidence of staying smoke free during pregnancy and reasons for confidence 
• Confidence of staying smoke free after delivery and reasons for confidence 
 
5. Referral to services 
• Description of referral process 
• Time-interval between referral and 1st appointment 
• Smoking status and quit attempts between referral and appointment attendance 
• If not attempt was made ask why 
 
6. Experience of Stop-Smoking Services 
• Description of services 
• Helpful elements 
• Less helpful elements 
• Suggestions for improvements 
 
7. Incentive-schemes 
• Thought and feels about existence of such schemes 
• Preferences regarding cash vs. voucher for baby stuff or voucher for 
cosmetics/clothes 








Appendix 5.5: Framework – Quit attempt during pregnancy 
Incentivised group 
 No of cigarettes 
smoked before 
attempt 
Reason for initiating attempt Overview of 
attempt 
Outcome Facilitators Obstacles Strategies Goal 
SSPW14 Before quitting 
about 10/day 
(18:13), most 
during the evening 
(18:11). But when 
drinking or going 
clubbing she’d 
have about 30/40 
(18:18-19) 
The pregnancy has given her that 
extra willpower, extra reason-
without which there wouldn’t 
have been no reason to make her 
quit (7:8-12).  
 
She’s pregnant and it’s important 
that her kids have the best start in 
life and best health (26:19-21)  
 
 
The vouchers gave her the 
incentive to stop smoking (2:9-
10) 
 
Quitting is better for your health, 
you can do more and she’d have 
more money (7:15-17) 
 
Because your kids look up to you 
and if they see you smoking hey 
think it’s alright for them to 
smoke and it’s not She doesn’t 
want her lads to smoke because 
it’s not good for their health as 
she’s aware that smoking 
increases your chances of cancer, 
and other medical things. She 
says you wouldn’t want to get old 
one day to find out you’ve got 
cancer. (28:7-11). She’s got less 
of chance of her kids smoking if 
she doesn’t smoke (22:21-23). 
 
Because she doesn’t want to 




within a day 











Has quit for 
bout 7 months 
(8:11-20). From 
set quit date till 






Last time she did it because she had to. This time she did 
it because she wanted to. (21:21-22). Pregnancy gave her 
the extra willpower (7:8-12) 
 
The thought that her baby is going to be smoking too has 
put her off smoking when stressed (9:4-7) 
 
The thought that she needs  to pass the no-smoking thing 
to get her vouchers (9:9-10) made her think that  it’s not 
worth risking (9:13) 
 
The vouchers were a really good incentive because that’s 
what made her give up (2:9-10 11:20-21) 
 
When taken off the scheme what helped her not smoke 
was the thought of what if she didn’t get on the course 
again (16:21) 
  
She’s got a strong will (33:17; 25:15) 
 
The inhaler helped (19:14) and worked while she was still 
craving (7:2). She found it easier with the inhaler because 
she didn’t have the willpower as she did when she was 
young (11:11-12). It helped with taking the edge off (22:4-
5)I. 
When she smells people smoking around her she can’t 
stand it, it’s vile (17:10-11) 
 
She now realises how bad your sense of smell is when you 
smoke (17-13-14). She can smell a lot more than she used 
to smell and she can smell if someone’s been smoking 
really strongly. She says that when you’re not a smoker 
you can really tell how strong it is and that that little baby 
must be feeling the smoke really badly (17:17-22; 18:1-2) 
 
She realises that her body reacts to things better (20:7-8)  
 
she doesn’t see the point in ruining her health after she’s 
given up (22:21-23) 
With first pregnancy she did everything by the book 
– stopped smoking and drinking- but this time round 
she’s already done it all once and it’s not exciting 
when your having your 2nd child (2:17-20) 
 
She’ not as strong willed now as she used to be 
(3:17-18) 
Socialising is difficult (17:1) 
 
She still goes out and has an occasional drink and 
that’s when she find it hard (6:5-6) (18:5-8). When 
she first gave up that’s when she was finding it the 
hardest (6:7-8). She felt she needed a fag because 
she’s not used to drinking without smoking (6:12) 
 
When stressed she’s thought that she could do with a 
fag because it calms her down (9:3-4)  
 
 
She was taken off the voucher scheme because she 
missed one appointment and nearly started again 
(2:10-11). She  thought that there was no point 
(14:16-19) and thought about smoking (16:20) 
 
She weren’t too sure whether she should bother or 
not (she had 2 minds) because she knew people that 
were smoking when pregnant and their kinds were 
fine and her first son has asthma even though she 
wasn’t smoking during that pregnancy, so she 




When taken off the scheme and 
thought about smoking she didn’t 
because she wasn’t craving and 
thought she didn’t need to crave, 
she didn’t need to smoke or want 
to smoke and thought about the 
baby (17:5-8) and the vouchers 
(16:21) 
 
She thinks that when pregnant 
you get confused whether you are 
craving fags or food so she just 
started eating  things (21:10-16) 
 
When she was craving really 
badly she’d be looking all over 
for the inhaler (5:1-5). used the 
inhaler when she had cravings  
(19:15-16) and  when she had the 
urge to buy fags (20:7). 
She’s going to 
remain smoke 
free after the 
birth (22:17) 
SSPW20 Before falling 
pregnant she used 
to smoke about 
20/day (7:4)  
She’s pregnant and she shouldn’t 
be smoking (5:5-6) 
 
People ask her whether she 
would give a new born baby a 
cigarette and telling her that she’s 
When found 








(7:2). Has cut 
down to 5 or 6 
(10:12) from 
What has helped her cut down is having her son and being 
pregnant and knowing that every fag affects her baby 
making her think that she can’t smoke as many because 
it’s really bad (12:15-20) 
 
Found it easy to cut down because she knew that she could 
When trying to quit she gave in to fags when other 
people would go out for a fag because normally she 
would go out with them and have fag conversations 
(8:7-11). This would happen when at the pub as well 
(13-17) 
 
When trying to quit completely 
she’d tell herself that there’s no 
point in having a fag because 
she’d gone the whole day without 
having now so there’s no point in 
ruining that (8:2-5) 
Her goal is to 
smoke 5-6 





damaging her baby (5:6-9, 13) 
 
Because smoking is expensive 
(6:4, 6; 13:14) 
 
The midwife told her that if she 
quit smoking she would get £200 
and she said that she’d quit 
(26:19-21) 
 
Family have died from 
emphysema and smoking and she 
sees old people coughing and 
dying because they’ve been 
smoking all their life and thinks 
she’s going to end up like that 
(6:8-12) 
 
She looks at old people and can 
tell which ones smoke because 
they’ve got really bad skin and 
saggy faces and she doesn’t want 
to look old before she actually is 
(4:22-23; 5:1-2) 
 
She want to be able to do things 
like run after her son and not get 
tired (5:4-5) 
Tried to quit completely because 
her midwife told her to give it a 
go and thought she might as well 
(15:20-21, 23) 
 
Because she didn’t try it with her 
first pregnancy she thought she’d 
give it a go this time and try and 
experience what it’s like to go 
through it (15:14-16) 
20 (7:4) to 5/6 
(10:12) Did not 
find it difficult 




days (7:2) when 
the midwife 
told her about 
these smoking 
classes that she 
could go to 
(13:1-4)but 












the time she fell 
pregnant (7:4)  
till present 
have a cigarette (14:8). When she’s got fags she’s not 
really bothered (14:14-14; 15:9) 
 
When attending the smoking classes she tried quitting and 
cut down even more and was having a few drags of 
someone’s fag a day (17:21-23, 18:1) because she knew 
that she’d get into trouble by the man who’d know that her 
levels had gone up (18:4-5).She was constantly thinking 
that she had to keep her carbon monoxide levels down so 
she didn’t get into trouble (18:7-8). She was afraid of 
being told off for not trying to quit (18:16-17). She wanted 
to show that she was actually trying (18:24) so he’ll keep 
helping (19:2) 
 
Other people smoking around her used to make her 
feel that she needs a fag because she’d smoked other 
people’s smoke (9:8, 10) 
 
The fact that people where watching her and making 
comments about why she was bothering with 
quitting when attending the appointments put her off 
going to the services (24:1-3) 
Found it a bit difficult to quit completely when her 
partner smoked but not really bothered (33:4-5, 14-
15) 
 
When partner or people refuse to give her fags or tell 
her that she’s not supposed to smoke it makes it 
worse and winds her up, has the opposite effect and 
makes her want to smoke more(33:21-23, 34:2-19) 
She says there’s too much stress (5:24) 
 
She says there’s too much stress (5:24) 
For two days she did well not having her morning 
fag and then she was too stressed and needed to have 
a cigarette (7:10-12) She’s used to having a morning 
fag when her son watched telly (9:17-18) and did 
well for two days not having (7:9-11) it but she 
missed it. 9:13) 
 
She say’s she she’d gotten into her routine of what 
she does and she has a cigarette when she does 
specific things, like after dinner, which she looks 
forward to (31:16-22) When thinking of old people 
who are dying because they’ve been smoking all 
their life she wonder’s why she’s bothering 
smoking. But then she thinks to herself that she 
won’t end up like that (10-13) 
 
She says she’s not really smoking that much now 
that she’s cut down so it can’t harm the baby that 
much (12:19-20) 
 
She wanted to carry on with quitting smoking but 
when it came to the 2nd week after she’s seen her 
carbon monoxide levels go down she thought she’s 
doing well and she can go back to smoking her 
five/six fags a day because she wouldn’t see the man 
till the following Thursday. But she never went back 
(20:1-8) 
 
She smoked all the way through her first pregnancy 
and her son came out fine (30:18-19). She also know 
a lot of people that smoked through their 
pregnancies and everything was alright (31:1-3) 
 
She knows inside her head  that she could get 
something from bad from smoking but she thinks it 
won’t happen to her (32:16-17) She goes to a pub 
and will get bored so she gets up and goes outside 
and she talks to other people. If she didn’t smoke 
she’d be just sitting there and that’s boring (8:13-17, 
21) People tell her that by smoking it’s like sticking 
a cigarette in a newborn’s mouth. But she still 
 
When dealing with the morning 
fag she would take a bath at the 
time she would normally have 
the fag and when done she told 
herself that there’s no point in 
having it now because it’s two 
hours later and she hasn’t had it 
(10:4-5) 
 
In trying to cut down she told 
herself that there’s not point in 
having 20 cigarettes a day and 
that she’s being greedy (13:16, 
18) When had an urge to smoke 
she would pick up her son and 
play with him so she couldn’t 
have a fag (7:18-19) 
 
When partner when out to smoke 
she went on the computer and 
tried to concentrate on something 
else and not think about it, so she 
didn’t go out with him (33:5-13) 
Got something to eat when had 
an urge to smoke (7:16) 
 
When had an urge to smoke 
she’d keep puffing on the inhaler 
(8:1-2)  
 
She doesn’t smoke a whole fag. 
She smokes them in two’s 
(meaning half a fag) (10:18-20). 
When she’s on her own she 
smokes half and saves the rest for 
later (10:1-2) or throws it or 
gives it to someone else (10:10)  
 
In trying to deal with the habit of 
the morning fag she would tell 
herself that she wouldn’t have a 
fag but go have a bath instead 
(9:19-20) Didn’t buy fags when 
trying to completely quit (7:21) 
When smoking 20 fags per day 
she’d smoke a whole fag and 
then sit down and two minutes 
later pick up the box and smoke 
another one. Although she still is 
in the habit of picking up the box 
she puts it straight down and 
realises she doesn’t need one 
(11:19-23, 12:1-3, 5-12) She has 
one when she actually needs one 
not just for the sake of having 
one (13:20-21, 14:17) 
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doesn’t see it like that now that she’s pregnant.(5:14-
15, 19) even though she knows that the smoke goes 
to her blood and the baby (5:20-21) 
She enjoys smoking (31:21; 32:1) 
 
She says she really wants’ to quit but she thinks 
about quitting then she doesn’t want to (31:13-14) 
 
 Thinking that she had to quit smoking because she 
was going to the smoking classes made her need a 
fag (16:18-20). She stressed about quitting (16:15-
17) 
 
Knowing that she can’ t have a fag makes her 
stressed and  makes her want more and more (14:11-
14) and makes her run around the house thinking 
that she could have had 10 fags by now and hasn’t 
got any (15:1-3) 
 
She thought she would get the £200 and then have a 
fag (26:21-24) 
 
She doesn’t see quitting as that important (30:12; 
31:3-4). It doesn’t really bother her (31:11). 
 
SSPW01 N/A For the baby (8:5). She doesn’t 
want nothing to happen to the 
baby. She wants it healthy when 
it comes out (12:10-11) 
She thinks it’s a better life for the 
kids (7:10)- She doesn’t want her 
two kids to see her smoking, She 
doesn’t want them to grow-up 
smoking (18:15-16) 
It’s getting too much buying all 
the fags – she can’t afford it (7:8-
10). She and her partner used to 
write down how much it would 
cost buying the fags and used to 
add it all up and said that they 
could be going on holiday with 
that amount (21:4-9) 
She hasn’t really thought about 
herself, just the baby and 
everyone else (8:11-12) 
 
Because they haven’t said much 
about what harm it does to the 
baby and doesn’t want to take 
that risk of carrying on smoking 
and hurting the baby (24:19-22) 
she doesn’t want the or her 
children breathing in the smoke 
and rubbish and grow up 
smoking (18:13-16) 
She made the 
decision about 
3 weeks after 
she found out 
she was 
pregnant when 
she told the 
midwife that 
she was ready 
to quit (6:17-
23) She is 




patches and the 
lozenges (6:11-
12) 
Has quit since 
about three 
weeks after she 





was about 3 
months ago 
(6:9. It was 
difficult (8:17) 
The first thing she thinks when having an urge to smoke is 
what it’ll do to the baby. She doesn’t want nothing to 
happen to it, so she thinks  no she can’t because of the 
baby (12:10-13). It’s the baby that goes through her head 
(12:15) 
Her partner has quit smoking – he’s on the same scheme 
(7:11-12). That makes it easier (7:17-21). It helps not 
seeing each other smoke (10:10).  
Her partner wanted to quit during this pregnancy as well 
(22:18-19) 
Her family have helped her by not smoking anywhere near 
her and by keeping well away from her, something they 
also did during the other quit attempts (19: 12-24). They 
have even threatened if the see a fag in her mouth to ram it 
down her throat  and that they will hurt her (20:4-9) 
She put her mind to it and she’s done it (8:8-9) 
She’s getting help this time and all the support (20:11-13) 
and is glad about it (21:20:21)because she knows that if 
she had gotten help in the past she would have quit 
completely (21:15-17)   
 
She’s told people that if you want to quit help is out there 
and that she’s getting it and that’s important (25:3-5) 
She’s getting help this time and all the support (20:11-13). 




She doesn’t like to smell of smoke now (8:21-22). The 
smell of it when she goes past people who have smoked is 
horrible (9:7-9). It put her off (10:21-23) 
The first month it was difficult because she used to 
go out and see other people smoke (8:17-21). She 
would want a fag and would have the urge to go to 
the shop and buy a pack (9:4-6) 
At first she would think about the 
vouchers when had an urge to 
smoke (16:1-4). She would think 
that she can’t smoke because she 
won’t get the vouchers which are 
helping her with the baby and 
then they will stop completely 
(16:6-9) 
If she gets an urge she tries to 
distract herself- either go wash 
up or vacuum or play with the 
kids or just do something to stop 
her from having the urge (11:12-
15) 
 
She and her partner used to write 
down how much it would cost 
buying the fags and used to add it 
all up and said that they could be 
going on holiday with that 
amount (21:4-9). What they 
could have spent on fags they put 
away in a moneybox to go on 
holiday (24:2-4) 
 
SSPW02 N/A She tried giving up for the baby 
(5:6). She knows it’s better for 
the baby not to smoke (6:4-5) 
She tried twice: 
Once for a 
month-6 weeks 
Now smokes 
about half and 
sometimes a 
The thought of the health of the baby literally helped her 
not smoke (9:10-11) 
The first week was easy because she’d set her mind to it 
She thinks she’s quite weak (6:2) and does not have 
willpower (15:1-2) 
When first trying to quit during current pregnancy 
When using the patches she 
though she shouldn’t need 
anything else because the 
She’d like to 
give up when 
the baby is 
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She doesn’t want to smell of 
cigarettes when she’s going to 
hold the baby (20:8-9) 
 
Doesn’t really see herself 
smoking right up until she’s her 
Nan’s age or something like that 
where she’s coughing and yet 
still smokes (11:8-10) 
 
She thought she should (7:17) 
 
(5:10)  when 





a month and 
didn’t have a 
single drag of a 




drags. And she 
started smoking 
again (8:1). She 
decided to try 
again when the 
midwife told 
her about the 
stop smoking 
scheme (7:1-4) 
when  she did 
the vouchers 










She had the 




the services the 
first week was 
easy not to 
smoke (17:4) 
 







The patches helped with the carvings  (15:14) 
Knowing that someone from the services was going to 
check whether she was smoking made her not want to 
smoke because it was like a test (12:5-8). She wanted to 
prove she was still not smoking (13:17-18) 
she was living in supported accommodation and the 
only way that you would really go and interact with 
other residents or go outside for some fresh air was 
for a cigarette. So she was feeling quite isolated and 
was just in her bedroom all the time (5:11-18). That 
was the start to carry on smoking (5:20-21) 
 
Her partner would also come back upstairs from a 
cigarette and would smell and she didn’t  want not to 
be with him so she thought if you can’t beat them 
join them (5:21-23; 6:1-2). The smell on her partner 
made her want to have a cigarette (26:3-4) 
 
When doing the vouchers the partner hadn’t fully 
given up and that was still quite difficult (13:20-22) 
because the smell would make her crave and make 
her think that she’d have a couple of drags (14:2-3). 
They spend so much time together that she’d feel 
left out in a sense (18:6-7) 
 
Everyone around her smokes, her parents, her 
partner, so there is no one to give an example 
(18:20-21) She was quite stressed because she 
thought she was going to be homeless at one point 
(6:12-15) When trying to quit she had cravings but 
didn’t smoke and didn’t have a single drag of a 
cigarette at all (9:4-5) 
 
She craves cigarettes and coffee, the two thins that 
she’s not allowed (22:16-19) She spoke to other 
parents and mothers and almost talked herself round 
to the fact that other people like her Mum and Nan 
and aunties smoked during their pregnancies so she 
thought that if they can do it it’s fine (6:5-10) 
 
When she first wanted to quit it was quit early on in 
the pregnancy. (8:11-13)  Now she’s got far into the 
pregnancy and she’s still smoking and she thinks she 
might as well carry on (8:17-19). She feels like she’s 
gone past a point and thinks she might as well carry 
on (19:17-18) When she took her first drag after 
having quit for a month she felt quite lightheaded 
and quite dizzy and that was almost quite an 
enjoyable feeling, it wasn’t nasty feeling that made 
her think she’s glad she’s not smoking. She actually 
quite liked it so she continued (9:22-23; 10:1-6) 
 
The second week of using the services was more 
difficult because she was thinking that she’s actually 
going to give up smoking now (17:22-23; 18:1-3) 
 
She feels that if she really wanted to quit they she 
really could (21:1-2) 
nicotine was going through 
(15:14-17). 
 
For the first week she’d set her 
mind to it. She said she was 
going to do it and told herself 
that since she’d quit for a month 
before on her own using the 
services would be a breeze (17:4-
13) 
 
To deal with the cravings she just 
started eating more. Because 
you’ve got to eat more for when 
you have the baby she thought 
she’ll just have to eat more (9:7; 
12-15) 
 
After the trying to quit for a 
month she thought she’d just 
have a few drags and share with 
her partner. She’d have the first 
quarter and give him the rest 
(10:11-15) 
born. (20:3-5).  
 
SSPW03 N/A She wanted to quit for ages 
(5:18) but more help to try when 
she was pregnant (7:17-19). She 
wanted to quit because It’s not 
good for the children’s health 
(13:14) 
She wanted to 
quit before her 
midwife gave 
her information 
and asked her 
about quitting 
She’s smoking 




She got more help when she was pregnant than she did 
when she wasn’t (7:18-20) 
 
She’s not one of those people that have got the 
willpower to just stop (15:6-7) 
 
 Because her son is at school she used to socialise 
with people who are smoking (4:20-21).  
When she has an urge to smoke 




wants not to 





It’s expensive (13:13). She’ll see 
something in the shop thinking 
that it’s only a fiver but then that 
fiver could go on fags (14:5-7) 
She says smoking is not good for 
you  (5:20), for your health (7:12; 
13:15) 
(7:1-10). She’s 
smoked on and 
off for about 
three months 
(8:12; 16) 
It’s harder to get out of the habit because she’s been 
smoking for so long (2:10-11)  
It’s harder to get out of the habit when you’ve for 
people smoking around you (5:1-2) because the 
smell of smoke is tempting (5:4-5). Having people 
around her has made it difficult not to smoke (9:11-
13)  
 
When having a bad day it means smoking (8:14) 
 
 It’s harder to get out of the habit of not smoking 
during the day (2:11-13)  
 
Most people do smoke because it’s boredom (3:1-3). 
Because you’ve got nothing to do you smoke (3:5-6)  
 
She knows that if she wants to do it then she will do 
it (16:11)  
 
She doesn’t want to quit smoking and then eat loads 
but would choose to have more weight rather than 
smoke because you can shift the weight by going to 
the gym (19:13-14; 20:1-4) She doesn’t go down 
that smoking centre now (15:7-8) 
SSP04 About 10 a day 
(18:14) 
She was pregnant and she wanted 
a healthier baby (2:14-16). She 
told her mum to quit as well 
because she was pregnant and 
wanted her baby to be healthy 
(9:19-20) and be brought up in a 
healthy environment (9:22-23) 
 
She’s asthmatic (2:14) and she 
wanted to be more healthy (4:12) 
 
Because she was so tired when 
she was pregnant she wanted 














When she was 
3 months 
pregnant she 







told her mum 
that she wanted 
to quit (4:21-
22) She quit 
completely 
when she was 
pregnant. She 
started again 
after she gave 
birth thinking 
that she’ll just 
have 3 a day 
but ended up 
back on 10 a 
day (12:6-8)  
 
When she quit 
for a month she 
was on patches 
(3:18-19). 
When she came 
back she went 
on patches for 
two weeks and 
was then 
When she was 
3 months 
pregnant she 




she quit for 
about 8 months, 
which is the 
longest she’s 
ever quit (2:8-
10) until a 
month and a 




resumed to lose 
weight (7:5-6) 
Her friends encouraged her to stop and her mum quit as 
well (9:13-15). Her sister, brother and his girlfriend had 
stopped smoking so wherever she went no one really 
smoked, which made it easier (10:9-16) 
 
She puts on a lot of weight when she doesn’t smoke 
because she’s done it before but because she was pregnant 
and big anyway it didn’t bother her (12:11-15)  
 
When she was pregnant she couldn’t breathe at all because 
she’s asthmatic. For days she would be lying on the settee 
thinking she was having asthma attacks so she didn’t want 
to touch another fag (15:11-21) 
 
The patches helped her in the beginning because that 
helped with the cravings (18:8-10). She doesn’t think that 
she would have been able to quit without the patches 
(18:18-20_ 
She lapsed once and had a fag and it was vile making her 
think that she never wanted to put that in her mouth again 
(11:8-11) 
 
When she stopped she felt so great and had more energy 
all the time. When she used to smoke she was more  tired 
(16:9-15) 
 
She found that when she stopped her skin went more 
healthy (4:17-18) At first she wanted to quit because she 
was pregnant but then she started seeing changes, like how 
much energy she had and how much better she could 
breath and thought she’d never go back to it (19:10-10-17 
 
 
Her asthma was better and she could breath much better 
(19:13-15) 
She got a bit of cravings when her friends were 
round smoking (10:18-19) When she went to Malia 
for two weeks with her friends she got stressed 
because she couldn’t do anything because she was 
pregnant, like go out or drink so she started smoking 
again (3:5-9) 
 
She was really stressed out one day and lapsed and 
had a fag (11:16-18) 
 
When she went on holiday she wasn’t on the patches 
because she forgot to take them with her and she 
started smoking again (3:21-23; 4:1-3)  
 
She was overweight and she started smoking again 
(2:20). She put on so much weight having the baby 
and it was hard to lose it. So she started smoking 
after she gave birth to control the food cravings 
(9:3:10). As soon as she started smoking again her 
weight went down really quick (12:18-20) 
 
 
She put the  money she was 
saving from not smoking in a tin 
and saved about £400 over 7 
months (5:19-24; 6:1-3) 
 
When her friends were round 
smoking and she got a craving 
she would try and sit there for a 





referred to the 
services (5:2-








After she gave birth she didn’t feel like a cigarette (19:6-
7). She didn’t fancy one at all and never craved after that 
(20:9-11 
SSP05 About 20 (5:10) She wants to quit for the baby 
(3:9; 12) 
 
She wants to quit for her 
granddaughter (3:9) and her 
youngest son and all the 
youngsters in the house (3:11-
12); for their health (3:14) and 
the health of the rest of the 
family (4:5) 
 
Her son has been picking up on 
the telly ads against smoking and 
has been asking her why she 
smokes which makes her want to 
quit (18:11-18) because it makes 
her feel sad and think that he will 
end up being a smoker and that 
she could have done something 
to stop it (19:13-19). And she 
doesn’t want him and her 
granddaughter to breath in the 
smoke or be smokers (18:18-21) 
 
Her children will benefit from the 
money she’ll save from not 
smoking. She will be able to go 
out on treats like take them out 
more to the pictures, the seaside 
and little day trips out 
somewhere (3:14-21) 
 
The money from smoking soon 
mounts up and she could support 
her family better and give them 
little treats (25:7-10) but this is 
no t the most important reason 
(25:17) 
 
She wants to quit for the benefits 
that she’ll probably get with her 
own health (4:3).  
 
She want to quit more 
importantly for her health 
because she’s been harming 
herself (23:6-7) 
She quit for  
about one week 
when on the 
programme 
(3:2). During 
her one week 
quit attempt she 
had a cigarette 
on occasion 
(4:10). She 
didn’t find it 
easy not to 
smoke (6:2-4). 
She’s cut down 
from 20 (11:13-
14) and delays 
smoking to see 
if she can cut 
down more 
(She’s been on 
the programme 
for about five 
or four weeks 
(7:21) and was 
given patches 
(9:23) (4:10). 
Now she’s still 
smoking but 
not as many as 
20 (11:13-14) 
She was determined and looking forward to quitting (7:11-
12) 
She  thinks she’s a weak person (9:2) meaning that 
she gives in too easily (14:6) and gives in to 
temptations thinking that she’ll just have one fag, 
but one leads to another (14:1-3). It also means that 
if anything goes wrong she thinks about a cigarette 
straight away (16:7-8) 
 
She feels that she cannot blame her problems for 
smoking, just herself who’s not strong enough to 
quit (16:21-23) 
 
She’s an anxious person and she used to suffer with 
anxiety, making it difficult sometimes not to smoke 
(12:16-17) 
 
She doesn’t thin positive very much because she 
always thinks things are going to go bad (20:13-14) 
She felt really low and just thought well what’s the 
point (3:4-5), which is where she thinks she always 
goes wrong (3:5-7). If she’s feeling low she thinks 
that nothing is going right or wonders why should 
she do this and why should she do that. And then 
after she sits down and thinks of what she’s just 
done and that she she’s broke it that makes her feel 
even worse (6:15-20) 
 
Her mood made her take ten steps back after taking 
a few steps forward (7:12-13; 16-18) She finds it 
difficult when other people smoke around her 
because it’s temptation (14:1) She got stress and 
agro after being on the programme for about a week 
(3:3-4). Her son got beat up and the police wasn’t 
very helpful and she found that upsetting (10:14-21) 
which made her light one up without thinking and 
that’s how it all came about again(11:3-5) 
 
When she feels more anxious and stressed she find’s 
it difficult not to smoke (12:16-17) Cravings are not 
a big issue for her. She’s craved ore for cigarettes 
since she’s been pregnant but she’ tried to say no 
(13:13-15) She struggles most in the morning 
because smoking helps her wake up because she has 
to get up quite early for work. It makes her more 
alert because she knows she’s got a cigarette and 
can’t put it down (4:10-16) 
 
It was difficult not to smoke after dinner or before 
she went to bed because of the  
habit she’s gotten her self into (6:7-9) 
 
When she had a craving she told 
her self: “no you’re not having 
one. Just have a sweet” (7:7-8) 
 
She delays smoking to tell her 
body that she doesn’t need one 
and that if she’s managed without 
one for an hour then she can do 
without it for the next hour or so 
(12:2-5) When she had a craving 
she played with the baby 
(granddaughter) or her youngest 
son, got his homework out, or 
washed up or done the ironing 
(5:20-22; 12:13)) 
 
She has a game on her phone that 
she’s downloaded and tried to 
pick that up and play to take her 
mind off smoking (12:10-12) She 
managed by eating lots of sweets 
(5:15) and found she was picking 
more with food (5:17-18) 
 
She bought loads of hard boiled 
sweets and chewing gum so 
every time she had a craving she 
had a sweet (7:5-8) To stop 
herself from having her morning 
cigarette, she got up, had a wash 
first, changed what she was doing 
and that helped her (4:17-18) 
When she gets a craving she 
doesn’t have one immediately 
and tells herself that it’s too early 












She thinks that the difficult part of quitting for her is 
getting out of the habit (13:13; 17-18) She smoked a 
bit when pregnant with her oldest son and through 
her pregnancy with her youngest son and they turned 
out fine. But that has not put her at ease. She feels 
lucky and says that bad things could happen because 
her sister’s son has asthma because she was smoking 
heavily through out her pregnancy (24:1-23) She 
thinks smoking calms her down even though she’s 
read that it doesn’t, because it gives her 5 minutes 
away, to smoke a fag where nobody bothers you 
(12:19-22; 13:1-3) 
SSPW26 The most she’s 
probably smoked 
is about 14 
cigarettes a day at 
it’s heaviest (15:8-
9). Before she 
conceived she 
smoked about 5-6 
a day (23:23) 
Since becoming a mother she 
scared of something happening to 
her and her daughter being left 
(4:21-24). She didn’t want to 
smoke and risk her health. Her 
Mum had a stroke and one of the 
causes was that she was a really 
heavy smoker, which scared her 
and made her want to quit last 
time. It’s not a money issue, it’s a 
health issue (5:1-12; 14-23) 
 
She wanted to stop smoking 
because she was pregnant (24:21-
22)  
And  she knew how guilty she 
felt about even smoking a few 
cigarettes after she had her 
daughter (25:1-6) 
She’d cut right 
back when she 
and her partner 
decided that 
they were going 




and did have 
the time to cut 
down (23:10-
21). Before she 
joined the 
services she 








manages to quit 
completely for 
a while (29:19). 
She managed to 
stop and not 
smoke at all 
(29:22-23). She 
quit as soon as 
she entered the 
scheme, at 
about 8 weeks 
pregnant (36:8)  
she didn’t have 
another 
cigarette 
(30:17-21) for a 
period of a 
couple of 
months (31:1), 







a couple of 
months but then 
started smoking 
again (31:1-3) 
because she lost 
trust in the 
services after 
they told one of 
her neighbours 
the reason she 
visited the 
chemist (33:12-
13). She started 
smoking one or 







of trying again 
before the baby 
came (37:19-
20) but there 
were periods 
where she 
didn’t have any 
cigarettes like 





didn’t have a 
cigarette in 5 
days (38:8-13) 
She so adamantly didn’t want to smoke and was so 
focused on not doing it (40:7-8). She didn’t want to smoke 
(45:20). She’s adamant and a stubborn person and once 




In the beginning she found it easy to quit because she had 
cut down to 3 before starting the scheme (45:8-9).  
 
 
Because she’s a stubborn person having someone from the 
services who she didn’t know monitor and check on her 
helped her because of what that person would think about 
her being pregnant and smoking if he knew she was 
smoking. Having that support and knowing that she’d 
have to face somebody and be judged helped (25:14-25; 
26:1-2) Going and having the test done and proving to 
someone that she’s not smoking helped (26:16-19). She 
quit as soon as she entered the scheme she didn’t have 
another cigarette (30:17-21). The lady at the services was 
horrible and judgemental but that might have actually 
helped her stop (34:24-25) 
 
Fighting the urge to smoke was hard but she knew she was 
in the scheme and she knew that someone was going to be 
monitoring what she was doing (28:24-26) 
 
After starting smoking again there were a couple of days 
where she didn’t have a cigarette at all because she just 
didn’t want one (37:19-23). like when she was 7 months 
pregnant and went on holiday, she didn’t have a cigarette 
in 5 days  because she didn’t’ want one (38:8-15), didn’t 
fancy one (38:21-22) because she didn’t want to anyone to 
see her smoking (38:19) and because she wasn’t drinking 
she didn’t feel the urge to smoke (38:24, 39:14-15). Also 
if her daughter was around and up late at times when she 
would normally have a cigarette she wouldn’t want to 
have a cigarette (39:18-20) 
 
She tends never to smoke away from the house so if she is 
out she never smokes (39:3-8). Partly because she didn’t 
want people to see her when she was pregnant (39:12-13) 
 
She was founding it hard not to have those cigarettes 
of an evening when her daughter went to bed and 
she would sit and relax (28:18-22) 
 
The fact that the chemist told a person that didn’t 
even know that she’d smoked in the first place the 
reason she attended the pharmacy completely blew 
her trust in the scheme and made her start smoking 
again (33:15). As soon as it happened she sent her 
husband to go and get some cigarettes because of her 
stubbornness which made her think sod the lot of 
you and ended up having a cigarette (32:17:25). It 
was a pride thing her trying to quit (33:4)and 
breaking her confidence made her a bit of a rebel 
and made her think that she’s going to do what she 
wants to do so if she wants a cigarette she’ll have a 
cigarette (37:4-9)). It made her think hat it’s her 
choice and she’ll smoke if she wants to (37:14-16) 
To quit she used the technique 
she’d used in the past to stop 
herself, which was to pick a date 
in her head which was the date 
she started the scheme (45:11-
14)Setting a quit date in her mind 
is something she does when 
ready to quit for herself and 
makes her feel in control of 
smoking (9:17-19) 
 
She ate tons and tons of carrots 
and celery. She remembers eating 
so many crunchy vegetables and 
that’s literally how she was 
fighting the urges. She’d sit and 
watch telly and eat them every 
time she had them (29:1-7) 
She also watched Paul McKenna 
on the telly on how to stop 
smoking and did this tapping 
think which kept her mind 
occupied for those few minutes 
until the craving passed (29:8-13) 
 
Before smoking was a pattern, a 
routine and she could have told 
what time she was going to go 
out and smoke . It wasn’t like 
that when she started again. She 
changed her mindset and It 
would be that if she felt like one 
she would have one (38:1-7) and 
had a few occasions where she 
didn’t smoke at all because she 




have any plans 





SSPW11  She wanted to quit for the baby 
and her other child as well as for 
own health and for financial 
reasons (5:10-13). 
 
She thought she’d give it a try 
when the midwife told her about 





she was 3 
moths pregnant 
(6:3). She went 
to the services 








and has quit for 
about 8 months.  
Not smoking seemed to get easier as time was passing 
(15:10) 
 
When she had her first son he had asthma and she thought 
it was because she was smoking through her first 
pregnancy (4:19-21) which made her decide that she 
should stop during this pregnancy (5:4) 
 
 
She managed not to smoke because she had willpower, 
because she did it with her partner, because no one smokes 
in the house and with the nicotine tablets (6:9-11) 
 
She found it helpful that her partner joined her (6:18-19). 
Having each other to do it kept her determined (9:22). She 
and her partner would tell each other “No” if one of them 
had a craving (15:19-20). She thinks it was easier to quit 
this time because of the tablets (7:18). It also helped not 
having people around her smoke (8:6-7) 
 
She had more energy to do things, which made her feel 
like going out more and she also had more money to do 
thins (8:15) 
 
She really wanted to stop (10:1) 
 
She no longer gets urges to smoke very often (14:13) and 
being around other smokers does not bother her (14:17-
19) 
 
She and her partner were craving for cigarettes 
which caused stress and arguments between them 
(6:19-22; 7:1) 
To deal with the craving she told 
herself that she didn’t want to 
smoke and occupied herself (7:7-
10) 
 
Now if she has an urge to light-
up she deals with it by occupying 
herself, doing something else and 
telling herself that she doesn’t 
need it (14:11-13).  
 
When having an urge to smoke 
she would also think of the 
vouchers (16:18-23; 17:1) and 
how she would not get the extra 
money for her sons (17:10-15) as 
well as her baby and how 
smoking is not good for him 
(17:7-8) 
Because a lot of 







because of the 
money and 
because if she 
thinks that if 
you smoke then 
your children 
could probably 
end up smoking 
(13:9-14) 
SSPW16 Probably about 
30/40 (11:10) 
She solely doing it for her kids, 
not for herself (2:20). She doesn’t 
want to put her kids through what 
her partner went through with his 
parents who were smokers and 
were severe asthmatics and had 
to be looked after (7:9-25). She 
doesn’t want to put her daughter 
in a similar situation, like when 
her Nan and granddad, whom 
she’s close to, got ill from 
smoking related diseases (8:1-
19). She doesn’t want her kids to 
wonder whether mummy and 
daddy will survive the night 
(11:15-18) 
When she first 
found out she 
was pregnant 
she wanted to 
see if she could 









(12:21)  instead 
of coming off 
them all 
together in one 
go (13:1) but 
hasn’t had any  
days where she 
hasn’t smoked 
at all (11:22). 
She waited 
until she went 
to the services 
to cut down so 
she could listen 
to what they 
She’s still 
smoking but 





Her daughter says “Mummy I want you off smokes” (3:1-
3), and she thinks that’s not nice. 
 
She’s not a very outgoing person. She doesn’t go to pubs 
or out for meals. She stays in. So she’s not in social 
situations where she would be associating with smokers. 
(10:17-20) 
 
She didn’t find it difficult to cut down (13:14-15)  and 
didn’t have any cravings where she had to tell herself not 
to have one now (14:6-12). She’s finding it a lot better this 
time round because she’s had more help and more support 
from the HI administrator who understands where she’s 
coming from (16:4-21) and her partner who keeps telling 
her she’s doing fine when she feels she’s not doing too 
good (17:1-6). If she has an argument with her mother in 
law and thinks of smoking her partner will sit her down 
and urge her to ignore her and tell her she’s doing brilliant 
(17:12-15). She says that her partner is her backbone and 
wouldn’t be able to do it without him (18:1-2). 
 
Her little girl turns around and her tells her she’s doing 
well and that keeps her going (19:2-3). 
 
She doesn’t think she could have done it without the 
patches or support (20:20-22). This time round it’s better 
because she knows she’s working for a goal especially 
with the vouchers (23:3-7) 
 
She knows what the consequences are of smoking 
when pregnant and they sound nasty but she says 
that at the end of the day she smoked with her with 
her first child for 6 months and no harm’s come to 
her. Her mum smokes with all 3 of her kids and no 
harm came to them (7:1-6) 
 
Her father-in-law has not been so good and she’s 
worried about him so that causes her to smoke 
(11:22-24; 12:2) 
 
She wanted to come off smoking in one go but her 
doctor told her that it could be a shock to her system 
with the baby so she should do it gradually (13:2-6). 
At the services she was told exactly the same even 
though she wanted to come off them immediately 
(32:20-23) 
 
She and her mother-in-law still don’t see eye to eye 
and if they’re having an argument she thinks that 
that’s it she’s going back on the cigarettes (17:12-
13)  
 
She thinks what it is with her is boredom because 
she has to do something with her hands (24:1-3). 
She gets bored and thinks she needs one (24:10-11) 
 
When she decided to quit she 
bought a 20 deck and told herself 
that once that’s gone that’s it 
(13:19-20; 14:1)/.She makes sure 
not to buy more than she needs 
and it has worked (14:4-5). She 
goes out and buys a box of ten to 
last half a day and then goes out 
again to buy another 10 (12:14-
18)  
 
If she’s had her 15 fags a day and 
feels like she needs another one 
she thinks to herself that it will 
mess up getting her vouchers for 
her kids and then she’ll leave it 
and if she still feels like it she’ll 
just say it again (23:16-22; 
25:11-14). And then she’ll just do 
something else (24:1). She gets 
her daughter to make a mess so 
she can clean it up (24:14-15) 
 
Even though she’s missed her 
stop smoking appointments she’s 
not tempted to smoke because 
she thinks she’s going to go back 
down on herself and she uses her 
partners’ parents breathing 
She wants to 
quit for life 





down so that 
every month 
she reduces the 
amount she 
smokes by 5. 
She has 4 
months of 
pregnancy left 
so she reckons 





have to say 
(32:17-19) 
because she 
was not sure 
how to go 
about it 
(33:14)In the 
last 4 months 
she hasn’t gone 








Getting the reading and seeing how much it has changed 
in the past months  makes her feel better in herself and 
feels like she’s getting there (27:9-16) 
 
machines to see how good her 
breathing is. This makes her feels 
like she’s been to the chemist 
(26:13-20) and feels stronger in 
herself (27:1-3) 
SSPW19 About 20 a day 
(11:1) 
It wasn’t really her  that wanted 
to quit. It was the nurse telling 
her that she shouldn’t smoke 
when she found out she was 
pregnant (8:1-3). She didn’t want 
to look bad in from of the 
medical staff and have them say 
“Look at her smoking and she’s 
pregnant” (19:16-18) 
She got referred 
to the services 
4 months ago 
and tried to quit 
and used to 
inhaler (9:12-
13). But she 
didn’t quit at 
all, not even for 
a day  but had 
cut down to 
about 4 a day 
(10:17-23) for 
about a week 
(17:10). She 
started cutting 
down when she 
went to the 
services 
because then 
she got the 
inhaler (33:11) 
She no longer 
smokes only 4  
(17:5) 
The urge for a cigarette goes away after 5-10 minutes. 
Getting over that period is hard. She can do it when out in 
shops and buses because she can’t smoke and she doesn’t 
think about it as much (7:1-11) 
 
 
She smoked to deal with her boredom (1:12-15) 
 
She’s tried to quit this time but she doesn’t want not 
to smoke (3:20) because she felt she’d been made to 
stop (17:18) Unless she wants to do something she 
won’t do it (8:4-5). Being told what to do doesn’t 
help. She doesn’t like it (8:7-9) 
 
The incentive to quit is not there and what’s missing 
is her wanting to quit (9:15-19). She feels the inhaler 
didn’t work this time because she wasn’t ready to do 
it (11:11-12) 
 
She’s stressed about this pregnancy because of her 
age and because she’s worrying about whether the 
baby will have Down’s Syndrome but won’t have 
the test because of the needle it involves (3:21-22; 
4:1) and smoking is her comfort (4:4). Not knowing 
is quite stressful. She’s stressed about the pregnancy 
because she’s had 3 more kinds and known’s what’s 
coming and it’s frightening and quite scary (10:8:12) 
 
She can not smoke when on the bus or in shops 
because she can’t smoke there but as soon as she’s 
off the bus she wants one (7:8-13) 
 
She smoked with her other children and everything 
was fine with them (8:18-21; 9:1-4; 10:7-8). And she 
knows she not the only person smoking while 
they’re pregnant (19:18-19) 
 
Everyone is smoking around her all the time (11:9) 
and when she tried to smoke only 4 a day seeing 
people smoke made her want a cigarette (17:15-16) 
 
The 2nd time she went to the services her reading had 
gone down but it wasn’t enough to make her think 
that that’s good enough to stop. She says she doesn’t 
understand what the reading meant on the machine 
(1:1-5) 
 
Not getting any support or praise make her think 
“What’s the point?” (14:14:13-14).  
To be able to cut down she ate 
loads of sweets and tried really 




quit attempt in 
the future only 
because she’s 
sat down and 
talked about it 





everyday is just 
another day and 







When the baby 
comes she’ll 
cut down and 





When she’d down she wonder’s why she’s doing 
this (14:1-2) and she smoked more during those days 
(14:17-19)  
 
She no longer bothers with the inhaler (17:7) 
 
When smoking 4 a day she had bad moods with 
everyone (17:13) and she has depression and doesn’t 
like being in moods (18:4). And even though she 
used the inhaler she had a constant urge to for 
nicotine because she was not lighting up a cigarette 
(18:11-17) 
 
She tried to justify herself for smoking while 
pregnant by looking at the fumes she’s breathing in 
anyway (20:1-2) 
 
She doesn’t want to get fat because when she gave 
up before she put on a bit of weight (15:12-15) 
SSPW08 She did about 2-3 
days for one 
packet (6:19). 
Before she went to 
the services she 
would smoke 1-2 a 
week (13:7) 
She wanted to quit because of her 
age, because she’s getting older 
and she thinks of illnesses and 
think like that that may be 
coming, like heart disease 
(7:13:20) and she thought that 
maybe she can try to stop 
smoking. The 2nd baby coming 
made her decide to quit, for it’s 
health (8:1-8).  
She quit since 
she found out 
she was 
pregnant, about 
5-6 months ago 
and hasn’t 
smoked at all 
during that time 
(9:6-16). She 
smoked her last 
cigarette in 
September 
2009 before she 




says that when 
she joined the 
services she 




went with her 
husband who 
joined her 2-3 






She didn’t find it difficult to quit (9:17-18) 
 
When she really want to quit she can do it any time (2:5) 
 
When she’s pregnant she doesn’t want to smoke and if she 
does she feels sick (3:1-6). When she tried to smoke and 
doesn’t really want it she realised that maybe she was 
pregnant again (4:18-20) 
 
Since having her first child they don’t smoke in the house 
so even though her husband is a smoker it didn’t bother 
her (7:7-10) 
 
She hasn’t had any desire to smoke at all (9:19; 10:1-3) 
 
She thinks the voucher can push people stop smoking and 
is good for the pregnancy (16:12-13) because when you 
decide to stop smoking if you don’t have a target you 
might just try one or 2 cigarette in the pregnancy but then 
you realise that you have to go to the pharmacy to do the 
reading to get the voucher (16:12-23). That helped her 
stop the 1-2 she had a week (17:8-9). When she joined the 
cessation she don’t even go try for the voucher and also 
because the people at the pharmacy would know if she 
smoked or not and that’s embarrassing if you’re pregnant 
and still smoking (17:12-17) 
In the beginning even though she would fell sick 
when smoking, because she was used to doing it she 
still tried to have one (13:1) 
 As long as 
she’s doing the 
breastfeeding 
she’ll be able to 
remain smoke 
free (29:20) and 
that’s at least 6 
months after 
the baby comes 
(30:3) 
 
SSPW30  She gave up a million percent for 
the baby. Because it’s not her 
life, it’s her daughter’s and she 
would never risk it (10:8-9) 
 
She gave up because she was 
pregnant not because she wanted 
to give up (11:9-10) 
 
As soon as she 
found out she 
was pregnant 
she gave up 
without even 
thinking about 
it (10:1-3). As 
soon as she 




has had 10 




It didn’t bother her not smoking because it was for 
somebody else (10:3-4) It was never an issue giving up 
during her pregnancy (10:9-10, 19) She just knew she 
wouldn’t smoke when it was harming somebody else 
(11:3-4) 
 
She didn’t find anything at all tempting (12:16-17) 
 
Her partner didn’t smoke around her (12:19) 
Since giving birth since only smoked in social 
situations (15:7-8)She smoked at her friends’ hen 
due when her daughter was 6-7 weeks when it was 
the first time she went out without her and her friend 
who had a baby  was smoking as well, who doesn’t 
smoke (13:16-17; 14:1-3). It was something that 
they hadn’t been able to do while pregnant (14:9-
10). When she had a drink she wanted a cigarette 
(14:10-11)And then she smoked at her friend’s 
When she went out the first night 
after giving birth and bought 
cigarettes she didn’t get the brand 
she used to smoke. She got the 
lightest ones (14:17-18( 
She didn’t 
intent to start 
smoking after 
she gave birth 
(11:14-16) but 
when she went 





She wouldn’t risk anything 
happening to her baby because 
she wanted a cigarette (13:1-2) 
was like “Right 










She didn’t have any cravings (13:5) 
 
She believes she gave up because she always thought she 
was just giving up while she was pregnant.  (17:11-14) 
 
Being checked at the services didn’t influence her because 
she didn’t even think about smoking while she was 
pregnant and could confidently give them a reading every 
time and turn down anything like the patches or gym 
(22:8-11) 
wedding (14:22-23) she’d planned 
to smoke. She 





they would do 











might have the 
odd cigarette 
socially (37:7-
8). She thinks 
that she will 
smoke socially 
(39:6) 
SSPW15  She wants to quit because she’s 
pregnant (4:16). She wanted to 
quit for herself anyway because 
of her breathing (4:21-22). She 
was out of breath and couldn’t 
breath (6:1) Finding out she was 
pregnant was all the more reason 
(5:2). Because there’s a little one 
growing inside her that she 
would be harming is she would 
be smoking (13:13-) 
 
Last time she quit only because 
she was pregnant. This time it’s 
for her and the baby (6:4-5) 
She wanted to 
quit before she 
found out she 
was pregnant 
and the day 
before she 
found out she 
went to the 
doctor’s to get 
patches and 
then she found 




She quit 9 
weeks ago and 
hasn’t smoked 
at all (6:13-17) 
She not 
smoking and 
has quit for 9 
weeks (6:6-12) 
She doesn’t get craving on her own  
(8:6) 
 
She goes outside when her friends smoke but it doesn’t 
bother her (14:7-9) 
 
She didn’t find it easy to quit because her mate still 
smokes around her and that makes her “fingers 
itchy” because she wants some (6:19-22). She gets 
craving when people are smoking and drinking (8:6) 
 
She was used to using her hands when smoking and 
would itchy hands  when she quit (17:17-18)  
 
 
When her mates smokers around 
her and she wants some she 
thinks “No” (6:22). She tells 
herself (No you can’t have it” 
because you’re  pregnant and on 
that scheme” (7:2-3)  She thinks 
to herself that she doesn’t need it 
anyway (7:6) and that she doesn’t 
want it because they’re horrible 
little thinks (7:8-9). She thinks of 
the vouchers and how they can 
help with the baby because she 
struggles with money (7:12-16) 
 
She had a drag one time that her 
mate lit up and she nearly threw 
up (14:16-17) 
 
She’s used the inhaler when 
socialising (8:16) 
 
The vouchers and knowing that 
she’s got to stop smoking 
because if she blows into that and 
it comes up that she’s smoking 
she won’t get the vouchers has 
helped her (9:1-5) 
 
When she first quit and had itchy 
hands she’d be flicking her phone 





tempt her or 
make it difficult 
not to smoke 
(12:18-20)  
SSPW36 20 a day (15:3) Guiltiness made her want to quit She’s tried to She has a fag in  Because her mum thinks she doesn’t smoke now when When she’s with her mum and she can’t smoke after She doesn’t buy 20 fags and She would love 
317 
 
because smoking is bad for the 
baby and her son is always telling 
her  “Mum you’re not supposed 
to smoke “(12:13-17; 13:1). 
As soon has she found out she 
was pregnant she felt guilty for 
smoking  because it’s going 
insider her and into the baby 
(17:16-18) 
stop (4:18). Has 
been using the 
inhaler (5:2). 
She cut down 
from 20 to ten. 
Then she tried 
to limit it and 
get the 10 to 
last her 2/3 
days (17:5-8). 
That’s taken 










(32:15) but was 
still smoking a 
lot (32:18). She 
hasn’t had any 






through the day 





more than 3-4 a 
day (17:2) 
she’s with her she can’t smoke out of respect for her. If 
she did she would go mad (13:3-11). She could be with 
her mum for 6 hours and she wouldn’t have a cigarette 
(13:15-18) 
 
Having all these different stop smoking items from the 
services encouraged her better (18:19-20) 
 
She used to think that she can’t smoke because she 
wouldn’t get her voucher (22:6-7)so she’d try and stop 
even more (22:10) 
 
When she goes to the chemist she has to prove to the 
pharmacists that she’s cut down (24:14-15) because it’s a 
bigger goal (24:18) 
 
She doesn’t smoke in public because she would be 
embarrassed being pregnant and holding a cigarette 
(36:12-14; 37:8-12). So she doesn’t smoke when 
socialising (36:19-20).  
 
Since being pregnant she can’t smoke without having a 
drink because it makes her feel sick so she won’t smoke if 
she doesn’t; have a cold drink (38:1-16). That’s affected 
the amount she smoked (39:4-10) 
 
When blowing into the machine the number stay the same 
she feels she’s done good and doesn’t; feel guilty in her 
self (29:12-14).  
 
3-4 hours (14:5) she’s itchy and she’d feel it inside 
that she can’t have one and might have a sneaky one 
when she goes round to the shops (13:18-19; 14:1-2) 
 
She thinks of a cigarette after she’s eaten (14:7) 
because she enjoys it then and she’s used to it 
(14:11-18) 
 
She’ll smoke if she has cigarettes there (16:1) 
 
When trying to cut down on her own the cigarettes 
would always be constantly on her mind (18:1) 
 
One week she didn’t go to her appointment so she 
was in the house and then she’d start smoking 
because she didn’t have anything to prove to 
anybody (23:20;22; 24:1-12). During that week she 
smoked about 6-7 a day (25:6) 
 
She has to have a fag in the morning (33:20) and hen 
she’ll have another one not long after and she’ll be 
happy till about 4-5 o’ clock. And then she wants 
one (34:1-11). If she doesn’t have the morning fags 
she’s agitated (34:19-20; 35:1) and will go to the 
shop and buy some (35:3). If she has a cup of tea in 
the morning she needs a fag (36:2) 
 
The baby is not here  and even though she knows it’s 
in her it’s not actually here so she tried and forget 
her on purpose because she feels guilty (45:1-13)  
 
Enjoying smoking keeps her from wanting to quit 
100% (47:17-19) 
hasn’t for months. She’s stopped 
that and she buys 10 (15:14-17). 
She stopped buying 20s when she 
joined the scheme (32:15) 
 
 
When trying to cut down on her 
own she’d try and space her 
cigarettes our (32:17) 
 
She tells her partner to take some 
of her cigarettes and he takes 
them with him (15:19-20) 
 
If she doesn’t have cigarettes 
there she won’t go to the shop to 
buy them because she doesn’t 
want to do that (16:4-5). If she’s 
tempted to go she thinks “no 
don’t” (16:9) 
 
She hasn’t had an appointment in 
3 weeks because from now on 
she’ll do a monthly test but she 
still blows into the machine 
(26:17:19; 27:1-8) because she’s 
in that routine and she gets her 
free inhaler. She goes at least 
every other week (27:12-19). 
That’s her choice then and that 
encourages her (28:1) to carry on 
not smoking (28:18). It helps her 
because blowing into the 
machine tells her how much 
nicotine is in her body and when 
the number comes up she wants 
to stay the same because she’s 
done well (29:5-10).She keeps on 
going to keep herself on target 
(29:19) 
 
She uses the inhaler when she’s 
eaten or when she feels like 
smoking (32:3-7) and when has 
an urge to smoke (33:5). She also 
eats or sleeps to forget about it 
(33:7-12). She also tried to be 
with her mum (36:10) 
 
If someone smoked around her 
she looks but tried not to 
acknowledge it (37:15) 
to just stop 
completely 
(39:21) 
SSPW25 About 20 a day 
sometimes less 
(7:8) 
She wanted to quit because 
smoking is so expensive now. 
She’s a singly mum and she 
couldn’t afford to smoke and 
look after her kids (7:16-18). It’s 
over 5£ to buy a pack of 20 fags. 
That’s over £50 a week. She says 
She found it 
difficult to quit 
(7:6). She had 
help off the 
doctor’s and 
stuff to quit 
(8:20-21). She 
She’s quit 
(3:12) for about 
6 months 
(3:18). She has 
not smoked any 
cigarettes at all 
since 
This time she had the willpower to do it where last time 
she didn’t (6:6). Not affording to smoke and look after her 
kids gave her the willpower to quit this time (7:17-19). 
 
She thinks that being older this time helped her have the 
willpower to just carry instead of giving up so easily 
(11:1-4)  and wiser (33:14-15) 
During her bad weeks she would be thinking of a fag 
and was moody and snappy (11:6-8) 
 
The stress of life made trying to quit hard. She was 
used to having a fag when a bit stressed (31:2-4). 
 
She was used to having a fag in the morning when 
To deal with her bad weeks she 
used to buy herself sweets and 
used to such on them. She used to 
think that she’ll have a sweet 
instead of a fag (11:13-18).  
 
She never thought of just having 
She won’t start 
smoking again 
(22:12-13; 
26:18). She will 
try her hardest 




that’s ridiculous and she could 
spend that on her  kids (7:21-22; 
8:1-2). The expense of smoking 
made her want to quit this time 
(15:5) 
 
She says that with smoking the 
baby could be smaller  and has 
other health sides and quitting 
helps (8:4-8) Being pregnant also 
made her want to try (15:15) 
had patches for 
3 months and 
then didn’t use 
them anymore 
(9:19-19). She 
had a meeting 
with the non 
smoking 
people, she got 
her patches and 
the day after 
she just stopped 
(10:9-12). The 
first few weeks 
she found it 
easy and then 
she felt like it 
got harder as 
the time went 
on. She had her 
good weeks and 
her bad weeks 
(10:17-20) 
which she dealt 
with (11:10-




21). From the 
time she got 
referred to the 
services till she 
got an 
appointment 
she didn’t try to 
quit on her 
own. She 
waited to have 
the help (20:4). 
She needed the 













the first couple 
of months. 








No one smokes inside a pub anymore so it was ok. It’s not 
so unsociable now (not smoking). So she didn’t find it 
difficult socialising. Also she hasn’t drunk being pregnant. 
(13:1-9). She enjoyed drinking and having a fag but now 
she has coke (28:3; 14) 
 
She only has 3 friends that smoke so she says she’s lucky.  
She doesn’t have smokers around her (13:13-19). All her 
family used to smoke but now they’ve quit (13:21-22) 
 
She says she wanted to quit this time whereas the last time 
she didn’t really want (14:21-22) 
 
 
She was going to the smoking appointments every week 
and she didn’t know what to go and say “I smoked”. She 
knows that helped her (18:7-9). She didn’t want to feel 
like she’d let them down (18:11). She says that if she 
didn’t go she would have started smoking again (19:10-
11) 
 
She says the services helped her quit (20:15-16). Seeing 
the people helped her (24:3-4) 
 
 
After about 2 months smoking stopped playing on her 
mind (30:3-4) 
 
She couldn’t have done it without the patches (32:13-15) 
 
Her asthma is a lot better now that’s quit. She hadn’t 
considered that before she quit. It was something she 
figures out (8:11-18).  
 
She is a lot bigger with this pregnancy than she was with 
the other two and she thinks that’s related to her not 
smoking (23:4-13) 
 
She noticed she had a bit more time in the morning 
because she wasn’t sitting in the kitchen having a fag so 
that was good (31:23; 32:1-5) 
 
Smoking is so expensive and to start smoking would be a 
letdown to herself and her children (27:3-8) 
 
she got up and she missed that (31:9-12) 
 
During the most difficult times she would gat a 
craving about 5 times (32:19-22) 
 
one because if she did she knew 
she’d just smoke the pack 
(11:19). She didn’t some to be 
sociable because if she had one 
she’d be smoking again (12:1-2).  
 
She stopped buying cigarettes 
and she chucked everything away 
– ashtrays, lighters. In the past 
she would always keep an 
ashtray in case someone wanted 
to smoke but ended up using it 
herself(12:6-17) 
 
She wouldn’t stay in a lot. I’d go 
out and about and would be 
around her family who doesn’t 
smoke(12:21-23) 
 
If she needed a fag she would get 
up and clean to distract her mind. 
She would get up and do 
something (14:10-13) 
 
If she had an urge to smoke she 
would think of the services and 
that she’d have to say that she’d 
smoked and get that disappointed 
look (18:16-20). She never 
thought that she would smoke 
and not go to the appointment 
(19:3) 
 
She doesn’t know how she dealt 
with missing her morning fag, 




SSPW27 Probably 15-20 a 
day (18:20) 
She was determined to give up 
because she was pregnant (6:11-
12) 
In January she 
started the 
patches and she 
was doing well 
(6:1-2). This 
time round she 
and her partner 








before she even 
knew she was 
pregnant (7:7-
12). If she 
wasn’t pregnant 
she wouldn’t 




quitting on her 
own while 
waiting for her 
appointment 
and was about 
down to about 
2-3 a day (19:1-
11). It took 
about a week 
after she went 




had just one for 




She quit for 6 
weeks (7:21) 
She was doing well because she was pregnant (6:2). She 
was determined. She was giving up (6:10).  
 
She managed not to smoke for 6 weeks because there was 
a reason not to. She was pregnant (8:17-19). She was 
determined because she was pregnant. She just knew that 
she wasn’t going to do it (9:12-13). She has the willpower 
in her (9:13). The pregnancy kept her from smoking (12:5) 
 
Socialising has gotten easier because you can’t smoke in 
pubs and public places so it doesn’t affect her as much 
(9:19-22) and a lot of her friends and family don’t actually 
smoke now (10:7-8) 
 
Her partner wouldn’t smoke around her. He tried his 
hardest not to smoke when she wasn’t smoking (10:17-
20). Her partner helped her. She says if you’ve got 
someone who’s quitting with you it’s sort of a challenge. 
To see which one gives up first. Like a competition (18:3-
10) 
 
About a week and a half after she quit she reached a point 
where she couldn’t even stand the smell of the cigarette 
(11:17-20) 
 
She thinks the patches made it easier. She doesn’t know. 
She thinks it helped her in her mind (20:3-5) 
 
She felt really ill when pregnant so she didn’t feel like 
smoking (21:4—6) 
 
She found it easy to remain smoke free. She was excited 
about the pregnancy and she just moved and was thinking 
that she had to save up money while they were making the 
house up (21:21; 22:1-2) 
 
She says the texts were good because when you give up 
you don’t realise the benefits. But then she got the text 
message saying that she’d given up for so ling and she 
should be feeling better was quite good (24:8-22). They 
probably made a difference in keeping her going (25:1-3) 
She had a miscarriage and thought what’s the point 
in giving up(6:4-8). When she found out the first 
thing she did was have a cigarette (8:6-9; 14:4-6) 
 
When trying to quit she found she had the worst 
urges as soon as she got up (9:8-9) 
 
The weeks she didn’t smoke she found just wanting 
to have a cigarette difficult. Because she rolls her 
cigarettes as well and that’s a habit (11:1-2) 
 
 
If she had an urge to smoke she 
just wouldn’t do it. She would 
have a bar of chocolate or 
something like that (9:1-5) 
 
If she wanted to smoke or roll a 
cigarette she’d decorate. That 
took up a lot of her time (11:5-
10) 
 
During the first week of her 
attempt she would just moan a lot 
when wanting a cigarette (19:17) 
She’d planned 




SSPW31 Between 10 and 
20 (19:16) 
She was pregnant again (12:18)  
 
She doesn’t want to smoke and 
be out of breath and spend her 
money on something that’s just 
going into the airways (22:13-
15). She doesn’t want to get ill 
and get any kind of lung disease. 
She has 2 to think about now and 
knows how she would feel if her 
mum weren’t around, let alone 
these would feel who are only 
kids (38:8-16) 
She’s finding it 
a lot harder this 
time to quit 
compared when 
she was 
pregnant to her 
first son (4:15-
17; 12:18). She 
struggled (5:2). 
She was on the 
patches and 
then had to buy 
more patches 






got about 8 
weeks on her 
own (22:4) 
When she had the patches she had quit completely. She 
was absolutely fine (13:16-20). It didn’t matter how stress 
she was or anything. She was just fine..she had a patch on 
(14:1-2) 
 
Her morning sickness helped her stop the morning fag 
(16:9-11). She had it even after the patches had stopped. 
That helped her for a few weeks (16:14-19) 
 
There were a few days where she wouldn’t smoke as 
much. She’d have 2 all day. She’s not sure why. Maybe 
because she was busier or because of her being pregnant 
and wouldn’t smoke outside because she doesn’t think it 
looks very nice when you see a pregnant woman with a 
bump and a cigarette in her hand. So if she was out all day 
With her first pregnancy she was more concerned 
about her baby and did everything to the book and 
proper. That took over and she was baby mad. 
Whereas with this one because she’d already done it, 
she knows what’s to come. So it wasn’t so much 
taking over. She already had her son to look after 
and deal with. So her pregnancy wasn’t the only 
thing going on . So it wasn’t top agenda (5:13-21; 
6:1-5) 
 
With her first pregnancy she was fussy about going 
out and wouldn’t, whereas this time she is and she’d 
finding it harder (6:14-16). It’s hard when everyone 
else goes outside and she’s still inside and thinks 
“okay what now?” (7:4-5) 
When the patches stopped she 
felt she had no choice but to go 
and buy them (14:21-22) 
 
When the patches stopped she 
stuffed her face to  try not to 
smoke (15:3-4).  
 
To try not to smoke after she’d 
eaten she would make herself 
really busy. She would clean, do 
housework. Anything to stop her 
going to the shop because she 
had just had her dinner and 
needed a fag (15:19-22; 16:1-3) 
She doesn’t 
want to start 
again. She 






for ages. Then 
she woke up 
and said that 
she doesn’t 
want one and 
stopped (5:2-5). 
She started with 
an 8 week 
programme and 
was using the 
patches and 
was fine (13:7-
8). For 3-4 
weeks she then 
struggled and 
then one day 
woke up and 





went from not 
having a 
cigarette a all 
and being on 
the patches to 
waking up and 
having 
sometimes 10 a 
day, to then 
waking up one 




she wouldn’t smoke. And she wouldn’t crave for it either. 
She didn’t want people thinking she was a bad person 
(17:1-16). She’s getting big now and she won’t have 
people looking at her thinking ugh she’s pregnant, she’s 
smoking, and that’s disgusting. So that’s what’s putting 
her off  when she’s outside with friends (23:17-24) 
 
She thinks part of what made her stop is that she thinks 
that it looks horrible and she hates it (17:22-23) 
 
She woke up one day and just didn’t want one (19:4-6). 
She didn’t think that she was going to quit. It was because 
she didn’t have time. She had stuff to do. And she was 
busy. And she didn’t have one all day and she didn’t have 
any but she hadn’t thought about it and hadn’t wanted one. 
She didn’t do anything out of the ordinary. She just didn’t 
want one all day (19:20-23; 20:1-6) 
 
She was proud for not smoking that day and she thought 
she’d see how she got on (20:20-21). After the 2nd day she 
didn’t even wake up wanting one (21:14-15, 22) or even 
thinking about one (22:2) 
 
She finds the smell of smoke vile and disgusting and does 
her head in (24:9-18).  
 
If she were given the patches without having to go to the 
services she doesn’t think it would have been the same 
because she wouldn’t have had anyone to talk to if she 
needed (37:19-23; 38:1-4) 
 
She has a friend staying with her that smokes and she’s 
tempted to ask him for one but he won’t give her one 
anyway because he knows that she’s stopped and how 
well she’s done. She he refuses anyway when she asks 
(24:2-8) 
 
Now she doesn’t want or crave a cigarette (33:19) 
 
She doesn’t think she would have been able to quit 
without the services (36:20-22) 
 
When the programme finished she couldn’t do it for 
3-4 weeks. Her son was being difficult and she 
couldn’t do it for some reason. There was just 
something there (13:9-13). She just didn’t have it in 
her to stop for a good few weeks (17:20-21) 
 
When the patches stopped she ate to try not to 
smoke. I could eat and eat and eat until she couldn’t 
eat no more and she’d still be here at the end going 
“I need one” (15:3-8) 
 
She says mornings are hard. She wants a cigarette 
more then. Because that was a routine. She’d get up 
in the morning, have a cup of tea and a cigarette. 
After she’d eaten was also hard (15:12-17) 
 
When her morning sickness disappeared she was 
wondering what to do not to smoke her morning fag 
because she felt fine (16:11-13). It was a struggle 
(16:19) 
 
There have been a few times when she’s been 
stressed and she’s thinking whether she should or 
shouldn’t go to the shop (22:9-10) 
 
This quit attempt has been more difficult because 
there are more things going on now, not just on her 
own. She’d got things to do with her son when he 
plays up and she has other things in her life that she 
didn’t have before. So when she gets stressed and 
when she’s arguing with people it’s much more 
tempting to just give up and just go to the shop 
(23:6-11) 
  
When she started smoking again she justified going 
to the shop and having a cigarette  by saying to 
herself that the vouchers were not a big amount of 
money (32:11-14) 
 
To prevent herself from smoking 
her morning fag she tried to 
convince herself that it was vile. 
And it smelled and it’s disgusting 
(16:8-9). She constantly made 
herself busy (16:22) 
 
When socializing she doesn’t go 
out with everyone who smokes 
because then she’d be tempted to 
say “Just give me one of them” 
(18:10-11). In such situations she 
goes to the toilet or something so 
she’s not on her own for a bit 
(18:14-18) 
 
After not wanting to smoke for a 
day she thought she’d de how she 
got on for a few more hours 
(20:21). She woke up the next 
day and realized she didn’t have 
any fags but had done it the day 
before and thought she would see 
if she could do it that day as well 
(21:2-4). She thought about it 
more that day but thought “no 
I’m not going to. I did well 
yesterday and I’m not going to do 
it today” (21:8-12) 
 
The 2nd day not to smoke she ate 
a lot, she talked to her son, she 
went to see friends, she kept 
herself busy until she went to bed 
that night (21:18-20) 
 
When thinking about whether she 
should go to the shop or not she 
starts thinking about the bad 
points (22:12)  
 
When she was asked at the 
hospital whether she smoked or 
not she thought about lying and 
save herself looking bad. Then 
she thought that she wasn’t going 
to be the one that would be 
affected, it would be her baby. So 
she told them the truth and asked 
for help (25:2-10) 
SSPW32 She used to smoke 
40 fags per day 
(25:5-6) 
She wanted to quit for the baby 
really. She was pregnant (2:23). 
Mainly for his health and it’s a 
lot healthier for herself and the 
other children (7:20; 8:1-2) 
 
She has two teenage daughters 
and they get peer pressure for 
She used the 
patches and she 
was fine on the 
and did it 
without them 
(3:2-3). She’s 






just before she 
had her son 
(23:19). She 
smokes about 4 
She smoked during her other pregnancies but she was a lot 
younger. Now she’s older and wiser and she knows what’s 
best.(8:5-12) 
 
She thought of how it would affect the baby and that he 
would have been even smaller and can cause other 
problems (8:15-19). She was aware of these with her other 
pregnancies but she didn’t pay much attention. She was 
She thinks she smokes mainly out of boredom. 
There are too many hours in the day when she is at 
home (3:16-17). She’s on her own and she gets 
bored (5:16).  
 
When they weaned her off the patches she found it 
difficult. She got more of an urge to smoke (17:9-
12). When they stopped she managed really bad 
She stopped everyone smoking in 
the house (3:3-4; 21:7). That was 
a bonus because the smell was 
not there (21:8) 
 
When she tried quitting on her 
own she wouldn’t buy cigarettes 
and wouldn’t go to the shop. 
She thinks she 
will keep up 
with smoking 
only 4 a day. 
She thinks she 
might even try 




smoking so she thought she’d try 
and they might not want to pick it 
up (9:11-14) 







She was 4 
months 
pregnant when 
she decided to 
try and quit and 
went to the 
services(9:20).  
 
She tried on her 
own when she 
found out she 
was pregnant 
but she needed 
help (10:16-
18). She tried 
for a couple of 









Her mum tried 
to give up at the 
same time to 
try and help her 
and went to the 
services with 
her  (11:3-4) 
 
She didn’t try 
to quit while 
she was waiting 









after she went 
into labour 
(16:17-19).Just 
before she had 
her son (23:19), 
a couple a 
weeks before 
(24:1)She quit 
fags per day 
(25:5) 
younger and thought differently. Everything when over 
her head (9:3-8) 
 
Getting checked at the services on was an incentive to try 
and do her best(10:1-2). Once she would realise that she’d 
done boosts it would boost her confidence to keep not 
smoking (14:15-18) 
 
Having her mum try and quit with her was helpful because 
there was someone else doing it with her and it was a bit 
of competition (11:9-11). To see who will do better then 
the other (11:17-18) 
 
It helped a lot going down there and speaking to them 
about it (smoking) (11:13-14) 
 
When she’s outside she doesn’t get the urge to smoke 
because her mind is occupied. (13:10-11) 
 
She doesn’t go out and she doesn’t drink (13:14-15) 
 
The incentive (vouchers) boosted he confidence (19:5-9). 
She wouldn’t think of the vouchers when she was craving 
a fag but when they would come she would think that 
she’s done well. That she’s achieved (20:13-17) 
 
 
If she were in a good mood and had a good day and 
smelled smoke fags wouldn’t cross her mind (21:14-15) 
 
Although she’s smoking she doesn’t  smoke half as much 
now that her baby is here because she’s not allowed to 
smoke in the house cause of cot death and everything 
(24:11-15). He keeps her occupied and she doesn’t think 
about it because she’s with him 24 hrs a day (25:1-3) 
 
She had this big bump and was reminded constantly that 
there’s a baby there and she didn’t want him inhaling that 
smoke (27:15-18) 
 
She had her family going “no you don’t need that, you 
don’t need to pick up a cigarette” (35:20-21) 
 
The main incentive for continuing was the children and 
her own health (16:12-15) 
 
(21:1). It was hard (21:3) 
 
If she’s had a bad day and she smelled smoke she’d 
want a fag. She says you are likely to smoke (21:13-
14; 19) 
 
She started smoking a couple of weeks before she 
had her son. She thinks she was stuck ore in the 
house and she was bored and had a lo of friends who 
smoked and they were round her and that made it 
harder. So she started smoking again (24:1-9) 
She’d  send someone else 
because they are right in front of 
you when you’re at the counter 
(12:9-14) 
 
If she had the urge to smoke 
she’d clean the house from top to 
bottom (12:22-23) and keep 
herself busy (13:2).   
 
To deal with the urges she would 
go down to her mum’s because 
she was doing it as well and they 
could support each other. Her 
mum would tell her that she 
wasn’t going to have one (17:17-
21) 
 
To manage when the patches 
stopped she tried and kept trying 
and kept saying she can’t do it 
and that she had to keep stopping 
smoking (21:3-5) 
 
If she smelled smoke and wanted 






about 4 months 
(16:20-21) 
SSPW17 She used to smoke 
about 5-6 (6:20) 
She wants to quit because se ha a 
young kid and one on the way 
(2:18-20) and for her health as 




She cut down 
from 5-6 to one 
and it was 
difficult. She’s 
been able to cut 
down for 2 
months (10:10-
13). She 
managed to cut 
down before 





17). She; cut 
down to one 
(7:4) 
Socialising is not a problem (8:8-9) 
 
She thinks the patches have helped her cut down (9:3-4) 
 
Some days she doesn’t smoke at all because people don’t 
smoke around her (16:11-14) 
It’s been difficult because of stress (7:11-12). She 
smokes when she’s stressed (16:4-6) 
She eats loads (6:16), exercise, 
go to the shops, distract herself 
(8:3-5) 







































3.2 Reason for attempt 3.3 Overview of attempt 3.4 Outcome 3.5 Facilitators 3.6Obstacles 3.7Strategies 3.8Goal 
SSPW13 20-30 (5:9) She wanted to quit because 
of the baby. She knows it’s 
terribly bad for the baby if 
she’s smoking. And after 
it’s born she doesn’t want 
it to breath in the smoke. 
That’s why she stopped. 
Not necessarily for her 
health benefits (3:12-18).  
She says it’s not fair on 
bump (3:20) 
She says smoking is 
expensive (19:5) but that  
wasn’t a factor in her 
decision to quit. She knows 
she was spending too much 
money on it but she’s 
earning enough to pay for 
it (19:12-18) 
Cut down as soon as she found 
at she was pregnant (5:5-7) 
from about 20-30 to 8-10 (5:9) 
with the intention of ultimately 
quitting (8:22). She would have 
liked to have just stopped but it 
was difficult to quit the last few 
which is why she then went to 
the services (9:2-4). She’d cut 
down for about 2-3 weeks 
before getting referred to the 
services (5:15-16). She 
managed to cut down very 
easily (6:2-3) and also quit 
pretty easily (7:9-11). She 
stopped smoking when she 
went to the services (12:9-11). 
She stopped the next day 
(12:15) and it was not more or 
less difficult not to smoke that 
day than every day since 
(12:21-22). She didn’t find it 
very difficult (13:12-13) 
She had half a cigarette on New 
Year’s when her partner nicked 
one of her dad’s cigarettes and 
one when she was out with 
some friends a girl who smoked 
through her pregnancy gave her 
one (15:18-23; 16:1-2) 
She’s quit (8:1) 
when she went to 
the services (12:11) 
Before cutting down she was mostly smoking because of 
boredom. She would sit down read a magazine and have a 
cigarette and have another one when it went out to do 
something. It wasn’t necessarily that she craved the 
nicotine (6:18-22). It felt more of a habit rather than 
desperately wanting a cigarette (10:1-2). It was a habit not 
an addiction because it was something she did rather than 
desperately wanting (9:20-21; 10:1-2).  
Not having her partner smoke much was a big help (7:21) 
and her parents in low who live with her aren’t smoking 
as well so she doesn’t have any smoke in the house to 
make her crave (8:11-16). It was easier not to smoke at 
home because her partner had stopped smoking (15:8). 
Going to the services with her partner was useful because 
they were quite competitive and that kept her from 
smoking because she knew that they were going to go 
together and see how they’d both done (28:17-28; 29:1-
11) 
It was easier when the baby started moving because then 
she became more aware of why she’s not smoking (8:6-
7). She’s aware of the baby now (18:3) 
She doesn’t go out much (8:9) 
It wasn’t much of a problem to come home and not have a 
cigarette because the association wasn’t that strong and 
she could do other stuff (10:11-14) 
The services helped because of the inhaler which she used 
on her routes  and because she’d informed was someone 
that she’d made a decision to quit and there was someone 
relying on her to stop smoking. If she hadn’t told anyone 
she was quitting it wouldn’t have really mattered if she 
still had the odd cigarette (11:3-9). Knowing that the 
reading had to be good because there was a quantifiable 
way of seeing if you’d stick to the routine was useful 
(28:20-23).She’ didn’t want the disapproval (11:13-15). 
Her mother was horrified and shocked that she didn’t just 
stop when she found out she was pregnant (11:17-20). 
Was easier not to smoke at home partially because she 
knew they’d be more disapproving at home which made 
her not want to smoke (15:10-11) 
Not drinking has helped her a lot. Her partner found it 
harder because he’s drinking and it’s very much an 
associated activity (13:22; 14:1-2). Not smoking when at 
home was easy because she didn’t have much of an 
association with sitting down and smoking and there are 
ore distractions like reading a book or doing something 
else (15:13-15) 
When she smoked on New Year’s it wasn’t has enjoyable 
as it was when she was smoking and when she smoked 
and the second time (when her friend offered her a 
cigarette) she didn’t enjoy it at all, so she hasn’t bothered 
When having cut down she still smoked 8 which 
was the ones she had at work (6:5). The only time 
it was bad as at work because her colleague smokes 
it was routine to smoke when on rounds dropping 
off things with various companies (7:14-18). That 
association was quite difficult to break (7:20).  She 
was used to having a cigarette at certain times 
(10:7-8).She use to have one before she started 
work and again she would want the one (9:15-16). 
It was routine (10:17) 
Before quitting she thinks she could have cut down 
even more because it was a habit not an addition 
((9:20-21). Those last few she would have because 
she would think “why can’t I have one?” and 
would have one (10:4-6) 
Every now and then when the weather is nice and 
she sits out she fills it more difficult not smoking 
than at other time (13:2-4) 
Going out in the evening sometimes is more 
difficult because some of her friends still smoke 
and it’s big social thing when everybody goes 
outside to smoke which makes her think that she 
could do with a cigarette (13:16-21) 
The other hardest time is lunchtime when she’d 
usually have a cigarette after lunch. That was 
probably the most difficult (14:9-11) 
A girl who smoked through her pregnancy offered 
her a cigarette telling her not to worry and to have 
one (16:1-5). This made it more acceptable and 
made her feel that she there wouldn’t be 
disapproval (17:10-13) 
On New Year’s she and her partner thought hey 
would have a cigarette because they’d been so 
good as a treat (16:9-16) 
She misses smoking but it’s the social aspect  of it 
(19:22) She still has a lot of friends that smoke and 
it’s nice going out and having that social activity 
(20:1-3) 
If she had a craving she 
would use the inhaler (7:6) 
To break the association of 
smoking at work she told 
herself it was bad for the 
baby (8:3-4)  
In the evenings it wasn’t so 
much a problem because 
she just did something else 
(9:10-13) 
She removed herself from 
the tempting situation. She 
didn’t go out after lunch 
and would stay in the 
office so she couldn’t 
smoke. And the same with 
going out. She wouldn’t go 
outside (14:14-18) 
She would try and remind 
herself that she wasn’t a 
smokers anymore and she 
didn’t need to smoke (15:1-
3) 
She’s aiming to 
certainly not 
smoke while 
her baby is a 











since (17:1-6). She knows that if she starts again she’s not 
going to enjoy it (19:23) 
She now hates the smell of smoking in the house (19:5) 
She hasn’t smoked so long so it seems really stupid to 
start again (19:3-4). It just seems like of waste of time to 
start again going though all that process (20:1-3) 
 
SSPW10 About 30 a day 
(12:7) 
She thought it would be 
more beneficial for the 
baby and herself to quit 
(3:7-9). She knows that 
smoking can cause 
difference diseases and 
being pregnant gave her 
the incentive to try and quit 
(3:12-15). Money wasn’t a 
priority when trying to quit 
(18:8-10). It wasn’t a 
financial reason why she 
decided to stop smoking 
(18:12-13) 
As soon as she found out she 
was pregnant she wanted to 
give up. After attending the 
services she gave up for about 
8/9 days (5:9-11) 6:20-22; 1-5). 
Then her father was rushed in 
hospital and she bought a 
packet and started smoking 
again (11:13-15). When he got 
out she cut down (12:1-4) from 
30 to 15 (12:7-8) 
Quit for 9 days. 
Then started again. 
Now she’s cut down 
to 15 (12:4-9) 
It didn’t really bother her that people were smoking 
around her but she started being more around people that 
smoked for the smell. It was comfort to be around the 
smell She didn’t think about smoking or having a 
cigarette when she was around the smell (6:8-12) because 
she would be distracted by the conversation she might 
have been having but the smell would be there (7:17-18). 
When she’s got people to talk to she doesn’t think about 
smoking as much (8:17-22) 
It got a lot easier after the first 3-4 days (10:7-8) 
When quit for 9 days she had cravings (5:20-21). 
The first few days it was constantly on her mind. 
She needed a cigarette (10:10-11). It was hard 
(12:16) 
She think it was mostly not having anything to do 
with her hands. Not the cravings so much but more 
just not knowing what to do. It was just a natural 
reaction to pick up a cigarette and start smoking 
with her hands (6:5-9) 
Being in the house on her own was more difficult 
than being around people that smoked because she 
didn’t have the distraction or other things to think 
about as much  (8:7-16). When she’s in he house 
she can just light up at any time (8:14-17) 
After 10 days her father got rushed to the hospital 
and she didn’t care. She needed a cigarette (11:3-5) 
She’s gone through the pregnancy now and has 
been smoking and she thinks there’s now point in 
quitting now (13:13-18) She feels it’s not really 
worth quitting now (22:3-4). 
 
She just decided that that’s 
what she was going to do 
and quit for 9 days (5:17-
18) 
To deal with the cravings 
she would have a piece of 
fruit or something (5:22), 
bit her nails down (6:3; 
8:4). 
She didn’t keel any 
cigarette s in the house and 
the thought of going to the 
shop and buying some kept 
her from smoking when 
alone in he house (9:4-11). 
If she wanted to smoke she 
did jobs around the hose, 
walk the dogs (9:18-22). 
She tried to keep herself 
busy and occupied with 
other things (10:13-15) 
She wants to 
quit (13:7). 
She’s going to 
try again once 
the baby’s here 
for the baby’s 
sake (15:5-6). 
She doesn’t 




the baby comes 
she will do her 
damn hardest to 
do everything 
she can not to 
smoke (22:6-7). 
She’s made up 
her mind 
(24:14-15) 
She says that 
she’ll be 
smoking like a 
trooper on the 
way to the 
hospital and 




SSPW18 Between 10 
and 15 a day 
(16:12) 
For the baby (11:17) 
For herself because she’s 
approaching 40 and in 
her mind she’s always 
said that she doesn’t 
want to be smoking past 
the age of 40 because she 
thinks one has got like a 
magic number of 
cigarettes one can smoke 
before one starts to do 
some irreparable damage 
(11:19-22; 12:1-7) 
She was smoking at the earliest 
stages of her pregnancy (5:11-
12) but managed to quit 
completely (16:4). She cut 
down and then completely 
stopped (16:7-9). She cut down 
to about 5 and then she stopped 
(16:3). It took a long time to 
stop completely. She was 
smoking until her baby was 
about 6 months inside her 
(16:15-16). She rates the 
difficulty of quitting as a 4 
(20:21). She wouldn’t say that 
it was a walk in the park (21:1). 
She didn’t get any help from 
the services (26:5-7) 
She was smoking 
till 6 months 
pregnant but now 
she’s quit (16:9; 
16:16) 
She wasn’t well during the pregnancy so that was one 
of the spurs that made her think enough is enough 
(13:2-6). This pregnancy wasn’t quite right she was 
bleeding and the scans were suggesting that he wasn’t 
growing as quickly as he might. Those things were 
planting seeds in her head about what he was doing to 
the child because she was smoking (17:9-23). She kept 
having those episodes and was very very worried for 
herself and for the baby (18:11-15). She linked the 
episodes with the smoking and that helped her get rid 
of something that she wanted to get rid of  
anyway(20:5-9). By association, so every time she 
would have a bleed she would blame a cigarette and 
smoking (20:11-13) 
She’s fearful of the effects of smoking (18:4) 
 When her husband would come back in after having a 
cigarette she’d think “phuh he stinks I’m glad I’ve not 
had one”. So it made it easier (15:9-11) 
Prayer helped her quit completely. She prayed for 
help when she had the episodes. During those dark 
times she turned to God and she thinks that was the 
It’s always difficult because she sais that you get 
the urge (10:16).  
She thinks smoking is more of a habit that you 
associate with other things (10:19-21). It’s more 
of breaking those habits (11:1). She’d come 
back from school  after dropping the kids off 
and her routine was to come back and have a 
coffee and a cigarette and it was hard to break 
that habit (14:14-19) 
Initially she found it difficult even though she 
was pregnant because she was going through 
quite a stressful time and she was very busy 
(12:9-13) With her first pregnancy she didn’t find 
it difficult. She was excited with the pregnancy and 
was focused on the children growing inside her 
(twins). (8:7-17) 
Before she got pregnant she was smoking a lot 
to keep her weight down and the pregnancy was 
a big surprise (12:14-12)  
Her husband smokes as well so in the evening 
when the children were all in bed they’d go 
The urge passes quite 
quickly if you can distract 
yourself (10:16-17). 
To break the habits she 
would just make herself 
do something else. She 
would think about the 
craving and ride it out 
and think about how well 
she’s done and that she 
doesn’t want to undo it 
(5-12). She ate cake or 
read a newspaper or did 
a crossword, phone a 
friend, clean the 
bathroom, got on with 
something (15:15; 16:3) 
Every now and then she’d 
think that she wouldn’t\t 
mind a cigarette but it 
went very quickly 
She doesn’t 
want to be a 
smoker (21:9-
16). She hopes 
she’s not one of 
the people that 
start after 




difference. It made her feel stronger and that she 
could do it (18:15-19). She asked for the strength to 
resist temptation, to just stop and it seemed almost 
instantaneous. She felt supported and that anything 
was possible with God (19:9-19). The difference this 
time was prayer. She thinks it was the helping hand 
(32:7-9). Fear and prayer helped her (32:17) 
She had willpower (21:2). 
There’s the connection in her mind that she’d spoken 
about it and told somebody that she wanted to do 
something about it  made her do it (28:12-16) 
She’s done all this good work and doesn’t want to 
undo it by having a cigarette because she’ll set those 
receptors off (11:9-10) 
She doesn’t want to be a smoker(21:9-16) 
outside and have a cigarette and a chat. It was 
him that she’d have to let go out by himself and 
have  cigarette (15:1-7) 
She supposes she was a bit reassured in the 
beginning because she was smoking during her 
previous pregnancy (17:6-9) 
The hold that smoking had on her was very 
strong (18:6) 
It’s easier when the baby is actually here because 
it’s a bit abstract when they’re in the tummy (14:5-
8) 
because she would go “No 
you don’t”. She’d tell 
herself “no you don’t” 
(21:4-6) 
SSPW12 10-15 a day 
(11:21-22) 
She’s pregnant and she 
didn’t want to smoke 
through the pregnancy 
(3:2-5). But before she 
found out she was 
pregnant she wanted to 
quit anyway (6:5-6). It 
was getting too much..she 
couldn’t afford it (6:8-
13). She also suffers from 
asthma and it was getting 
worse for it so she wanted 
to quit because of her 
health and then she 
found out she was 
pregnant and thought 
that this is the time now 
(6:14-19). Because she 
wanted to quit anyway 
she thought that this was 
a good chance to quit 
(7:4-5) 
It’s important not to 
smoke free because she’s 
got a living being 
growing inside her (10:6-
7) 
She’s quit for 5 months 
(2:14). 
She went from 10-15 a day to 
none (11:21-22; 12:2). 
She went to the services and 
was given patches (7:12-15) 
and the inhaler (18:9) 
At first she smoked a few 
cigarettes when socialising 
(18:7-9)  but then stopped 
when she used the inhaler 
(22:4-6). It took about 3 
months to come off smoking 
(24:6-7) 
She’s quit for 5 
months (2:14) 
Thinking of the baby helped her (6:21-22) 
She found it easier to quit when pregnant because all 
she had in her head was to think of the baby (7:20-21) 
She hasn’t had any urges or cravings (8:10-15) 
Being around her partner who smokes  doesn’t bother 
her because she’s always around someone who smokes 
(9:1-6). Being around her brother and step dad who 
smoke is not so hard (20:10-14) 
Her dad sends her to they shop to buy him fags and 
she wonders how he can pay that price because 
they’ve gone shot up since she’s quit (9:8-10) 
She doesn’t want her baby to come out with the same 
health problems she and her brother have because her 
mother smoked when she was pregnant (10:9-17) 
When people smoke around her now she can’t stand 
the smoke. It doesn’t appeal to her no more (11:2-10) 
The encouragement from the services helped her 
(17:10-11) 
Using the inhaler helped her socially (18:13) . After 
she got it she didn’t smoke socially anymore (22:4-6). 
Going out doesn’t bother her no more (24:3). Now she 
can go outside with her mates while they smoke 
(25:10) 
 
When people smoke around her now she can’t stand 
the smoke. It doesn’t appeal to her no more (11:2-10) 
She’s got a bit more money to herself now and then 
that money she can spend on the baby (11:14-19) 
She’d done so well for 3 months she thought she 
couldn’t start smoking after 3 months. She doesn’t 
want to smoke again because she’s done so well so why 
would she start again? She made that mistake last 
time and she doesn’t want to do it again (25:19-21; 
26:2). She cant afford to star again with a new born 
baby (26:15-16) and she doesn’t want to die at a young 
age (27:3) 
Even though she wasn’t drinking, when she was 
with her mates and they smoked At fist she 
found it difficult when going out (19:13-15). It 
was awkward for her not to smoke so she was 
having a fag (19:5-7). Then she got used to it 
(19:17) 
Compared to when at home it was more difficult 
going out because she would be around more 
people who smoked (20:1-8) . When she goes out 
with her mates a lot of them smoke so she’s 
around more people and watching them and 
smelling them was difficult because she was 
craving at the time (20:14-21) 
When socialising the cravings would get the 
better of her (21:10) 
If she gets a thought 
about smoking she thinks 
of the baby (9:11-15) 
She used the inhaler 
when she went out with 
her mates and when she 
was socialising instead of 
using a cigarette (18:15-
14, 19:2) 
When she went out with 
her friends she would try 
not to smoke and could 
go quite a long time but 
near then end of night she 
would start smoking 
(21:7-8) 
When trying not to smoke 
socially it was hard at 
first but then she was 
thinking that she couldn’t 
do it and that she wasn’t 
going to do it and then 
she’d stay inside while 
they all went out for a fag 
and it was less hassle. 
And then she got used to 
it (24:11-14, 25:1-2) 
If she had cravings at 
home she ate. She dealt 




want to smoke 
(25:19-21). She 
doesn’t want 
to start back 
up after the 
baby’s born 
(10:2) 
SSPW06 About 10 a 
day (8:12) 
She decided to quit when 
she found out she was 
pregnant (6:7) She 
wanted to quit for her 
baby. She doesn’t want to 
be out of breath when she 
takes him to the park 
when he’s older. And for 
She didn’t quit. She tried 
with the inhaler for a couple 
of days and it didn’t work 
(7:16-17). She did it for a day 
(8:6) 
She’s smoking at 
the moment (7:14) 
 She thinks it’s hard to stop because smoking has 
become a habit. She’s gotten herself into a 
routine. She gets up in the morning and the first 
thing she does is light a cigarette and have a cup 
of tea (2:18-20; 3:2-3). She felt she needed a 
cigarette more in the mornings and after having 
something to eat. It’s routine for her (7:21-23; 
11:1-4) 
The day she didn’t smoke 
she just kept telling 
herself “Don’t do it, don’t 
do it” (8:16). She did that 
because she really wanted 
to quit (10:12) 
She says she’s 
going to quit 
(15:1). She’s 
going to give 
herself a 
couple of 




health as well(7:6-12). 
She doesn’t think it 
would be funny if 
anything happened to her 
and her baby had to grow 
up without his mum 
(15:16-17) 
Smoking is expensive and 
she could be saving that 
money to take her son on 
holiday when he’s older 
(18:8-12) 
She wants to prove to 
people she can to it (19:2-
3) 
When attending the services she was told she 
wasn’t allowed patches being pregnant (7:4) 
She quit for a day and then got to the stage 
where she just needed a cigarette (8:8-9). It 
made it worse because it was like someone 
telling her she couldn’t have something when 
she knew she really wanted it (9:3-5) 
When she was pregnant she was going round to 
her sister’s a lot who smokes so that was harder 
(10:9:21:10:1-6). Everyone around her smokes 
and she questions why she should stop when 
they’re all smoking still (17:9-11) 
She was panicking about giving birth and didn’t 
think she would quit (19:7-9) 
She was smoking during her 3 other 
pregnancies and because her children are fine it 
didn’t worry her much about smoking during 
the last pregnancy . If something were wrong 
with one of them she would have been more 
determined to quit (19:22-23:20:1-11). Because 
they were all fine she thought to herself that 
nothing’s going to happen (20:15-16) 
motivated and 
she’s going to 
go speak to 
her doctor 
(16:18-21) 
SSPW07 At least 20 a 
day (8:10) 
Smoking is expensive, it’s 
not good for the kids and 
it’s not good for herself 
(3:8-9). She wants to quit 
for herself really 
(3:11).She has children to 
look after  and wouldn’t 
want to get cancer and 
dying (18:2-5) 
She felt ready to pack up 
smoking before she found 
out she was pregnant 
anyway. (8:12-13). She 
wanted to give up when 
she was pregnant because 
she had a baby in her and 
didn’t want the smoking 
to affect it (13:12-14). 
She says there’s more 
pressure from herself to 
give up when pregnant 
because the baby doesn’t 
have a choice (13:16-21; 
14-1-2) 
Her son see the tv adverts 
and tells her the he 
doesn’t want her to die 
(21:20-21; 22:2-4) and 
tells her off for smoking 
(21:18) 
She tried the patches but 
she’s got eczema (8:15-16) 
and the inhaler (8:22). She 
attended one smoking 
cessation appointment (9:18). 
She didn’t quit at all (10:3). 
She found it extremely 
difficult to quit during 
pregnancy (11:16) 
She’s cut down but 
hasn’t quit (10:6). 
She’s smoking 
about 10 , maybe 
15 (10:13-15) 
She felt guilty because of what people were probably 
thinking of her standing with a bump lighting up a 
cigarette. That made her feel bad  so she didn’t smoke as 
much because she’s bothered about what other people are 
thinking of her (11:21-23; 12:1-4) 
If she has a packet of cigarettes and knows that she can 
have one if she wants one she tends not to have one 
(19:19-21) 
The patches irritate her skin because she has 
eczema. She tolerated them for a while but they 
blistered her skin  (8:15-20). The inhaler gave 
her a nasty taste and the gum burnt her tongue. 
So she ran out of options and didn’t know what 
else to try. She couldn’t take the tablet because 
she was pregnant (9:2-10) 
She says it was difficult because It’s stressful 
when you’re pregnant because you’re worrying 
about the baby. Work could also get stressful 
(10:19-23) She says smoking sort of calms you 
down and relaxes you when stressed (11:4-5) 
What she found most difficult was the cravings 
(11:19).  
If she’s bored and hasn’t got much to do she tends 
to smoke more (12:15-16) 
She associates things with smoking like after her 
dinner she’ll go and have a cigarette (16:11-12) 
Not having cigarettes available makes her need a 
fag (20:8-9) 
She was worried about the detriments of smoking 
to her baby and was getting worked up because 
nothing was helping her quit hat she smoked even 
more (23:6-14) 
Trying to keep busy 
helped her and trying to 
find things to occupy her 
time (12:10-12) 
She always makes sure to 
have cigarettes  because 
she finds it worse when 
she doesn’t have any. If 
knows she can have one 
she tends not to smoke as 
much (19:18-21) 
She questions whether 
she really needs a 
cigarette (20:1) 
Some days she will go for 
quite long without having 
had a cigarette without 
realising it. Then she’ll 
try and go a little bit 
longer before she has 
another (20:15-20; 21:1-
3) 
She’s trying to 
cut down as 
much as she 
can and then 
knock it on the 
head (10:7-8) 
SSPW09 20-25  
cigarettes a 
day (8:7) 
She has really bad 
asthma. Her health is in a 
bad way and on her dad’s 
side of the family there’s 
a thing with cancer. She’s 
lost an aunt and uncle to 
cancer, and has another 
She came home from the 
interview with the services, 
set a quit date because she 
couldn’t quit straight away. 
She didn’t have a cigarette 
for 24 hours because she 
knew that if you put that 
Didn’t manage to 
quit at all (4:3-6). 
She managed to 
cut down to about 
15 a day (15:3-4) 
The inhalator helped because it was helping the hand 
to mouth habit and when she was inhaling it did feel 
like smoking a cigarette (8:13-18) 
Being told her daughter wasn’t growing kept her from 
smoking for 48 hours. She needed to give up because 
her other daughter was born prematurely. She was 
only one pound ten and she almost lost her. And she 
She didn’t have a substitute (4:8). 
She says smoking is a habit and if she doesn’t 
have a cigarette she finds herself miserable. It’s 
a habit of putting her hands to her mouth. She 
found her self being moody and unhappy (4:11-
17). 
She had really bad craving (4:18-19) more than 
She waited to see whether 
the patch would just take 
time to work and it would 
eventually work. She was 
hoping (9:11-14) and that 
helped her not smoke for 
49 hours (10:14) 
She wants to 
quit and 
before she goes 
back to college 





auntie who has breath 
cancer. So she’s worried 
it could come to her (3:5-
22) 
When she was pregnant 
and had a scan she was 
told that her baby was 
really small and she knew 
it was from smoking 
because she had read 
about how babies can be 
small if you smoke. So it 
wasn’t good for her (5:1-
15) 
She wants to quit most of 
all for her health and her 
children because her 
older daughter has 
asthma as well (18:2-3) 
patch on and have a fag it 
makes you really dizzy. She 
then put the patch on (6:18-
24; 7;1-4). She tried it for two 
days (8:10) 
has two holes in her heart. And she was smoking with 
her. So to nearly lose one daughter and being told that 
her other daughter is not growing made her think that 
she had to try (10:17-22; 11:7) 
Those two days that she was trying not to smoke her 
partner was good. He didn’t smoke in front of her and 
didn’t even put a pack of cigarettes in front of her. 
And he never came in smelling smoke (14:12-20) 
Her baby helped her cut down. Jus knowing that she’d 
lost the water and that she was smell. Knowing that 
something could happen to her made her think that 
she had to stop smoking as many (15:7-16). She had to 
be monitored daily in case she needed an emergency C 
section (15:22-23; 16:1-3) 
usual when she was pregnant. It was what she 
craved for (5:17-22). The cravings were the most 
difficult thing (9:4-6) 
She was told that she could only have a low dose 
patch when she wanted to highest one because 
she smokes a lot. Later she found out that they 
weren’t right (6:13-16) 
The low dose patch did work for her (7:1-2). She 
asked for a higher dose but they told her she 
wasn’t allowed to have it because she was 
pregnant (7:11-15). She says that if she were 
given the fight amount she wouldn’t be smoking 
now because a 20mg patch didn’t do anything 
for her because of the amount she smoked (8:8). 
She couldn’t cope with the 20mg patch (10:11) 
After not smoking for 48 hours she felt rough. 
Slow, tired unhappy and stressed (21:18-21; 
22:2) 
 
She was chewing a lot of 
gum to try not to smoke 
those 48 hours (21:15-16) 
(26:14-21) 
SSPW21 Between 10-20 She didn’t manage to 
quit during her 2nd 
pregnancy and hadn’t 
considered quitting since 
giving birth. But then her 
midwife asked if she’d 
like help with quitting at 
her booking appointment 
and she would never say 
no to that kid of help. 
Because she really want 
to quit (15:11-19). 
She not only wants to 
quit for her baby’s health 
but for her own as well 
(16:1-2). She wants her 
children to see her 
around for a lot longer. 
And she always been 
quite an athletic person 
she wants to stay fit and 
healthy (16:4-7). 
Her daughter tells her 
“Mummy I don’t want 
you to smoke” (16:22-24) 
and “Mommy you’re 
going to get black teeth 
and smelly breath and all 
this horrible things, I 
don’t what you to smoke 
(17:10-11). Her partner 
has given up for a week 
and her daughter loves 
that (17:6-9) 
She wants to set a good 
example for her children 
as well. She doesn’t want 
them smoking when 
they’re older (18:2-3) 
 
She found trying to quit 
during this pregnancy more 
difficult compared to the last 
(1:11-12). She hasn’t had any 
days where she’s managed 
not to smoke as much (20:21-
23) 
  She’s not sure she has the willpower even 
though she wants to quit (1:15) 
She thinks she has a bit of an addictive 
personality (3:16-17)She enjoys some of the 
cigarettes she smokes like the first one of the 
day and after her tea (16:10-11) 
She’s really struggling. Smoking has got a hold 
of her (17:15-16). She feels she doesn’t want to 
smoke but she needs to (17:23-24) 
She smokes more if she’s having a stressful day 
(19:6) 
She thinks she’s doing well and at the end of the 
day she looks at how many she’s smoked and 
she realises she hasn’t done well. If anything 
she’s smoked more (20:1-4). This stresses her 
out even more because she’s yet failed to do 
what she wanted to do that day(20:6-7) 
She just can’t go without one (20:13) 
She tends to smoke quite a few in the morning 
(21:5) 
She says she has all the reasons and encouragement 
there: her daughter is telling her not to smoke and 
she’s pregnant with her 3rd baby but for some 
reason she can’t do it (22:3-9) 
Part of her still wants to smoke. As horrible as it is 
she still enjoys a cigarette(23:16-18) 99% of 
herself hates smoking and 1% still wants to smoke 
(23:19-21). Until she gets rid of that 1% she says 
she can only do so much (23:21-23) 
She doesn’t smoke the 
full fag. She rips off the 
half and smokes it (19:7-
8) and throws the half 
away (19:13-14) 
If she’s dying for a 
cigarette she’ll wait for 
five minutes and then five 
more minutes (19:19-21). 
To do that she either 
watches telly or her little 
boy keeps her occupied. 
Or she washes (20:17-20) 
She’s tried buying ten 
packets but at night if 
she’s got non left she’ll go 





SSPW23 About 20 on 
average (4:15) 
She hasn’t really 
bothered trying to quit 
because she doesn’t really 
want to do it (7:17-18). 
She was sort of thinking 
about it because she was 
feeling pretty rough at 
the early stages of the 
pregnancy. She felt 
sleepy and lethargic and 
she thought she’d give it 
a go. Also her auntie died 
of a smoking related 
disorder which made her 
think she should give it a 
go. (7:20-24:8:2-6). Also 
she hears about people 
dying and stuff and 
smoking is aging her skin 
and her teeth (8:13-16) 
Her doctor sort of put 
her off smoking because 
he saying the she needs to 
stop smoking because it is 
know fact that it blocks 
the arteries and that it’s 
not good for the baby 
(9:19-23) 
She wants to decorate her 
house and smoking 
makes it smell (17:9-12). 
She get’s out of breath 
too quickly (18:6-8) 
She didn’t really attempt 
(8:7). She never went to the 
services (9:17). She didn’t try 
to quit even for a day (12:4-
7). She hasn’t cut down either 
(12:8-9) 
 If she’s busy she won’t smoke for a few hours. You 
lose track of time (23:11-17) 
If she’s stresses she smokes more, about 30 a 
day (4:15-16). She get’s stressed quite badly and 
smoking keeps her stress levels down she finds 
(22:19-21) 
If people are smoking around her and she smells 
the smoke it makes her want to ask for a 
cigarette (6:11-12) 
She can’t go really go about half an hour 
without a cigarette (8:7-8) 
She smoked during her other 2 pregnancies and 
she says you either stop or you don’t. And she 
didn’t have any problems with her children. 
They say that babies have low birth weight 
when you smoke but her children were pretty 
heavy (8:18-23). She wasn’t really concerned 
about smoking during her 1st pregnancy either 
and that hasn’t changed with her other 
pregnancies (9:10-15) 
She asked her doctor for patches and he told her 
that he’ll give her a month before he prescribes 
them because he said he didn’t really want to do 
that because it’s like offering her a pack of fags. 
Even though she told him that she wouldn’t be 
able to do it without the patches (9:24; 10:1-8). 
If she were given the patches she probably 
would have given it a go (27:5-6) 
There are patches in her partner’s room but she 
hasn’t bothered trying them (11:2-3). She’d 
rather have her own prescribed to her so that’s 
she knows it’s the right dosage since she’s 
pregnant (11:8-14) 
She took what the doctor said on board but a 
couple of days later in went out the window 
(12:1-3) 
She hasn’t tried to cut down because if she 
thinks that she has 10 fags and needs to make 
them last longer she’ll smoke them faster (12:9-
11) and she just ends up going back to the shop 
for some more (12:18-19) 
If she doesn’t have a fag she feels like climbing 
walls (12:21-22). The cravings are bad (13:1-2).  
Her partner is very negative about her attempts 
and does not support her which makes her think 
“forget it I’ll carry on doing it” (14:9-17). 
Because he has a negative attitude she smokes in 
front of him to do his head in (14:22-24) 
She doesn’t want to quit and put weight on 
(17:15-23) 
She says that out of 10 people about 1 or 2 quit 
and then a few months later they do it again. So 
she say’s there’s no point (21:15-20) 
If she’s having a drink she smokes a few more 
(23:4-5) 
She smokes out of boredom and because it’s 
habit of doing something with her hands (23:7-
8) 
Sometimes she manages 
to do 3-4 a day by 
watching telly or 
something or by having 
half a fag (15:2-7) 
She might go 
back to the 
doctor and ask 
for the patches  
and take it 
from there 
(27:15-18) 
SSPW29  She says as a women 
pregnancy is the time 
when you thinks over and 
She manages to quit at 5 
weeks of pregnancy. She did 
herself with no NRT, no sort 
She hasn’t smoked 
for 6 months (8:19-
20) 
The opportunities to smoke are much less compared to 
previous years because of all the rules about where 
one can’t  and can smoke. That’s made it easier (7:20-
There was that little voice at the back of her 
head going “You’ve been doing this for years 
what difference is it going to make? You’re not 
She told herself she 
wanted to see how long 
she could go without 
She hopes to 




above anything else that 
you should really quit 
because it’s not just you 
there, there’s a little life 
in there (9:12-15) 
She didn’t want to smoke 
while pregnant (46:5-6) 
Her father died at 51 
from a smoking related 
heart disease and she 
didn’t want that to 
happen to her (30:16-24; 
47:4-5) 
For the money (17:3-8; 
29;14-15; 47:4-5) 
of other support (30:6-10). 
She went to her doctor and 
told him she was having 
trouble quitting smoking and 
the next day she woke up and 
decided that she was going to 
try not to smoke that day 
(35:14-23). When she went to 
the nurse she was 5-6 days 
smoke-free. 
23) 
Her friends and family supported her by telling her 
how well she’s done (30:10-11) 
She woke up one day and decided not to pressure her 
self and see if she could not smoke for a day. And she 
did it 35:20-26). She says that  making a choice of not 
smoking instead of feeling forced or feeling under 
pressure you feel empowered by saying no to the 
cigarette so you are more likely to stay stopped (52:9-
13) 
Her midwife is quite happy and her community 
midwife has been checking in on her and telling her 
it’s brilliant she’d still not smoking. And she says she’s 
been lucky because her work colleagues have been 
very supportive. And her husband’s delighted (37:9-
16). She sent around an email at works saying the if 
she didn’t smoke by a certain day she would buy cakes 
for everybody and one of her bosses said that if she 
managed that then he would buy the cakes (48:1-5). 
She appreciated the support and well done messages. 
In the early days of her attempt when she got craving 
and needed a fag one of the girls at work would tell 
her “no you don’t no go sit down and I’ll make you a 
cup of tea: (48:13-22). She has a good network of 
people around her which she thinks is the key thing 
which probably made a difference versus a lot of the 
occasions in the past when she’d tried to stop (62:1-4) 
The more the time passes that she hasn’t smoked the 
more harder she’d finding it to remember what it was 
like to be a smoker. Being a non-smoker now feels 
completely natural (45:13-18) 
She says she was determined this time that she didn’t 
want to smoke while pregnant even though she’d done 
it with her other pregnancies(46:4-6).She says that this 
time what made her more determined in part was that 
she turned 30 last year and got to a point where she 
suddenly thought that she had to stop fooling herself. 
She supposes she’d grown up a bit (46:9-19).She was 
already trying to stop at the end of last year and was 
actually doing all right but had f family crisis and 
stopped the attempt (46:20-26 ) 
The nurse at the services insisting she take the patches 
even though she was smoke-free for 5 days made her 
stubborn and made her think “sod you. I’m going to 
go away and keep doing this and I’m going to do it 
without patches on her own” (47:11-21). She was 
stubborn this time (50:6-7) 
The longer she managed to go the more successful she 
felt, the easier it got (47:4-6) 
She started realising how much money she had and 
not scraping her credit card to within an inch of its life 
at the end of the month trying to find money for 
cigarettes(49:1-9) 
She realises now how much better she feels and she 
also knows that she doesn’t smell anymore and that 
this baby is growing and is healthy. All those things 
which she knew but weren’t enough to make stop in 
the past now that she has stopped she realises that 
these are why she should stay stopped (50:11-20) 
hurting anyone” There’s this kind of constant 
monologue going on. And it’s all of the 
justifications that you’ve ever had over the 
years and all the reasons why she’d always 
smoked. It makes her want to stick up 2 fingers 
to society and say “Bollocks this is up to 
me”(32:23-27; 33:1-4). She would get these 
mental dialogues of reasons why she could just 
go and have one if she wanted, and questioning 
why she was trying to quit (33:18-22). And this 
mental dialogue was constant (33:26). It would 
spike up more towards the times where she 
might have normally had a cigarette (34:2-5).  
For her it was always the psychological bit that 
was the problem (41:23-26) 
When you stopped smoking the feeling of 
wanting a cigarette which really does feel very 
physical like a clenching in the stomach and 
makes her feel very tense was much stronger 
(33:7-16) 
She says that like a lot of smokers the first one 
of the day is the most difficult not having (36:5-
7) 
She’s depressive and has been struggling with 
long-term depression on and off and something 
like smoking was a crutch she used and trying to 
get rid of it was a lot harder (42:1-8) 
In the early days of her quit attempt she had 
physical carvings (48:15-20) 
Her grandmother dies about 6-8 weeks ago and 
the day she found out she’d died her gut 
reaction was that she wanted a cigarette. And a 
week later at the funeral all the family smoked 
and they were in each other’s company for two 
days with lots of emotion and everybody was 
smoking and she very nearly caved in (49:12-21) 
 
having her morning 
cigarette and she found 
that the longer you can go 
between getting up and 
that first cigarette the 
easier it seems o get 
(36:9-11) 
Around week 3 of her 
attempt she sent an email 
around at work and told 
her colleagues that if she 
still wasn’t smoking by 
pay day she would buy 
cakes for everyone (48:1-
3) 
During the time of 
grandmother’s death and 
funeral to resist smoking 
she kept thinking that 
she’d come this far and 
that she really shouldn’t 
smoke (50:1-3) 
She’s reached a point 
now where she says she 
would really detest 
herself if she ruined her 
quit attempt (51:14-15) 
She once bought a packet 
of 10 cigarettes and 
enjoyed the ones she 
smoked. But then she 
carried on without 
putting herself on a big 
guilt trip about it and 
without believing that 
just because she had one 
that means she’s started 
smoking again (52:15-19) 
Her therapist has taught 
her some relaxation 
techniques so when 
stressed rather than her 
reaction being to want a 
cigarette she’s able to do 
other things or deal with 
it in other ways (54:15-
20) 
comes (51:16-
17) But since 
her 
grandmother 
died it’s been a 
bit rocky 
psychologicall
y for her so 













After the first week-10 days of her attempt smelling 
smoke made her feel really sick. She felt a bit 
nauseous during her pregnancy and the smoke made it 
worse. She thinks she ended up with a bit of a physical 
deterrent almost (51:3-12) 
She once bought a packet of 10 cigarettes and enjoyed 
the ones she smoked. But then she carried on without 
putting herself on a big guilt trip about it and without 
believing that just because she had one that means 
she’s started smoking again (52:15-19) 
She’s been in therapy and that has helped her be more 
mentally strong. She’s more settles in herself and 
secure and able to manage how she feels about things. 
(54:12-13). Psychologically she’s in a quite strong 
place (61:26) 
SSPW34 Max 20 but 
about 10 (5:7) 
or 15 (31:3) 
Her fitness has gone 
down because she used to 
be quite fit. And the 
money side of 
things.(4:21-23; 5:1-2; 
39:16)). She feels run 
down (39:18-19) 
She thought of the cost of 
smoking because of her 
situation being on her 
own with her son (6:4-6) 
Her son hates that she 
smokes (16:18-21) and 
tells her that it will kill 
her (17:1-7) 
She found out she was 
pregnant and thought she 
would stop it all (19:9-10) 
for the baby’s sake 
(27:12). She want to quit 
for her son as well but 
mainly because she’s 
pregnant (27:12-14) 
because it’s affecting 
someone else (29:11-12) 
 
She’d quit at the beginning of 
this pregnancy (3:7-8).As 
soon as she found out she was 
pregnant she tried quitting 
(30:18). When she found out 
she was pregnant she got the 
lozenges but kept on having 
the odd cigarette (19:9-15). 
She quit completely at first 
(31:1). That lasted about 2-3 
weeks (31:6) 
She smoking 
heavily at the 
moment (35:20) 
At the beginning of this pregnancy she was happy so 
she was able to quit (27:18-19; 31:21) 
She found the lozenges helped in being quit for 2-3 
weeks (31:7-11) 
She used to go round to her boyfriend’s who’s a non-
smoker and hates smoking. So she found that helped 
(31:17-19). He didn’t allow her to do it (34:15-18) She 
couldn’t  let her son see her either so she couldn’t 
smoke while he was around  (34:18-19) 
Her dad died of a smoking related disease(3:15) 
but that was not enough to teach her 
(3:22)because she says she’s not like her dad 
who smoke 50-60 a day(5:4-7). She tries to blank 
out the possibility of something like what 
happened to her father happening to her (5:13). 
Her brother who smokes a lot has also been 
diagnosed with what her father had but she 
always thinks it won’t happen to her (5:15-17; 
6:7) and that she doesn’t smoke that much (6:8). 
She has much going in so she has other things 
on her mind (5:19-21). 
She’s worried about putting on weight if she 
stops (8:20-21) 
She ran out of lozenges and couldn’t get an 
appointment with the nurse. She begged the 
doctor for a prescription  because it would take 
too long to get the appointment but he wouldn’t 
. She was told that she had to see the same nurse 
and be monitored (18:1-22). So then she says she 
couldn’t be bothered anymore (18:24-25). Some 
morning she’s feeling positive and thinks she 
could do it if she had some lozenges (27:4-8) 
To get the appointments she’s had to wait 3 
weeks each time (25:9-10) and by that time her 
willpower had gone again (41:14-15) 
 
With her it’s boredom as well and something to 
do with her hands (20:20) 
She doesn’t have the willpower. Part of her 
wants to quit and other times she’s thought that 
smoking is her only enjoyment (29:6-8) 
The fact that she smoked during her 1st 
pregnancy and her son is now fine has been her 
excuse about it and makes her thinks that she 
was able to do it once and get away with it. So 
that gives her hope (29:17-22; 30:1) 
The 2-3 weeks that she was smoke free not 
smoking was difficult because she would get 
angry and moody (32:6). She would get moody 
as she was craving (32:10-13). And she would 
die for a cigarette after meals (32:8) 
She would have an odd cigarette when her 
boyfriend wasn’t around (33:21-22; 34:2-3) 
At the beginning of this 
pregnancy when she was 
trying to quit she was 
constantly stuffing her 
face (9:13-15) 
Being occupied helped 
with the craving s(31:21) 
She wants to 
go back to the 
services and 
try and quit 
(39:6). She 
doesn’t have a 







because she would be craving (34:9-10). She 
didn’t have the willpower and she would just 
give in (34:12) 
Two weeks into her attempt something really 
bad happened so the first thing she did was turn 
to a pack of cigarettes (33:1-2).  
Her partner was not relaxed and supportive. If 
he were she thinks she would have smoked less 
(35:8-9). He was nasty about it and turned on 
her for it. The more he stressed her out and 
gone on about it the more she’d smoke (35:11-
17)  
Her whole like at the moment is making it 
difficult not to smoke (31:22; 1-2). Loads of stuff 
happened last week which has made her smoke 
more (35:1-5). She and her partner split up and 
some days she feels she doesn’t want the baby 
anymore (37:1-6). She can’t quit at the moment. 
Her head is a mess (37:14-15) 
A lot of the time she feels it’s too late in the 
pregnancy and she’d done what she’s done 
(37:20-21). She thinks she’s done the damage 
now because it’s been 6 ½ months (38:6) 
She’s worried about her finances and stresses 
about how she’s going to cope which makes her 
smoke (42:22-24; 43:1-2) 




She wants to quit to have 
a healthy baby. She says 
it’s not fair that the baby 
is smoking and it’s not 
the baby’s choice to 
smoke (15:2-3) 
She also has health 
concerns(37:14) She 
wouldn’t want her child 
to feel bad if she were to 
have a smoking related 
illness like her mother 
(18:21-22) 
By not smoking she’ll 
have more money to 
spend (37:1-7) 
She says that this attempt is 
proving a lot harder than in 
the past (14:20). She’s cut 
down a hell of a lot (16:7) to 
about 5 cigarettes (16:9). She 
decided to quit as soon as she 
found out she was pregnant 
(17:8). She cut down 
gradually (27:8) and it took 
about 2-3 weeks (27:10) 
She’s currently 
smoking about 5 
cigarettes a day 
(16:9) 
When she’s out she’d fine and she doesn’t smoke 
(5:18-19). She doesn’t smoke when out because she’s 
embarrassed because people know she’s pregnant and 
if they see her smoking they’ll start saying things and 
that’s going to make her stressed and angry (34:1-7) 
She recently found out that her other has a serious 
respiratory track problem and will die within 10 years 
if she doesn’t quit smoking. This makes her try even 
harder to give up smoking because she doesn’t want 
her child to go to feel like she’s feeling now about her 
mum(18:19-22) 
She usually has her mum round and takes the 
cigarettes off her. She sometimes keeps her fags for 
her. She also has neighbours that help her by holding 
her fags for her (25:4-21) 
The people she socialises with doesn’t smoke so when 
she’s socialising she smokes less (29:10-21). She says 
it’s easier in a group of people who doesn’t smoke 
(30:1-2) 
She says with the smoking ban she can’t smoke in 
pubs and bars so it’s become easier not to smoke when 
socialising (30:4-6) 
 
Stress and boredom makes her want to smoke 
(12:21) 
She’s fining it hard because she’s limited to 
what smoking aid she can actually have. 
Because she has morning sickness the gum 
makes her feel sick, the tablets gave her an 
allergic reaction, she can’t use the patches 
because of her psoriases and the lozenges taste 
awful (15:9-21). She hasn’t been given the 
inhalator yet (16:1-5) 
She worries about whether everything is ok with 
the baby making her attempt harder (16:19-21).  
Her next door neighbour is quite loud (16:22) 
which makes it harder because it annoys her 
and stresses her (17:2-3). There’s load of stress 
going on which makes it hard for her (22:15-16). 
The baby’s dada doesn’t want to know about it 
and she’s worrying about money (22:18-20) 
If she has cigarettes there then she smoked more 
(23:16-17) 
She usually needs cigarette in the evening 
because her next door neighbour is an alcoholic 
and screams and shouts every evening 
constantly. So she sits there and gets stressed, 
angry and worked up. So she needs a cigarette 
to calm down (26:5-21) 
Se says sometimes the stress drags her back 
(29:2) making her think that she needs a 
cigarette (29:4-5). It’s her release. It helps her 
(32:9-15) 
People telling her that she shouldn’t be smoking 
makes her want to do it even more because she’s 
being told that she can’t do it making her think 
She doesn’t smoke a 
whole cigarette. She 
souses it away half way 
through so as not to 
smoke the whole thing. 
She’ll put it out and 
walks away and smoke 
the rest  later (16:11-17) 
She just buys 10 cigarette 
every 2 days instead of 
buying 20 and having 
them there (23:15-16). So 
she’s always thinking that 
she’s got to have 
something for tomorrow 
because she’d not going 
to buy more until the day 
after tomorrow (23:20-
21)  
She given her fags to 
some neighbours. She 
tells them to give then to 
here when the ones she 
has are gone and that she 
doesn’t want them on the 
same day (24:4-21) 
She tends to go out a lot 
for walks and 
deliberately leaves her 
cigarettes at home as well 
as her money. So she cant 
smoke and can’t buy 
more (25:7-13). Or she 
She given up 
alcohol 
completely 
and she says 
that obviously 




wants to give 
up completely 
(27:21) but 
does not have 




that they have nothing to do with her and can’t 
tell her to do something (34:14-15; 35:3-7) 
Her mum smoked through 4 pregnancies and all 
of her children were fine. And she knows other 
people that have smoked all through their 
pregnancies and their kids have been fine. This 
plays on her mind. Also she has a friend who 
smoked through all her pregnancies except one 
and the one she didn’t smoke with has loads of 
health problems  (35:14-21; 36:13) 
goes to see her sister-in-
law who just had a baby 
and is a non-smoker and 
doesn’t allow soke 
around that baby  She’ll 
spend the majority of the 
day with her (25:18-20) 
She’s not setting a quit 
date because if it’s too 
close it’s scarier and if 
it’s too far she thinks 
she’ll relapse more (28:4-
10). She’s taking one day 
at a time (31:5) 
When her neighbour is 
stressing her out she 
sometimes goes out and 
doesn’t come back until 
he’s gone all quite (33:14) 
 
SSPW35 About 10  a 
day (4:21) 
She decided to try and 
quit because she’s 
pregnant and smoking 
reduced the oxygen 
getting to the baby (3:12-
14). It’s better for the 
baby to quit (13:12) 
She wants to quit for 
herself as well because 
it’s healthier not to 
smoke (4:1-3) 
Because of the smell as 
well. She can’t stand it 
even though she smoked. 
It’s nice to keep fresh and 
healthy (4:5-10) 
She’s tried cutting down but 
it seems a little hard (3:14-
15). She decided to try as soon 
as she found out she was 
pregnant (4:13-18), about 5 
months ago (5:9).She cut 
down gradually (5:1-3). It 
took a couple of moths to get 
from 10 to 5 (5:5-6). She’s 
never smoked less than 5. 5 is 
the least she smokes (11:11). 
She’s finding it more difficult 
to cut down from 5 to none 
than it was to cit down from 
10 to 5 (341:2) 
She’s cut down to 
about 5  day (5:1) 
She has an ambition: she doesn’t want her baby to be 
around smoke. She’s determined and says that when 
there is a will there is a way (17:11-15). Thinking 
about a better lifestyle for her and her baby makes her 
determined (17:21) 
She can go an hour or two and then she can feel 
herself craving. That’s what she; finding hard 
the craving. And then she starts getting irritated 
and snappy (5:15-20; 6:1). So she thinks if she’s 
around people she has to have one because she 
seems irritable and it’s no nice for other people 
(6:3-4). 
When she tries not to smoke when craving she 
will reach a point where she feels like she’s 
going to explode (7:2-3) 
She says it’s difficult especially when she’s 
around people that smoke and there’s fags there 
and she’s craving one. She just wants to go 
“Give us one” (11:2-8). She’s ok if she’s just had 
one but If she’s gone for 2 ½ hours and then 
goes round someone who’s smoking and she’s 
craving she can’t extend it any longer (12:14-20) 
When she’s stressed out she seems to smoke 
more (11:14-18). She gets stressed because it’s 
her first baby and she’s trying to get everything 
together and some days she can be really calm 
and some day’s she’s thinking “oh my god I’ve 
got to get this and that” and then with the flat as 
well(11:21-22; 12:1-2). It can be stre4ssful when 
she starts letting things get on top of her (12:4-
5). She says it’s a scary experience because it’s 
her first and she doesn’t know what to expect 
(16:16-17). If she thinks about it too hard she 
ends up getting worked up (16:19-20) 
She says it’s difficult just when she craves (13:5) 
She thinks it has a lot to do with boredom as 
well (29:21-22) 
She gets more craving from 12 onwards. Not in 
the mornings (31:11-13) 
She has tried avoiding 
smoking as soon she gets 
a craving (6:20-22). She 
can probably last an 
extra hour and that’s 
with her going up the 
wall (7:14-15) 
She’s tried to resist buy 
not buying fags so that 
there are no fags around 
her (6:8-10).  
She’s stayed away from 
people who smoke (7:14-
15) 
She only smokes one 
when she needs one 
rather than just smoking 
while waiting around or 
something. And she tried 
to push it a little bit 
longer. Make the time go 
by a little bit longer. 
When she starts craving 
she leaves it and sees how 
far she can push before 
she starts getting 
irritable. That’s how 
she’s managed to cut 
down, by pushing herself 
a little bit (10:3-20) 
When she’s around 
smokers she tells herself 
she doesn’t need one yet 
(12:9) 
She would like 
to stop 
smoking now 




She’d like to 
keep it up still 
quitting when 
the baby is 
born as well 
(13:13-14). She 
expect to have 
quit in 2-3 
months at least 
(16:8) 
SSPW33 Up to 15 a day 
(7:18) 
She made the decision to 
try and quit because she 
was pregnant and in her 
head she shouldn’t be 
smoking when she’s 
  She felt guilty she was smoking the few she did so 
that’s what her from saying know to her manager who 
knocked on her door to go have a cigarette. She didn’t 
want to go back to smoking the amount that she did 
before (13:9-11). She felt guilty because she didn’t 
She says smoking is a habit. She’ll have 
something to eat and within 10 minutes she’ll 
have a cigarette. At work around 10.30-11 she’ll 
have a coffee break and have a cigarette. She’ll 
have dinner and then go for a cigarette. 
She knew what times her 
manager would knock on 
her door to go for a 
cigarette and she would 




pregnant. She says it’s 
not good (8:8-10). She 
wouldn’t have attempted 
to quit if she weren’t 
pregnant t (9:16-18). 
A few days after she 
found out she was 
pregnant she had a scare 
because she was bleeding 
and had to go to the 
hospital and have a scan. 
So when she saw him she 
knew she had to sort it 
out (10:21-24; 1-7) 
Everyone was telling her 
that her smoking is going 
to go in her baby (10:15-
19) 
want her baby to be affected (13:14-16) and have 
breathing problems and asthma because of him (14:1-
2) 
Her reception manager encouraged her to smoke so 
when she was with her it was easier not to go smoke 
(14:16-21) 
It got easier with time also because she was busy at 
work trying to wrap up everything before she left 
(16:16-18) 
Going out was ok because she wasn’t drinking (18:12-
13). With the ban inside pubs if she goes for a drink 
it’s fine because she doesn’t need to have a cigarette. If 
she’s not with a group of people who smoke it doesn’t 
bother her (18:15-18).  
When her sisters when out to smoke they didn’t ask 
her as much (20:1-2) 
Her oldest sister always told her off for smoking (19:7-
9) and if she was with her mum she would give her the 
evil eye (20:18-19). Her mum doesn’t like her smoking 
so limitations like that helped (21:1) 
She can’t smoke in her mum’s house, her own house 
or at 2 of her sisters’ houses so that stops smoking 
because if she were sitting down and was comfortable 
with her tea she didn’t want t6o get up and go outside 
(21:2-21) 
Sometimes if she had a bad day at work one of her girl 
colleagues would get loads of chocolates and they 
would sit there eating and eating. Her colleague really 
disapproved because she’s a trainee nurse. So she 
didn’t want to get a lecture from her so it was easier 
just not to go for a cigarette. When this colleague was 
there, because she worked part time, it made it easier 
(23:3-11) 
She didn’t want to be walking down the road 7 or 8 
months pregnant smoking and people looking at her 
(23:18-22). She’s scared of what other people are 
going to think (27:20-21) 
Her sister smoked during her pregnancy and her niece 
had breathing problems and asthma which the doctor 
said was because of smoking. She didn’t want her 
baby to be the same (24:14-23; 25:1-8) 
Some days she was able not to smoke at all because 
she had more willpower (31:1-6) 
No that she’s given birth she says it’s easier because 
she’s with the baby and won’t leave inside to go out 
and smoke (33:20-24; 34:1-2) 
Finishing work she’ll have a cigarette as soon as 
she walks out. She says it’s the routine of it..the 
time she usually has one (5:19-23; 6:1-3). That’s 
what she found the hardest. Getting out of the 
habit of when she would have a cigarette (6:5-8), 
She also associated having coffee with having a 
cigarette (15:19-20) 
She has 6 sisters and 5 smoke although they 
don’t live wither (7:9-10) so when they are at 
their mum’s they all go for one together (7:12-
13). So the temptation to join them was there 
(20:11-12) Because they would sit in the front 
garden chatting away to them so it was the 
social side of it (20:12-14) 
She wasn’t told until about a month before she 
gave birth and she could have the patches or 
other stuff. She presumed she couldn’t take any 
of that because she was pregnant (9:1-5) 
When she was trying to cut down one of her 
managers at work was constantly knocking on 
her door to go and have a cigarette and she’d 
have to say no that she can’t (11:21-22; 12:1-2). 
She would be tempted to say yes and sometimes 
she did (12:13-18) 
When smoking at work she could discuss work 
and catch up on stuff. There was a gossip 
element to it as well. So if there were a lot 
happening at work she would be tempted to say 
yes to her manager (13:1-6) 
She found it difficult that she had to stop both 
drinking and smoking (13:17-19). Trying to stop 
both of them was really hard (13:23-24) 
On work days she would smoke more because 
work was really stressful because they didn’t get 
a replacement for her. So if she had a stressful 
day she would smoke more (22|:7-10) 
Her midwife never mentioned smoking apart 
from the one time and although she received a 
call from the stop smoking services they never 
got back to her (25:11-23; 26:1-12). She thinks 
she didn’t contact them herself because the 
woman who had phoned her came across as 
judgemental and that she disagreed completely 
that she was still smoking (27:4-12). She thinks 
maybe it would have a difference if she’d gone 
to the services (27:22-24; 28:1) 
manager’s office at that 
time  and sit there for a 
bit. Because that manager 
encouraged her to stop 
and she knew that if she 
with her it would be 
easier to get caught up 
with work and not go 
smoke (14:10-22) 
To break the habit of 
wanting a cigarette she 
didn’t have coffee (15:12) 
especially during coffee 
break time (16:5-6) 
She also didn’t go out to 
get her lunch because 
then she’d have to have a 
cigarette on her way 
back. She would get 
lunch inside the hospital 
where she worked. And if 
she wanted something 
from out the other girls 
would go get her 
something (17:5-13) 
She kept away from 
certain people who 
smoked (17:18-24) 
She didn’t go much out 
when she was pregnant 
(19:1-2) 
To avoid smoking with 
her sisters she didn’t go 
out as much with them 
(20:17) 
She bought an inhaler 
(28:7-20) and used it 
when she felt like going 
for a cigarette (29:10) 
When trying to quit 
completely she tried not 
taking any cigarettes at 
work (30:2-4) 
SSPW24  She wants to quit because 
it’s bad for the children 
because there’s an 
unborn child inside her 
that’s going to get 
affected (8:8-9). She 
doesn’t want to harm the 
baby (13:2). 
She also wants to do it for 
herself because she’s 
getting out of breath as 
she’s getting bigger (13:2-
4) 
 She quit for 3 ½ 
(3:16-17) but now 
she’s been smoking 
for the past few 
days (14:12-13) 
For the first 3 ½ moths of her pregnancy she couldn’t 
smoke because she was being sick every time she 
smoked (3:16-17). At that time she didn’t have any 
cravings for cigarettes (10:1-5). She stopped trying to 
smoke in the beginning because she was getting more 
sick from smoking (26:11-12) 
She says that as soon as she found out she was 
pregnant she cigarettes started tasting horrible to her. 
She doesn’t know if it’s all in her mind (10:15-17). 
Because she was 2-3 weeks pregnant before she found 
out and was still smoking (11:5-9)  
When she’s got things going on around her she doesn’t 
think about smoking (21:15-16) 
She’s read the information about what smoking 
can do to the baby. She knows all thin ins and 
outs but she says it just goes to the back of her 
mind (8:12-15). She doesn’t really want to think 
about the problems smoking can cause when 
she’s pregnant. She had to put it at the back of 
her mind because if she keeps on thinking about 
it she gets depressed and starts crying (9:3-9). 
She chooses not to think about it (9:12-13) 
She doesn’t think about the money she wastes or 
about dying from cancer because she gets 
depressed (17:20-23) 
Even though smoking was making her sick she 
Sometimes when she’s 
depressed she tells herself 
to leave the cigarette 
there and that she can’t 
have it (15:6-9) 
When she feels she needs 
a cigarette she thinks no 
because it can harm her 
(21-22) and be bad for 
her daughter (19:1) 
She eats to try not to 





She says smoking is 
getting expensive and she 
has a daughter to buy 
things for and another 
one on the way (16:15-
18). Especially not having 
a job at the moment 
(16:20-21)  
Her daughter told her to 
stop (13:13). She said 
“Mummy I don’t want 
you to smoke no more it’s 
horrible” (13:19-21) 
 still tried to smoke a few times because she was 
used to having that cigarette in her hand and 
smoking it especially in college (23:13-15) 
because all the girls in her class smoked and she 
was the only one standing there. She says it’s a 
follow fashion. She wanted to smoke because 
everyone was smoking. She felt left out (23:19-
24; 24:2) 
She has a rat situation which made her want 
smoke. The other day she saw a dead rat and 
got stressed but was fine after she smoked 
(11:21-22; 12). And then smoking tasted lovely 
to her (12:12) 
Now if she smells a cigarette she wants one 
(12:20-21) 
She smokes more in the mornings. She doesn’t 
smoke in the afternoons. She thinks it’s because 
she’s happy in the mornings and depressed in 
the evenings (14:16-20) 
When she’s eaten loads of food that’s when she 
wants a cigarette. And she eats more when she’s 
happy (15:17-20). When her belly is full having 
a cigarette relaxes the stomach (15:19-22) 
When she’s upset about things she feels she 
needs to have a cigarette (18:21) 
She sometimes forgets she’s pregnant and just 
feels fat (15:11-13) 
She’s never known anyone to have cancer from 
smoking and dying from smoking. If she had 
someone in her family or knew someone that 
had some problem because of smoking she’d 
kick it on the head straight away (20:5-9) 
When sitting home alone she wants a  cigarette 
even more (21:13-14) 
Sometimes the smell of smoke when smokers 
smelt lovely  and she would want a cigarette 
herself (25:8-10) 
When she’s out she wants to smoke with her 
friends because she meets new people when she 
smokes because people smoke and talk asking 
for lighters (28:15-17) 
She takes the dog for a 
walk to try and get 
smoking off her mind 
(21:12-13). Or she plaits 
her daughter’s hair 
which takes an hour and 
forgets about cigarettes 
(39:17-19). Or she cooks 
some food (39:19-20) 
At college she just kept 
herself in the canteen and 
ate things (24:20-22) 
SSPW22  Because of the baby. If it 
was for herself she 
wouldn’t quit (19:17-18). 
But she has a baby 
growing inside her and 
that’s why she doesn’t 
want to smoke (19:21-22). 
She’s smoking and that 
smoke is going down to 
the child. She says that’s 
not very healthy (20:2-3) 
 She’s smoking 
(4:22-23) 
The smell of smoke in the morning made her heave 
and she would be sick. That made her think that the 
baby doesn’t like it (20:13-21) and was trying to tell 
her “Stop smoking” (21:1-2) 
When she had her first scan she realised she was 
giving a baby and she cried because she though she 
was killing it (22:15; 23:5) 
She hasn’t got it in her to quit. She says she’s not 
strong enough yet (19:18-19) . But because she’s doing 
it for someone else and not herself(16-17) she’s more 
determined for the baby’s sake (36:2-3) and she know 
that baby could come out and have bad breathing 
problems and that would be her fault (27:4-8) 
She cut down gradually so she didn’t find doing it 
difficult (30:4-5) 
In the beginning it hadn’t really kicked in that 
she was pregnant so she was smoking (22:8-12) 
She’s had a bad pregnancy. She’s been in and 
out of hospital because she’s been bleeding. And 
her mate was the same and had a miscarriage. 
So she started smoking again because she was 
scared that she would have a miscarriage too. So 
too calm her nerves down she was smoking 
more (21:7-21) 
She also hasn’t got a lot of money for the child 
so she’s stressing (28:22-23) which is why she 
smokes (29:4) 
If she has an argument with her partner 
because her hormones are all over the place and 
she’s a feisty person and she goes head to head 
with him. That doesn’t help. She smokes more 
(32:10-22). If she has an argument she ends up 
smoking (33:6) 
She watched the clock 
because she didn’t want 
to go over her daily limit. 
She had to make sure she 
was having them at 
certain times (30:6-16) 
If she wanted to have 
more than her daily 
limited she’d have 2s but 
leave that 2s in her 
ashtray for tomorrow 
and then knock that 2;s 
off the next day’s fags 
(31:3-4). She punished 
herself the next day 
(31:17-18) 
She’d try not to smoke 




Going out is difficult because she gets stressed 
for wanting the toilet always (34:1-5) and it 
makes her want a fag (*34:15) 
Most of her friends smoke (10:21) and if she’s 
out she’ll have a couple of drags but don’t really 
add those to her allowance (34:18-22) 
 
before she went to bed 
and if she couldn’t handle 
it she’d smoke that half a 
fag (32:1-2) 
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Appendix 6.2: HPV vaccination Invitation Letters 
Control Groups 
 
MISS XXXXX XXXXX 
 
ADDRESS LINE 1 
ADDRESS LINE 2 
ADDRESS LINE 3 
POSTCODE 
 
Wednesday, 27 November 2013 
Immunisation Team 
Newtown Health Centre 
171 Melbourne Avenue 
Newtown 







We are stamping down on cancer and inviting you to attend your first Human 
Papilloma Virus (HPV) vaccination. A leaflet about the vaccination is included and 
you can call us on the local rate number 0345-245-0777 if you would like further 
information. 
 
This is being offered to all girls 12 – 18 years of age and provides protection from 
cervical cancer. 
 
The vaccination will be held at: 
 
Sutton Cottage Hospital 
27a Birmingham Road 
Sutton Coldfield 
West Midlands 
B72 1QH      on XX/XX/XXXX at XX:XX. 
 
If you need to arrange a different time or would prefer to attend a different clinic then 
please call the appointment line on the local rate number 0345-245-0777, Monday to 
Friday between 9am and 4pm.      
 
Please do not contact the Health Centre directly to rearrange your appointment as they 























Wednesday, 27 November 2013 
Immunisation Team 
Safeguarding Offices 
Gee Business Centre 
Holborn Hill 
Aston 





Dear «Patient_Title» «PATIENT_SURNAME», 
 
We are writing to invite you to attend for your first Human Papilloma Virus (HPV) 
Vaccination. 
 
This is being offered to all girls 12 – 18 years of age and provides protection from 
cervical cancer.  You have been selected for a limited pilot incentive scheme where 
you will receive Love2Shop vouchers for receiving this vaccination.  These can be 
redeemed at over 80 High Street stores.  The vaccination is in 3 stages – you will 
receive £20 voucher for attending the 1
st
 vaccination, £5 voucher for the 2
nd





Your appointment to receive the vaccination will be at: 
 
Partners In Health 
163 Yardley Green Road 
Bordesley Green 
Birmingham 
B9 5PU      on «Current_appointment_date» at 
«Current_appointment_time». 
 
If you need to arrange a different time or would prefer to attend a different clinic then 
please call the appointment line on the local rate number 0345-245-0777, Monday to 
Friday between 9am and 4pm.  Please note that in order to receive vouchers you must 
attend on the date specified above (or a revised mutually agreed date).    
 
Please do not contact the Health Centre directly to rearrange your appointment as they 
will not be able to help with this. 
 
A leaflet about the vaccination is included and you can call us on the local rate number 
0345-245-0777 if you would like further information. 
 
Yours sincerely 
The Immunisation Team 
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Vaccination sessions will be held at the following community clinics: 
 
1. Sutton Cottage Hospital (Sutton Vessey) 
27a Birmingham Road 
Sutton Coldfield 
West Midlands 
B72 1QH   
 
2. Dove Medical Centre (Erdington) 





3. Partners in Health (Stechford) 
163 Yardley Green Road 
Bordesley Green 
Birmingham 









































HPV VACCINATION SURVEY FORM 
 
 
Name:        
 
 




To help us improve our service we are asking all those coming for HPV vaccinations 
to answer a few questions.  
 
 
1. For me, having the HPV vaccination is (please circle your answer): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




2. For me, having the HPV vaccination is (please circle your answer): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(1 = Not at all harmful; 7 = Harmful) 
 
 
3. Please state which of the following you think would be true or false if you have 
the HPV vaccination (please tick as appropriate): 
 
 True False Don’t 
know I am less likely to get cervical cancer    
I am less likely to get other sexually 
transmitted diseases 
   
I am less likely to get pregnant    
 
 
4. What is the main reason you came today to have the HPV vaccination (please 
circle your answer)? 
a. Because I’m concerned about my health 
b. Because my parents / guardian want me vaccinated 
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c. Because my friends are attending the HPV vaccination 
d. Other reason – please specify 
 
5. So we can increase the HPV vaccination take up rate we'd like to talk in detail 
to a small group of women about their experiences. These interviews would take place 
at home sometime over the next few months.  They are entirely optional but will help 
us to improve our services.  Would you be happy for us to call you about arranging an 
interview? 
YES / NO:_____ 
 
 
6. We may share some of your protected health information with the third parties 
who perform services for us necessary to operate the incentive scheme.  In those cases 
we have written agreements with the third parties that they will not use or disclose 
your information for any other purposes, except as required by law. Your 
confidentiality and privacy will be protected at all times and will be processed in 
accordance with the 1988 Data Protection Act. NHS Birmingham East and North will 
take all reasonably necessary steps to ensure your data is treated securely and 





 vaccination dates.  The information will also be used in writing a research 
report on how well the healthy incentives scheme helps increase the take up rate of the 
HPV vaccination – note that no one will be identified by name.  We may contact you 
in the future regarding health related programmes or services.  If you do not wish to 
participate in the scheme at any point, or require further information, you can contact 
us on 0345-245-0777. Are you happy to take part in the scheme? 
 


























Appendix for Chapter 8 
  
Appendix 8.1: Recruitment email 
 
Email title: Assessing the impact of Modagil (a new cognitive enhancing drug) on 
Memory – circular email 
Circular email for use for recruitment of volunteers for study ref: 203/26.06.2012, 
approved by the LSE Research Ethics Committee. This project contributes to the 
College's role in conducting research, and teaching research methods. You are under 
no obligation to reply to this email, however, if you choose to, participation in this 
research is voluntary and you may withdraw at anytime.' 
 
ARE YOU INTERESTED IN HELPING PROMOTE SCIENCE AND ENHANCING 
YOUR MEMORY AT THE SAME TIME? 
If your answer is yes, then you might be interested in participating in a trial to assess 
the impact of a new drug, called Modagil, on memory.   
Modagil is a central nervous stimulant that has been shown in human trials to be 
effective in increasing wakefulness. It is currently approved for the treatment of 
medical conditions that cause sleepiness. We are interested in determining whether it 
is also effective in improving the memory and focus in healthy, non-sleep deprived 
individuals. 
What will be required of you? 
1. Completion of screening process 
In order to determine whether you are eligible to participate in the trial, you are first 
requested to undergo a screening process, which involves completing an online 
questionnaire.  
During the screening process you will also be given more information about the trial 
and the drug Modagil. 
To compensate for your time spent completing the questionnaire, you will receive 
an Amazon gift certificate worth £10. 
Completing the screening process does NOT guarantee your participation in the trial. 




To complete the screening process please click on the link: 
http://www.atemmtrial-screening.co.nr// 
 
2. Trial Participation  
If you are selected for participation in the trial you will be requested to: 
 • Complete a one hour visit to one of our laboratories in central London  
• Take a single dose of Modagil (200mg) (one pill)  
• Complete a number of simple memory-related tasks 
 
To complete the screening process and read more information about the trial 
please click on the link: http://www.atemmtrial-screening.co.nr/ 
 
For any further information please contact:  
 
Eleni Mantzari 
Health Psychology Section, Department of Psychology 
King’s College London, Guy’s Campus 
5
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Appendix 8.2: Study website -pages viewed by those offered £25 































































































































































































Appendix 8.3: Additional analyses confirming the robustness of 




The distribution of the time-scores across the sample is positively skewed (S=10.69) 
and leptokurtic (K=145.13), as can be seen from Figure 1, with a mean of 106.11sec 
a mode of 53.6sec of and a median of 54.44sec (Table 1). Table 2 displays the cases 
with five highest and five lowest values. Casewise diagnostics identified four 
extreme outliers (i.e. cases with studentized residuals greater than 2) (Table 3).  
 













Table 1: Descriptives relating to the distribution of time-scores 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Time_seconds Mean 106.1174 14.06244 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound 78.4337  
Upper Bound 133.8011  
5% Trimmed Mean 76.2484  
Median 54.4445  
Variance 54579.608  
Std. Deviation 233.62279  
Minimum 1.37  
Maximum 3401.60  
Range 3400.23  
Interquartile Range 63.34  
Skewness 10.689 .147 




Table 2: The five highest and five lowest time-scores 
 Case Number Value 
Time_seconds Highest 1 216 3401.60 
2 214 833.25 
3 53 741.95 
4 215 734.23 
5 165 558.86 
Lowest 1 16 1.37 
2 13 2.20 
3 39 2.58 
4 137 2.73 
5 154 2.81 
 
 
Table 3: Cases identified within the distribution of time-scores as extreme outliers 
Case Number Std. Residual Time_seconds Predicted Value Residual 
113 2.955 833.25 149.5905 683.65874 
114 2.527 734.23 149.5905 584.63570 
115 14.058 3401.60 149.5905 3252.00849 
138 2.943 741.95 61.0401 680.90786 
 
 
Taking into consideration the above and in order to assess the robustness of the 
findings relating to the impact of financial incentives and the moderating role of 
cognitive load on the time spent viewing the pill-related information presented in 
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Chapter 8 two sets of additional analyses were conducted: a median (or quantile) 
regression, which is based on median values instead of means, and a robust 
regression, which places less weight on extreme and influential observations. Both 
of these additional analyses confirmed the findings of the initial analyses, which 
were based on log-transforming the data.  
Specifically, as seen in Table 4, median regression revealed a significant effect of 
financial incentives on the median time spent viewing risk-information. This effect 
was moderated by cognitive-load. Pairwise comparisons using the median test 
revealed that under no load, participants offered £1000 for taking the pill spent 
longer time viewing the pill information (median=233.3 sec) compared both to 
those not offered incentives (median=37.5sec; χ²(1, N=87)=21.3 p<0.001) and 
those offered £25 (median=65.7sec; χ²(1, N=85)=12.9 p<0.001). Those offered 
£25 also spent more time viewing the information compared to those not offered 
incentives (χ²(1, N=84)=17.2 p<0.001). Under load, those offered both £1000 
(median=53.6sec; χ²(1, N=90)=21.4 p<0.001) and £25 (median=53.6sec; χ²(1, 
N=101)=18.6 p<0.001) spent less time viewing the information compared to those 
not offered incentives (median=112.6sec). There was no significant difference 
between the two incentivised groups, (χ²(1, N=105)=2.16 p>0.05) (Figure 3).  
 
Table 4: Median regression 
Time_seconds Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Group 55.67 5.59346 9.95 0.000 44.65784 66.68216 
Load 151.37 17.08744 8.86 0.000 117.729 185.011 
















Figure 3: Median time spent viewing risk- information: impact of incentive level and 




























As seen in Table 5 robust regression also revealed a significant effect of financial 
incentives on the median time spent viewing risk-information. This effect was 
moderated by cognitive-load. 
Table 5: Robust regression                                      
Time_seconds Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Group 8.718498 3.988372 2.19 0.030 0.866235 16.57076 
Load 74.45829 12.03273 6.19 0.000 50.76838 98.14819 
Group*Load -30.85021 5.563017 -5.55 0.000 -41.80262 -19.8978 
Costant 
 
32.1551 
 
8.593861 
 
3.74 
 
0.000 
 
15.2356 
 
49.0746 
 
 
 
